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ABSTRACT 
The pattern of nationalisation and free enterprise in Bangladesh 
has been primarily shaped by the environmental conditions in the country. 
The poor industrial structure, slow economic growth, existence of a 
sizeable public sector, chaotic political and economic condition, 
presence of a strong, radical and militant student and labour front, 
sentiments generally against capitalist owners of the means of produc-
tion were factors leading to the decision of nationalisation in 1972. 
This decision generated expectations in the people of Bangladesh for 
building up a society free from poverty and exploitation. Within a 
short time this optimism gave way to a sense of dissillusionment and 
disappointment. Nationalisation gradually lost its force and sharp-
ness particularly since the military took over government in 1975. 
The practice of nationalisation did not match its precepts during the 
Awami League Administration and the leanings of the military rulers 
towards free enterprise became evident despite reticence about their 
social policy. 	In this situation nationalisation programmes were 
• 
based on expediency rather than principle, resulting in a lack of 
clear perception of goal and structure with respect to their legal, 
administrative and operational aspects which vitiated their performance. 
Inconsistencies were also discernible in respect of ideological or 
pragmatic justification used for the genesis, organisation and operation 
of the nationalised undertakings. 	In the developing circumstances of 
the Third World countries it is especially difficult to demarcate the 
boundaries of ideology and empiricism particularly when political and 
economic grounds for nationalisation are interrelated. 
Studies in nationalisation focus on both ideology and expediency 
as factors in it. 	In instances where this is not clearly differentiated, 
it leads to a dichotomous situation. This dichotomy has been found to 
(vi) 
exist in different forms. 	The developing countries provide the best 
known examples, although others are available in developed western 
nations as well. The British model has symbolised this dichotomy as 
a central feature and much of the structural framework of the model 
depends on resolution of this dichotomy. 
This study selects the experiences of nationalisation in Bangla-
desh, one of the world's poorest countries, as the base of its empirical 
research. The findings tend to show that nationalisation involves 
experiences of diverse kind. 	Ideology and pragmatism often overlap in 
respect of formulation and implementation of a nationalisation programme 
and both grounds are individually or jointly applicable to specific 
situations. 
Nationalisation as implemented in Bangladesh has become a support 
to fragile private enterprise, even at the cost of the nationalised 
industries themselves. 	The role of nationalisation can, however, be 
perceived not as a weapon in the ideological armoury, but more as an 
empirical need of the economy. While its success or failure depends 
on a variety of factors, a moot question is the political willingness 
to use it for a clearly defined purpose. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Bangladesh is among the most recent of the Third World countries 
which have undertaken a policy of nationalisation in some sectors of 
its economy. Although a sizeable public sector existed at the time of 
its emergence as an independent State on December 16, 1971 1 , national-
isation as a matter of governmental policy had no precedent in this 
land 2 . However, within only seventy five days of its inception, a 
decision was taken to nationalise her banking system, insurance companies 
and the majority of large scale industries. This was explained in part 
as a fulfilment of the election promises 3 of the Awami League4 party 
which spearheaded the Liberation 5 movement and partly as a means to 
establish a socialist economic system 6 . Socialism was declared as one 
   
1 Bangladesh emerged as an independent State fighting a bloody war of 
Liberation. The region constituting Bangladesh was the eastern part 
of the Bengal province until the Indian subcontinent was partitioned 
in 1947 to form two new independent States- India and Pakistan. The 
eastern part of the Bengal province joined with the western provinces 
of undivided India, later known as West Pakistan, to set up the State 
of Pakistan. 	The two regions of Pakistan were geographically 
separated by over one thousand miles. The former came to be known 
as East Bengal, later East Pakistan. 	The grounds of the termination 
of the union between the two parts of Pakistan are indicated in the 
Chapter II below. 	In this study the term Bangladesh is used to refer 
to the independent State of Bangladesh since 1971 and also the geo-
graphical and political unit known before as East Bengal/East Pakistan. 
	
2 A demand for nationalisation of jute trade was voiced in 1954. 	See 
the Dawn (Karachi daily), 4 April 1954. 	There were demands for 
"nationalization of banks, insurance companies and all big industries" 
in 1969. 	See Tushar Kanti Barua, Political Elite in Bangladesh 
(Bern: Peter Lang, 1978), p. 334. 
3 See "Awami League Manifesto" reprinted in Government of India, 
Bangladesh Documents, Vol. I (New Delhi: Ministry of External Affairs, 
Publications Division, 1971), pp. 67-79. 
4 See Chapters II and III below. 
5 In Bangladesh both the terms "independence" and "liberation" are used 
to indicate the dissociation of the former eastern province from the 
main body of Pakistan and its emergence as an independent state. 
6 The avowed goal was to realise "through the democratic process a 
socialist society". Awami League Manifesto, op. cit. 
1 
2 
of the four pillars 7 of the new State. State ownership through the 
creation of a "nationalised public sector embracing the key sectors 
of the economy" and a "planned economic growth" were envisaged 8 . 
The new Awami League Government attached importance to formul-
ation of economic policies and planning. 	It was realised that all 
agencies of the State had to be activised and reoriented to work, 
keeping in view the declared socialist objectives. A Planning 
Commission9 as a central planning agency was set up to design perspec -
tives, long term as well as short term economic development programmes 
and also devise economic policies. 	The First Five Year Plan 1973-7810 
(hereafter FFYP) was prepared within a year and a half of Liberation. 
The fundamental principles of State policy as set forth in the Consti-
tution, the primary objectives of the State as outlined in the FFYP and 
political guidance and directives were the source-base of formulation 
and implementation of government policies. A set of new policies were 
adopted in the fields of agriculture, industry, finance, trade and 
commerce and public administration. Some of the new policies were in 
sharp contrast to the policies pursued in the immediate past. 	By the 
very nature of things, the new policies had to cater to the requirements 
7 Other "pillars" or the fundamental principles of State policy were 
nationalism, democracy and secularism. Government of Bangladesh, 
Parliament Secretariat, The Constitution of the People's Republic 
of Bangladesh, (Dacca: Government Press, 1975), Article 8(1). 
8 Ibid., Articles 13(a) and 15. 
9 Before Liberation, there was only a small planning department at 
the provincial level. After Liberation, the high powered Planning 
Commission was set up with an elaborate machinery. See A.M.A. 
Rahim, "An Analysis of Planning Strategy", Asian Survey, Vol. 15 
(May, 1975), pp. 383-393; see Nurul Islam, Development Planning in 
Bangladesh, (London: C. Hurst & Company, 1977). 
10 Government of Bangladesh, Planning Commission, The First Five Year 
Plan 1973-78 (Dacca: Government Press, 1973). 
3 
of the changed circumstances and to meet the aspirations of the people 
in the wake of Liberation. 	It also underpinned the need for devising 
institutional framework which would be equal to the tasks in the 
changed context. Within the framework of the FFYP, Annual Development 
Programmes were prepared and implemented. Periodic reviews and changes 
of the fiscal and monetary policies as well as of the export and import 
policies were undertaken. 	Basic principles of labour policy, industrial 
workers' wages policy and policies regarding pay scales embracing all 
categories of government and public sector employees including those of 
the nationalised enterprises were laid down by the government. A policy 
of reogranisation of the administrative structure, both at the national 
level and below was adopted so that the system could respond to the new 
ideologies of the State. 
The Constitution envisaged a radical transformation in the rural 
11 areas through promotion of an agricultural revolution. The FFYP 
pointed out that socialism would be inconceivable without socialisation 
of agriculture12 . 	The declared goal of the industrial policy in 1973 
was 
one of consolidation of nationalisation, of establishment 
of new institutions and of development of a socialist 
consciousness among the management and workers. 13 
The government held the view that the assumption of responsibility of 
the bulk of the industrial sector by the State 'should be effected 
within a total perspective' 14 . 
11 Constitution, op. cit., Article 16. 
12 FFYP, op. cit., p. 2. 
13 Government of Bangladesh, Ministry of Industries, "Industrial 
Investment Policy 1972-73", The Bangladesh Gazette Extraordinary, 
(12 January 1973). 
14 Ibid. 
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The scenario changed sharply when the military seized the State 
power from the Awami League in August 197515 . The Constitution was 
modified by a military decree and the "socialist pretensions" were 
discarded. 	Secularism as one of the fundamental principles of the 
State Policy was abandoned. 	The industrial policy was revised with 
a view to encouraging the dormant private investment. As a result 
compensation provisions were liberalised, generous incentive packages 
were introduced for the private sector, scope of private industrial 
investment was expanded and sales to private investors of smaller 
enterprises abandoned earlier by non-locals and taken over by the 
government were expedited. 	In addition, the fiscal apparatus of the 
government was exploited with the same object in view. 	Simultaneously 
a campaign was mounted by the private sector lobby to discredit the 
nationalised industries so that a majority of them could ultimately 
be reverted to private ownership. 	It was urged that 
nationalisation had caused enormous losses and damage 
an most spheres of our economy...On the whole national-
ised sector is performing dismally.. .Losses are piling 
up to the detriments of the economy—. Denationalisation 
will help capital formation...The only way to restore 
...(entrepreneurs') confidence is by positive steps such 
as denationalisation. 16 
The Military Government officially maintained a vague stance on 
nationalisation although its leaning towards private sector as cam to 
manifest in its policies and their implications, was indubitable. While 
the idealism of a socialist economy yielded to the course of "mixed 
15 See Stephen Oren, "After the Bangladesh Coups", The World Today, 
Vol. 32 (January, 1976) pp. 18-24; also Alan Lindquist, "Military 
and Development in Bangladesh", I.D.S. Bulletin, Vol. 2, (July 1977) 
pp. 10-18. 
16 See The Holiday, (Dacca English Weekly),(1 May 1977) for the state-
ment of the chairman of the Bangladesh Jute Mills Entrepreneur's 
Society, an association of the previous owners of the nationalised 
mills. 
economy"17  simultaneously it was maintained that the policy implications 
of the Two Year Plan 1978-80 (hereafter TYP) launched by the Military 
Government was a temporary affair, largely independent of major political 
issues18 and that it was not possible to formulate a long term planning 
in the absence of national consensus emanating from a political process 19 . 
The planners during the military regime, therefore left the important 
issue of resolving the operational jurisdictions of public and private 
sector 20 to be decided upon in the Second Five Year Plan 1980-85 
(hereafter SFYP) scheduled to be operative from 1980 when it was expected 
that a political process based on national election would emerge. Yet 
in the interim the economic policies pursued by the Military Government 
were geared to a reduction of public sector and enlargement of private 
sector21 . With fifty three of the nationalised enterprises privatised 
before the end of the implementation period of the FFYP i.e., June 30, 
1978 and fifty seven enterprises during the next two years following, 
the Military Government, in effect was drastically changing the national-
isation programme of 1972 initiated by the Awami League Government and 
on the eve of the former's putting the SFYP of Bangladesh in operation. 
The study concerns itself with the Bangladesh experience in 
nationalisation of industries. 	The focus is primarily on the period 
covered by the First Five Year Plan of Bangladesh from July 1, 1973 to 
June 30, 1978. The period surveyed passed through an intense uncertainty 
and fluidity. The country was gasping from the traumatic experience 
17 The TYP document declared that as the features of mixed economy, 
public sector and private sector "will co-exist - complementing each 
other". Government of Bangladesh, Planning Commission, The Two 
Year Plan 1978-80 (Dacca: Government Press, 1978), p. 155. 
18 Ibid. p. 291. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Infra., Chapter III, fn. 145. 
of a recent political and economic upheaval 22 . During this short period, 
governments changed or toppled, constitutional emphases altered, 
national ideology wavered and democracy was tampered and finally sup-
planted by a military dictatorship. 	The economy, one of the most 
resource starved in the world and seemingly always at the edge of the 
precipice of economic disaster, further floundered. Even after the 
end of the FFYP and at the threshold of a twenty year perspective plan, 
controversies raged between socialists and nonsocialists and among 
various splinter groups of the socialists, between secularists and 
regionists, between Bangladeshi and Bengali nationalism, between the 
protagonists of the public sector and the lobbyists of the free enter-
prise, and finally, about the relative merits and demerits of national-
isation, denationalisation and disinvestment 23 . 
Under the above circumstances, it is not surprising that from 
the very beginning; the process of nationalisation lacked perspective 
and vision. 	There appeared to be no consistency of purpose. The sense 
of direction was frequently blurred. No enduring success was possible 
without a clear perception of a national purpose of nationalisation and 
of the role the nationalised sector was to perform at the macro and 
micro levels. The nationalised sector and in particular the nationalised 
industries demonstrated signs of drift and became subjects of circum-
stances. 	Much of it could be ascribed to the inability of the ruling 
elite to perceive the real purpose of nationalisation in the context of 
22 Damages to the economy as a consequence of the Liberation War amounted 
to U.S. $1200 million as estimated by the United Nations Relief 
Operation in Bangladesh. This amount was nearly equivalent to 20 
per cent of the GDP of Bangladesh in 1972-73. 	See TYP, op. cit., 	____ 
p. 1; Government of Bangladesh, Ministry of Finance, Bangladesh 
Economic Survey 1979-80 (Dacca: Government Press, June 1980), 
p. 241. 
23 See The New Nation, (Dacca Weekly) 30 March 1980. As late as in 
March, 1978 the Planning Commission referred to the unresolved 
issues regarding the public-private sector relationship and high-
lighted the need of a political decision. 	See TIP, op. cit. p. 23. 
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Bangladesh and the part the public and private sectors were to play. 
However, the ambivalence of the ruling elite about the purpose and 
objective of nationalisation may possibly be traced to the social 
forces within the polity and the group character of the ruling elite 
and group interests it tried to promote and perpetuate. 	The origins 
of nationalisation, the circumstances governing the emergence of the 
nationalised sector, its contribution to the economy, the operational ' 
performance and organisational and administrative capability were 
conditioned through the interactions of social, political, economic 
and administrative factors. 
The study surveys the nationalisation of the manufacturing 
industries in Bangladesh. 	The service oriented industries like 
electricity generation and transport are not included although gas, 
petroleum refining and marketing and mineral exploration and develop- 
ment are. 	The basis of inclusion is that all industries considered 
come one way or other under the purview of the omnibus nationalisation 
law of Bangladesh known as the Bangladesh Industrial Enterprises 
(Nationalisation) Order, 1972 or more commonly known in Bangladesh as 
"P.0.27 24 . 	Except natural gas, minerals exploration and development 
and petroleum processing and marketing, the activities of the national- 
ised industries consisted in manufacturing. 	This renders greater 
importance to nationalisation of industries as it is in the manufacturing 
that private enterprises had been dominant during the period immediately 
before the emergence of Bangladesh as an independent state. 
24 Government of Bangladesh, Ministry of Law and Parliament Affairs, 
President's Order No. 27 The Bangladesh Industrial Enterprises 
(Nationalisation) Order, 1972. (Dacca, Government Press, 1977); 
see for the original version in The Bangladesh Gazette Extraordinary, 
26 March 1972. 
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The study seeks to identify the major problems and issues 
connected with the nationalisation and especially the politics and 
administration of the nationalised industries of Bangladesh. 
Administration is meant to include both organisation and management 
and organisation is viewed as the structure of hierarchy of tasks which 
are formally or legally set up. Management is defined as the processes 
by which the work is accomplished including planning, staffing, financ-
ing and controlling various activities. The study proceeds from the 
facts that concern the status and role of the two different regimes - 
one that owed its origin to a democratic process and the other, a 
military power group which ousted the elected government. 	The issues 
are examined in the context of the political, economic, social and 
administrative environments in Bangladesh. 	The historical factors 
that gave rise to nationalisation are examined. Analysis is presented 
in the light of the two regimes' plans, programmes and dispositions and 
in turn, on the basis of how closely nationalisation policy of the 
successive regimes conformed to the avowed socialist objectives 
mentioned in the Constitution and other documents. In a word, 
implementation of nationalisation during 1972-78 is compared with what 
the government had set out to do initially what seemed necessary and 
desirable according to the perceived national objectives and what 
resulted from all this in the end. 	Our purpose is not primarily to 
delve into positive and negative aspects of nationalisation or public 
ownership but to compare nationalisation as it has evolved in Bangladesh, 
differentiating the role of the public and private sectors of the economy 
and appreciating the problems facing the nationalised industries. 
9 
The approach used in this study may be described as a blending 
of an historical-empirical approach with a traditional or institutional 
analysis within a functional-analytic context. An historical analytic 
approach has been adopted because no economic or political system 
including the components of it (such as an industrial structure) can 
be studied meaningfully apart from the associated social structure. 
Consequently, policy of political, administrative or economic strain 
must be related to the historical experience in a society. 	Such an 
approach is particularly relevant to a study of former colonial 
economies whose society is in the quagmire of a dual evolution and 
has been subject to influence and interaction of exogeneous 
cultures. 
The main sources for this study are official documents such as 
economic and development plans, annual national budgets, industrial 
policy statements, annual reports of the public corporations and their 
enterprises, reports of various local and international organisations, 
official investigations and inquiries, parliamentary debates and 
proceedings, various statutes and government and private publications. 
Newspapers have provided valuable factual information on events and 
political trends. A field study in Bangladesh gave access to some 
internal management documents and original data from the corporations 
and the enterprises. 	Interviews and discussions with the top 
management in the nationalised industries including the members of 
the Presidential cabinet, chairmen and directors of the boards of the 
public corporations and officials in the ministries as well as 
academicians, research workers, journalists, politicians and represent-
atives of chambers of commerce and industries gave some insight to the 
10 
problems and issues concerning the study. An analysis of the question-
naire presented to the management of the nationalised industries helped 
a balanced assessment of various propositions in the study. 	The 
personal background of the author being a civil servant with earlier 
access and experience with some official documents could not have failed 
to enrich his ideas. The plan documents, annual economic surveys, 
government budget documents, national and international reports, annual 
reports of the corporations and the enterprises, statistical digests 
and surveys published by the government and finally, the author's own 
investigations in the offices of the nationalised industries have 
supplied most of the statistical information. 
Among the secondary sources, selected literature on political 
economy, public administration, international law and in particular 
books and scholarly articles on public sector, public enterprises and 
nationalisation have been profitably used. 
Among the operational difficulties in research first is a dearth 
of published materials even in the form of public documents. 	Empirical 
research is hampered due to paucity of statistical data. 	But in 
Bangladesh one faces not only the problem of availability of statistical 
data but also their frequent unreliability, contradictions and incon- 
sistencies. 	At times they appear irreconciliable. Published figures 
vary not only between agencies but also by the same agency at different 
points of time without an ostensible explanation. 	Although all the 
public corporations have public relations departments they seldom publish 
for general information. The data on operational performances are 
closely guarded. Even public documents such as the reports of the 
Public Service Commissions are classified for "official use only". 
11 
The most sloven and archaic studies are kept shrouded with secrecy 
in the name of high security. 
For most of the period under study Bangladesh was under a 
military dictatorship and parliamentary democracy remained suspended. 
As a result, parliamentary control and accountability did not have a 
real impact on the operations of the nationalised sector. 	Parlia- 
mentary proceedings for the period that the parliament functioned do 
not contain a strong evidence of a deep concern by the people's 
representatives about the nationalised industries. Parliamentary 
organs like Select Committee on nationalised industries in U.K. or 
in India never functioned. On the other hand only a few academic 
attempts have been made to study the experiences with nationalisation 
in Bangladesh. 
The first three chapters of the study endeavour to set the 
scene of operation of the nationalised industries in Bangladesh - 
the genesis, background and environment. 	The next three chapters 
attempt to describe, examine and analyse the actual operation of 
nationalisation in Bangladesh industries. 	The first chapter 
attempts to present a theoretical overview of nationalisation and 
then concerns itself with its individual aspects and their relation- 
ship to the political economy. 	An early attempt is made to establish 
the orientation of the field of study in relation to political economy 
in general and public administration in particular in so far as the 
same will have implications for the content of subsequent analysis 
and empirical findings. 
Chapter Two examines the political, economic, social and other 
factors which conditioned the growth, level and structure of industrial 
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development in Bangladesh-and which paved the way for nationalisation. 
Chapter Three examines the environment which tended to mould the 
policy and planning for political, economic and industrial development 
in Bangladesh and their implementation since Liberation. 	Chapter 
Four is devoted to a perusal of the organisational structures and 
management pattern evolved. Chapter Five is concerned with a review 
of the various facets of operations of the nationalised industries 
such as production, marketing, distribution of products, financing 
and development programme. Attempt is made to see if a policy vacuum 
existed in the nationalisation programme which would have effect upon 
the operation and performance of the nationalised industries. 	Chapter 
Six makes an appraisal of the personnel policies and practices in the 
nationalised industries. 	Effort is made to explore the possibility of 
having a durable, sound and well integrated system of personnel 
practices and of industrial relations established. The final chapter 
gives a summary leading to a discussion on the major findings of the 
study. 
CHAPTER I 
A THEORETICAL OVERVIEW 
Nationalisation as a Continuum 
NATIONALISATION remains a controversial issue in the realm of 
political economy, international relations and public administration. 
The term seems to have acquired emotive and political connotations. 
Attitudes towards nationalisation have polarised on ideological 
grounds. 	For some1  i , t remains a panacea for economic and in partic- 
ular, industrial ills. i For others 2  i , t s an unsavoury and illusory 
political dogma. Nationalisation does no longer generate as much 
heated feelings as in the early days of its formulation 3 but our 
understanding of its aims, nature, achievements, failures and diffi-
culties has not much improved 4 . 	Extremely opposite views have tended 
to blur objective evaluation of nationalisation. 	Ceaseless and 
extensive campaigns5  have attempted to make bare the facts of the 
1 See for example, Hugh Gaitskell, Socialism and Nationalisation, 
(London: The Fabian Society, 1957); John Stratchey, "The Object 
of Further Socialization", The Political Quarterly, Vol. 24 
(January-March, 1953), pp. 68-77. 
2 See for example, Rhodes Boyson (ed.), Goodbye to Nationalisation, 
(London: Churchill Press, 1971). 
3 The earliest demand for nationalisation of land is attributed to 
Robert O'Brien of National Reform League, in Britain during 1849- 
50. 	See E. Eldon Barry, Nationalisation in British Politics: 
The Historical Background, (London: Jonathon Cape, 1965), p. 31. 
4 Peter Donaldson, Guide to the British Economy, (Harmondsworth: Penguin 
Books, 1977), p. 103. 
5 E.H. Scammel, "Nationalisation in Legal Perspectives", Current 
Legal Problems, Vol. 5 (1952) pp. 30-54, wrote: "It would be easy, 
on the one hand to expound a thesis which would hail nationalis-
ation as a fairy god mother to the nation, and equally easy, on 
the other hand to construct a case personifying nationalisation 
as a tyrant with bloody hands". 
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shortcomings of nationalisation. 	Supporters of nationalisation, by 
and large, however, have failed to explain the objective of national-
isation and assess its performance or bring out the causes of its 
success or failure. 	The concept of nationalisation has been shrouded 
with ambiguities and different meanings have been attributed to it 
depending upon prevalent traditions, role of political parties or the 
type of government structure6 . Considerable difficulties have 
surrounded the attempts to find a satisfactory and a "completely 
comprehensive" definition of the term nationalisation 7  . 	Institut de 
Droit International tentatively adopted a definition of nationalisation 
in 1952 as 
the transfer to the state by a legislative act and in 
public interest, of property or private rights of a 
designated character with a view to their exploitation 
or control by the state, or to their direction to a 
new objective by the state 8 . 
This definition raises more questions than it answers when 
compared with the alternatives noted below. 	For example, what is the 
public interest? Does only a designated character imply of a narrow 
kind? 	Is exploitation the same as control? There is no single 
comprehensive definition and a general lack of consensus in the dis- 
cussion about nationalisation. 	Perhaps it is better to see the 
concept of consensus as a continuum from at the one pole transfer of 
6 Mario Einaudi, Maurice Bye and Ernesto Rossi, Nationalization in 
France and Italy, (New York: Cornell University Press, 1955), 
36 
7 B.A. Wortley, Expropriation in Public International Law, (London: 
Cambridge University Press, 1959), p. 36. 
8 Quoted in Martin Domke, "Foreign Nationalization, Some Aspects of 
Contemporary International Law", The American Journal of Inter-
national Law, Vol. 55, 1961, pp. 585-616. 
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property from private ownership to public ownership 9  to the other 
pole of "transformation" of private ownership into ownership by the 
community. Along that continuum fall a host of intermediary defini- 
tions which appear as "border-line cases" 10  often overlapping with the 
two categories. 	In addition, nationalisation as practised in the 
Third World countries, often constitutes by itself, a special kind. 
These four types will be discussed below. 
The first category of definitions of nationalisation is well 
represented in the following description given in the Encyclopaedia 
Americana. Nationalisation is defined as 
the acquisition and operation by a national government 
of business enterprises formerly owned and operated by 
private individuals or corporationsll. 
White12 considers nationalisation as a measure which sets in motion a 
legal process whereby private rights and interests in property are 
compulsorily transferred to the State or to some organ created by the 
State. 	Foighel13 views nationalisation as a compulsory transfer to 
9 According to David Corbett, Politics and the Airline, (London: 
George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1965), pp. 38-42, private ownership 
and public ownership differ only marginally from one another as 
long as one is looking at them from an economic, not a political 
point of view. 	Gaitskell, op. cit., made a distinction between 
nationalisation and public ownership. 	The former is generally 
understood to mean the taking over by the state of a complete 
industry so that it is owned by and managed and controlled for 
the community. 	Public ownership, strictly speaking, means the 
ownership by the community of any property, whether industrial 
or not, whether embracing the whole of an industry or only part 
of it. The state may become the owner without necessarily 
exercising detailed control even over an individual firm - much 
less over a whole industry. 
10 	Domke, op. cit. 
11 Quincy Wright, "Nationalization" in Encyclopaedia Americana, 
Vol. 19, 1969, pp. 766-767. 
12 Gillian White, Nationalization of Foreign Property, (London: 
Stevens & Sons Ltd., 1961), p. 41. 
13 	Isi Foighel, Nationalisation, (London: Stevens & Sons Ltd., 1957), 
pp. 18-19. 
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the State of private property dictated by economic motives and having 
as its purpose the continued and essentially unaltered exploitation 
of the particular property. 
It may however, be facile to think that nationalisation is 
only a process by which private property is expropriated14 and absorbed 
into the State. 	Even at its worst, as Robson15 points out, it may be 
a little more than a transfer of the proprietory interest •from private 
ownership to the State. 	To Williams 16 nationalisation is an act 
whereby government takes into ownership, by compulsion, if necessary, 
private property for a public purpose. 	Scamme117 opines that 
nationalisation in its widest sense implies making national in charac-
ter and as applied to property it is usually understood to connote a 
"passing into national ownership". Nationalisation has been viewed 
14 C.D. Foster, Politics, Finance and the Role of Economics, An 
Essay on the Control of Public Enterprises, (London: George 
Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1971), p. 11. 	The term expropriation and 
nationalisation are both used to describe the taking of property 
by a government. Nationalisation is an expropriation by a 
government as part of a programme of social and economic reform 
and is viewed as a special form of expropriation. 	The terms are 
frequently used interchangeably. 	Expropriation refers to the 
taking of one or several properties within a single area of 
economic activity whereas nationalisation refers to the taking 
of all properties within the area. 	The term expropriation is 
usually applied to measures taken in individual cases and nation-
alisation is used as a measure of general change in the state's 
economic and social life. 	Expropriation can be carried out when 
necessary by permanent machinery but nationalisation is usually 
the subject of special legislation. 
15 W.A. Robson (ed.), Problems of Nationalized Industries, (London: 
George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1952), pp. 346-7. 
16 M.L. Williams, "The Extent and Significance of the Nationalization 
of Foreign Owned Assets in Developing Countries", Oxford Economic 
Papers, Vol. 27 (1975), pp. 360-7. 
17 	Scammel, op. cit. 
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by Sharma18 as one of a number of ways in which the State can alter or 
terminate the control or ownership of private property. 	It is in one 
form or another, 'the essential ingredient - the fundamental technique' 
in the establishment of the State ownership and public control of the 
means of production, exchange and distribution. Bhandari 19  also views 
nationalisation as implying ownership and control of certain industries 
or assets which have been taken over 20 from the private enterprise in 
the national interest. 	On the other hand, according to Webb 21  while 
nationalisation involves the compulsory acquisition of property, such 
property can be in either public or private hands; it does not necess-
arily imply a movement of assets from the private to the public sector. 
Friedman22  is of the view that it is not a conceptual necessity that 
the nationalisation measures encroach upon the economic structure of 
the community, since nationalisation does not prevent retention of 
18 H.C. Sharma, Nationalisation of Banks in India Retrospect and 
Prospect, (Agra: Sahitya Bitan, 1970),p. 1. 
19 K.C. Bhandari, Nationalisation of Industries in India Doctrinaire 
Adherence Redundant, (Calcutta: Academic Publishers, 1962),p. 2. 
20 The term "taking of property" or "taking over" includes an outright 
taking of property and also interference with the use, enjoyment 
and disposal of property. 	The more general term "taking of 
property" is regarded by Domke, op. cit., as preferable to terms - 
"nationalisation" and "expropriation". 	The term nationalisation 
(W. Thornhill, The NationalisedIndustries An Introduction, London: 
Nelson, 1968, p. 17-18) usually refers to the process of take over 
especially as it ig done on compulsory basis and the enterprises 
taken over from the previous private sector owners are administered 
by public corporation. 	Taking over is thus a process of national- 
isation and may be a device for temporary or permanent acquisition 
of property by the State for miscellaneous reasons such as ad-hoc 
management in the absence of owners or managers or as a consequence 
of punitive confiscation. 
21 Michael G. Webb, The Economics of Nationalized Industries, (London: 
Nelson, 1973), p. 5. 
22 S. Friedman, Expropriation in International Law, (London: Stevens 
& Sons Ltd., 1953), p. 12. 
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private capital and can indeed provide occasion for a certain co-
operation between private interests and state capital. 	According to 
Friedman, nationalisation only needs to exclude private capital in so 
far as it concerns the property itself in nationalised undertakings 23 . 
To Ingram 
nationalisation meaning taking of all properties does 
not always bear the connotation of a general national 
political programme or of a social purposeli 
Nationalisation is not just simply a form of State interference with 
private property as White25  seems to suggest. 	It is an assertion of 
sovereignty, a basic attitude of statehood in international law 26 . 
It is an expression of the sovereignty by the State in order to safe-
guard its natural resources and to dispose of natural resources and 
other assets located in its territory, even if they belong to foreign-
ers27 . 	This recognition of sovereignty is sometimes qualified to the 
23 The terms nationalised undertakings, nationalised enterprises and 
nationalised industries are used interchangeably. 	Public Sector 
consists of central government, local authorities and public enter- 
prises and public corporations. 	But the public sector also com- 
prises some enterprises which are taken over from the private sector. 
Nationalised undertakings are therefore, those among the public 
enterprises which are taken over from the private sector or which 
were earlier sponsored by the state and subsequently placed under 
the nationalised sector. 	Robson (Problems, op. cit., p. 276) 
considers nationalised industries as new phase of public enterprise 
clearly distinguishable from earlier experiments in the field. 
According to Katzarov, once the act of nationalisation is applied 
to certain industries, undertakings or enterprises such industries, 
undertakings or enterprises become nationalised industries, 
nationalised undertakings or nationalised enterprises. 	They 
become a State or more generally collective undertakings. 	See, 
Konstantin Katzarov, The Theory of Nationalisation, (Hague: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1964), p. 161. 
24 George M. Ingram,Expropriation of U.S. Property in South America: 
Nationalization of Oil and Copper Companies in Peru, Bolivia and 
Chile, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1974), p. vii. 
25 	White, op. cit., p. 41. 
26 M.K. Nawaz, "Nationalization of Foreign Oil Companies - Libyan 
Decree of September, 1973", Indian Journal of International Law, 
Vol. 14, 1974, pp. 70-80. 
27 U.N. General Assembly Resolution 3171 in 1973. Quoted in ibid. 
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extent that the property has to be "taken for a public purpose or in 
the public interest". This concept of "public utility" or "public 
use" or "dominant public purpose" is embodied in the constitutions 
of many countries as a justification for taking private property and 
above all as a protection for their own citizens against legislative 
and executive abuse. On the international plain the United Nations 
Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty over natural resources declared 
that 
the right of the peoples and nations to perrmalent 
sovereignty over their natural wealth and resources 
must be exercised in the interest of the national 
development and of the well-being of the people of 
the State concerned 28 
and that 
nationalisation, expropriation or requisitioning shall 
be based on reasons of public utility, security or 
national interest which are recognized as over-riding 
purely individual or private interests, both domestic 
or foreign29 . 
The third category of definitions visualizes nationalisation not simply 
as an act of transfer. 	Nationalisation, according to this view is not 
merely a change in the holder of property rights or Ern act of transfer-
ring ownership from the private owner to the community or the state. 
It is an act of converting or transforming private ownership into 
collective ownership 30  . 	It needs to emphasize that despite the uni- 
versal acceptance of the rights of the State to interfere with private 
property31 the controversy over nationalisation has its genesis largely 
28 U.N. Resolution 1803 (XVII) of 14th December, 1962. Quoted in U.O. 
Umozurike, "Nationalization of foreign owned property and economic 
self determination", East African Law Journal, Vol. 6, 1970, pp. 
79-99. 
29 Ibid. 
30 	Katzarov, op. cit.. p. 160. 
31 Chanan Singh, "Nationalization of Private Property and Constitutional 
Clauses relating to expropriation and compensation", East African 
Law Journal, Vol. 7, 1971, pp. 95-127. 
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in the concept of the right of property32 . 	The acquired rights are 
recognised in the law of the civilised nations as the principal basis 
of intercourse in economic relations 33 . 	The world's religions provide 
sanction of property 34 . 	The concept of "property" has been held as of 
cardinal importance by individualistic societies for centuries 35 with a 
view to uphold the prevailing societal values. However, the Utilit-
arians, Liberal Socialists and Fabians have challenged the individual-
istic conception of property. 	It has been argued that excessive 
concern with acquisition of property tends to defeat itself in the 
process and become morbid and diseased in consequence36 . 	A tiny 
minority gains control of enormous economic power with concomitant 
emergence of monopolies in the production system of the society. 	In 
such a situation a group of people controlling a strategic sector can 
32 R.S. Arora, "Nationalization of International Investment A Case 
Study of the International Petroleum Industry", The Indian 
Journal of Public Administration, Vol. 19 (October-December, 1973) 
pp.552-599. 	John Adams wrote: "Property must be secured or 
liberty cannot exist... 	The moment the idea is admitted into 
society that property is not as sacred as the laws of God and that 
there is not a force of law and public justice to protect it, 
anarchy and tyranny commences". 	See, George A. Peek, Jr. ed., 
The Political Writings of John Adame: Representative Selections. 
(New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1954). 
33 Acquired rights are "stronger than the ordinary rights of property" 
see Wortley, op. cit., pp. 35-36. 
34 For example, Islamic law upholds the universal maxim of the 
protection of acquired rights. 	See Joseph Schacht, "Islamic Law 
in Contemporary States", The American Journal of Comparative Law, 
(1959),pp. 133-149; Anderson, "The Significance of Islamic Law in 
the World Today", The American Journal of Comparative Law, 
(1960), pp. 187-198. 	Also see Maxime Rodinson, Islam and 
Capitalism, (London: Allen Lane, 1974). 
35 See for example, W. Paschal Larkin, Property in the Eighteenth 
Century, (Dublin: Cork University Press, 1930). Larkin discussed 
among other things about the rise of individualism (Chapter II) 
and reactions against the individualistic theory of property (pp. 
124-136). Also see, Wolfgang Friedman, Law in a Changing Society, 
(London: Penguin Books, 1972), pp. 93-118. 
36 R.H. Tawney, The Acquisitive Society, (London: The Fontana Library, 
1961). 
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exert pressure greatly disproportionate to their numbers. 	This tends 
to breed insecurity, inefficiency and injustice in the society. 	The 
fruits of the property - profits and surplus are appropriated by a 
privileged few and the enormous economic power of the production system 
is not utilised in the interest of the community. 	Non-intervention 
policy enjoyed by the individualist and free traders leads to erosion 
of physical, moral and cultural values. 	State intervention37 at this 
stage becomes a necessity and in some states the right to property is 
abridged or redefined 38. . 	The fundamental ideas of nationalisation 
comprise the utilisation of all or part of the means of production in 
the interests of the society and not of private individuals. 	To attain 
this aim it is necessary for the means of production, if in the private 
hands, to become the property of the community 39 . 	Such a conception 
is anathema to the principle of absolute property rights derived from 
natural law as embodied for centuries in the positive law in all civil-
ized countries 40 . The significance of nationalisation lay in the fact 
that the social function of property was, for the first time, recognised 
in legislation41 . Property was regarded not merely as a relationship 
37 P.C. Gordon Walker, Restatement of Liberty, (London: Hutchinson, 
1951), wrote: "The State must control or take into its own hands 
those industries or sections of industry that, because of their 
economic power and their innate tendency to act at variance with 
the interests of the economy as a whole, continuously threaten 
society with devastation and disaster and simultaneously relapse 
into over-cautious sub-activity". 	Also see, Frank Broadway, 
State Intervention in British Industry, 1964-68, (London: Kaye and 
Ward, 1969), Chapters 1 & 14; Katzarov, op. cit., regards State 
-intervention as forerunner of nationalisation. 
38 Singh, op. cit. The Bangladesh Constitution defines three forms 
of ownership and control: State Ownership, Co-operative Ownership 
and Private Ownership. 	See Bangladesh Constitution, op. cit., 
Article 13. 
39 	W.A. Robson, "Preface" in Katzarov, op. cit. p. v. 
40 Ibid. 
41 /bid. 
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between the owner and the things he owned but as a tripartite relation-
ship which also involved society 42 . 	Two fundamental elements in the 
definition of nationalisation therefore emanates from the above43 : 
(i) the ownership of the means of production and exchange by the 
community; and 
(ii) their utilisation in the interests of the community. 
Katzarov has accordingly tried to provide a "comprehensive definition" 
of nationalisation. 	According to him nationalisation is (i) the 
transformation, (ii) in the public interest of a superior kind, (iii) 
of specific assets or of a specific activity, which (iv) are, or may be 
means of production or exchange in the widest sence of the term, (v) 
into the assets or activities of the community - (a) state, (b) local 
or (c) co-operative, (vi) with a view to their immediate or future 
utilisation in the general interest and no longer in the private 
interest44 . Katzarov views his own definition of nationalisation as 
the narrow sense of the term, "although the true sense" 45 . 	In the 
wider sense of the term, according to Katzarov, nationalisation 
constitutes a combination of the following acts: the transformation of 
property, the nationalisation and operation of the nationalised under-
takings, co-ordination of the national economy and national economic 
planning" . 	Gaitskell47 understands nationalisation as the taking 
over by the State of a complete industry so that it is owned by and 
managed and controlled for the community and public ownership. 
Nationalisation as understood in terms of the third category of 
42 	Katzarov, op. cit., p. 159. 
43 	Ibid., p. 160. 
44 Ibid. 
45 	Ibid., p. 161. 
46 Ibid. 
47 	Gaitskell, op. cit., p. 6. 
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definitions may be synonymous with socialisation 48 . But a distinction 
is made. 	According to Friedman49 a measure of nationalisation Possessest 
an economic character and permit the reorganisation of certain forms of 
property within a given sector of economy in order to ensure their 
survival amid new conditions of production. Measures of socialisation, 
on the other hand, are of a more distinctly political character and its 
object is to secure the benefits of technical reorganisation to new 
social classes acceding to power50 . 	Socialisation, according to 
Friedman, is the most important form of expropriation where the system 
of private ownership is either modified or excluded from one or several 
factors of economy with a view to reorganisation of social or economic 
forces of a particular country. 	Wortley51 however finds this distinc- 
tion of value only so far as the term socialisation seems more directly 
to refer to Communist or Fascist theory than does the term nationalis- 
ation. 	According to Robson52 a substantial realisation of the social 
48 Socialisation in the context of socialism and nationalisation should 
not be confused with its usage in behaviouristic sciences. 	Social- 
isation in anthropological studies means "the integrational trans- 
missions of culture", see, Thomas R. Williams, ed., Socialization 
and Communication in Primary Groups, (The Hague: Mouton Publishers, 
1975). 	It also means, among other things, a process "to acquire 
a new role involving learning and behaviour patterns and technical 
skills crystallizing role expectations and regarding the self image". 
See for example, Barbara K. Varley, "Socialization in Social Work 
Education" in Social Work, Vol. 8, No. 3 (July, 1963), pp. 102-9. 
In the context of this study, Wilczynski's definition of socialis-
ation is appropriate. 	He defines socialisation as "expropriation 
of privately owned enterprises, firms, agencies etc., as a rule 
without compensation". According to him nationalisation is normally 
associated with a piecemeal process with compensation while social-
isation implies no compensation to previous owners". 	J. Wilczynski, 
The Economics of Socialism, (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1977) 
p. 19 & 114. 
49 	Friedman, op. cit., p. 12. 
50 	Ibid., p. 6. 
51 	Wortley, op. cit. p. 37. 
52 	Robson, Problems, op. cit., p. 347. 
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implications of public ownership and operation is made possible through 
socialisation. 	The term socialisation is used where nationalisation 
is deployed as a part of planning and general economic policy of the 
State and where it pervades the entire economic life of the country 
as in the U.S.S.R. 53 . 	On the other hand, the State takes over through 
nationalisation, the ownership and management only of a section of the 
economy and proceeds along this path gradually without disturbing the 
existing economic structure in its entirety54 . 	Socialisation is 
viewed as the beginning of a great experiment 55 and nationalisation is 
considered as a particular measure of it 56 . 
The fourth category of definitions relates to the developing 
nations and reflect an amalgam of the above definitions in some respects 
or other. 	Nationalisation in these nations as in other nations may be 
viewed in terms of their ideological orientations, state of their 
economy and the extent of public ownership and control. 	Chester con- 
cluded that nationalisation may have a different meaning for these 
countries and that it 
is not the transfer of already existing industries, 
but the creation of completely new undertakings which 
have to be put into working order57 . 
53 	Brus writes, "...a long road separates the nationalization of the 
means of production from their complete socialization, the creation 
of...a socialist attitude to work and social ownership". 	See 
Wlodzimierz Brus, The economics and politics of Socialism, (London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973), p. 8. 
54 Lavigne writes: "Nationalization does not automatically mean 
Socialization" and that "Even an extensive nationalisation does not 
transform the country concerned into a socialist regime if there is 
not at the same time a radical restructure of a socialist regime". 
See Marie Lavigne, The Socialist Economies of the Soviet Union and 
Europe, (London: Marlin Robertson, 1974), pp. xv-xvi. 
55 Om Prakash, The Theory and Working of State Corporations, (London: 
George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1962), p. 33. 
56 	Strachey, op. cit., p. 68. 
57 	T.E. Chester, "Public Enterprise in South Asia", The Political 
Quarterly, Vol. 26, (January-March, 1955), pp. 43-54. 
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This definition however, does not take into consideration of the 
incidents of nationalisation in the sense of taking over of existing 
industries to public ownership which have been increasingly taking 
place since the beginning of 1950. 	Definition attempted by Bhandari 
seems appropriate in the context of these countries. To Bhandari 
nationalisation in these countries often include transfer of private 
enterprises to public ownership as going concerns as also setting up 
of enterprises in the public sector 58 . 
Reasons for Nationalisation  
To the liberal supporters, nationalisation is a matter of 
expediency. 	Nationalisation perceived as a transfer of private 
property to public ownership on the grounds of "public interest" or 
"public purpose" tends to support this statement. 	On the contrary, 
nationalisation defined as a "transformation" of private property into 
"collective property" tends to emphasize ideological motivations behind 
it. 	Thus considered, nationalisation becomes a matter of principle 59 . 
These two strands of arguments for nationalisation are not necessarily 
contradictory to each other. 	Instead, it seems to validate the 
assertion that nationalisation covers a wide diversity of experience. 
It shows that most of the crucially important motives for nationalisation 
have either one or more of ideological, political, economic, social or 
administrative dimensions attached to them 60 . 
58 	Bhandari, op. cit., p. 2. 
59 H.A. Clegg and T.E. Chester, The Future of Nationalization, (Oxford: 
Basil Blackwell, 1955), p. 2. 
60 	See for example, Anthony King, "Ideas, Institutions and the Policies: 
A Comparative Analysis, Parts I & II", British Journal of Political 
Science, Vol. 3, 1973, pp. 291-313 & 409-423. 
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Ideologically, nationalisation has not only been often regarded 
as a principal means to Socialism, it has also been thought as a goal 
in itself61 . 	It has been considered as "the only possible means which 
could not fail to produce the desired ends to Socialism .62  . 	A belief 
in public ownership coupled with an erosion in the traditional belief 
in the infallibility of proprietory rights of the individual, a desire 
to establish a "socialist democratic state", to gain workers' control 
over means of production and disenchantment with experiments in co-
operatives have acted, at different times, as motivating factors for 
nationalisation. 	The capitalist system, it is argued, leads to waste, 
artificial scarcity amidst plenty, unemployment and insecuirty. 	Private 
ownership of capital inevitably tends to concentrate power in a few 
individuals which ought to be exercised only by the community as a whole 
and for the benefit of all. Nationalisation helps moving towards 
greater equality by correcting unearned income by virtue of ownership 
of private capital which it takes over. Nationalisation places greater 
control and power of directions over investment and thus helps to main-
tain full employment and higher productivity. Nationalisation paves 
the way for greater efficiency by exploiting the economies of larger 
scale production and management without having to create a private 
monopoly with evils associated with it. Thus nationalisation comes 
to represent a great revolt against the ethics, the incentives and the 
results of capitalist enterprise 63 . 	It permits the realisation of 
certain social, economic and political principles based on some profound 
changes in the general structure of the society64 . 	It has become deeply 
61 W.A. Robson, Nationalized Industry and Public Ownership, (London: 
George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1962), pp. 486-487. 
62 	Gaitskell, op. cit., p. 5. 
63 	Robson, Problems, op. cit., p. 367. 
64 	Stratchey, op. cit. 
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rooted in an all embracing programme of economic planning and funda-
mental social, political, administrative and industrial reforms through 
collective action65 . 
Many of the acts of nationalisation are conditioned by some 
nationalist ideology which associate both domestic capitalists and the 
"international imperialists" so that they do not interfere with the 
political and economic interests of the nationalising country. 	It is 
regarded as a means to exercise the rights of the States and people to 
determine their economic future and economic self determination 66 . 
It aims at furthering the "liberation" and to act against "economic 
aggression“ 67  . 	It is regarded as a policy measure aimed at increasing 
indigenous control of the economy and an assertion of "economic inde- 
pendencefl68 	In recent times nationalisation arguments have tended 
to emerge in the more developed countries mainly as a result of the 
establishment of common market zones, reduction of tariff barriers and 
the growth of massive multi-national corporations 69 . Nationalisation 
has also been desired, at times, as to demarcate the areas of operation 
of the public and private enterprises and ensure that public 
65 Robson, Problems, op. cit., pp. 278-296. 	Also see for example, 
Hugh Gaitskell, "The Economic Aims of the Labour Party”, The 
Political Quarterly, Vol. 24, (1953), pp. 5-18. 
66 Umozurike, op. cit. 
67 Martin Domke, "Indonesian Nationalization Meausres Before Foreign 
Courts", The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 54, 
(1960), pp. 305-323. 
68 Al Gedics, "The Nationalization of Copper in Chile Antecedents 
and Consequences", Review of Radical Political Economics, Vol. 5, 
(1973), pp. 1-25. 	Nationalisation of three largest copper 
companies in 1971 was heralded as Chile's "Second Independence". 
69 N.S. Carey-Jones, S.M. Patankar and M.J. Boodhoo, Politics, Public 
Enterprise and the Industrial Development Agency, (London: Croom 
Helm, 1974), pp. 13-16. 
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enterprises 70 function as supplement to private enterprise 71  . 	To 
the followers of free enterprise philosophy, nationalisation may be 
desired, paradoxically as it seems, as a guarantee, so that public 
sector activities are carried on in accordance with commercial principles 
as the nearest approximation to private sector under government control 72 . 
Economics plays a very definite part in nationalisation. 	A 
monopoly has always been a suspect even if it is created as a public 
utility or operate on commercial consideration through some form of 
licensing granted by the government. Monopolist control over the means 
of production and channels of distribution leads to concentration of 
both economic and political power in a few hands. 	The community as 
a whole may suffer at the discretion of the monopolists in terms of 
stoppage of supply, interrupted services, inefficiency in production, 
wastes and higher prices. 	The need for effective planning of the 
economy renders support to arguments for nationalisation. 	Effective 
regulation of national resources into desired channels may be best 
obtained through ownership of these resources. Among other economic 
70 Encyclopaedia Britanica defines Public Enterprise as an "undertaking 
that is owned by a national, state (or provincial) or local govern-
ment, supplies services or goods at a price, and is operated on a 
more or less self-supporting basis". 	The definition covers 
industrial, financial, agricultural and commercial concerns which 
are either wholly or partially (with more than 50 per cent of the 
capital)owned and controlled by the government. State Enterprise , 
State Undertaking . , Government Enterprise or undertaking are often 
used as synonymous of Public Enterprise. David Coombes, State 
Enterprises: Business or Politics, (London: George Allen & Unwin 
Ltd., 1971), refers to nationalised industries as a special type 
of state enterprises, pp. 20-24. 
71 	Ibid., p. 27._ 
72 Thomas writes: "The aim was...to manage...affairs on the same broad 
commercial principles as a concern in the private sector". 	See 
R.E. Thomas, The Government of Business, (Oxford: Philip Allan, 
1976), p. 141. 	Also see, Henry H. Schloss, "Public Enterprise as 
a Form of Business Enterprise: Role, Purpose and Performance", The 
Annals of Public and Cooperative Economy, Vol. 48, 1977, PP.299-305- 
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motives are the compelling need to salvage some private enterprises in 
deep economic trouble 73 . 	Nationalisation of foreign investments are 
seen as a cure for economic ills and an inexpensive and non-risky mode 
of financing development or reconstruction programmes. 	At the time of 
an economic crisis nationalisation affords an opportunity to the polit-
icians to divert public attention. Nationalisation of foreign enter-
prises helps to stop drain of capital outside in the form of remittance 
of profits, dividends and royalty and net transfer of capital and to 
sustain the indigenous enterprises which are otherwise squeezed out in 
competition with the multi-national corporations 74 . 
Of the political dimensions attached to nationalisation a major 
reconstruction programme is necessitated after a crisis or instability 
or a war or in the wake of an independence/liberation movement. 
Frequently, collaborators of the enemy are to be punished and their 
"abandoned properties" are seized 75 . 	It becomes politically necessary 
to eliminate the vestiges of foreign economic domination. 	Considerations 
of strategic defence needs induce the host country to take measures to 
safeguard the "national interest", to protect the "public domain" and 
to take such measures as will ensure public control of resources 76 . 
There is a social dimension to the motives for nationalisation. 
Nationalisation is motivated by the objective to ensure a more equitable 
distribution of national income among the various sections of the 
73 	Carey-Jones et al.,' op. cit., p. 22. 
74 	Ingram, op. cit., pp. 3-4. 
75 	Friedman, op. cit., p. 31. 	Friedman writes "...the play of 
political forces and the de facto situation created by the German 
invader would seem to be an adequate explanation of the profound 
economic changes in Eastern Europe, regardless of any influence 
exercised by the socialist system of the Soviet Union". 
76 See G.P. Caravalho, Petrobras: A Case Study of Nationalized 
Institution Building (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation: University 
of Connecticut, 1976). 
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people 77 . 	This suggests a desire to effect changes in the social 
order, to create equal opportunity for all citizens, to acquire 
experiences, know-how and technology, to maintain employment at a 
higher level, to provide security for the citizens, to ensure a fuller 
life for the workers, to create industrial harmony and to offset the 
effects of trade cycles. 	Enclave development 78 resulting from foreign 
investment leads to unfair localisation and nationalisation ensures 
dispersion of industries to depressed areas and open up opportunities 
for the local people. Public ownership and control are expected to 
reduce costs and prices and banish nepotism in recruitment and other 
avenues of patronage. 
There are strong administrative elements involved in a national-
isation programme. 	In the wake of a political crisis or war many 
enterprises are left without owners or managers and some are seized 
from the enemy collaborators. 	This accidental taking over of enter- 
prises often leads to nationalisation. 	State ownership and control 
seek to bridge the entrepreneurial and managerial gaps left by the 
previous owners and entrepreneurs who were either aliens or collaborators. 
Punitive cum preventive nationalisation is some times resorted to 
prevent certain sabotage activities in private enterprises. 	National- 
isation becomes a more practical form of State intervention in order to 
make use of the economies of scale and rationalisation through organis-
ational improvement and effective coordination. 	Nationalisation is 
advocated so that adequate capital and investment, dynamic leadership 
77 See, George Caus and Marcelo Selowsky, Potential Distributive 
Effects of Nationalization Policies: The Economic Effects, 	• 
(Washington: IBRD Staff Working Papers No. 178, 1974). Also see 
C.A.R. Crosland, The Future of Socialism, (London: Jonathan Cape, 
1963), pp. 19-41. 
78 	Ingram, op. cit., p. 10. 
31 
and management, facilities for research and introduction of modern 
technology can be provided. Nationalisation may thus ensure to put 
the management on sound and modern footing. 
In summary, a rigid compartmentalisation on the basis of ideology 
or the lack of it seems unrealistic. 	Debates surrounding nationalis- 
ation often contained arguments of expediency that surpassed those 
based on ideology 79 . 	In spite of "rightist" orientation some govern- 
ments have established public enterprises and in spite of socialist 
predilections, the practical aims of nationalisation of some govern- 
ments are economic 80  . 	Thus nationalisation is not a socialist mono- 
poly81 . 	It has been, therefore, asserted elsewhere 82 that national- 
isation is not an end, but only a means tolan enc" \ Dissimilar ideological 
attitude may not necessarily inhibit pursuance of a nationalisation 
programme. 	Even in the developing countries where the appeal of 
nationalisation is great 83 , the governments have taken on responsibility 
of establishment of public enterprises through nationalisation or other 
means, irrespective of their ideological commitments 84 . 
79 A. Beacham, "Nationalization in Theory and Practice", The Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, Vol. 65 (November, 1954), pp. 550-553. 
80 	Chester, Public Enterprises, op. cit. 
81 	Beacham, op. cit. 
82 	Tawney, op. cit. p. 120. 
83 M. Bronfenbrenner, "The Appeal of Confiscation in Economic Develop-
Ment" in A.N. Agarwala and S.P. Singh, ed., The Economics of Under-
Development, (Bombay: Oxford University Press, 1958), pp. 472-494. 
84 Issara Suwanabol, "Public Policy Making in the Third World: The 
Case of Asean Public Enterprises". A paper presented to the 21st 
Annual Australian Political Science Association 27-30 August, 
1979, Hobart. 
Nationalisation Throughout the World  
Nationalisation has become a world wide phenomenon. 	Since the 
Communist revolution in Soviet Russia it has come to be introduced 
simultaneously under radically different sets of circumstances 85 . 
Until the First World War measures of nationalisation were effected 
"sporadically" but the application of nationalisation did not have yet 
a definite character86 . 	Nationalisation came to rest on a relatively 
sounder base and more clearly established principles 87 . 	In the Soviet 
Russia, nationalisation dates from the very beginning of the Soviet 
power in 1917 with abolition of private landed property and private 
ownership of the means of production and went through a number of 
theoretical and experimental phases 88 . 	A common ideological motivation 
and structure in the East European State - Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, 
Hungary, Poland, Rumania and Yugoslavia made nearly complete national- 
isation of their economic life possible89 . 	China was also developing 
its economy on the basis of nationalisation 90 . 	The measure of social- 
isation adopted in these countries originated from an economic philosophy 
based on the establishment of a centrally planned economy and elimination 
of the traditional capitalist system 91 . 	Under different circumstances 
85 	See for example, Katzarov, op. cit.,pp. 26-73; White, op. cit., 
pp. 18-26; Wortley, op. cit., pp. 58-71; Friedman, op. cit., pp. 
5-66; Foighel, op. cit., pp. 11-31; also, W. Friedman & J.F. Garner 
Government Enterprise: A Comparative Study, (London: Stevens & Sons, 
ation and Management in Various Countries, (Brussels: International 
Institute of Administrative Sciences, 1955). 
1970); A.H. Hanson, ed. Public Enterprise: A Stury of its Organis- 
86 	Katzarov, op. cit., 
87 	Ibid,p. 76. 
88 Ibid. 
89 Lavigne, op. cit 
90 See, R.M. Breth, Mao's China: A Study of Socialist Economic Develop-
ment, (Melbourne : Longman Cheshire, 1977) pp. 23-25. 
91 Bela-Csika-Nagy, Socialist Economic Policy, (London: Longman, 1973) pp. 37-39. 
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Mexico enacted a Constitution in 1917 which emphasized "the priority 
of the social and economic elements in state ownership" and launched 
a series of actions having the effect of nationalisation in the legal 
sense of the term92 . 	Nationalisation was also effected in countries 
like Britain, France, Italy, Austria and Germany, each of whom had 
pronounced liberal economy. 	Even in the U.S.A., the citadel of free 
enterprise, the Tennessee Valley Authority, contained some character-
istic elements of nationalisation. While public enterprises came to 
exist virtually in all countries of the world, nationalisation was 
increasingly resorted to as a means of expansion of the public sector 
and for launching public enterprises especially in the Third World 
countries. 	During the period 1956-72 there were 121 "events" of 
nationalisation in 40 developing nations in Asia, Africa and South 
America involving assets worth more than U.S.$10 billion and which was 
nearly 50 per cent of foreign investment stock in these countries at 
the end of 1972 93 . 	Another estimate shows that during the period 
1960-74 there were 875 cases of nationalisation in 62 countries and of 
this 340 "cases" were effected in black Africa 94 . 	Instances of 
nationalisation include diverse activities - agriculture, land, mining, 
manufacture, trade, public utilities, banks, insurance companies, 
transports, fuel, power, public works, etc. 	The fundamental idea of 
nationalisation - the transfer of the means of production, distribution 
and exchange to the State with a view to their utilisation in the 
interest of the community came to be accepted and adopted in varying 
92 	Katzarov, op. cit., pp. 31-32 & p. 70; Friedman, op. cit., pp. 10, 
23 & 25. 
93 Williams, op. cit. 
94 United Nations, Secretary General, Permanent Sovereignty Over 
Natural Resources, A/9716 (Supplement to E/5425), 20 September, 
1974. 
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degrees in all these countries although specific political, social and 
economic conditions were different. 
The Process of Nationalisation  
Launching of nationalisation involves two legislative processes 95 . 
Firstly nationalisation is effected generally on the basis of an 
expressly provided constitutional sanction. 	Like the socialist 
countries, nationalisation is recognised and incorporated in the con-
stitutions of the various non-socialist countries confirming its legal 
basis96 . 	Most of the present day constitutions attempt to define not 
only the political form and mechanism of government, but also the 
economic and social structure of the State. 	They recognise the limit- 
ation or alienations of property in the general interest and keep 
provisions which would not debar the State from directly undertaking 
economic activities 97 . 	Thus several constitutions have categorised 
property as (i) State, (ii) co-operative, and (iii) private. 	In 
several constitutions nationalisation is treated as a distinct insti-
tution, even though in some cases nationalisation has preceded the 
promulgation of the constitution itself 98 . 	Not all constitutions 
have, however,directly used the term nationalisation even though making 
indirect references to it. 	Appearance of nationalisation as a distinct 
institution in the constitution and reclassification of property as 
above reflect a profound ideological change that has taken place in the 
social, economic and political structure of a great number of the States. 
95 	Katzarov, op. cit., pp. 131-142. 
96 Ibid. 
97 Ibid. 
98 Ibid., p. 136. 	In Bangladesh nationalisation law preceded the 
formation of the Constitution as in U.S.S.R. 
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Secondly, nationalisation is effected through enactment of special 
legislation in the Parliament or by the highest authority of the State 
having law making power. It may not be regarded as an administrative 
• 
or executive action. A nationalisation law confers upon or transfer 
to the State of (a) certain activities or certain branches of the 
economy, (b) certain undertaking(s) of importance to the economy or 
(c) economic activity as a whole. 	Thus nationalisation may be partial, 
individual, selective, complete or general in nature 99 . 	A partial 
nationalisation may affect only some or all major firms and leave others 
to continue their operations. 	Nationalisation can be immediate or else 
involve a planned move to be implemented in phases. The complete 
nationalisation is also regarded as a system that involves elimination 
of the private ownership of the means of production. Likewise in a 
predominant nationalisation although private property and private 
enterprises are retained, a drastic limitation is imposed on them. 
A selective nationalisation, on the other hand, is based on private 
property and private enterprise, which is retained in principle. 
The right of a State to nationalise the property of the citizens 
or the aliens is not now seriously challenged. 	But certain limitations 
have been placed upon the exercise of the expropriatory powers of the 
State. 	The State has an obligation to respect rights acquired by the 
aliens according to international law100  , and of property acquired by 
its citizens according to the provisions enshrined in the national 
constitution. 	The obligation to pay compensation for nationalisation 
of a property - whether of aliens or of local citizens is customary and 
99 Katzarov, op. cit., p. 195. 
100 Foighel, op. cit., pp. 39-74. 
36 
a well established principle 101  . 	This obligation has been incorpor- 
ated in most of the national constitutions and recognised in practice_ 
even by socialist nations. A basic tenet of nationalisation is that 
it can not be arbitrary or discriminatory. 	It has been stated that 
nationalisation of property may be carried out only for reasons of 
"true public necessity" 102 . 	The property has to be taken for a public 
purpose or in the public interest. 	The government is often bound to 
afford protection of foreign property in commercial treaties. 	More- 
over, the property in question must be within the jurisdiction of the 
nationalising State. On the other hand, if the purpose of national-
isation is independent of any consideration of the nationality of the 
affected owners, it can not be said that the dispossessed owners have 
been discriminated against. 
101 Ibid., pp. 75-87. 	International law did not impose an obligation 
to pay compensation out of all proportion to the financial capacity 
of states. 	See, Friedman, Expropriation, op. cit., p. 207. 
Also see, Richard B. Lillich, The Valuation of Nationalized Property 
in International Law, (in three volumes) (Charlotteville, University 
Press of Virginia, 1952). 
102 Wolfgang Friedman, The Changing Structure of Internationa Law, 
(London: Stevens, 1964), p. 321. 	According to Friedman national- 
isation of alien property is lawful but only if it is for a public 
purpose, non-discriminatory and accompanied by compensation which 
is prompt, adequate and efficient. 	Also see, Katzarov, op. cit., 
p. 339, who writes: "The changed attitude towards property is 
particularly marked in relation to nationalization". 	N.R. Doman, 
"Postwar Nationalization of Foreign Property in Europe", Columbia 
Law Review, Vol. 48 (1948), pp. 1125-116) writes: "Insistence on 
abstract legal rights with no consideration for political and 
economic realities will not provide such solution". 
' Environment, Organisation and Operation  
Once nationalisation is acted upon, the ownership of the enter-
prise is transferred to the State. 	But more than a mere transfer of 
ownership there occurs a transformation such as: 
(i) a private property is changed into a State or community property; 
(ii) private profit motive and private enterprise as the basis of 
economic activity are supplanted by a new orientation towards 
the collective interests based on State planning; private 
competition is excluded; 
(iii) the undertakings that are nationalised become legal entities 
independent of the State but are organically attached to it. 
No single trend is discernible as typical of innovations in organisation 
and control of the nationalised undertakings. 	Indeed there is a great 
diversity in the forms adopted on the implementation of nationalisation. 
Katzarov103 has pointed out three groups of structure and form within 
the nationalised sector that are distinguishable. 	The character of 
these groups are largely conditioned by the aim of nationalisation in 
a given country and particularly by the question whether the State is 
striving to control production and exchange in their entirety as in 
Soviet Russia or predominantly as in East European socialist countries 
or only selectively in some of the major branches only as in Britain 
and France. 	The wide diversity of the forms of organisation and control 
and their "frequently paradoxical appearance" is attributed to the 
exceptional conditions in which they were created. 
103 Katzarov, op. cit., pp. 190-196. 
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Nationalisation effected in a socialist economic system 104 is 
based on the complete rejection of private property in the means of 
production and of private enterprise. 	This results from the appli- 
cation of mono-party rule which helps integrate the economic and non-
economic objectives in the State's totality of action, central economic 
planning, social ownership of the means of production and socially-
equitable distribution of national income through virtual elimination 
of unearned incomes. 	In East European socialist countries, however, 
some deviations have been made. 	Radical nationalisation is instituted 
by constitutional means in an equally explicit manner but similarly is 
the place of private enterprise and property recognised. 	However, the 
role of the private enterprise is severly delimited. The problem of 
the form of nationalised undertakings is obviously simplified where 
the pationalised sector exists alone or predominates, since it does 
not have to face many of the complex issues that further arise out of 
the private sector operating to a significant extent or competing with 
the public sector. 	As a result a unified status for the State under- 
takings was achieved in Soviet Russia and East European countries in a 
relatively clean and spontaneous fashion. 
As opposed to a socialist economic system where State (public) 
property is the dominant sector, in a capitalist economy private 
ownership is the dominant sector. 	Being not unique for a 
104 The general characteristics distinguishing the socialist from 
capitalist economic system are, according to Wilczynski, the 
following four basic elements: (i) concentration of power in the 
Communist party representing the working class, (ii) social owner-
ship of the means of production, (iii) central economic planning 
and (iv) socially equitable distribution of national income. 
Wilczynski, op. cit., pp. 22-23. 
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socialist economy, nationalisation is also grafted on to a capitalist 
economic structure based on private property, private enterprise and 
competition. Heterogeneous ideological reasons but mainly economic 
compulsions - cause in part a structural change in such economies. 
Nationalisation is carried out as a necessary move to improve 
the existing socio-economic system, i.e. the capitalist system. 	It 
is not treated as a means of a gradual socialist transformation but 
ultimately to facilitate the development of the private sector. 	Even 
when public sector is genuinely conceived as compatible with the private 
sector in such an economy, the problem of the form of nationalised 
enterprises appear to be complicated with a dominant private sector and 
which may constitute a competitive element. 	Moreover, as the structure 
of economic life is not uniform it becomes difficult to determine the 
structure of the nationalised enterprises. 
The sharp distinction between capitalist and socialist economies 
have been obliterated to some extent by the developments described as 
"convergenceH 105  of the two systems. 	This process is marked by increas- 
ing departures from free enterprise and growing State intervention in 
the capitalist world and with liberal economic revisionism incorporating 
several elements of capitalism in the more developed socialist countries. 
In the changed circumstances, Socialism is no longer regarded as diametric-
ally opposed to individualism and the liberal economy and they are not 
as mutually exclusive systems as before. This development has made 
105 See, Jan Tinbergen, "Do Communist and Free Economies Show a Converg-
ing Pattern?", Soviet Studies, Vol. 12, 1961, pp. 333-341; P. Wiles, 
"Convergence - Possibility and Probability" in A Balinsky, ed., 
Planning and the Market in U.S.S.R., (Rulgers University, 1967), 
pp. 89-118; Jan S. Prybala, "The Convergence of Western and Com-
munist Economic Systems: A Critical Estimate", in M. Borstein ed., 
,Comparative Economic Systems: Models and Cases, (Irwin, 1969), 
pp. 442-452. 
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compatibility between public sector and private sector possible. 
This co-existence of nationalisation with liberal economy results in 
the parallel existence in the economy of 
(i) a private sector in which free competition, private enterprise 
and private property manifest themselves; 
(ii) a nationalised sector at the disposal of the State. 	Within 
this sector, a further distinction can be drawn between a 
nationalised sector enjoying a monopoly position, exclusively 
reserved to the State and a nationalised sector concurrently 
existing with the private sector; here the State undertakings 
find themselves in competition with private enterprise. 
The term "mixed economy" has gained currency to denote the mixture of 
working of both public and private enterprises. 	In all contemporary 
States except in the totalitarian socialist states examples of comple- 
mentarity between public and private sectors are discernible. 	It 
does not, however, mean exclusion of competition between the two but 
none of them is in a position to overwhelm the other in the economy. 
The interaction of free enterprise and State intervention has evolved 
a complex system in many countries with different background, ideologies 
and legal approaches. 	The role, purpose and motives of public enter- 
prises and private enterprises continue to shift with changes in ideas, 
policies and events in the non-socialist mixed economies. 
According to Jenkins 106 , nationalisation seems to have helped to 
rehabilitate, strengthen and stabilize the ailing capitalist sector 
when operating in the framework of a Mixed economy. Nationalisation 
does not take effect and nationalised sector does not operate in a 
106 Clive Jenkins, Power at the Top, (London: Macgibbon & Kee, 1959), 
p. 13. 
41 
social and economic vacuum. 	In a mixed economy, the relation between 
capitalist sector and state business operations is far from being 
distant. 	Instead nationalised sector is often subordinated to the 
needs and interests of the capitalist economy. 	Contrary to ideolog- 
ical wishes of creating a challenge to capitalist economy, nationalis-
ation tends to become an instrument in maintaining the old class 
structure of the society intact 107 . Generous compensation arrangements 
for the previous owners help to sustain the balance of social forces 
favourable to the propertied class as before. 	Public enterprises are 
steered to acquire increasingly more commercial orientation 108 . 
The prices and investment policies are forced to conform to the needs 
of the private sector. 	Production units of the nationalised sector 
are forced to hold down prices even if it means deficit. 	Payment of 
compensation and depressed prices through State intervention result in 
transfer of resources from the nationalised sector to private sector 109 
No significant redistribution of income between the various social 
groups and especially in favour of those at the bottom of the ladder 
can be achieved through the nationalised sector110 . Scant control 
over the pricing and general activites of the private sector by the 
State, growing oligopolization in manufacturing and distribution and 
deteriorating competition tends to emphasize a predominance of the 
107 Ibid., p. 22. 
108 John Hughes, Nationalised Industries in the Mixed Economy, 
(London: The Fabian Society, 1960). 
109 Jenkins, op. cit., p. 25. 
110 Cauas and Selownsky, op. cit. Cauas and Selowsky study shows that 
the redistributive effect will depend crucially on the part of the 
government in choosing the channels of distribution. 	If their 
ability changes as a result of new pressure groups - associated 
with nationalisation policy the effective redistributive effects 
can be quite different to the ones expected when the policy was 
conceived. 
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capitalist sector 111 The nationalised enterprises are relegated to 
the task of supplying cheap goods and services to the high profit 
making private sector and the public concerns become capitalist insti-
tutions. 	The situation is further compounded as the government fails 
to take the advantage of the opportunities to carry out a reform or 
reconstruction through the State planning mechanisms. Resurgent 
propertied class and their active adherents mount a planned and concerted 
campaign against the public sectorNdAha view ultimately to revert towards 
"privatisation" of the economy through the process of denationalisation. 
Denationalisation and Disinvestment  
If nationalisation enables ownership of enterprises to be 
transferred from private sector to public sector, a reversal of policy 
should be practicable that is, a retransfer of ownership and control 
from the public to private sector. 	The latter process has come to be 
known in recent times as denationalisation 112 in contrast to national- 
isation. 	It has also been termed as "reprivatisation "113 However, 
despite the fact that overt enthusiasm about nationalisation has waned 
considerably and despite contrOversies surrounding the concept as in 
the past, usual reaction of the governments has been to consolidate 
the effects and operation of nationalisation once it has been acted upon 
111 Hughes, op. cit. 
112 Herbert Heldman, "The Economic Problems of Denationalisation",Pait-
ical Science . Quarterly,Vol.66,pp.576-597, 1951. Also, Edmond Langer, 
"The Danger of Denationalisation to Freedom, Security and Welfare", 
Annals of Public and Co-operative Economy, Vol. 32,pp.27-74, 1961; 
Katzarov, op. cit., pp. 239-245; Scammel, op. cit., p. 53. 
113 Return of some public undertaking to private enterprise is called 
"reprivatisation". 	Katzarov, op. cit., p. 240. 
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irrespective of ideological views held by them114 Thus, practical 
experience in denationalisation is "too spares and succinct". 	Some 
examples of denationalisation can be found in Britain among the Western 
nations and Syria among the Third World nations. Both Britain and 
Syria have witnessed a cycle of nationalisaticma., denationalisation and 
renationalisation115 . 
The concept of denationalisation tends to be often confused with 
the term disinvestment 116 just as the concept of nationalisation is 
distorted through equating all public enterprises with nationalised 
undertakings. 	It seems the term denationalisation connotes an act 
which have a nullifying effect on an earlier at of nationalisation 
by transferring ownership of the nationalised Landert4ings from public 
sector to private sector. 	Abolition of a public enterprise earlier 
set up by the State as a going concern, public utility or as a pioneer-
ing activity and from public funds and disposing of its shareholdings 
114 See, Herbert E. Weiner, British Labour and Public Ownership, 
(London: Stevens & Sons, 1960), p. 80 &pp. 84-5; also, Barry, 
op. cit., p.,376. 
115 John Hughes, Plan for Steel Renationalisation, (London: The Fabian 
Society, 1958); M.R. Kassam, Nationalization of the Syrian Textile 
Industry with Special Reference to Labour Behaviours. Unpublished 
Ph. D. dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 1968, pp. 111-4; 
D.D. Brulle, "The Labour Plan for Renationalisation of the British 
Iron and Steel Industry", Annals of Public and Cooperative Economy, 
Vol. 17, 1966, pp. 213-272. 
116 Disinvestment is used generally to mean sale of shares of a company 
with a view to transfer ownership. 	It is also a form of denational- 
isation when public property is transferrad to private ownership 
through open or negotiated sales. 	It relates to sale of shares to 
private buyers of a company initially set up in public sector. 	It 
seems to differ from privatisation which means transfer to private 
ownership of a nationalised undertaking or reprivatisation which 
is really restoration of ownership to previous owners of the same. 
Jr.practice, this distinction is often blurred. 
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to general public or private sector group organisations, companies or 
agencies cannot be considered as denationalisation. At the best such 
an act can be construed as disinvestment of shareholdings of public 
enterprises in favour of the private sector. 	Disinvestment can thus 
be a converse action of para-nationalisation 117 Therefore, denation- 
alisation is not just simply something which is contra-paranationalis-
ation. 	In a mixed economy disinvestment of public enterprise is 
viewed as a means to raise new capital by the State once its objective 
of pioneering a new enterprise is accomplished. 
A doctrinaire adherence to a policy of denationalisation may 
118 involve complicated legal, economic and social problems . From a pure 
legal point of view denationalisation may not give rise to serious 
difficulty in cases where shares in certain companies were transferred 
from private to public ownership119 . 	It is purely a question of 
repealing the Act constituting the corporation controlling the national-
ised undertakings and presenting the shares vested in the corporation 
for sale in the open market. However, it is not as simple where through 
nationalisation is vested the physical assets of private enterprises in 
public corporations specially constituted to run the nationalised 
undertakings 120 . 	A statute containing the provisions for denational- 
isation in such cases will have to repeal the nationalisation law, 
dissolve the public corporations created thereunder and also to create 
new private companies with specified amount of share capital which will 
117 Wieslaw Sadzikowski, "The Public Sector in Capitalist Countries 
Austraia, Great Britain, France and Italy", Oeconomica Po1ona, 
1/1975. Paranationalisation takes place "creepingly"through 
buying of shares held by private owners by the State, pp.65-89. 
118 Heldman, op. cit. 	Langer, op. cit. 
119 Heldman, op. cit. 
120 Ibid. 
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be placed for subscription for members of the public. 	Furthermore, 
a move to denationalise an industry will require its administrative 
structure to be reorganised. 	The public corporation created under 
nationalisation statute may be abolished but the need for a regulatory 
agency for the concerned industry becomes imperative. Thus even after 
denationalisation, the industry is subjected to State control and the 
industry continues to be supervised by the new regulatory agency 
created as a sequel to denationalisation121 . 	The economic problem 
posed by a denationalisation programme is also formidable 122 
	
Nation- 
alisation of basic industries is a central feature of introduction of 
economic planning as a national policy. Heldman divided the economic 
problems arising out of denationalisation into four groups: financial, 
price policy, labour and technology and distribution. 	The exact form 
of the problems will vary from country to country and depend upon the 
institutional background and heritage of the industry. Like national-
isation, denationalisation is a pervasive phenomenon and the problems 
relating to it may vary according to a multitude of factors such as 
national and social philosophy, economic condition, income distribution, 
group interests within industry, and notion about the optimum economic 
structure of a country. 
Denationalisation is, however, theoretically possible although 
the above factors hinder its implementation in various ways 123 . The 
complexity of the process is accentuated when the entire industry is 
121 Weiner, op. cit., p. 85. The Iron and Steel Board was set up as 
the authority responsible for supervising the industry after 
denationalisation in Britain. 
122 Heldman, op. cit. 
123 Katzarov, op. cit., p. 244. 
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involved or when the entire economy is nationalised. Denationalis-
ation can be implemented far easier in an economy where nationalised 
andprivate sector coexist124 . 	It is nevertheless imperative that 
there is a complete recognition of the implications of a denational- 
isation policy. 	It is necessary that the majority of the people are 
willing to accept the consequences of a reversal of such a policy. 
As aptly pointed out by Heldman: 
The social organism is similar to the biological 
organism in the manner in which it selects or 
rejects internal change in the structure125 . 
However, the policy makers involved in the process of national-
isation, denationalisation and renationalisation tend often to become 
oblivious of this truism. 
Performance and Evaluation Criteria  
Expectations underlying nationalisation and disenchantment with 
it, from time to time tend to find expression in the demands for 
denationalisation. 	This warrants an objective assessment. 	The 
foregoing overview has indicated the multifaceted dimensions of 
nationalisation in theory and practice. 	Interactions of politics, 
economics, sociology, administration and law give great complexity to 
the subject. 	Nationalisation, it seems, is not just an economic trans- 
action and therefore quantifiable for concrete assessments. 	The 
imponderables such as moral, social and ideological aspirations toward 
establishing a just and harmonious society introduce elements which 
make it difficult for an objective evaluation of nationalisation in 
various countries and in different setting. 	Under varying political, 
124 Katzarov, op. cit., pp. 244-5. 
125 Heldman, op. cit. 
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economic and social environments nationalisation has come to be 
regarded often as an end in itself but more often as means to various 
and even contradictory ends. Nationalisation in different circum-
stances has come to be typified as "socialistic", "democratic", 
"capitalistic", "nationalistic" or "reactionary" 126 . 
In such a state of diffused perspectives public enterprises 
even when created through the means of nationalisation suffer from 
"dubious terms of reference" 127 and vague, unrealistically defined and 
conflicting objectives 128 . 	Thus although the number of public enter- 
prises world over has tended to increase irrespective of ideological 
orientations of the countries concerned and public enterprises are 
accepted as major instruments of socio-economic policies, the basic 
philosophy and overall strategy have seldom been precisely defined. 
Dimock129 as early in 1949 discerned in the government corporations in 
U.S.A. "uncertainty" as to their "distinctive purpose and underlying 
principles". 	Over the period of years this diagnosis for public 
enterprises has not proved wrong. Especially in the Third World 
countries it is now established through various surveys 130 that public 
126 V. Vinogradov, Socialist Nationalisation of Industry, (Moscow: 
Progress Publishers, 1966). Vinogradov mentions of Bourgeois 
Nationalisation, the reactionary nature of the Reformist theories 
of nationalisation and Democratic Nationalisation in addition to 
Socialistic Nationalisation.Alsosee Harry G. Johnson, "A Theoretical 
Model of Economic Nationalism in New and Developing States", Polit-
ical Science Quarterly, Vol. 80, June 1965, pp. 169-185. 
127 Gart Glentworth, "Public Enterprises in Developing Countries", 
Journal of Administration Overseas, Vol. 12, July, 1973, pp. 190-205. 
128 Ibid. 
129 M.E. Dimock, "Government Corporations, A Focus of Policy and 
Administration", American Political Science Review, Vol. 63, 1949, 
pp. 899-921 & 1154-64. 
130 See for example, P.K. Basu, ed. Approaches to the Public Enterprise 
Policy in Asia on Investment, Prices and Returns Criteria, (Kuala 
Lumpur, Asian Centre for Development Administration, 1976), p. 131. 
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enterprises, by and large, lack definite policy guidelines for their 
operation. As a result public enterprises have not often responded 
to the facts surrounding their creation and to the imperatives built 
into their existence. Instead of being national concerns they have 
often succumbed to sectarial interests. 
It has been argued that only in a totalitarian communist country 
ideology can be "meaningfully and clearly regarded" as the determinant 
of the economic system131 . 	Thus in societies following socialist 
economic policy there is no scope for ambivalence in ideology or 
objectives of nationalisation or goals to be realised by the national- 
ised enterprises. 	In the non-socialist economies, on the other hand, 
the course of economic development is fashioned by a multiplicity of 
ideologies and it is impossible to regard any single ideology 132 
Not surprisingly, therefore, public enterprises in non-socialist 
economies are no longer judged through ideological perceptions. 
Ideology has become increasingly insignificant in the operation of 
public enterprises in the Third World 133 . 
131 Alexander Gerschenkron, "Ideology as a System Determinant" in 
Alexander Eckstein ed., Comparison of Economic Systems Theoretical 
& Methodological Approaches, 	(Berkley: University of California 
Press, 1971), pp. 	269-89. 
132 Ibid. 
133 Suwanabol, op. cit. In a study conducted under the auspices of the 
Asian Centre for Development Administration, Kuala Lumpur it has 
been observed that ..."the prevailing ideology in these countries 
aims more at controlling private enterprise rather than rejecting 
it altogether, as is evident from the fact that none of these 
countries accept the more orthodox socialist ideology.." See A.S.H. 
K. Sadique, "Coordination and Control of Public Enterprises: An 
Overview of the Asian Situation", in A.S.H.K. Sadique ed. Public 
Enterprise in Asia, Studies on Coordination and Control, (Kuala 
Lumpur: Asian Centre for Development Administration, 1970) p. 7. 
One of the distinctive features of Australian public enterprises 
system, for example, is the striking extent to which the public 
sector has advanced without ideological support. See R.L. Wetten- 
hall, "Public Ownership in Australia", The Political Quarterly, 
(continued over) 
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Relegation of ideology does not however preclude the need for 
an explicit statement of objectives for public enterprise nationalised 
or directly sponsored by the State. 	Indeed the Geneva Seminar on 
organisation and administration of public enterprises found that 
it is essential to make a selection from the range of 
possible objectives or to arrange them in some clear 
order or priority. 	Unless this is done, not only are 
national purposes unlikely to be carried out but the 
morale of the enterprise managers is likely to be under- 
mined gince every critique of management will have a 
different criterion by which he assesses its performances 134 
Notwithstanding the above assertions the literature is replete with 
inconclusive analyses about the aims and objectives for running and 
operating nationalised and other forms of public enterprises 135 The 
various strands of arguments have been reinforced by a variety of 
critical lessons drawn from the experiences in different countries. 
Policy debates : surrounding the objectives of public enterprises, following 
categorisaton made by Merrett 136 fall under the three headings: 
(i) Unrestricted welfare criteria; 
(ii) Commercial criteria; 
(iii) Restricted welfare criteria. 
133 (Continued) Vol. 36,(1965), pp. 426-440. Musolf writes: "Important 
as ideology is, one may suspect that practical circumstances are 
even more critical in the choice of public enterprises". See, 
Lloyd B. Musolf, "Public Enterprise and National Development (Mixed 
Economy)" in the United Nations; Organization and Administration of 
Public Enterprises Selected Papers, (New York: Department of Econ-
omic and Social Affairs, United Nations, 1968, p. 112. 
134 Report of the United Nations Seminar on Organisation and Adminis-
tration of Public Enterprise, United Nations: Department of Economic 
and Social Affairs, document ST/TAO/M/35. Quoted from Section I of 
the report. 
135 The multiplicity of objectives has not been clearly defined. 	See Basu, op. cit., p. 42. Also see, Andre Heurtebise, "The Place of 
Public Enterprises in the Economy", Annals of Public and Co-oper-
ative Economy, Vol. 49, 1978, pp. 309-343. 
136 A.J. Merrett, "A Reconsideration of Investment and Pricing Criteria 
in the Nationalised Industries", The Manchester School of Economic 
and Social Studies, Vol. 32, September 1964, pp. 261-289. 
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Shepherd137 refers to availability of four approaches to analyse the 
problem for financial policy of public enterprise. 	Thus public 
enterprises may have a straight "commercial" approach and seek profit 
maximisation or a straight "social"approach and violate commercial 
guidelines if economic and social conditions so warrant. 	Public 
enterprises may also follow an approach of combining social and 
economic considerations which may be discussed, isolated and duly 
accounted for. Another approach may be in seeking an integration 
among the government policies for promoting adjustment, growth, 
technical advance and equitable distribution. 	It is not easy to 
strike an ideal equilibrium amidst a myriad of interests that are very 
often contradictory. 	A flexibility is warranted. A quantification 
of social and economic costs and benefits 138 , wherever possible, would 
help siphon off the subjective elements. 	But the benefits of specific 
policies in government cannot always be measured in narrow financial 
accounting terms 139 	The basic dilemma that confronts government 
137 W.G. Shepherd, Prices and Investments in Public Firms: The British 
Fuel Industries, Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 
1963. W.G. Shepherd, "British Nationalized Industry Performance 
and Policy", Yale Economic Essays, 1964, pp. 183-221. 
138 See, M.H.N. Awad, Nationalization of Production State of Petroleum 
Industry in the Middle East - Economic Cost Benefit Analysis. 
Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Colorado, 1974. 
Awad attempted to make out a case for the use of Cost-Benefit 
analysis as a methodology to examine the performance of national-
isation policy treating nationalisation as an "investment project". 
Awad however encountered limitations of the Cost Benefit Analysis 
such as ':non-commensurability of intangible benefits and cost and 
involvement of subjective value judgement". 
139 Strachey had as early in 1953 drawn attention to the problems of 
such an approach. He wrote: "But to narrow the argument to the 
assertion that nationalization may be expected to increase the 
efficiency ofOis or that industry is to overlook the whole indis- 
pensable process of social reconstruction which faces us. 	To 
argue so would be to degrade the cause of socialism to the calcu-
lation of the cost accountant". Strachey, op. cit. 
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in owning and operating nationalised enterprises is to link the 
financial objectives of business of nationalised enterprises with 
the social, political and economic objectives of the government. 	It 
is, therefore, necessary to identify the financial objectives on the 
one hand and social, political and economic objectives on the other 
along with their quantification in measurable terms. This would serve 
to answer fundamental questions concerning the outlook for the future 
of the strategy and criteria of operation and performance evaluation. 
Nationalisation in the Developing Nations  
Expansion of the public sector in the developing nations 
especially those who were previously under colonial domination is 
regarded as an assertion of their economic independence140 and self-
reliance in step with the attainment of political sovereignty 141 
developing nations find in nationalisation a convenient means to enlarge 
their public sector through expropriation of indigenous private enter-
prise and of foreign investment within their territorial limits. 	As 
a result many of the developing nations have resorted to nationalisation 
over the years since the 1950's. 	These developing nations have shared 
common experiences. For instance, they were ruled or domin- 
ated by some foreign colonial power and, their national sover- 
eignty was of recent origin. As a corollary to the historical process 
of formation of the capitalistic economic system, these former colonies 
were unable to make sufficient progress in economic and social develop-
ment. 	Their societies remained industrially backward and capital 
140 A. Leykovsky, Role of the Public Sector in Achieving Economic 
Independence, (Moscow: Novosti Press Agency: 1973). 
141 S.C. Jain, "Nationalization in Tanzania Some Legal Aspects", 
African Quarterly, Vol. 9 (1969), pp. 141-148. 
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formation was retarded due to uninterrupted drain of their resources 
to their colonial rulers. With the termination of colonial domination 
and achievement of political independence these countries find them-
selves ushered into an era of rising expectations. 	The demands of 
modernisation have tended to upset the traditional indstitutions and 
values involving a complex interaction of their psychological, political, 
social, economic and cultural motivations 142 Extreme poverty and the 
awareness of the sharp contrast in economic development with the rich 
nations stimulate them to seek a short-cut. 	In their quest for an 
approach to development 143 the developing nations seem to have been 
keeping their options open. 	They have a deep distrust of capitalism 
because of the legacy of the colonial exploitations. They have also 
been moved by the demonstration effects of socialist economic develop- 
ment144 . 	But in their attempt to solve economic and social problems, 
they have been hesitant and cautious in adopting any specific ideology 145 . 
Instead the leaders of these nations have tried to synthesize the 
elements of different ideologies as seem most relevant and appear 
most appealing to the majority of the people simultaneously being in 
general tune with the overall societal values. Attempt to accommodate 
conflicting social views in these countries are reflected in the differ-
ent ideological models of socialism such as the "African Socialism" 
of Senghor, the "democratic collectivism" of Nehru, the "communitarianism" 
142 See, Paul E. Sigmund,ed. The Ideologies of the Developing Nations, 
(New York: Praeger, 1964), especially, "Introduction" pp. 2-40. 
143 See, Willard A. Belling& George 0. Totten, eds. Developing Nations 
Quest for a Model, (New York: Van Nostrand, 1970). 
144 John H. Kauntsky, "The Appeal of Communist Models in Underdeveloped 
Countries" in Ibid., pp. 101-115. 
145 Sigmund, op. cit. 
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of Nyerere, the "communocracy" of Sekou Toure, the "Humanism" of 
Kennethe Kaunda, the "Nkrumaism" in Ghana, the "democratic, socialist, 
co-operative democracy" of Nasser or "Arab Socialism" in the Arab 
world and "Islamic Socialism" in many of the Islamic countries the 
world over146 
The governments of these developing countries tend to adopt 
'elements of the policies associated with the type of regimes which 
have been branded as "New-Deal Regimes .147 . 	These developing nations 
take cognizance of the fact that the possibility of successfully 
pursuing the classical capitalist path is quite remote 148 . 	They also 
realise that to accelerate the rate of growth and economic development 
the State must play a dominant and active role. 	Their socialist 
aspirations consist of social equality and rapid economic development. 
Conflicting interests of the divergent social groups are sought to be 
resolved through deomcratic process. 	This pious intention is, how- 
ever, often frustrated by a military take over and suspension of the 
representative government 149 . 	Socialisation of land is yet to be 
attempted and confiscation of property is not generally resorted to. 
The policies pursued by these developing countries are interventionist 
in character and include protection, public expenditure and planning, 
which are later regarded as important adjuncts to the national 
146 Ibid. pp. 3-22. Also see Ehud Spinzak, "African Traditional 
Socialism - A Semantic Analysis of Political Ideology", Journal 
of Modern African Studies, Vol. 11, 1973, pp. 629-647. James A. 
McCain, "Ideology in Africa: Some Perceptual Types", African 
Studies Review, Vol. 18, April 1975, pp. 61-87. 
147 Paul Baran, The Political Economy of Growth, (New York: Monthly 
Review Press, 1957). 
148 S.P. Sinha, New Nations and the Law of Nations, (Leiden, 1967). 
149 See for example, Morris Janowitz, The Military in the Political 
Development of New Nations, (Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press, 1964). 
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development strategy. 	But it is in nationalisation that most of 
these regimes find an opportunity, particularly if such nationalisation 
involves foreign investment, to ascribe a radical and anti-imperial 
image. 	Nationalisation in such circumstances also help to relieve 
the inherited burdens from the colonial period. By taking over 
foreign investments the potential dangers of external control over the 
strategic segments of their economies are extinguished while similar 
action taken in respect of indigenous capital help to dismantle the 
combine of the domestic capital with multi-national corporations. Above 
all, as the culmination of a long process of political and economic, 
development150 nationalisation is regarded as an integral part of the 
search for new forms of economic life not only in the more developed 
Western and socialist nations but also in the developing nations. 
Summary Observation  
Nationalisation, it appears, is a transfer of any property to 
public ownership and control for a public purpose and effected as a 
matter of national policy. 	Since property relationship has been 
traditionally, considered as pivotal in human society, its purported 
infringement is deemed as precursor to profound social changes. 	After 
nationalisation has taken place in many developing as well as developed 
countries enthusiasm for it has waned considerably as the expectations 
remain greatly unfulfilled. While supporters of nationalisation declare 
denationalisation as a retrograde step, socially, politically and 
economically151 considerable forces tend to consolidate power with a 
view to undo nationalisation. 	It is argued that the declared objectives 
150 See, Johnson, op. cit. 
151 Langer, op. cit. 
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of nationalisation are not often achieved. 	On the other hand, 
nationalisation takes place in many cases as pragmatic responses to 
specific practical needs. 	As a whole, therefore, nationalisation 
needs to be judged on a socially acceptable criteria based on general 
consensus and free from rhetoric and not primarily on ideological 
grounds. 	Indeed, nationalisation has been successful in ideologically 
uncongenial environments as well. While it must not be considered as 
something good in itself it is an outcome of a realisation of an unsat- 
isfactory state of economic growth. 	It is a legitimate instrument of 
modern government but by itself it cannot solve the problems. 	As 
Jewkes stated 
the economic system is not a machine but an environment, 
a set of relations between human agents and natural 
forces of such infinite and organic intricacy that we 
possess and probably continue to possess, only Imperfect 
understanding of it. 152 
In a discussion of nationalisation policy one may not remain oblivious 
of this possible truism. 	In the next chapter, therefore, the political, 
social, economic and environmental background of the Bangladesh exper- 
ience in nationalisation will be discussed. 
152 John Jewkes, Public and Private Enterprise, (London: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul Ltd., 1966), p. 89. 
CHAPTER II 
THE BACKGROUND OF BANGLADESH NATIONALISATION 
Industrial development can hardly be conceived as solely an 
economic phenomenon. As with other fields of economic development, 
political, social, demographic, technological and cultural factors are 
important concomitants of industrial development. 	The problems and 
causes of retardation of an economy lie deep in the above factors. 
But as Hagen1 points out this observation alone is of little value 
unless the roots of the resultant structures are traced. 	Empirical 
evidences in developing countries suggest a high degree of correlation 
between the level of economic development and the nature of political 
structure 2  . 	Attitudes, values, sOcial structure and political organ- 
isations have great impact on the level of development attained in a 
society. 	In many of the Third World countries, the humiliation of 
colonial legacy and an awareness of economic and industrial backwardness, 
for example, help breed radical movements. 	Political repression, sub- 
jugation, discrimination and economic exploitations associated with an 
authoritarian or powerful colonial regime which draws its strength from 
the bayonet, do not go unchallenged for long. The mass of the people 
become frustrated, bitter and restive, and find expression in violence 
and extremism. 	Gyrating first around the political aspirations to 
1 Everett E. Hagen, "Framework for analyzing economic and political 
change" in Development of the Emerging Countries: An Agenda for 
Research, Robert E. Ashe et al eds., (Washington: The Brookings 
Institution, 1962), pp. 1-38. 
2 Karl de Schweinitz, Industrialization and Democracy Economic Neces- 
sities and Political Possibilities, (New York: The Free Press of 
Glencoe, 1964), p. 35; also see J.J. Spengler, "Economic Develop-
ment: Political Preconditions and Political Consequences", The 
Journal of Politics, Vol. 22, (1960), pp. 387-416. 
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become independent of the colonial rule the dissatisfaction is trans-
formed into a struggle between the exploiter and the exploited - the 
have and the have-nots. 	These developing nations desire to change 
and mould the inherited political, economic and social institutions to 
maximise their own welfare. 	Elimination of the vestiges of colonial 
exploitation of the economy is realised as equally important to the 
attainment of political freedom. 
Industrial policy 3 as Dell4 mentions, is a collection of varied 
responses to the different kinds of political responsibility imposed 
on government by changing requirement and circumstances of industry. 
Observing the Bangladesh experience it seems that the responses of the 
government towards industrial policy varied according to its political 
character. 	The British colonial power (1757-1947) pursued a laissez 
faire policy in respect of industrial development and remained 
generally content with its regulatory and administrative role. 	The 
Pakistani administration (1947-71) in its exploitative character adopted 
a favoured private enterprise policy and utilised its regulatory and 
administrative instruments to the same end. The government assumed 
some promotional role in public industrial development but public sector 
3 The concept of industrial policy is regarded as a recent addition 
to the more traditional group of economic policy instruments which 
fall into categories such as fiscal, monetary, commercial, transport 
or manpower policy. 	For definitions, aims and instruments of 
industrial policy in liberal economies, see for example, The Aims 
and Instruments of Industrial Policy, (Paris: Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development, 1975), pp. 7-16 & pp. 127- 
133. 	For discussions regarding the developing countries see for 
example, Albert Winsemius and John A. Pincus eds., Methods of 
Industrial Development with Special Reference to Less Developed 
Areas, (Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment, 1962), pp. 79-92 & pp. 323-333. 
4 Edmund Dell, Political Responsibility and Industry, (London: George 
Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1975), pp. 32-52. 
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was not conceived as the dominant sector but as supplementary to the private 
sector. In the independent State of Bangladesh (post-1971) government 
declared a dominant public sector policy and assumed a. direct, positive 
and pervasive role in industrial activity. 	It resorted to radical 
means of converting the private enterprise into public enterprise 
through nationalisation. 	This was as profound a change for a subsis- 
tence level society with traditional values of Inalienable rights of 
private property as in any Western developed capitalist nation. An 
attempt is made below to explore the compulsions and the factors 
responsible for initiating such a pervasive process of change in 
attitudes, values, philosophies and policies of the people of Bangla- 
desh. 	In this, the relevant aspects of their political subservience, 
economic exploitation, discrimination in industrial policy, entrepre-
neurial vacuum and interaction of divergent values in the society will 
be examined. 	But firstly, the evolution of the public sector and the 
growth of a large number of public enterprises in the economy of 
Bangladesh will be traced. 
Evolution of the Public Sector  
Public sector of which nationalisation may be regarded, among 
other things, a means of its expansion, may claim some antiquity in 
Bangladesh. Historically, even before the advent of the British rule, 
the Crown used to patronise and maintain some forms of State under-
takings, though with limited purpose of meeting the demands of the 
State and the royal family 5 . 	Primarily oriented towards regulatory 
and administrative roles the British colonial government introduced a 
5 B.B. Misra, The Indian Middle Classes,(London: Oxford University 
Press, 1961), p. 40. 
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postal system in 1766 and set up telegraph lines in 1851. 	Railways, 
initially starting as private companies,became major State concerns as 
they were considered strategically important. 	The public utilities 
that came to be developed in so far as they existed followed the owner-
ship pattern in the metropolitan economy in Britain. The public sector 
during the British!period - was limited in its concern for providing 
public goods and services to post, telegraph and telephones, roads and 
railways, education and health, some banking services and manufacture 
of defence equipment, arms and ammunitions. 	The government activities 
were largely dictated by the needs of the colonial rulers. 	In the 
words of Asoka Mehta the role of the government in economic activities 
was "more a reflex action than a policy decision". 
After the British departed the report of the Economic Appraisal 
Committee 7 ,constituted during the Pakistani administration in 1952, 
visualized the government as administrator and not as an entrepreneur. 
The main strategy in the industrial policy statement was to encourage 
the private sector. 	The industrial policy in 1948 of the Pakistani 
administration limited public ownership to a few specified fields 8 . 
This policy reflected the view that monopolies and public utilities 
6 Asoka Mehta, "Growth of the Public Sector as the dominant Sector" 
in C.K. Vakil ed., Industrial Development in India: Policy and 
Problems, (New Delhi: Orient Longman, 1973), p. 16. The Indian 
Industrial Commission constituted in 1915 envisaged the main 
activities of the government in the industrial field as confined 
only to research, education, intelligence, direct assistance and 
purchase of stores. 	It was the war needs which brought the 
government close to the organised industry. 	See A.G. Clow, The 
State and Industry, (Calcutta: Government of India Publications 
Branch, 1928). 
7 The Report of the Economic Appraisal Committee, (Karachi: Government 
of Pakistan Press, 1952). 
8 Government of Pakistan, Planning Commission, Industrial Policy of 
the Government of Pakistan, (Karachi: Government of Pakistan Press, 
1961), pp. 1-5. 
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were peculiarly suitable for public ownership. 	Communication and 
transport services such as posts, telegraph, telephone, wireless, 
broadcasting, railways and air transport were to be owned and operated 
by the government. 	The government also reserved the rights to take 
over any industry for reasons of security and welfare of the State. 
The private sector was given full scope to operate with the exception 
of three specified fields, namely, (i) arms and ammunitions, (ii) 
generation of hydro-electricity and (iii) manufacture of railway wagons, 
telephones and wireless apparutus. 	The government could set up a 
limited number of industrial units more as a measure for attracting 
private enterprises if adequate private investment did not materialise 
in any particular industry of national importance. The industrial 
policy statement in 1959 pledged 9 to give maximum scope to private 
enterprise in the development of the resources of the country within 
the framework of the national five year plans. 	The general provision 
that the government might take over any industry considered essential 
or vital was deleted from the policy statement. 	However, the govern- 
ment could establish essential industries through specially constituted 
public corporations where private sector was hesitant to show up. 	On 
the other hand, the idea persisted throughout Pakistani administration 
that the State should ultimately disinvest the running public industrial 
enterprises set up by the government though such undertakings involved 
long gestation period. 
Adoption of a planned development process within the framework 
of the national plans was symbolic of an increasingly pronounced role 
of the government in the economy. But each of the successive five 
9 	Ibid., pp. 8-11. 
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year plan documents of the Pakistani administration gave more emphasis 
to investment in private sector over public expenditure. 	The aggre- 
gate allocations for the private sector industrial development as 
reflected in the four five year plan documents during Pakistan period 
show that it was nearly double the aggregate allocation for public 
sector industries 10 . 	The first planned approach to industrial develop- 
ment in Bangladesh was embodied in the Six Year Development Plan 11 of 
Pakistan launched in 1950. 	In the Two Year Priority Programme12, launched 
in 1951 specific projects were included which were to be executed by 
the government in association with private enterprise, if possible and 
without private enterprise, if necessary. 	The First Five Year Plan 
1955-60 13 in Pakistan period advocated a reliance on private enterprise 
for development as it would stimulate entrepreneurship, result in better 
management and promote innovation and invention. The public sector 
investment in industry was directed to areas where private enterprise 
was not attracted because of technical complexity, high capital require-
ments or relatively low profitability or lack of facilities due to 
geographical factors. 	This basic reliance on private enterprise did 
not change with the launching of the Second Five Year Plan of Pakistan 
10 See, Government of Pakistan, Planning Commission, The Third Five 
Year Plan, 1965-70, (Karachi: Government Press, 1965), pp. 103-4 
& p. 4; Government of Pakistan, Planning Commission, The Fourth 
Five Year Plan, 1970-75, (Islamabad: Government Press, 1970), 
pp. 27-8 & p.37. 
11 Six Year Development Plan, 1950-56 was, in fact, scheduled to go 
into effect from the middle of 1951. 	It was merely a collection 
of projects and a statement of intents and possibilities. 
12 Two Year Priority Plan was drawn up within the framework of the 
Six Year Plan. 
13 Government of Pakistan, National Planning Board, The First Five 
Year Plan, 1955-60, (Karachi: Government of Pakistan Press, 1957), 
pp. 86-7. 
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for 1960-65 which laid down the basic principles for public sector 
industries as follows: 
The cardinal principle is that there should be no 
public industrial sector in the sense of reservation 
of complete industries for public enterprise but that • 
the Government should remain generally responsible for 
promoting all industries by providing the required 
facilities and should directly participate only in these 
enterprises which are essential for overall development 
and where private capital is not forthcoming or high 
considerations of national security intervene. 14 
The Second Plan recommended measures for the guidance and encouragement 
of private investment such as effective operation of an investment 
promotion bureau to help solving the problem for investors, publication 
of investment schedule with a view to making it easier for .private invest--; _ 
ment to obtain foreign exchange component of the investment, rational-
isation of industrial legislation, simplification for import of machinery 
and raw materials, arrangements of financial credit and so on. 	The 
Third Five Year Plan 1965-70 was more explicit in its orientation 
towards private enterprise. 	The Third Plan left the primary respon- 
sibility of developing directly productive investment to the private 
sector. 	It envisaged policies which would undertake to stimulate 
the private sector industries through provisions of industrial estates, 
improved physical infrastructure, institutional financing, increased 
training,simplified procedures and adequate flow of equity capital 
through participation of public sector agencies 15  . The Plan viewed 
public sector investment as supplementary and not competitive with the 
private investment and confined to high risk low profit areas. 	The 
14 Government of Pakistan, Planning Commission, The Second Five Year 
Plan, 1960-65, (Karachi: Government of Pakistan Press, 1960), 
pp. 225-6. 
15 Government of Pakistan, Planning Commission, The Third Five Year 
Plan, 1970-75, (Karachi: Government Press, 1965), pp. 99-109. 
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Fourth Five Year Plan 1970-75 of Pakistan demonstrated the previous 
reliance on the private investment for the bulk of industrial invest-
ment but it noted the need for a change in strategy as the dimensions 
of development changed as did the climate of expectations 16 . 	As it 
noted during the previous decades 
the basic objective of national economic policy was 
to seek maximum possible economic growth through 
encouragement of private enterprise backed by 
provision of social, physical and institutional 
infrastructure by government. 17 
In this relentless pursuit of economic growth the desired goal of 
equitable distribution of incomes was ignored. The Fourth Plan took 
note of resentment on the question of concentration of industrial 
incomes and wealth and abuses of the capitalist system. 	It considered 
the option regarding nationalisation and realised that it could not be 
divorced from political framework and that it could not be purely an 
economic issue. 	The question of nationalisation was therefore, to 
be left as an open question for the time being. 	Instead, the Plan 
called for a new industrial policy that would define the categories of 
industries for operation by the public sector, mixed public-private 
sector and private sector so that the question of public and private 
ownership was settled 18 . The public sector would have to play 
larger role than in the past. 	The private sector, on the other hand, 
with its role reserved in a mixed economy must abide by new rules of 
game which would recognise social responsibilities on the part of the 
private sector as well 19 . 
16 Government of Pakistan, Planning Commission, The Fourth Five Year 
Plan, 1970-75, (Islamabad: Government Press, 1970), p. 12. 
17 	Ibid., p. 11. 
18 	Ibid., p. 16-17. 
19 	Ibid., pp. 17-18. 
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Increasing rate of public expenditures reflected an expansion 
of the public sector within the economy. 	Thus public expenditure of 
the central government administration increased nearly six times during 
1950 and 1970 while the public expenditure of the then provincial 
administration in Bangladesh increased by nearly 13 times during the 
corresponding period 20  . 	Public sector expenditure in development 
was nearly double the development expenditure in the private sector 21 . 
Public expenditure as proportion of Gross Domestic Product also showed 
a rising trend22 . 
Utilisation of the large public investments was facilitated 
through the operation of various public enterprises set up from time 
to time. 	The Economic Appraisal Committee in 1952 pointed out the 
need for State trading in some essential consumer goods and public 
sector operation in commercial warehousing, jute trade, agricultural 
development, transport, communication, industrial financing, banking 
and insurance. 	Each of Pakistan's five year plans set the tone for 
20 Results arrived at from computation of data given in the following 
sources: Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Finance, Pakistan 
Economic Survey 1970-71, (Islamabad: Government Press, 1971), 
pp. 94-95, pp. 100-103 & pp. 111; Tables 43, 45, 47 & 51. 
21 Aggregate of development expenditure in Bangladesh during the 
period of 1950-70 was - 
Public Sector 	: 	Rupees 20,639 million 
Private Sector 	: 	Rupees 10,934 million. 
Source: Ibid. 
22 Public Expenditure in relation to GDP of Bangladesh: 
Year Expenditure as percentage of provincial Gross 
Domestic Product 
1949-50 1.4 
1954-55 2.1 
1959-60 2.5 
1964-65 5.8 
1969-70 9.3 
Source: Ibid.; Pakistan Third Plan, op. cit., p. 11; and Government 
of Pakistan, Ministry of Finance, Pakistan Economic Survey, 1969- 
70, (Islamabad: Government Press, 1970). 
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expansion of the public sector and recommended establishment of some 
public enterprises in various sectors mainly with a view to implement 
the development projects. 	The First Plan in 1955 noted the need for 
setting up public corporations in industrial credit and finance, 
agricultural development, shipping and operation of ports. 	Pakistan's 
Second Plan sought to define public, semi-public and private sector in 
the economy. 	The Third Plan attempted to limit the activities of the 
public sector to building infrastructure, ownership of essential 
services and monopolies or on reasons of scale. Public sector 
activities were to consist in high risk capital intensive and technol-
ogically complex areas and to areas where otherwise private ownership 
would enhance concentration of economic power. The Fourth Pakistan 
Plan also relied on public sector agencies for implementation of 
development programmes. 	By the time it was launched,which coincided 
with the dissociation of Bangladesh from Pakistan, there came to exist 
a large number of public enterprises in different fields of activities 
in the country. 
At the time of Liberation, public enterprises functioned in 
respect of central banking, commercial banking, industrial financing, 
house building loans, agricultural credit, insurance business etc. 
Public enterprises existed in the railway communications, road trans-
port, airlines and inland and marine shipping. Public enterprises 
operated in the fields of jute marketing and foreign trade. 	There 
were state undertakings in as diverse fields as agricultural develop-
ment and extension services, fisheries development, regulation of 
inland water transport, aviation, water and sewerage services in major 
cities, power generation, flood control and irrigation, city improve-
ment, regulation of tea plantation and processing, promotion of tourism 
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to film industry development. 	There were autonomous and semi-auto- 
nomous bodies in the areas of atomic energy research, rural development, 
industrial and scientific research etc. 	The universities were mostly 
dependent on government grants and were effectively as much public 
sector organisations as other public sector agencies. 	In the indust- 
rial field there were public corporations either directly operating in 
the manufacturing process or engaged in promotional activities. 	The 
role of the Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation (hereafter 
PIDC) in this category was of pivotal and singular importance in the 
industrialisation process in Bangladesh. 
Policies pursued by the Pakistani administration were, however 
biased towards fostering private enterprises in the industrial field. 
This strategy did not help to alleviate the slow growth in Bangladesh. 
A class of Bengali industrial entrepreneurs did not emerge 23 . 	The 
Pakistan government set up the PIDC to secure satisfactory industrial 
growth and to undertake industrial investment where the private sector 
23 Instead, concentration of economic power in a few minority Muslim 
commercial community based in West Pakistan province occurred. 
The policies leading to such concentration is now well documented. 
See for example, Lawrence J. White, Industrial Concentration and 
EcOnomic Power in Pakistan, (Princeton: University Press, 1974); 
Stephen R. Lewis, Economic Policy and Industrial Growth in Pakistan, 
(London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1969); Sergy Levin, "The Upper 
Bourgeoisie From the Muslim Commercial Community of Memons in 
Pakistan 1947-71", Asian Survey, Vol. 14 (1974), pp. 231-43. For 
an analysis of the slow growth of the indigenous entrepreneurship in 
Bangladesh, see Hanna Papanek, "Entrepreneurship in East Pakistan" 
in R. and Mary J. Beech, eds. Bengal Change in Continuity, (Michigan: 
State University, Asian Studies Center, 197 , pp. 119-;50. About 
the lack of industrial and commercial entrepreneurship among the 
middle class Bengalis, Kling has argued that this class is at bottom 
a frustrated entrepreneur. 	See Blair B. Kling, "Entrepreneurship 
and Regional Identity in Bengal:, David Kopf, ed., Bengal Regional 
Identity, (East Lansig: Michigan State University, Asian Studies 
Center, 1969), pp. 75-86. 
67 
might not have evinced interest. 	The avowed policy was to supplement 
and not to substitute the private enterprises. 	The PIDC was charged 
with assuming leadership and initiative in the promotion of industries. 
The emphasis was not on ownership of industries and industries set up 
by PIDC could be disinvested as soon as the shyness of private capital 
was overcome. By the time it was bifurcated in 1962 - one each in 
West Pakistan and Bangladesh region, PIDC investments came to account 
for more than 16 per cent of the total industrial investment in the 
united Pakistan 24 . The PIDC concentrated in pioneering industries 
requiring large capital and management of high order as fertilizer 
plants, heavy engineering, paper, machine tools and ship-building. 
Completed projects included jute mills, sugar mills, paper and board 
mills, fertilizer factories, cotton textile mills, ship-building yards 
and chemical and pharmaceutical plants 25 . 
The PIDC stimulated industrial growth through sponsoring 
association between public and private sector or through some deliberate 
concessions or simply by public sector development. 	The move into 
large scale industrial ventures by a new Bengalientrepreneurial class 
was made possible through the promotion of PIDC. 	Special financial 
arrangements were designed to promote private entrepreneurship amongst 
the Bengalis. Many of the Bengali entrepreneurs could do with contri- 
buting much less than the sponsor's share in setting up a mill. 	The 
PIDC not only subscribed part of the equity but also made arrangements 
24 Gustav F. Papanek, Pakistan's Development Social Goals and Private 
Incentives, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 
1967), p. 96. 
25 Bangladesh Industrial Development Corporation, BIDC In Figures, 
(Dacca: Planning Division, BIDC, 1972), p. 44 & pp. 108-189. 
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for providing foreign exchange. 
The emergence of Bangladesh witnessed a spurt in public sector 
organisations. 	The new government in independent Bangladesh had to 
take over, as successors, various government and public sector organ- 
isations which existed earlier. 	But more significantly, government 
faced with the problems of caretaking a substantial number of indust-
rial enterprises, commercial concerns, financial institutions, trans-
port companies and other properties abandoned by the non-local owners 
who left Bangladesh at the time of the Liberation War 26 . 	The govern- 
ment took over these abandoned enterprises and properties and national-
ised some parts of the industrial financial and commercial sectors of 
the economy. 	A number of new public sector organisations were 
created. The shares held by the public of the State Bank of Pakistan 
were taken over by the government as well as all assets etc, and 
Bangladesh Bank was established to function as the central bank 27 . 
Entire capital vested in the government. 	The government nationalised 
twelve commercial banks owned by both Bengali and Pakistani shareholders 
and set up six new banking organisations with the entire capital of 
each bank vested in the government 28 . 	Certain institutional readjust- 
ments were made in respect of the specialised financial institutions. 
26 Generally, non-local owners who had earlier immigrated into 
Bangladesh speaking languages other than Bengali or who had their 
principal financial interests shielded in West Pakistan were 
regarded as aliens and enemy collaborators. 
27 The Bangladesh Bank was established under the Acting President's 
Order No. 2 of 1971 known as the Bangladesh Bank (Temporary) 
Order, 1971. 
28 Government of Bangladesh, Ministry of Law and Parliamentary 
Affairs, "President's Order No. 26 of 1972 The Bangladesh Banks 
(Nationalisation Order) 1972", The Bangladesh Gazette Extraordinary, 
March 26, 1972. 
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New corporations were established or converted from the old ones as 
inherited in the public sector. 	The Bangladesh House Building 
Finance Corporation was set up in place of the Pakistan House Building 
Finance Corporation operating in Bangladesh but the entire authorised 
capital was subscribed by the government29 . 	The Industrial Develop- 
ment Bank of Pakistan and the Equity Participation Fund were merged to 
create the Bangladesh Sh .i.ip-a Bank (hereafter • BSB) with the entire 
authorised capital subscribed by the government 30 . 	Likewise the 
Pakistan Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation, the Investment 
Corporation of Pakistan and the National Investment Trust were merged 
to set up the Bangladesh Shilpa Rin Sangstha (hereafter BSRS) with its 
entire authorised capital subscribed by the government 31 . 	Two con- 
trolling public corporations were set up, one each for life insurance and 
the general insurance business for the nationalised insurance business 32 . 
The entire amount of authorised capital was subscribed by the govern- 
ment. 	Public organisations such as the Agricultural Development 
Corporation, Agricultural Development Bank, Jute Board, Tea Board, 
Port Trusts, different city development trusts, Water and Sewerage 
Authorities, Inland Water and Transport Authority continued their 
functions as before. Water and Power Development Authority was 
29 Government of Bangladesh, Ministry of Law and Parliamentary Affairs, 
"Acting President's Order of 1972 The Bangladesh (Administration 
of Financial Institutions) Order, 1972", The Bangladesh Gazette 
Extraordinary, January 7, 1972 and "President's Order No. 7 of 
1973 The Bangladesh House Building Finance Corporation Order, 
1973", Ibid., February 3, •1973. 
30 "President's Order No. 129 of 1972 The Bangladesh Shilpa Bank 
Order, 1972", Ibid., October 31, 1972. 
31 "President's Order No. 128 of 1972 The Bangladesh Shilpa Rin 
Sangstha, 1972", Ibid. 
32 	"President's Order No. 95 of 1972 The Bangladesh Insurance National- 
isation Order, 1972", Ibid., August 8, 1972. 
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bifurcated to establish the Water Development Board and the Power 
Development Board with no authorised capital. 	New public organisations 
were set up in agriculture sector such as Cotton Board, Tobacco Board 
and Horticulture Board. 	The Trading Corporation of Bangladesh (here- 
after TCB) was established to carry on the business of foreign trade. 
The Consumers' Supplies Corporation was set up mainly as a price 
stabilisation measure for essential commodities. 	The jute export 
trade was nationalised and Bangladesh Jute Export Corporation was 
created. 	In the transport sector, Inland Water Transport Corporation 
was established through the merger of East Pakistan Shipping Corporation 
and six other private companies engaged in water transport business and 
abandoned by their non-local owners. 	The Bangladesh Shipping Corpor- 
ation was established for operation and development of marine transport 
services. 	In the industry sector, government dismantled the PIDC 
establishemnt and created ten Sector Corporations to operate the 
abandoned enterprises with fixed assets of more than Taka 2.5 
million, the existing public industrial enterprises from the PIDC 
establishment and the nationalised industrial enterprises 33 . 	Some 
abandoned manufacturing enterprises were placed with the newly created 
public organisations, namely, Freedom Fighters' Welfare Trusts and 
Sena Kalyan Sangstha while the rest of the abandoned manufacturing 
enterprises were left to be managed by the government department until 
disinvested to private buyers or returned to the owner claimants. 
In summary, the industrial policy in Bangladesh during Pakistan 
period consisted mainly in encouraging the private enterprise. 	The 
private sector was the dominant sector and the role of the public sector 
33 	industrial Nationalization Order, op. cit. 
71 
was viewed as to supplement the former. 	After the emergence of 
independent Bangladesh this strategy was reversed. 	A very large and 
more important segment of the industries in the private sector was 
statutorily transferred to the public sector in addition to retaining 
those already existing in the public sector. 	The public sector 
became dominant and the favoured sector in the industrial field. 
Conflicts Within the Polity  
The people of Bangladesh, a majority of whom are Muslims were 
apprehensive of the domination by their Hindu neighbours at the time 
of independence from the British rule in 1947. They thought that a 
political 'separation from the Hindu neighbours would best safeguard 
their political, social, economic and cultural interests as the 
Bengali Hindu community held control of land, business, commerce, 
industries, money lending, civil services, education, legal and other 
professions. 	The people of Bangladesh were rural and constituted 
predominantly an agricultural community. The relationship between 
the Bengali Hindus and the Muslims provided a classical example of 
the landlord g exploitation of the peasantry. As a result the Bengali 
Muslims supported the Pakistan movement and formed a political union 
with the Muslim majority areas of northwest regions of the United India 34 
The contradictory and often incompatible characteristics of the people 
of the two incongruous regions in the newly constituted Muslim State 
of Pakistan surfaced even before the first flush of independence from 
34 By United India is meant the Indian subcontinent under the British 
rule prior to independence in 1947. 
the British rule was over 35 . 
The expectation of the people of Bangladesh that they would 
have an easy ride over the vacuum created by the mass exodus of the 
Hindu community from Bangladesh could not be realised. The Bengali 
Muslims lacked an urban middle class and the aristocratic elements 
lacked strong economic power. 	The most important class that emerged 
came from the petty middle class consisting of small traders, shop 
keepers, professional people, teachers and clerks 36 . The economic 
strength of this class was feeble. 	There was hardly a rich peasant 
class or indigenous trading community following migration of the Hindus 
nor an immigrant trading community willing to be absorbed in the main- 
stream of the Bengali society. 	The people of Bangladesh had neither 
the funds nor the experience to fill the vacuum in the domestic trade 
of the world's near monopoly of jute supply. 	There was scant repre- 
sentation of the Bengalis in the higher echelon of the bureaucracy or 
in the armed forces. 	The political leaders of the Bengalis specially 
after the abolition of the Zamindari system 37  came primarily from the 
35 A great deal of scholarly writing is available about the split 
between two erstwhile regions of Pakistan. 	For a bird's eye 
view account, see M.B. Naqvi, "West Pakistan's Struggle for Power", 
South Asian Review, Vol. 4 (1971), pp. 213-30; M. Anisur Rahman, 
"East Pakistan: The Roots of Estrangement", South Asian Review, 
Vol. 3 (1971), pp. 235-39; Richard S. Wheeler, The Politics of 
Pakistan A Constitutional Quest, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1970). 
36 Richard Nations, "The Economic Structure of Pakistan and Bangladesh" 
in Robin Blackburn, ed., Explosions in a Sub-continent, (London: 
Penguin, 1975), p. 257. Also see Ramkrishna Mukherjee, "The 
Social Background of Bangladesh" in Kathleen Gough and Hari P. 
Sharma, eds. Imperialism and Revolution in South Asia, (New York: 
Monthly Review, 1973), pp. 399-417). 
37 The Permanent Settlement Act in 1793 elevated the Hindu rent 
collectors to the position of the landholders with proprietory 
right in the soil. 	These landlords were locally known as zamin- 
dars. A majority of the zamindars in Bangladesh belonged to the 
Hindu community. 
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families of peasants, shopkeepers, petty government officials, clerks 
and the like
38 
 . 
West Pakistan also lacked the middle class- 	But it had 
rich landlords who dominated the vast rural expanse. 	These landlords 
owned more than 30 per cent of the privately cultivated land and were 
in a position to extract both feudal rents and capitalist profits from 
their estates which were cultivated by dependent peasants and wage 
labourers. These landlords had strong links with the increasingly 
powerful bureaucracy in Pakistan. West Pakistan inherited a good 
civil service and a number of officers belonging to the highest category 
of the civil services were members of the prestigious Indian Civil 
Service (ICS). 	The demands of a modern State and the anarchic 
conditions prevailing after the departure of the British administrators 
made the bureaucracy based in West Pakistan a most influential element of 
the power structure during the Pakistan period 39  . 	The military drawn 
almost fully from West Pakistan40 became a strong political force. 
The immigrant trading communities who settled inVbast Pakistan and later 
transformed themselves into an industrial capitalist class, maintained 
close liaison with the bureaucracy. 	This ensured formulation of 
economic policies in a way to support their economic interests41 . 
38 For a statistical attempt to analyse the social structure 
desh see Y.V. Gankovsky, "The Social Structure of Society 
People's Republic of Bangladesh", Asian Survey, Vol. 14 (1 
pp. 220-230. 
39 Khalid B. Sayeed, "The Political Role of Pakistan's Civil 
Pacific Affairs, Vol. 31, (June, 1958), pp. 131-46. 
40 Richard D. Lambert, "Factors in Bengali Regionalism in Pakistan", 
Far Eastern Survey, (April, 1959), pp. 49-58. 	For a discussion of 
the military and the bureaucracy as power gmtips, see Hamza Alavi, 
"Army and Bureaucracy in Pakistan", Interrutianal Socialist Journal, 
Vol. 	, (March-April, 1966). 
41 Papanek, Pakistan's Development, op. cit., Hassan N. Gardezi, "Neo-
colonial Alliances and the Crisis of Pakistan", in Gough and Sharma, 
op. cit., pp. 130-43. 
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As a result not more than 22 families came to control a majority of 
industrial and financial assets in Pakistan42 . 
The West Pakistani elite group consisting of land based ari!toc-
racy, capitalists, higher bureaucracy and the military siezed the power 
structure in the absence of a similar combine existing in Bangladesh. 
Thus even in their homeland, the Bengalis could have access" only to 
the middle and lower ranges of economic activities 43  . The top govern-
ment commercial and industrial positions were occupied by the West 
Pakistanis. 	The decision at the level of the central government was 
virtually the monopoly of the West Pakistan power elites. 	As a result 
all classes of the people of Bangladesh - the proletariat, the peasantry 
and the petty bourgeoisie came to stand in antagonistic relationship 
with the West Pakistan power combine 44 . 	The people of Bangladesh 
demanded regional autonomy within the framework of a united Pakistan. 
In their attempts to frustrate the popular wishes of the people of 
Bangladesh the power elites and the militaryoligardhY based in West Paki-
stan applied military forces which ignited the war of Liberation by 
the people of Bangladesh. 
42 White, Industrial Concentration, op. cit., pp. 45-85. 	Pakistan 
News Digest, (Karachi, 15 June, 1970), p. 10. Quoted in Gardezi, 
op. cit. In 1968, 22 families controlled 66 per cent of Pakistan's 
total industrial capital, 70 per cent of insurance and 80 per cent 
of banking. 	These figures were first quoted by the government's 
own chief economist, Dr. M. Haq. These "robber barons" became so 
powerful that they could influence government policy and "even to 
bring about the fall of a Cabinet unresponsive to - their pressure". 
See Talukder Maniruzzaman, "Group Interests in Pakistan Politics 
1947-58", Pacific Affairs, Vol. 39, Nos. 1 & 2 (1966), pp. 79-98. 
43 	Mukherjee, op. cit., p. 409. 
44 Feroz Ahmed, "The Structural Matrix of The Struggle in Bangladesh", 
Gough and Sharma,op. cit. pp. 419-448. 
Within the social structure in Bangladesh the attempts to 
subjugate the Bengalis by the ruling elites of Pakistan did have 
divergent effects. 	The Pakistan oligarchy emulated the British 
imperial tradition and sought to foster a loyal rural elite class in 
Bangladesh who had earlier received severe shock from the abolition 
of the Zamindari system in 1950. 	The ceiling for land holding was 
raised in 1961 with retrospective effect45 . 	The original landlords 
if available got back their land up to the revised ceiling of land-
holding. A new class of rural elite emerged from the "surplus" 
farmers who owed the existence to various government subsidies and 
extension service in the form of seeds, fertiliser, irrigation facili- 
ties, and agricultural credits etc. 	The Pakistan ruling elites 
utilised its mechanism of the institution that was branded as "Basic 
Democracies", dominated the political scene in the rural areas as well 
as the national life 46 . An elaborate and subtle mechanism was provided 
45 The East Bengal Estate Acquisition and Tenancy Act in 1950 fixed 
the ceiling of land at 33 acres per head. At the time of 
Partition in 1947 in Bangladesh 75 per cent of the land, including 
all the biggest Zamindari holdings, belonged to Hindu Zeuninder 
class, some of them possessing as much as 750,000 acres of land. 
By 1956 nearly 421 Zamindari holdings were acquired by the govern-
ment. 	Thus by 1956 Bangladesh was largely freed from the grip of 
feudalism. 	See Maniruzzaman, op. cit. 	The raising of ceiling 
of landholding in 1961 must be regarded as a move to reverse the 
situation. 	For results of 1950 land reform see Azizur Rahman 
Khan, The Economy of Bangladesh, (London: Macmillan, 1972), pp. 
38-41 & 128-143. 
46 The programme of "Basic Democracies" was introduced by Pakistan's mili-
tary ruler Ayub Khan. The "Basic Democracies" elected at the grass root 
level were entrusted with the power and responsiblity to run local 
governments. 	They also constituted the electoral college for the 
legislatures and the Presidency under the Ayubian system. 	The 
Basic Democrats came almost exclusively from the rural rich class and 
thus the systeminstitutionalised political hegemony of the rich. See 
Nations, op. cit., p. 256-7. 	Rehman Sobhan, Basic Democracy Work 
Programme and Rural Development in East Pakistan, (Dacca: Dacca 
University, Bureau of Economic Research, 1968). 
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for transferring the margin of surplus from the rural agricultural 
sector primarily of Bangladesh to finance urban industries and 
other development mostly in West Pakistan 47 . 	The government-induced 
depressed prices of agricultural products and the absence of credit 
institutions forced the ordinary peasants into debts and at the mercy 
of a new money lender class. 	There was not much outlet for capital 
investment by the Bengalis and a capitalist relation of production in 
the rural areas did not develop. 	The surplus capital was increasingly 
utilised for money lending, trading, petty leasing or simply hoarding" . 
The rural society tended to become polarised with the affluent farmers 
and village lenders grabbing land and other means of production and 
the poor and middle peasants liquidating their means of livelihood. 
Simultaneously, the Pakistan ruling elites proceeded to foster 
a faithful and gratefulmiddle class in the urban areas of Bangladesh. 
This became necessary to quell the increasing restiveness among the 
Bengalis for lack of opportunity for the articulate middle class. 
The carefully nourished Bengali entrepreneurial class 49 , were mostly 
small businessmen who were awarded construction contracts by the govern-
ment to help formation of their initial capital. 	Permits and licences 
47 A.H.N. Nuruddin Chewdhury, "Some Reflections on Income Redistri-
bUtion and Intermediation in Pakistan", Pakistan Development 
Review, Vol. 9, (1969), pp. 95-109. 	Keith B. Griffin, "Financing 
Development Plans in Pakistan", Pakistan Development Review, Vol. 
5, (1965), pp. 601-30. 
48 Swadesh R. Bose, "Trends of Real Incomes of Rural Poor in East 
Pakistan", Pakistan Development Review, Vol. 8, (1968), pp. 452-87. 
Bose study shows the increasing poverty of the rural masses. 
Sobhan, op. cit., shows increasing accumulation in the hands of 
a minor segment of the rural population. 
49 Rehman Sobhan, "Nationalisation of Industries in Bangladesh: Back-
ground and Problems", in Economic Development of Bangladesh within 
a Socialist Framework, E.A.G. Robinson & Keith Griffin, eds. 
(London: Macmillan, 1974), pp. 182-185. 
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having ready cash value were issued to a few Bengalis having contacts 
with influential elements in the ruling groups. Representation of 
the Bengalis in the central elite civil service went up from only one 
officer in 1947 to 27 per cent in 1959 and 40 per cent in 1970 50 . 
With its rising influence the Bengali middle class was able to extract 
constitutional commitment to the elimination of disparity in economic 
and other development between the two regions. 	The ruling elites of 
Pakistan found it expedient to keep potential Bengali resentments and 
opposition docile and under control. But in the milieu of the Bengali 
society these were belated efforts. 	As , Gankovsky's analysis showed, the 
society of Bangladesh was characterised by the fact that more than 80 
per cent of its economically active population was involved -in the 
traditional-subsistence and small scale commercial structures of the 
national economy51 . 	The principal classes and strata of bourgeois 
society was still in a formative stage. 
Economic Exploitation  
During the British rule, the people of Bangladesh experienced 
economic exploitations in two ways. 	Firstly, as a part of the Indian 
colony of the British Empire there was a great drain of resources to 
England in the forms of imposed adverse balance of . payments, direct 
transfer of tax revenue collected in the colony to the metropolitan 
country, transfer in the shape of so-called home charges, National 
Debt on accounts such as wars raged by the colonial rulers and famines 
50 Abu Abdullah, "The Class Bases of Nationalism: Pakistan and Bangla- 
desh" in Barbara Thomas and Spencer Lavan, eds., West Bengal and 
Bangladesh Perspectives from 1972, (Michigan State University, 
Asian Studies Center, 1973), p. 265 -79. 
51 Gankovsky, 	Social Structure, op. cit. 
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of the past and repatriation of military expenditures of the colonial 
rulers 52 . 	Secondly, while the whole of the Indian subcontinent was 
exploited as a captive market for the British productions, Bangladesh 
region was relegated to a position of a hinterland vis-a-vis certain 
other parts of British India53 . 	As a result no major industries were 
set up in Bangladesh during the British period although it had natural 
advantages in jute, sugar, tea, tobacco, paper and leather industries. 
Bangladesh held a monopoly in the production of jute in the world but 
none of the 106 jute mills in British India was situated in Bangladesh 54 . 
At the time of the Partition of British India, Bangladesh was one of 
the most backward regions in terms of economic and industrial progress. 
Economic policies pursued during Pakistan period did not much 
help to alter the disadvantaged position of Bangladesh. 	It remained 
52 Historian K.M. Pannikar writes that the administration which the 
British established in India was a 
"robber state the one object of which was to extract 
as much as possible from the territories it was 
supposed to administer". 
K.M. Pannikar, A Survey of Indian History, (Bombay: Asia Publishing 
House, 1963), p. 201. Also see, R. Palm Dutt, "The Exploitation of 
India: A Marxist View", in Martin D. Lewis, ed., The British in 
India - Imperialism or Trusteeship? (Massachusetts: Heath & Co., 
1962), pp. 41-52. Romesh Dutt, The Economic History of India 
Under Early British Rule, (London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1950) 
pp. v-xxi. John McLane, "The Drain of Wealth and Indian National-
ism at the turn of the Century", in Tapan Ray Choudhury ed. Contri- 
butions to Indian Economic History, II (Calcutta: Firma Mukhopadhya, 
1963), pp. 21-40. 
53 According to Nafis Ahmed, "practically all the jute fibre" grown 
in the Bangladesh region used to feed the jute mills in West Bengal 
or exported through it until 1947. 	See, Nafis Ahmed, An Economic 
Geography of East Pakistan, (London: Oxford University Press, 1968) 
p. 104. 
54 Ibid., p. 222. There were 1500 industrial enterprises (with 20 or 
more workers in each factory) in West Bengal against only 83 in 
East Bengal in 1945. 	Figures are from a Government of India 
publications in 1950 quoted by Mukherjee, op. cit., p. 408. 
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comparatively less developed vis-a-vis West Pakistan. The rate of 
increase of the Gross Domestic Product in West Pakistan was much higher 
than Bangladesh55 . 	Differences as regards to the amount of Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) and Per Capita Income widened over the years 
between the two regions. If purchasing power of the currency and the 
relative price ratios of the two regions are considered including 
- consumption patterns,the disparity in economic development between the 
two regions becomes more glaring 56. 1  
The ruling oligarchy of Pakistan manipulated the State power 
in channelling the surplus of the whole economy in their control 57 . 
As both the regions were essentially rural economies their strategy 
involved three tasks: conversion of agrarian surplus into risk capital 
for industry; control of foreign exchange earned through exports of 
agricultural products to enable payment for imports and - utilisation of 
55 	Pakistan Third Plan, op. cit., p. 11. Government of Pakistan, 
Planning Commission, Report of the Panel of Economists on the 
Fourth Five Year Plan (1970 - 75) (Islamabad: Government of Pakistan 
Press, 1970),p. 132. 
56 Regional disparities between Bangladesh and West Pakistan in 
different fields are now well researched and documented. 	The 
policy of the central government of Pakistan was the prime 
cause of the widening gap. 	See Government of East Pakistan, 
Planning Department, Economic Disparities Between East and West 
Pakistan, (Dacca: Government Press, 1963); Md. Anisur Rahman, 
East and West Pakistan: A Problem in the Political Economy of 
Regional Planning, (Harvard University Center for International 
Affairs, 1968); Kabir U. Ahmed, Break-up of Pakistan: Background 
& Prospects of Bangladesh, (London: The Social Science Publishers, 
1972) pp. 26-51; Arjun Sen Gupta, "Regional Disparity and Economic 
Development of Pakistan" in V.K.R.V. Rao, ed., Bangladesh Economy: 
Problems and Prospects, (Delhi: Vikas Publications, 1972) pp. 15- 
55; Mahbub ul Haq, The Strategy of Economic Planning, (Lahore: 
Oxford University Press, 1963) pp. 52-111; Lewis, Industrialization 
and Trade Policies, op. cit., Chapter 6; S.A. Akanda, East Pakistan 
and Politics of Regionalism, Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
University of Denver, 1970). 
57 	Nations, op. cit., p. 258. 
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agricultural produce as raw materials for industries 58 . 	Implement- 
ation of this strategy resulted in transfer of about 24 to 48 per cent 
of the annual income of the agriculture sector during 1960-65 to the 
industry sector 59 . 	As during the early years the economy of Pakistan 
was heavily dependent upon jute exports of Bangladesh the strategy 
effectively resulted in a transfer of agricultural surplus of Bangla-
desh to build up import-substitution industries in West Pakistan. 
In this the ruling elites made good use of two devices in their command: 
power to determine the foreign exchange rate of the domestic currency 
and import control mechanism. 	In allocation of import licence Bangla- 
desh was discriminated against and its share in the vital industrial 
licences and raw materials did not exceed 30 per cent of such 
import licences issued 60 . 	Due to the deliberate over-valuation 
of the domestic currency the agricultural sector notably jute, received 
less from exports in exchange of its surrender of foreign currency 
earned at the rate officially fixed. 	Ironically, agriculture sector 
had to pay for the imported products at rates designed to subsidize 
the industrial sector. 	The agriculture sector in West Pakistan 
received 52 per cent of the international market price for its produce 
during 1950 and 1965 due to the operation of this concealed subsidy 
to industry61 . 	But the Bengali cultivators received only 44 per cent 
of the international market price for their exports 62 . The Bengali 
58 Ibid. 
59 	Nuruddin Choudhury, op. cit., p. 99. 
60 Stephen Thomas, "Import Licensing and Import Liberalization in 
Pakistan", Pakistan Development Review, Vol. 6, (1966), p. 534. 
61 A.R. Khan, "What Has Been Happening to Real Wages in Pakistan", 
Pakistan Development Review, Vol. 7, (1967), pp. 317-347. 
62 Ibid. 
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consumers similarly paid prices between 10 and 15 per cent higher than 
his counterpart in West Pakistan was paying 63  . 
The pattern of economic development was directly influenced 
through resource allocations. 	The policies of the central government 
in Pakistan regarding budgetary expenditures, foreign trade, inter-
regional trade and international aid influenced such resource alloca- 
tions. 	During the two decades between 1950 and 1970, the aggregate 
development expenditure in Bangladesh was less than 50 per cent of the 
aggregate development expenditure in West Pakistan 64 . 	In this the 
central government discriminated against Bangladesh. At the regional 
level the aggregate of the provincial government development expenditure 
in Bangladesh and West Pakistan was nearly equal 65 . However, the 
central government expenditure in Bangladesh region was only 28 
per cent of the same in West Pakistan 66 . Likewise, Bangladesh 
received 47 per cent of the aggregate financial allocations in three 
63 Abdul Ghafur, "A Comparison of Inter-regional Purchasing Power of 
Industrial Wages in Pakistan, Pakistan Development Review, Vol. 7, 
(1967), pp. 533-543. 
64 Aggregate development expenditure during the period between 1950 
and 1970 was: 
Sector Bangladesh West Pakistan Total 
Public 20639 30827 51466 
Private 10934 31986 42920 
Aggregate 31573 62813 94386 
in million rupees. 
P.C. Verma, "Economic Stagnation of Bangladesh", in Rao, 
Bangladesh Economy, op. cit., pp. 56-64. 	The above figures are 
based on compilation by Verma from Pakistan Five Year Plan documents, 
Pakistan Economic Surveys, etc. 
65 The aggregate development expenditure by the respective provincial 
governments in Bangladesh and West Pakistan during 1950-68 period 
was: 
Bangladesh 	Rupees 12006 million 
West Pakistan Rupees 13675 million. 
Ibid., p. 59. 
66 Ibid. 
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Five Year Plans and 53 per cent of the Plan allocations went to West 
Pakistan67 . 	In addition an amount equivalent to nearly one-fourth 
of the total allocations for Bangladesh in the three Plans was spent 
on the Indus Basin Project in West Pakistan68  . No separate funds were 
correspondingly earmarked for Bangladesh for its flood control projects. 
The central government also spent an amount that was equivalent to more 
than 11 per cent of the total allocations in the three Plans for develop-
ment of the new capital territories. 	Nearly 94 per cent of this cate- 
gory of public expenditure was utilised in West Pakistan 69 ' 
The central government expenditure from the Revenue Budget 
remained tilted in favour of West Pakistan. 	The expenditures on 
defence establishments in Pakistan was about 57 per cent of the 
revenue budget during the two decades. 70 More than 90 per cent of 
the defence expenditures was spent in West Pakistan 71 . 	The actual 
estimates in the Annual Budgets revealed that the central expenditures 
were diverted to West Pakistan in a proportion larger than its contri-
bution to the central revenues 72 . 
67 Planned expenditure during the period between 1955 and 1970 under 
the three Five Year Plans was: in million rupees 
Bangladesh 	38571 
West Pakistan 	43060 
Source: The Five Year Plans of Pakistan. 
68 An amount of Rupees 9046 million was spent on the Indus Basin 
Replacement Project in West Pakistan which was outside the scope 
of the Five Year Plan allocations. 
69 An amount of Rupees 8700 million was spent for development of 
capital territories located in West Pakistan. The central govern-
ment spent only Rupees 574 million for development of the so-called 
"Second Capital" in Bangladesh region. 
70 	Pakistan Economic Survey 1970-71, op. cit. pp. 94-5. 
71 	Feroz Ahmed, op. cit. p. 129. 
72 Bangladesh provided 60 per cent of the total revenue of the central 
government but received only about 25 per cent for its expenditure. 
West Pakistan, on the other hand provided 40 per cent for its expen- 
diture. See, A Group of Scholars in Vienna, "Why Bangladesh?" 
Bangladesh Documents, op. cit., p. 16. 
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The financing of the development plans was heavily supported 
through foreign economic aid which met 33 per cent of the total 
financial requirements of the three Plans during 1955-1970 73 . 	The 
manner in which the foreign economic aid was utilised and disbursed 
helped to further widen the disparity in economic development between 
the two regions. 	Bangladesh received only 20 per cent of foreign 
exchange out of the total availability for the whole of Pakistan and 
only 4 per cent of foreign aid excluding U.S. Aid 74 . Only 34 per 
cent of total U.S. Aid for the whole of Pakistan was received by 
Bangladesh 75 . 
In foreign trade, during the period 1947-1970, the exports of 
Bangladesh exceeded the exports of West Pakistan at 54:46 ratio 76  . 
During the same period Bangladesh earned more foreign exchange than 
West Pakistan in foreign trade but the value of its aggregate imports 
was only 45 per cent of the total value of the goods imported by West 
Pakistan77 . 	Due to the control exerted by the Central Government . 
Bangladesh could not import proportionate to its exports earnings. 
West Pakistan, however, was allowed to import more than double its due 
share according to her exports 78 . 	Industrial projects could not be 
73 Feroz Ahmed, op. cit., p. 127. Foreign economic aid provided 55 
per cent of Pakistan's First Plan, 50 per cent of its Second Plan 
and 26 per cent of the Third Plan. 
74 Bangladesh Documents, op. cit., p. 17. 
75 	Ibid., p. 17. 
76 Verna, op. cit., p. 60. 	During 1950-70 period exports abroad were: 
From Bangladesh 	Rupees 23303 million 
From West Pakistan 	Rupees 19476 million 
77 Ibid., p. 61. During the same period imports were: 
To Bangladesh 	Rupees 19261 million 
To West Pakistan 	Rupees 41918 million 
78 Imports by West Pakistan 	Rupees 41918 million 
Exports by West Pakistan 	Rupees 19476 million 
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implemented in Bangladesh owing to shortage in foreign exchange. 
Bangladesh was exploited as a captive market for the manufactures 
of West Pakistan. 	On account of inter-regional trade between Bangla- 
desh and West Pakistan during 1948-1970 the latter had a net aggregate 
favourable balance of trade 79 . 	The pattern of this inter-regional 
trade was discriminatory against the interests of Bangladesh. 	Bang- 
ladesh imported high cost inferior manufactures from West Pakistan 
but the latter imported primary products such as wood, timber, spices, 
betelnuts and manufactures like jute goods, paper and matches from 
Bangladesh. 	The cotton textiles of West Pakistan faced a stiff 
competition in international markets but found a captive market in 
Bangladesh. 	On the contrary Bangladesh had to drastically reduce its 
international exports of tea to meet domestic consumption of West 
Pakistan. 	Some attempts have been made to estimate the transfer of 
resources from Bangladesh to West Pakistan during 1947-1970 period. 
Accordingly, if Bangladesh was to be refunded its resources transferred 
during 1947-69 period, about 65 per cent of the entire value of Gross 
National Product (GNP) generated in West Pakistan in 1969-70 would be 
needed to effect the same and this "net liability of Pakistan to Bangla-
desh" was equivalent to nearly 86 per cent of GNP of Bangladesh in the 
same year80 . 	This drain of Bangladesh resources in favour of West 
79 Economic Survey 1970-71, op. cit., p. 58, Table 27. The total 
imports of West Pakistan from Bangladesh during the period amounte 
to Rupees 13180 million. 	The total exports of West Pakistan to 
Bangladesh were Rupees 17086 million. 
80 Faaland and Parkinson estimated that "Bangladesh has a claim on 
Pakistan equivalent to nearly U.S. $4,000 million". This is equal 
to Rupees 19,000 million at pre-1972 rates. 	See, Just Faaland and 
J.R. Parkinson, Bangladesh The Test Case of Development, (Boulder, 
Colorado: Westview Press, 1976), p. 191. 	The GNP of the two regions 
in 1969-70 was: 
Bangladesh 	Rupees 23,119 million 
West Pakistan Rupees 31,156 million 	(continued over) 
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Pakistan was undoubtedly one of the major factors contributing to a 
slower rate of growth in GNP in Bangladesh as compared to its counter-
part81 . 	Bangladesh thus suffered a most archaic form of discrimination 
and exploitation during its association with Pakistan. 	Lopsided econ- 
omic policies and unending avarice of the ruling elites of Pakistan 
reduced Bangladesh in a client colony and ensured that Bangladesh remained 
a hinterland as before. 
This strategy of financing economic development through transfer-
ring resources from the poorer section of the economy resulted in high 
social cost. 	The income redistribution effected led to an absolute 
fall in the real income of the poorer section of the community - the 
industrial workers, agricultural labourers and the rural population 
generally82 . 	The industrial policies pursued by the Pakistani adminis- 
tration forced an extraction of resources from the traditional sector to 
a relatively few privileged sections of the community, such as business-
men, industrialists, salary earners, professionals, urban rentiers and 
anti-social elements such as smugglers, profiteers and corrupt officials. 
80 	(Continued) Report of the Panel, 	op. cit. 	p. 132. Another estimate (Ahmad, Break-up, op. cit.) puts the amount of the "net 
transfer of real resources" from Bangladesh to West Pakistan at 
Rupees 31,120 million over the entire period. 	This amount is 
almost equal to the GNP of West Pakistan in 1969-70. 
81 GNP of Bangladesh and West Pakistan at 1959-60 Constant Factor Cost 
(Rupees in millions) 
1950 	1960 	1970 
West Pakistan 	12,106 	16,494 	31,157 
Bangladesh 12,360 14,945 23,119 
Source: Pakistan Third Plan, op. cit. p. 11. 
Report of the Panel, op. cit. 
82 The way this was effected may be seen in Keith Griffin and A.R. 
Khan, eds. Growth and Inequality in Pakistan, (London: Macmillan, 
19f70); Khan, Wages, op. cit., Ghafur, op. cit. 
Disparity in Industrial Development  
At Partition Bangladesh inherited a legacy of industrial back-
wardness that dated from the beginning of modern industrial era in 
British India. 	Bangladesh had only about 11 per cent of the total 
number of industrial establishments located in the British Bengal in 
the 1910's 83 and 2 per cent of the total number of industrial establish-
ments in British India84 . 	The pathetic absence of modern industries 
in Bangladesh was largely the result of the British policy which 
proved destructive of indigenous industries from the beginning of the 
British rule 85 . 	All initiatives and resources were in the hands of 
British capital interests and investment decisions were guided to suit 
their vested needs. 	The geographical locations or consideration of 
factor endowments of Bangladesh were of secondary importance. 
In spite of its comparative backwardness, Bangladesh, inherited 
at Partition some major industries at least as large as those in West 
Pakistan. 	The following table shows the relative position of the 
two regions in 1947: 
83 	Total number of industrial establishments in Bangladesh in 1911 was 
95; there were about 822 industrial establishments in British Bengal 
in 1919. See P.P. Pillai, Economic Conditions in India, (London: 
George Routledge & Sons, 1925) pp. 170-74 and Nafis Ahmed, Economic 
Geography, op. cit., p. 223. 
84 C.N. Vakil, Economic Consequences of Divided India, (Bombay: Vora 
& Co. Ltd., 1950), p. 247. Total number of industrial establishments 
in the undivided India in 1945 was 13163 as against 252 in Bangla-
desh and 1154 in West Pakistan. 
85 This was noted very early during the British rule in India by a 
Governor of Bengal, Harry Verelist who wrote: "The influence... 
proved.. .destructive of industries." Quoted in Pillai, op. cit. 
p. 15. 
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TABLE I 
Number of Large Scale Industrial Enterprises 
in Bangladesh and West Pakistan in 1947 86  
Industry 	Bangladesh West Pakistan  
Jute nil 	nil 
Cotton 10 6 
Sugar 	5 4 
Cement 1 	4 
Safety Matches 	4 4 
Total 20 	18 
Starting initially from nearly the same level of industrial 
development as of West Pakistan, Bangladesh during 1947-1970 period 
tended to fall behind its associate in all spheres of economic develop-
ment including in industrial growth. No doubt some significant strides 
in industrialisation during post-Partition period was made by Bangladesh. 
Total number of industrial establishments increased from 252 in 1945 to 
462 in 1955 and finally 3704 in 1970-7187 . 	Industrial employment in 
Bangladesh grew to an average daily figure of 259,000 in 1971 from a 
tiny 36,000 in 194788 . 	However, industrial progress in West Pakistan 
was more accelerated than in Bangladesh. 	Relative contribution of the 
manufacturing sector to GDP continued to lag behind in Bangladesh as 
86 	Vakil, op. cit., pp. 297-309. S.M. Akhtar, Economy of Pakistan, 
(Lahore: Ashraf Publications, 1955), p. 6. 
87 	Nafis Ahmed, op. cit., p. 223. Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, 
Statistical Digest of Bangladesh No. 9:1973, (Dacca: Bangladesh 
Government Press, 1975, p. 59). 
88 	Ibid., pp. 62-63. 
87 
88 
compared to West Pakistan 89 . West Pakistan enjoyed a higher rate 
of structural development. 	A higher proportion of the more complex, 
capital intensive and technologically more sophisticated industries 
were located in West Pakistan which had a more developed infrastructure 
ready for a more rapid and successful industrialisation at the end of 
1970. 	As against Bangladesh which lost much of its meagre entrepre- 
neurs in the wake of Partition in 1947 because of the mass exodus of 
the Hindu community, West Pakistan had a new inflow of immigrant entre-
preneurs90 . West Pakistan had, in addition, a better supply of engin- 
eering, industrial and technical personnel91 . 	Of the total contri- 
bution of the manufacturing sector to the GDP of the united Pakistan, 
share of Bangladesh was only 33 per cent compared to about 67 per cent 
by West Pakistan92 . 	The following table shows how far industrial 
production in Bangladesh was outstriped by West Pakistan in 1970: 
89 Contribution of the Manufacturing sector to GDP during 1950-1970 
was as follows: 
Year 	Bangladesh 	West Pakistan 
1950 3.80 7.94 
1960 6.03 12.26 
1965 	7.91 	13.66 
1970 8.25 
Sources: T.M. Khan and W.A. Bergan, "Measurement of Structural 
Change in the Pakistan Economy", Pakistan Development Review, Vol. 
6 (Summer, 1966), pp. 182-3, 199-202. 
90 Fapanek, Entrepreneurs, op. cit.; Levin, op. cit. 
91 Government of Pakistan, Economic Affairs Division, 20 Years of 
Pakistan in Statistics 1947-67 (Karachi: Managre of Publications, 
196 ), p. 170. 
92 	Ahmad, Break-up, op. cit., p. 32; Economic Survey, 70-71, op. cit. 
pp. 2-3; (Figures arrived at from the data given in the sources 
cited. 
TABLE II 
Production of major manufacturing industries 
in Bangladesh and West Pakistan in 1970 93 
Product Unit Production in 1969 - 1970 Bangladesh 	West Pakistan 
Cotton Yarn Million Pounds (16) 106 602 (27) 
Cotton Cloth Million Yards (51) 59 726 (55) 
Sugar Thousand Tons (16) 89 551 (17) 
Cement Thousand Tons (20) 53 2570 (380) 
Safety Matches Million Gross (0.11) 13 1.2 (00.42) 
Tea Million Pounds (53) 69 nil nil 
Urea Thousand Tons 94 203 
Sulphuric Acid Thousand Tons 6 31 
Art Silk Yarn Million Sq. Yards 5 79 
Cigarettes Billion Sticks 18 22 
Vegetable Oil Thousand Tons 6 121 
Paints Thousand Cwt. 5 79 
Varnishes Thousand Gallons 81 1509 
Tyres Tubes Thousand Pieces 280 6290 
Paper Thousand Tons 42 nil 
Newsprint Thousand Tons 17 nil 
Paper Board Thousand Tons nil 37 
Jute Goods Thousand Tons 580 nil 
Resources generated in manufacturing industries in Bangladesh 
were transferred to West Pakistan as only 2.5 per cent of private 
industrial assets were owned by the Bengali Muslims 94  . 	A substantial 
amount of resources was thus siphoned off to West Pakistan in the forms 
of dividends, salaries, interests and profits. 	Industries in Bangladesh 
came to be closely tied to financial and social interests of West Pakistan 
and failed to contribute towards local capital accumulation or emergence 
of a dynamic entrepreneurial class in Bangladesh. 	Bangladesh market 
became an enclave extension of the West Pakistan based capitalism. 
93 Ibid., pp. 22-25. Figures given in parenthesis are for the corres-
ponding products in 1950. 
94 	Papanek, Development, op. cit., p. 42. 
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The Entrepreneurial Vacuum 
Traditionally, Bangladesh lacked an indigenous entrepreneurial 
class. 	In this, the Muslim community lagged behind the Hindu community. 
As a result of the policies pursued during the British rule, a majority 
of the people of Bangladesh - peasants, weavers and the mass of the 
handicraftsmen earlier lost their livelihood and were reduced to 
poverty95 . 	In this the Act of the Permanent Settlement passed by the 
British rulers during the early period of their administration helped 
bring the ruin of the Bengali Muslims 96 . 	By placing proprietorship 
of land in the landlords for perpetuity97 the cultivators were placed 
at the mercy of the landlords, most of whom belonged to the Hindu 
community. 	The arbitrary rates of rent, illegal exactions, high 
handedness and tyranical acts of the landlords made the condition of 
the cultivators miserable 98 . 	The Permanent Settlement indirectly led 
to a creation of a powerful money lending class. 	The poor cultivators 
9nce in debt continued to remain in debt. The money lending class were 
generally Hindus who operated in the rural areas while maintaining close 
linkage with the urban centres. 	There could not be a meaningful capital 
formation within the rural segment of the economy. Poverty was a 
cause for neglect of western education for the majority of the people of 
95 S.M. Ikram, Modern Muslims in India and Brith of Pakistan, (Lahore: 
S.M. Ashraf, 1965), p. 96. 
96 Stagnation in agriculture can largely be ascribed to the land tenure 
system. 	Report of the Land Revenue Commission, Bengal, Government 
of Bengal, in 1940 recommended for the abolition of the Permanent 
Settlement. 	Also see A.R. Mallick, British Policy and the Muslims 
of Bengal, 1757-1856, (Dacca: Asiatic Society, 1961). 
97 	See, B.H. Badel-Lowell, The Land System of British India, Vol. 1, 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1892). 
98 Shila Sen, Muslim Politics in Bengal, 1937-1947, (New Delhi: Impex 
India, 1976), p. 18. 
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Bangladesh99 who came to be thinly represented in government jobs and 
various professions like law, medicine, government services etc. 	In 
the absence ofa moneyed class among the Bengali Muslims in general, 
most of the existing commercial and industrial undertakings were 
operated by the local and non-local Hindu community until 1947. 
Moreover, nearly all industrial development took place in or around 
Calcutta which was the colonial capital of the British India till the 
beginning of the century. 	As a result, capital, wealth and entrepre- 
neurship tended to be concentrated in Calcutta. 	The neighbouring 
Bangladesh community of Muslims were virtually unrepresented in trade, 
commerce and industry. 
After the emergence of Pakistan, the strategy to encourage 
private enterprise and specific government policies providing incentives 
helped a rapid industrial growth for Pakistan as a whole. A great 
majority of industrial establishments came to be owned privately. 
The new class of industrial entrepreneurs in Pakistan period were drawn 
from the Muslim immigrant traders from India, Burma, and East Africa. 
They brought some amount of capital and a limited fund of technical and 
entrepreneurial skills with them100 . 	These trading classes preferred 
to settle down in business in West Pakistan. 	The central capital 101 , 
the principal port and the centre of import trade on which many of these 
99 Ibid., p. v. 
100 See, Levin, op. cit. Papanek, "The Development of Entrepreneurship", 
American Economic Review, Vol. 52, (May, 1962), pp. 46-58. Gustav 
F. Papanek, "The Location of Industry", Pakistan Development Review, 
Vol. 10, 1970, pp. 291-307. 
101 At Partition, Karachi, more than 1000 miles away from Bangladesh 
became the central capital of the new nation of Pakistan. 
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entrepreneurs made their first fortunes were situated in West Pakistan. 
Simultaneously, transfer of industries as a subject to be administered 
by the central government came as strategically advantageous for these 
emerging entrepreneurial class 102 The centralisation caused to place 
intending Bengali entrepreneurs in great disadvantage. The rules 
required prior permission to be obtained to establish a new undertaking 
or to extend an existing one. The great geographical incongruity was 
by itself a sufficient disincentive for an aspiring Bengali investor to 
come all the way to central capital. 	On the contrary, immigrant entre- 
preneurs found the location of their industrial establishments in West 
Pakistan with many advantages. Proximity enabled them to cultivate 
personal contacts with the bureaucracy. 	The government policies to 
result in dispersion of industries to various regions were also half- 
hearted and had little effect 103 . 	Only a few immigrant entrepreneurs 
later found it easier to obtain permission for imported machinery or 
raw materials for industries established in Bangladesh and decided to 
set up part of the family business there. 
The avowed policy of the government to allow a reasonable 
inequalities of income and wealth in order to provide incentive for 
private enterprise created a relative concentration of wealth and 
income in West Pakistan. 	The policy of import licensing along with 
the policy of encouraging industries to engage in export trade under 
incentives such as the Export Bonus Scheme 104 helped in this economic 
102 Under the Government of India Act of 1935, industrial development 
was a provincial subject. 	The new Pakistan government reversed 
this arrangement by enacting the Development of Industries' 
Federal Control Act of 1949. 
103 Papanek, Location, op. cit. 
104 Quazi Kholiquzzaman Ahmed, "The Operation of the Export Bonus Scheme 
in Pakistan's Jute and Cotton Industries", Pakistan Development 
Review, Vol. 6 (Spring, 1966), pp. 1-37. 
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concentration through the integration of trading and manufacturing 
business interests of West Pakistan based private sector. 	Limitations 
of the size of the market and economies of scale did not leave much 
room for expansion in different branches of business and industry. 
The device of import licensing regulated the import trade and only 
limited number of import licences were issued so that licence holders 
were assured of an economic volume of business. 	The renewal of 
licences among importers were decided in reference to their performance 
in trade and their financial position and established import houses 
continued to grow in size. 
The availability of foreign aid financed import went far to help 
very rapid growth of the private enterprise in industry sector during 
Pakistan period. 	Some of the donor countries often attached a condition 
to economic aid in the form of a requirement to encourage private enter- 
prise. 	The lion's share of the foreign aid allocations were diverted 
to West Pakistan based capitalists because a powerful, influential and 
dynamic private entrepreneurial class came to exist there. 
The direct financial assistance to private sector was inadequate 
in Bangladesh. 	During the two decades, financial assistance of centrally 
sponsored financial corporations like the Pakistan Industrial Credit and 
Investment Corporation, Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan, Agri-
cultural Development Bank of Pakistan and Pakistan House Building 
Finance Corporation pursued a discriminatory policy towards Bangladesh 
interests. 	The financial assistance to private sector in Bangladesh 
was only 34 per cent of the total amount allocated to West Pakistan 
based clients 105 . 	The development expenditure in the private sector 
105 Verma, op. cit., p. 60. 
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in Bangladesh was about only one-third of the same in West Pakistan. 
Resulting entrepreneurial vacuum in Bangladesh is indicated 
from the fact that at Liberation Bangladesh found 21 per cent of 
its industrial establishments, 27 per cent of trading houses and 75 per 
cent of bank organisations were owned or controlled by non-locals consti-
tuting hardly 1 per cent of its population106  • 
Interaction of Values and Politics  
Political subjugation and economic exploitations by the West 
Pakistani power elites led first to disenchantment, then bitterness 
and finally, resistance. 	The leadership of the resistance movement 
was in the hands of the Awami League which was the organ of the middle 
class bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie in Bangladesh107 . 	But the 
party's opposition was limited to western constitutional framework. 
Its main elements were lawyers, teachers, petty traders and shopkeepers 
which abound in Bengali society. 	The radical political elements, 
however, considered the Awami League as a reactionary party. 	Still, 
the Awami League won support and dominated the Bangladesh politics 
because it grasped the principal issues facing the Bengalis when all 
106 Out of 3704 registered manufacturing enterprises 786 units were 
left without owners. 	Of 9,293 commercial establishments 2187 
were abandoned by the non-locals. 	In addition, there were 12 
banks with 1175 branches which were owned by Pakistanis with a 
large number of non-local managerial staff. Sources: Government 
of Bangladesh: Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Pocket Book of 
Bangladesh, 1978, (Dacca: Bangladesh Secretariat, 1977), pp. 127, 
325; Government of Bangladesh, Ministry of Finance, Resume of the 
Activities of the Financial Institutions in Bangladesh, (Dacca: 
Government Press, 1976), p. 8, The Holiday,"18 December 1977 . 
107 See M. Rashiduzzaman, "The Awami League in the Political Develop-
ment of Pakistan", Asian Survey, Vol. 10 (July, 1970) pp. 574-87; 
Nurul Islam, Development, op. cit., pp. 21-24; Barua, op. cit. 
Tariq Ali, "Pakistan and Bangladesh: Results and Prospects" in 
Blackburn, Explosion,, op. cit., pp. 295-301. 
95 
other political parties played hide and seek. 	The leftist 108 parties 
were inept and furthermore remained factionalised. 	Some of the leftist 
parties pursued opportunistic course which was harmful to the people of 
Bangladesh109 . 	The Awami League stirred the people against West 
Pakitani domination and advocated regional autonomy but the leftist 
parties decided to live in seclusion. 	This enabled the Awami League 
to present itself as the only meaningful opposition to oppressions of West 
West Pakistani ruling group. The Awdmi League swept the poll in general 
elections in 1970 and captured 160 of 162 seats in the Central and 288 
of 300 seats in the provincial legislatures. 	The aspirations of the 
Bengali national bourgeoisie and the middle classes in the national 
life that so far eluded them came in the process of being realised. 
The Awami League was organisationally stretched to the grass 
root levels. 	The party leadership was aware of the conflicting 
interests involved and sought to accommodate the divergent views and 
interests in its policies and programmes. 	As a result, the Awami 
League could not over-ride the deep Islamic sentiments of the people 
during the 1970 elections. 	Simultaneously emphasizing Islamic 
108 The leftist parties in Bangladesh consisted of the pro-Moscow 
faction of the National Awami Party as well as its pro-Peking 
faction. 	In addition there were the Maoist East Bengal Communist 
Party (Alauddin-Matin Group), East Pakistan Communist Party 
(Marxist-Leninist). For further details see, Talukder Maniruzzaman, 
"Radical Politics and the Emergence of Bangladesh" in Radical Politics 
in South Asia, Paul R. Brass, & Marcus P. Franda, eds. (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1973), pp. 223-80; Marcus F. Franda 
"Communism and Regional Politics in East Pakistan, Asian Survey, 
Vol. 10 (1970), pp. 588-606. Also see, M. Rashiduzzaman, "The 
National Awani Party of Pakistan: Leftist Politics in Crisis", 
Pacific Affairs, Vol. 43, 3 (1970), pp. 40-68. 
109 East Pakistan Communist Party (Marxist-Leninist) led by Toaha and 
Abdul Hug opposed any national struggle that might divide Pakistan. 
See Kathleen Gough, "Imperialism and Revolutionary Potential in 
South Asia", in Gough and Sharma, op. cit., p. 18. 
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principles, the Awami League went on to advocate the "establishment 
of a socialist economy" in the 1970 Election Manifestoes 110 . 	The 
Awami League promised nationalisation of banking, insurance companies, 
and some large industries. 	The Awani League also advocated land 
reform. 	The Awami League leadership had, no doubt, thought that under 
the prevailing circumstances, its planks for "full autonomy" coupled 
with these promises were adequate radical programmes. But the 
Liberation War and the emergence of Bangladesh changed the scenario. 
The Awami League found that in the changed perspectives they needed to 
adopt a more direct and hard-hitting strategy. 	The leadership of the 
Liberation War passed on to the Award_ League but many of the freedom 
fighters were idealistic students deeply influenced by socialist 
thoughts. 	The Awami League leadership found it necessary to link the 
Liberation movement with socialist and revolutionary ideologies especially 
to maintain hold over the freedom fighters 111 . 
The Awami League had some radical elements within it almost since 
its inception. 	Earlier in 1952, the Provincial Communist Party adopted 
a policy of working through the Awami League as the Communist Parties 
were banned by the Pakistan administration. 	Some of the members of 
the Communist Party joined the Awami League and began to consolidate 
110 Awami League Manifesto, op. cit. 
111 See, Rounaq Jahan, "Bangladesh in 1972 - Nation Building in a New 
State", Asian Survey, Vol. 13 (February, 1973), pp. 199-210. 
Jahan writes "(the freedom fighters) - numbering 100,000 to 200,000 
armed men posed a threat to the fledgling Awami League". 
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their position. 	The Language Movement in 1952 112 helped to create 
socialist and secular ethos especially among the students and the 
younger generation. 	In this, the leftist parties had played a signif- 
icant role through working underground or in front organisations and 
also through inflitration of popular parties. 	Language issue, 
autonomy113 and exploitations were the main themes with which to agitate 
the people. 	The student fronts of the Awami League largely carried the 
movements for autonomy and restoration of democracy as the top leader-
ship of the Awami League were in prison most of the time during Pakistan 
period. 	The pressure of the radical elements in the students and work- 
ers in late 1960's compelled the Awami League leadership to take a 
more radical approach in its policies and programmes. 
During the Liberation War, the more radical leftist organisations 
organised an alternative centre of resistance 114 under the banner of 
"National Struggle Committee". 	This group urged for a united military 
112 Urdu was the language of less than 4 per cent of Pakistan's popula-
tion. Still it was declared as the national and official language 
of Pakistan disregarding the claims of Bengali spoken by a majority 
of Pakistan's population. 	The Bengalis responded against this 
cultural imperialism of Pakistan elites which got expressions first 
in the language movement in 1952. For details see Badruddin Umar, 
Purba BangZar Bhasha Andolan 0 TatkaZeen Rajneeti - 
[in Bengali] (Dacca: Subarna 1979) Revised Edition. 
113 Until March, 1971 the programme of the Awami League consisted in 
the establishment of a Federation for Pakistan providing for full 
regional autonomy for all regions of Pakistan. See Sheikh Mujibur 
Rahman, "Six-Point Formula - Our Right to Live, Bangladesh Documents, 
op. cit. pp. 23-33. Also see. Akanda, op. cit. The language issue 
was used as another weapon in the struggle for regional autonomy. 
See Catherine Houghton, "East Bengali Language and Political 
Development in Socio-linguistic Perspective", J.R. Mclane, ed., 
Bengal in the 19th and 20th Centureis, (Michigan: State University, 
Asian Studies Centre, 1975), pp. 119-151. 
114 See Gough, op. cit., p. 24. 
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struggle against the Pakistani invasion forces and its aim was to 
establish a "democratic social system, anti-imperialist, anti—feudal 
and anti-monopoly capital in character u115 . The middle class consti-
tutionalist and non-revolutionary nationalist leadership of the Awami 
League was apprehensive of this radicalisation of the Liberation 
Movement and hence was not in favour of a long protracted War of 
Liberation. 	But the credibility of the Awami League to lead a 
national liberation was in doubt from the beginning because of 
its group character and also the ambivalent manner in which its top 
leadership negotiated 116 with the Pakistani military rulers before 
the Liberation War. The Awami League leadership was, therefore, much 
too relieved to obtain an Indian military intervention to liberate the 
country from the Pakistani occupation forces. The radical writers 
viewed this failure of the Awaml League to liberate the country without 
external intervention as a "terrible indictment of the ideology it espoused" 
117. In their opinion the national struggle in Bangladesh was thus distorted. 
In many ways the situation during and after the Liberation War was 
ironical. The Awami League, essentially a petty middle class party came to 
spearhead the Liberation Movement, firstly through constitutional means 
and finally through an armed struggle. The party set up a parliamentary 
form of constitutional government in a revolutionary situation. 	The so- 
called revolutionary leftist parties, on the other hand, were indulging 
in semantic squabbling. 	One group termed the struggle in Bangladesh 
as a conflict between the West Pakistani monopoly capitalists and 
115 Ibid. 
116 Rehman Sobhan, 'Negotiating For Bangladesh: A Participant's View", 
South Asian Review, Vol. 4, (July, 1971), pp. 315-326. 
117 See for example, Tang Ali, Pakistan and Bangladesh, op. cit., 
p. 308. 
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Bengali nascent bourgeoisie and decided to remain aloof from the 
Liberation Movement. Another group decided to co-operate with the 
Awami League but interpreting its action as the first stage of the 
"two stage socialist revolution",118  . 	Ousting the Pakistanis, accord- 
ing to this group, was only the first stage in this process of tran-
sition. A third group among the leftist parties decided to remain 
inactive during the Liberation War because, according to them, a 
protracted war would help to radicalise the masses and allow the 
development of revolutionary infrastructure during the war 119 . 	This 
group was apprehensive about coming of power to the Awami League 
too soon as it would, according to them, only mean supplanting the 
non-local exploiters by the local ones120 . 
Along with its growing radicalization, the Awami League found 
it necessary to shift its stance regarding secularism in the national 
life. 	Earlier in 1970, election manifesto of the Awami League 
declared that Islam was the "favoured religion of the vast majority 
of the population" and that no law would be formulated or enforced 
contrary to the laws of Islam121 . During the Liberation War it became 
necessary to play up the cultural rather than the religious identity to 
obtain India's sympathy and support 122 . 	A formal transition to 
secularism was expediently done to win over more Indian sympathy and 
support. 	Simultaneously, the achievement of national identity as a 
crucial factor in nation building continued to remain an illusory 
118 Feroz Ahmed, op. cit., pp. 439-444. 
119 Ibid. 
120 Ibid. 
121 Awami League ManifestO, op. cit. 
122 See Joseph T. O'Connell, "Dilemmas of Secularism in Bangladesh" in 
Bardwell L. Smith, ed. Religion and Social Conflict in South Asia 
(Leiden, E.J. Brill, 1976), pp. 64-81. 
100 
concept for the people of Bangladesh123 . 	Despite the distinct 
historical, social, political, demographic and cultural features 
national identity of the people who inhabited the territory that is 
now Bangladesh seemed to be not well defined. 	The uncertainty about 
the national identity of Bangladesh arose from the constant conflict 
of her people between their adherence to the religion of Islam and 
their ethnic, geographic or cultural heritage. 	Historically, the 
duality of the culture of the Bengali Muslims had resulted out of the 
conflict between his being at the same time Bengali and a Muslim must 
as it happened for an Indian Muslim. The attachment of the Bengali 
Muslims remained strong to their Muslim legacy. The people of Bangla-
desh seemed to have opted out of extra-territorial consideration for a 
community separatism and religious identity in their earlier desire to 
form association with the Pakistan brand of nationalism124 But with 
the emergence of Bengali nationalism people of Bangladesh rejected both 
Muslim separatism and religion derived nationality. 	These factors 
made the option for Bangladeshi nationalism easier under the impact of 
a colonial legacy. 
The compulsion as above seemed to have led the Muni League 
leadership to formalise their public posture of Socialimn along with 
nationalism, secularism and democracy in the Constitution of the 
People's Republic of Bangladesh soon after Liberation125  . 	In this 
some of the earlier declared policies and programmes of the Awami 
League got expression in the Constitution. 	The Constitution envisaged 
a socialist society, free from exploitations, to be realised through' 
123 See Abidullah Gazi, "Muslim Bengal: A Crisis of Identity in South 
Asia" in Thomas and Levan, Bangladesh, op. cit., pp. 147-61, also 
Sunanda K. Datta-Ray, "Quest for Stability-Bangladesh:s Muslim 
Identity", The Statesman Weekly (Calcutta) Nay 24 & 31, 1980. 
124 S.M.M. Qureshi, "Pakistani Nationalism Reconsidered", Pacific 
Affairs, Vol. 45, (Winter 1972-73) pp. 556-572. 
125 Bangladesh Constitution, op. cit., Article 8(1). 
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the democratic process. 	In such a society, the rule of law, funda- 
mental human rights and freedom, equality and justice - political, 
economic and social - would be secured for all citizens. 	The State 
would adopt a planned economic growth and would be responsible for 
achieving constant increase in production to provide the people with 
basic necessities of life and steady improvement in the material and 
cultural standard of living of the people. 	The State would ensure 
a just and egalitarian society. 	It would take effective measures to 
remove social and economic inequality and ensure equitable distribution 
of wealth among citizens. 	It was envisaged in the Constitution that 
except for ownership by co-operative on behalf of their members and 
private ownership by individuals as prescribed by law, all instruments 
of production and distribution were to be owned and controlled by the 
people. 	The Constitution provided for acquisition, nationalisation 
or requisition of any property with or without compensation. 
In the election manifesto of 1970 simultaneously emphasizing 
Islamic values the Awami League made ft known that the party advocated 
the establishment of a socialist economy, and nationalisation of banking, 
insurance companies, jute industry, cotton textile and basic heavy indus-
tries. 	It was, however, never adequately debated in Bangladesh if 
Islam and Socialism were compatible although lively debates have been 
held in some other Muslim countries such as Indonesia and Egypt and 
also in the Western world 126 . 	It seems that deep in popular conscious- 
ness lay a belief among the ordinary Bengali Muslims that Islamic value 
and cultural systems were generally more agreeable to Socialism. 	Some 
126 Rosenthal mentions of one Muslim writer who claimed: "European 
socialists would be converted to Islam if they only knew that true 
socialism was taught in Islam alone and should be practised by 
every Muslim". See Erwin I.J. Rosenthal, Islam in the Modern 
National State, (Cambridge: University Press, 1965), p. 91. 
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scholastic writers have lent their support to this position. 	According 
to Mya Maung127, the philosophy of Islam tends to foster a collective 
social consciousness which is reflected in the concept of the Muslim 
community (Umma), the universal brotherhood and equality of believers, 
the social consciousness and oneness of God. 	The Koran's prohibition 
of usury along with its stress on alms-giving are 'thought to work against 
the acquisition of excessive wealth. Along with above Islamic values 
coupled with the less pronounced social differentiation, Bangladesh was 
apparently amenable to formation of a socialist society 128 . It has been 
argued by Etyptian and Indonesian scholars 129 that there is no dichotomy 
in man's pursuits of self interest on the earth and life hereafter or 
Islamic sanction of both private property and socialism so long as there 
is adherence to religious values. 	In other words, Islamic Socialism 
may not just be a lexicographic novelty but a practical proposition. 
127 Mya Maung, Burma and Pakistan: A Compar-Otive Study of Development, 
New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971), pp. 91-92. 
128 Maxime Rodinson on the other hand seems to think that Islam is 
poorly fitted to fly the banner of socialist economic construction. 
According to him, Islam is bound up historically with that tradi- 
tional society in which one of the fundamentals is practically 
untouchable status of private property. Rodinson points out that 
economic teachings of Islam, expressed in the Koran and in the 
Sunnah does not condemn in principle or hinder in practice, the 
development of the capitalistic sector in the economy. 	See 
Rodinson, Islam, 	op. cit. 
According to another scholar, Islam's fundamental concepts concern- 
ing the sanctity of contracts, the respect for private property, 
and the relationship of individual and State, are well in line 
with the trend of contemporary Western legal thought. 	Schacht, 
op. cit. 
129 See Donald E. Smith, ed., Religion, Politics and Social Change in 
the Third World (New York: The Free Press, 1971), pp. 237-243 and 
pp. 204-207. 
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According to Islam, Allah is the Owner of the earth and all its 
contents. 	But the earth is also the gift of Allah to man. 	So man 
can exploit the resources of earth for his material development. 
Truly, Islamic jurisprudence respects private property obtained by 
lawful means and prohibits any infringement of it; but the earthly 
owners of such property need to 
recognize in their property certain rights for others by 
which it seeks to attain social adjustment and realize a 
sense of brotherhood.. 130 
Islamic jurisprudence recognizes that compensation needs to be 
paid for loss or damage of such private property by the person who 
commits such acts. Private ownership is legitimate as long as the 
earthly owner abides by Allah's ordinances concerning such wealth. 
If the private owner fails to obey the ruler is entitled to devise 
laws and regulations which compel him to adhere to the injunctions of 
Allah. Accordingly, Islamic jurisprudence prohibits the monopoly of 
people's food and the necessities of their daily life. 	Islam thus 
gives sanction to public ownership of properties that are essential to 
people. 	Nationalisation of public institutions and monopolies to 
attain realisation of national interest, therefore, is within the 
legitimate rights of the government. 	In fact, according to the above 
interpretations, it becomes incumbent for the State to take over in 
certain cases such as monopolies of food and other essential commodities 
and services 131  . 	Individualism, it is argued, is not abolished by 
130 "The Mufti Answers Your Questions", Minbar Al-/slam, (Cairo: 
English ed.), July 1962, pp. 56, 58-60. Quoted in Ibid., p. 210. 
131 Ibid. p. 212. Mufti argues: "Faqihs-jurists - have unanimously 
prohibited the monopoly of people's food and the necessities of 
their daily life. The prohibition safeguards the interests of 
the people and is in accordance with the... tradition - hadith... 
Thus we can sanction the nationalization of public institutions 
indispensable to everyday life..." 
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virtue of nationalisation or socialisation 132 . 	Socialisation is 
only a means to realise social justice and the people's prosperity, 
which can be achieved without eliminating a certain class or group. 
Hence it is not necessary, the argument goes, to introduce socialisation 
of the whole economy. Nationalisation should be envisaged only when 
private sector fails to expand production or hinders productive 
activity. 
In the period preceding the Liberation, the academic circles, 
the national press or the legislatures did not debate the issues at 
any length. 	It seems at the time the aspects of economic exploit- 
ation by a non-indigenous capital and attainment of economic indepen-
dence were the major concerns of the Bengalis and the ideological 
aspects of nationalisation did not stimulate the Bengali intellectuals 
as much. 	However, it could have been possibly a different 
situation if any meaningful land reform proposal was introduced in 
the form of abolition of absentee landholding or rehabilitation of 
the landless labour on the lands they cultivate as sharecroppers or 
initiation of an effective system of co-operative agricultural farming. 
Petras133 has outlined a perspective for the transition to social-
ism in the periphery. 	Inequalities and penetration and interlock of 
class structures leave little room for a peaceful transition to social-
ism. Bangladesh at the time of Liberation in 1971 seemed to be on a 
wayward course. Objective conditions were not unsuitable for a radical 
132 In his speech delivered on Nay 21, 1962,Egypt's Nasser declared 
that nationalisation was not a blow to individual initiative but 
a guarantee to and an expansion of the range of general interest 
in cases affected by the socialist change, carried out for the 
benefit of the people. 	See Sigmund, op. cit., p. 133. 
133 J.F. Petras, "Class and Politics in the Periphery and the Transition 
to Socialism", The Review of Radical Political Economics, Vol. 8 
(2) (Summer, 1976), pp. 20-33. 
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transformation but in the absence of a radical leadership the movement 
passed on to the bourgeoisie which was effectively propagating 
socialist rhetoric but in reality its class character charted a differ-
ent path. 	The people of Bangladesh including its leadership, faltered 
within a twilight zone of different but not necessarily incompatible 
values and ideologies. 
Summary Observation  
The colonial economics of the British imperialism and the 
exploitative era of Pakistan were instrumental in the industrial 
backwardness of Bangladesh. 	The industrial structure that developed 
was distorted134 and can be at its best described as an example of 
"frustrated take-off" 135 . The ruling elites during the Pakistan 
period made industry the cornerstone of their strategy for economic 
development. The emphasis placed by them on the private sector 
tended to bias this strategy in favour of West Pakistan. 	The slow 
growth of the small scale industry, the enclave development of the 
large scale industries, existence of considerable underutilised 
capacity, high degree of capital intensity and non-emergence of 
indigenous Bengali entrepreneurship or large capital were the fruits 
of the economic policies pursued after the Partition and the establish-
ment of Pakistan. 
History of Bangladesh during the quarter century of its associa-
tion with Pakistan supports the hypothesis that political independence 
134 See for example, Gordon C. Winston, "Overinvoicing, Underutilization 
and Distorted Industrial Growth", Pakistan Development Review, Vol. 
10 (4) (1970), pp. 405-421. 
135 J.H. Power, "Industrialization in Pakistan: A Case of Frustrated 
Take-off?" Pakistan Development Review, Vol. 3, (1963), pp. 191- 207. 
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is meaningless without economic autonomy. There cannot be any stable 
political independence if foreign economic domination persists and 
foreign monopolies hold key branches of the economy. The crushing 
poverty of the vast majority together with colonial legacies strength-
ened the desire to own and control the means of production, distribution 
and exchange by the community. Primarily egalitarian character of the 
society, abject poverty, slow ripening of the capitalist attitude, lack 
of indigenous entrepreneurs or capital, policy discriminations and 
economic exploitations by the West Pakistan based ruling oligarchy, 
ownership of the major segments of the industrial and commercial houses 
including financial institutions by West Pakistani capitalists, radical 
views generated during various political movements and war of Liberation 
and transfer of resources to West Pakistan during 1947 and 1971 fostered 
a general apprehension toward private ownership of large scale indus-
tries, trading houses, financial institutions and other monopolies. 
There was also the pressure of a large majority of vocal students and 
the labour front radicalised before and during the armed struggle 
against Pakistan. 	Under these circumstances, there seemed to be not 
many policy options left for the post-liberation rulers in Bangladesh 
in respect of their formulation of economic and industrial policies. 
They declared the intention to pursue a dominant public sector policy. 
Nationalisation was the most important manifestation of this object. 
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CHAPTER III 
EXPERIMENTS IN NATIONALISATION 
Nationalisation could hardly have happened in Bangladesh fortuit-
ously. 	As examined earlier, the process of social, political and econ- 
omic experiences of the people of Bangladesh over past decades helped to 
mould the values, philosophies and material status which resulted in 
nationalisation being accepted as a major instrument of economic and 
industrial policy. The political elites explained nationalisation in 
terms of socialistic ideology. 	But as it will be seen in this chapter 
nationalisation in Bangladesh has served the purpose of patronising 
capitalism under the different regimes irrespective of their apparently 
dissimilar ideological orientations. Ambivalence of both the Awami 
League and the Military regimes contributed towards this dichotomy. 
In order to understand this dichotomy it may be in order to examine the 
relevance of the public postures of the ruling elites about nationalis-
ation in terms of the rhetoric, election manifesto, Constitution, plan-
ning strategy, and industrial policy in relation to the actual execution 
of nationalisation in Bangladesh. 
Political Rhetoric  
The immediate task at Liberation in the industrial sector was to 
resume production, provide employment and income to the workers, supply 
goods and services to the consumers and find access to foreign exchange 
to meet the import bills through exports of accumulated stock at the 
enterprises 1  . 	Owing to mass exodus of owners, managers, entrepreneurs, 
1 General Index of inudstrial (manufacturing) production in Bangladesh 
fell to 80.87 in 1972-73 as against 100 in the base year, 1969-70. 
Foreign Exchange Reserves of Bangladesh was nil from December 16, 1971 until January, 1972. See Government of Bangladesh, Statistical Year 
Book of Bangladesh, 1979 (Dacca: Bureau of Statistics, 1979), p. 237, 
Table 5.1; p. 317, Table 7.22. 
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technical and skilled personnel many of the enterprises abandoned by 
the non-local people came to a stand-still 2 . 	As a result in the 
initial stage management boards for the abandoned enterprises were set 
up regionwise under the leadership of officials of the Ministry of 
Industries. 	This seriously overstrained the meagre administrative 
resources of the government. 	These boards were practically replaced 
by the administrators, specially appointed to manage these enterprises. 
It was essentially a temporary arrangement. 	These administrators were 
mostly selected from the outsiders and out of personal choice of the 
political leaders without having regard to their educational or profes-
sional competence for the position3 . 
After the initial period of ad-hoc management, the need for a 
long term institutional and policy framework to cope with the problem 
of operating these enterprises was felt. 	The government had the option 
of handing over these enterprises to whatever private sector there was 
left. Alternatively, the government could nationalise them all or in 
part and run the enterprises as part of the public sector. 	There were 
practical difficulties in assuming managerial responsibility for as 
large as 786 enterprises with assets varying from Taka ten thousands to 
Taka fifty millions. 	Even if larger enterprises were to be taken over 
there was no unanimity where the line should be drawn and what should 
be drawn and what should be done with the units below the take-over 
line4 . There was also some uncertainty as to whether Bengali owned 
2 Supra., ChapterII, footnote 106. 
and owner classes the economy was 
and supply lines cut-off. 
3 Interview with a deputy director 
of a management board during the 
Sobhan, Nationalization, op. cit. 
Besides the exodus of the managerial 
devastated, communications disrupted 
of industries who served as a member 
period immediately following Liberation. 
, p. 187. 
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enterprises were to be excluded from being nationalised in the event 
of a decision to nationalise5 . 	Jute and cotton textile industries, in 
particular - contained the meagre Bengali entrepreneurialclass that existed 
and they were branded as the 'big capitalist class'. According to 
Sobhan, it would have been an anathema, in the prevalent mood of the 
people to let them survive, grow and prosper, and thus to connive at 
building the foundations of a virile and indigenous capitalist class 
who would have the potential to acquire far greater durability than the 
expatriate capitalists 6  . 
The political environment was appropriate for any radical move 
such as nationalisation. The people seemed to be willing to bear with 
any temporary dislocations which might have accompanied the nationalis-
ation decision 7 . 	There was a general feeling that industrial enter- 
prises had been set up at the expense and through exploitation of the 
people of Bangladesh and henceforth they should belong to the people. 
Even the idea of a transfer or sale of abandoned enterprises to Bengali 
moneyed class was resented and vehemently opposed. 	Thus immediately 
after Liberation, a prominent labour leader declared: 
A section of Bengali capitalist class is conspiring 
to buy the factories left by their original owners 
at nominal prices.. .We do not believe in private 
property and we are determined to uproot any budding 
capitalist at the very birth. 8 
5 Ibid., Rehman Sobhan was a Member of the Planning Commission and 
largely instrumental in the formulation of the industrial policy 
immediately after Liberation. 
6 Ibid., p. 188. Sobhan here admirably reflects the prevailing mood 
of the leadership and the people. 
7 Memories of political subjugation, economic exploitations and disparity 
in economic and industrial development under a free-enterprise policy 
were too vivid. Only 47 per cent of fixed assets in the private sector 
were owned by local Bengalis. 
8 Extracts from the speech of Abdul Mannan, General Secretary of the 
Jatiyo Sramik League - the labour front of the ruling Awami League on 
January 1, 1972; reported in the Bengali daily, Ittefaq (Dacca). Also April 11, 1972 issue of the daily. 
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The same labour leader demanded that no factories under govern-
ment management were to be transferred to any private ownership 9  . 
Several organised groups including employees' federation of financial 
institutions demanded nationalisation of banks, insurance companies 
and heavy industries 10 . 	The student front of the Awami League in a 
resolution of its central committee declared: 
The true and equal rights in the society, rather than 
the establishment of democracy will be possible only . 
through the complete abolition of economic inequality 
and a full socialistic system. 11 
There seemed to pervade a lurking apprehension about the resur-
gence of a capitalist class which, at times were bluntly expressed and 
in no uncertain terms. 	A labour leader declared that sacrifice in 
blood during the Liberation War was made not to create another Bengali 
capitalist class but for the establishment of an exploitation-free 
society12 . 
The government could not overlook the prevailing environment 
and the popular mood. 	The top personalities in the Awami League 
Government had to assure the people repeatedly as to their intentions. 
The Vice-President of the new republic affirmed to the nation that the 
taken over industries would not be restored to their former owners 
whether Bengalis or non-Bengalis. 	He announced : 
The government shall very soon nationalise the major 
industrial enterprises and commercial establishments 
owned by the foreigners in 
of socialism. 13 
order to achieve the goals 
9 The Daily Ittefaq, 22 March_ 1972. 
10 • The Daily Ittefaq, 23 January 1972. 
11 The Daily Ittefaq, 24 March 1972. 
12 The Daily Ittefaq, 20 March 1972. 
13 The Daily Ittefaq, 19 January 1972. 
A senior minister in the government declared: 
It shall not be permitted to help grow a capitalist 
class in Bangladesh...The Awami League Government is 
determined as pledged to establish socialism in the 
country. 14  
It was in this atmosphere that the decision to nationalise the banks, 
insurance and the major industries was announced by the government. 
The Prime Minister, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman declared: 
My government believes in internal social revolution. 
There must be a change in old social systems...My 
government and the party are pledged to introduce a 
scientific socialist economy.. .First step, namely, 
nationalisation has been taken as the beginning of 
a planned programme towards socialisation of resources. 15 
The Finance Minister claimed that nationalisation was a bold step 
	
towards establishment of a "complete socialism" in the country. 	This 
would enable the people to enjoy the profits of the industrial enter-
prises which were previously appropriated by a few capitalists 16 . 
Similarly the Industries Minister claimed that nationalisation would 
bring "revolutionary change" in the industrial field 17 and in explaining 
the decision stated: 
During the period of Pakistani Administration a monopoly 
capitalism of twenty two families was established in the 
name of development. These twenty two families controlled 
the economy. 	They also used to control politics with a 
view to safeguard their monopoly capitalism. In this 
their major shareholdings in banks, insurance business 
and foreign trade helped...The principal objective of the 
bloody War of Liberation was to attain economic freedom, 
...and freedom from all sorts of political and economic 
servitude. 18 
14 The Daily Ittefaq, 16 March 1972. Speech of Khandkar Mushtaque 
Ahmed who later became the President of Bangladesh after the 
military coup in August, 1975. 
15 The Daily Ittefaq, 27 March 1972. 
16 The Daily Ittefaq, 3 April 1972, Speech of Tajuddin Ahmed. 
17 The Daily Ittefaq, 24 January, 1972. 
18 The Daily Ittefaq, 3 April 1972. 
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There was no public opposition against the nationalisation programme. 
The Bengali daily Ittefaq, known for its views generally supporting 
free enterprise editorially mentioned: 
The government has demonstrated a firmness in 
nationalising banks, insurance and major industries 
true to its pledge)- 9 
There was no public articulation of views opposing the nationalisation 
programme by the Bengali private sector either. Bengali capitalists 
and financial interests were never a strong and consolidated force. 
Most of them owed their existence and prosperity to their partnership 
with West Pakistan interests and as such they could never establish a 
firm stronghold in the Awami League. 	It is because of this the existing 
Bengali private sector could not operate as a powerful pressure group 
affecting the policies within the Awami League. After the Liberation 
and expulsion of the Pakistani forces these Bengali private sector 
interests found themselves without any political ally and failed to 
work out a suitable strategy to protect and promote their interests 20 . 
Some questions were raised about the character of nationalisation 
programme 	The daily Ittefaq brought out a very mild critique as 
follows: 
Already doubts have been expressed that...for fear of 
nationalisation much of our resources are being trans-
ferred to foreign banks instead of investing them 
towards industrial production. 21 
The nationalisation programme, according to a commentator in Bangladesh, 
suffered from two major shortcomings. 	It ignored the practical diffi- 
culties which might thwart implementation. 	Second, it had wrong 
19 The Daily Ittefdq, 28 March, 1972, Editorial. 
20 Badruddin Umar, "They Call It Socialism!", The Holiday, 23 April 1972. 
21 The Daily Ittefdq, 3 May 1972, Editorial. 
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priorities. He suggested it was far easier to announce a programme 
to invent and devise appropriate institutions which would be necessary 
for its implementation. 	The planners of the Awami League appeared 
to be not really conscious either of the forces of resistance or of 
the need for appropriate institutional requirements for the implement-
ation of the programme which they had launched 22 . 	There was no 
opposition to nationalisation per se during the period immediately 
after Liberation. 	Apart from the above comments, the contention of 
a member in the Parliament that there was not a single person who 
opposed nationalisation at the time was not far from truth 23 . 
There were signs of awareness too that nationalisation would 
not, by itself, and automatically give rise to establishment of a 
socialistic society. 	A senior member of the Parliament stated that 
this nationalisation is not socialism and it cannot be 
said that this is the first step of socialism. This 
has set up a state capitalism and which is not conducive 
to (the growth of) socialism. 24 
It was argued that although Bangladesh adopted socialism as a funda-
mental principle of the State, the economy was far from being modelled 
in a socialistic economic pattern. 	The economy contained most of the 
characteristics of capitalism. The State had totally insufficient 
control over production, supply distribution, demand and purchasing 
power. As an observer stated, the overall economy of Bangladesh was 
22 Badruddin Umar, "Nationalisation: Cart Before The Horse", The 
Holiday, 12 April 1972. 
23 Speech of Mahiuddin Ahmed on April 13, 1973, a member of the Bangla-
desh Parliament. He said, "We did not find a single person who 
opposed at the time of nationalisation. See Bangladesh Parliament, 
Bangladesh Jatiyo Sangshader Bitarka Sarkari Bibaroni PPatham Khanda 
1973 (7th April to 19th April, 1973), p. 144 (hereinafter referred 
to as Debates). 
24 Debates, 12 April 1973, Vol. I, No. 3, p. 89. 
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a mixture of half socialism and half capitalism 25 . 	The government 
was yet to adopt or even to initiate a definite programme to achieve 
the avowed goals of socialism. There were as yet no changes in the 
rules, regulations and the system as they existed. 	Nowhere was a 
socialistic system being practised or was in the offing, as for example, 
in respect of work production, industrial production, agricultural 
production, utilisation of the manpower or the educational system. A 
major criticism of the nationalisation programme of the Awami League 
was its policy of keeping the marketing and distribution of the products 
of the nationalised sector insulated from public sector control and 
management. While production processes were State owned and controlled 
the marketing and distribution were left to the private sector dominated 
by greedy agents, dishonest wholesalers and retailers. The lacuna, 
according to a commentator was going to frustrate the move towards 
socialism26 . 
Doubts were raised about the socialistic pretensions of the 
Awami League. 	It was argued that although nationalisation and some 
other measures taken by the Awami League resembled socialistic methods, 
it could not be characterised as a socialistic organisation 27 . 	As 
previously noted 28 during the course of Liberation a large number of 
socialistic elements gathered under the banner of the Awami League 
and there were all varieties of leftists who had been popularising the 
socialiStic ideas for a long time. 	But the Awami League did not 
transform into a revolutionary organisation simply because it led the 
25 The Daily Ittefaq, 25 June 1972. 
26 Rizwanul Islam, "On Nationalisation", The Daily Ittefaq, 19 May 1972. 
27 Umar, Cart, op. cit. 
28 Supra., Chapter II. 
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armed struggle towards the Liberation of Bangladesh; similarly the Awam-i 
League did not become a leftist organisation by adopting socialism as 
a fundamental principle of the State 29 . 	The Alwami League was not a 
revolutionary government for the same reasons it was not a revolutionary 
political party 30 . The Awami League was possibly not more than 
reflecting the popular will and responding to popular pressures. 	The 
vast majority of the middle class within theAwami League leadership 31  
would have much liked to grab the "abandoned" enterprises, if they 
could 32 . 
It was stated by the Awami League leaders that the ultimate 
objectives of the various policy declarations made by them concerning 
industries, trade and agriculture, was the establishment of socialism. 
In a socialistic economy theabolitionof capitalist ownership and 
establishment of public ownership of the basic means of production are 
regarded as cardinal laws of the transition from capitalism to socialism. 
Any country which likes to follow a road to socialism must pursue a 
course of "socialistic nationalisation of industry II33 	But while 
the government in Bangladesh declared that the framework for its 
development was to be that of a socialist State, it was never explained 
with any clarity what exactly was meant by a socialist framework in the 
29 Abul Mansur Ahmad, "Whether the government in Bangladesh is revolu- 
tionary or an elected one?" The Daily Itteraq, 8 September 1972. 
30 /bid. 
31 For the background of the members of Bangladesh Parliament see, 
Rounaq Jahan, "Members of Parliament in Bangladesh" Legislative 
Studies Quarterly, Spring, 1976; Out of 315 members in the Bangladesh 
Parliament on the basis of election held in 1973, more than 36 per 
cent of the members were professional lawyers and physicians; 17 per 
cent of the members were businessmen and 12 per cent of the members 
were agriculturalists. Also see Bangladesh Parliament (44 Hand Book), 
Dacca; 1974. 
32 Eneyetullah Khan, "The State of the Nation", The Holiday, 22 October 1972. 
33 Vinogradov, op. cit., p. 5. 
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contextof Bangladesh. Prime Minister Sheikh Mujibur Rahman's reply to 
a query as to what he meant by Bangladeshi socialism was typically 
evasive. 	His reply was: 
Socialism as we shall practise in Bangladesh. 34 
The statement of the Law Minister, Dr. Kamal Hussain on the floor of 
the Constituent Assembly was vague and full of generalities. 	He 
stated that: 
...to us socialism means freedom from economic 
exploitation. 	By socialism we understand a 
social system in which everybody would equally 
share the needed sacrifice to build up the nation 
and its economic system. 35 
The brand of socialism avowed by the Awami League continued to remain 
unidentified. The political ideal and pattern of the Awami League 
administration came to appear as the continuation of goals and issues 
in general terms as embodied in the manifesto of 1970 elections. 	The 
Awami League did not spell out a comprehensive socio-economic programme 
during its two decades of existence since 1948. The Awami League 
could define for itself only a mild social democratic position in the 
mid 1960 's 36 . 	The Six Point Formula37 which was the response of the 
Awami League to the political and economic subjugation by West Pakistan 
merely took note of the cumulative effects of economic injustices done 
to Bangladesh. 	The Formula, in taking note of insufficient industrial- 
isation in Bangladesh pointed out that the little industrialisation 
34 Robinson & Griffin, op. cit., p. 13. 
35 Bangladesh Parliament, Bangladesh Gono-parishoder Bitarka, Vol. II, 
No. 1, 1972 [in Bengali] (Dacca: Government Press, 1972), p. 24. 
36 During the provincial elections in Bangladesh in 1954 the combined 
opposition programme included nationalisation of jute trade and 
abolition of the system of landlordism. 
37 Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, Our Charter for Survival: Six Point Programme 
(Dacca: Pioneer Press, 1966). 
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which had taken place was by the non-locals. 	This was, in effect, 
foreign investment both in the matter of employment and remittance of 
profit. Beyond this, the Six Point Formula did not contain any radical 
measure suggestive of socialistic orientation on the part of the Awami 
League. The objectives and programmes of the party were expressed in 
broadest terms so that wide options could be retained in selecting 
policies and programmes by the practical and pragmatic politicians of 
the Awami League38 . The ideological framework of the Awami League was 
thus more designed to accommodate divergent groups than to form specific 
guidelines for policy formulation and development 39 . 
A sense of urgency before the general elections in 1970 however, 
tended to make it politically imperative to make some public display of 
its socialist goals. In this regard, the Awami League could capitalise 
on the deep sense of exploitation already felt in Bangladesh 40 . 	The 
Awami League therefore, found no uncertainty at the time in introducing 
some socialistic elements in its election promises. The manifesto of 
the Awami League for 1970 general elections 41 carried not a few social- 
istic shibboleths. 	The manifesto deplored "the concentration of wealth 
in the hands of the privileged few" and stressed "radical change in the 
38 For an account of the emergence of the Awami League see, Rashiduz-, zaman, Awami League, op. cit. 
39 The Law Minister said in an interview: "We are not doctrinaire. 
Ours is not an ideological party" see, Stephen Clarkson, "The 
Emergence of Bangladesh and its Ensuing Foreign Relations Bangladesh: 
The Model Muddle" in Barbara Thomas & Spencer - Lavan eds. West Bengal 
and Bangladesh: Perspectives from 1972 (Michigan State University, 
Asian Studies Center, Occasional Paper No. 21, 1973), pp. 237-41. 
40 Supra. Chapter II. 
41 General elections in Pakistan were held for the first time after 1947 
in December, 1970. The Awami League won a landslide victory in 
Bangladesh. 
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structure of the economic systems". The basic aim of the Awami League 
programme was, as announced in the manifesto, the creation of a just 
and egalitarian society free from exploitation. The vision was that 
of a 
socialistic economic order in which economic justices 
would be removed.. .and provisions made for the just 
distribution of the fruits of such growth among all 
sections of the people... 42 
The manifesto took note of the fact that at the root of social 
inequalities lay a defective institutional framework which made private 
enterprise the sole vehicle of economic growth. The pursuit of 
private profit led inevitably to concentration of wealth in a few hands 
and to the control of the key sectors of the economy by powerful 
coteries. 	The Awami League, therefore, intended to 
alter the institutional framework of the economy by 
measures of nationalisation and the extension of the 
public sector, by the development of co-operative 
enterprises and by the evolution of new institutional 
arrangements such as workers' participation in the 
equity and management of industrial enterprises. 43 
The manifesto envisaged the programme of nationalisation as a precon-
dition for achieving economic growth in conformity with the goal of 
social justice. As the past policies of industrial development had 
shown scant regard for the fulfilment of social needs the Awami League 
programme set the basic goals of industrialisation as: 
(i) creating an industrial base capable of meeting the basic 
requirements of capital and consumer goods; 
(ii) reducing the dependence for basic requirements upon external 
resources; 
(iii) creating employment. 44 
42 Awami League Manifesto, op. cit. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid. 
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The manifesto contained a limited proposal for nationalisation of 
heavy industries including iron and steel, mining, machine tools, 
heavy engineering, petro-chemicals, fertiliser, cement, fuel and 
power45 . 	It also called for nationalisation of banking, insurance, 
foreign trade, jute and cotton trade, airlines, international transport 
and shipping. However, not one significant enterprise in the indus-
tries specifically mentioned was in fact in the private sector. 	Air- 
lines and most of the international transport were already in the 
public sector. Almost every political party in 1970 wanted national-
isation of banks, insurance business, public transport:, State trading 
of major exports etc. The programme of the Amami LaNagaewhen trans-
lated into specific economic programme was no radical than perhaps, 
the manifesto of the rightist Convention Muslim League Party in 1970 46 
which envisaged the same pattern of the public sector as the Awami 
League without indulging the semantics of socialism. 	The manifesto 
did not contain any significant proposal for land reform which was 
crucial for improvement in the major sector of production in the 
country47 . 
The public posture of the Awami League on socialism continued 
after Liberation and the new party constitution of the Awami League 
reiterated that the aim of the party was to 
45 Ibid. 
46 For the text of the Convention Muslim League Manifesto for the 
general elections in 1970 see Tariq Ali, Pakistan Military Rule 
or People's Power, (London: Jonathan Cope, 1970), pp. 255-59. 
47 See Azizur Rahman Khan, "Bangladesh: Economic Policies since 
Independence", South Asian Review, Vol. 8. (1947), pp. 13-32. 
establish the political, economic, social and 
cultural rights of all classes of people of 
Bangladesh and an exploitation free society. 48 
The manifesto of the Awami League for the general elections held in 
1973 re-emphasized its determination "to build a socialist economic 
structure" and to take up "programme for expanding the people's 
ownership of the basic industries and means of production". 49 
The formal expression of the Awami League socialism was embodied 
in the Constitution of the People's Republic of Bangladesh. 	The 
Constitution envisaged a socialist society free from exploitations, 
to be realised through the democrat process. 	In a society, the rule 
of law, fundamental human rights and freedom, equality and justice - 
political, economic and social would be secured for all citizens 50 . 
The State would adopt a planned economic growth and would be respon-
sible for achieving constant increase in production to provide the 
people with basic necessities of life and steady improvement in the 
material and cultural standard of living. The State would ensure a 
just and egalitarian society and would take effective measures to 
remove social and economic inequality and ensure equitable distribution 
of wealth among citizens 51 . 	The Constitution envisaged that except 
for ownership by co-operatives on behalf of their members and private 
ownership by individuals as prescribed by law, all instruments and 
means of production and distribution were to be awned and controlled 
48 Zillur Rahman, Bangladesher Awami Leaguer Gathontantra, in Bengali 
(Constitution of the Bangladesh Awami League) (Dacca: Bangladesh 
Awami League, not dated). 
49 Bangladesh Awami League, Bangladesher Awami Leag:.:er Nirbachoni 
Istehar,[in Bengali (Election Manifesto of Bangladesh Awami League) 
(Dacca: Bangladesh Co-operative Book Society Press, 1973), pp. 6-7. 
50 Constitution, op. cit. p. 1, Preamble. 
51 Ibid., pp. 5 & 7, Articles 10 & 19 (2). 
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by the people 52 . 	The Constitution provided for acquisition, national- 
isation or requisition of any property with or without compensation53 . 
In a legislature almost absolutely dominated by the Amami 
League, the enactment of the Constitution faced little criticism54 . 
However, some of the criticisms were not trivial though ignored at the 
time. 	The Constitution was criticised for aiming to create a unique 
system of dictatorship by the Prime Minister; it was intended for a 
perpetual emergency; and the socialist provisions failed to satisfy 
the socialists who thought that making socialism a part of the funda-
mental principles of the State policy, without making that principle 
enforceable in a court of law, would not lead to the establishment of 
socialism55  . 
The political philosophy of Bangladesh as reflected in the 
Constitution and according to the classical theory in the Marxist-
Leninist tradition, suffered from internal contradiction by aiming 
to attain socialism through traditional parliamentary democracy 56 . 
The Constitution provided, on the one hand, for a nationalised public 
sector embracing the key sectors of the economy57 and on the other for 
emancipating the peasants and workers from all forms of exploitation. 
But the greater part of the economy - the bulk of agriculture sector 
was left outside the public sector. The State would endeavour to 
52 Ibid., p. 6, Article 13. 
53 Ibid., pp. 14-15, Article 42. 
54 Abdul Fazl Hug, "Constitution Making in Bangladesh", Pacific Affairs, 
Vol. 66 (Spring, 1973), pp. 59-76. 
55 See for example, the statement of Maulana Bhashani, reported in the 
Daily Ittefaq, 15 November 1972. 
56 Md. Anisur Rahman, "Priorities and Methods for Socialist Develop-
ment of Bangladesh" -in Robinson & Griffin, op. cit., p. 16. 
57 Constitution, op. cit., Article 13 (a). 
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create condition in which, as a general principle, persons shall not 
be able to enjoy unearned income 58 and allow private ownership of the 
means of production and distribution to exist. 	It provided for 
parliamentary democracy of traditional Western variety where socialists 
_ and non-socialists, the exploiter and. the exploited, would have equal 
rights but unequal opportunities to seek election and seize power 59 . 
The contradictions within the Awami League became apparent 
early in the controversies over introduction of pure socialism or 
mixed economy. The controversies led to factionalism within the 
top echelon of the party and the government tilted the balance in 
favour of the rightist faction of the party when in the middle of 
1974 economic situation reached a crisis proportion and massive foreign 
aid was required60 . Incapacity in the economic management 61 and its 
wanton acts of patronage eroded the popularity of the Awami League. 
In its desperate attempt to suppress an increasingly vocal opposition 61 
the Awami League Government gave up the facade of parliamentary 
democracy and resorted to the device of a one-party dictatorship and 
58 Constitution, op. cit., Article 20 (2). 
59 Anisur Rahman, Priorities and Methods, op. cit. 
60 The economy of the country had virtually collapsed by the middle 
of 1974. See Talukder Maniruzzaman "Bangladesh in 1974: Economic 
Crisis and Political Polarisation", Asian Survey, Vol. 15 (February 1975), pp. 117-128. 
61 Rounaq Jahan, "Bangabandhu and After:Conflict and Change in Bangla-
desh", The Round Table, Vol. 66 (January 1976) pp. 73-84. 
62 The Real threat came from the radical revolutionary parties. 
These parties had been articulating the view that the Awami League 
Government were "representatives of exploiting classes of Bangla-
desh" and agents of "expansionist" and "imperialist" powers. 
They were arguing that the 1971 revolution was unfinished and the 
"puppet government" led by the Awami League must be replaced by 
force under the leadership of workers and peasants so that a 
"national democratic revolution" could be completed. 	See, Maniruzzaman, Economic Crisis, op. cit., pp. 120-22. 
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totalitarian control. 	The Constitution was amended to provide for 
a presidential form of government. A State of Emergency was declared 
and all fundamental rights conferred by the Constitution were suspen-
ded63 . The Awami League Government's attempt to deploy the Army as 
aid to Civil Administration" finally ended up in its own ouster from 
power in the tradition of pre-liberation military coups. 
The military regime which replaced the Awami League, however, 
faced certain criticism from the radical elements. 	The leftist 
parties called for the formation of "revolutionary councils among the 
soldiers, industrial workers, peasants and intellectuals to usher a 
proletariat revolution" 65 . 	The military elite was criticised as it 
was allegedly being led towards an "anti-revolutionary direction by 
the rightist reactionaries and pro-U.S.A. elements”66 . 	In fact, the 
group character of the new military elite was hardly any different 
from the political elite it replaced. The officers of the Bangladesh 
Army came from the middle class families (landholders and urban 
employees) like the ruling political elite it succeeded 67 . 	Although 
traditionally apolitical 68 discrimination against them by the Pakistani 
administration and their participation in the Liberation War helped 
63 Talukder Maniruzzaman, "Bangladesh in 1975: The Fall of the Mujib 
Regime and its Aftermath", Asian Survey Vol. '16, (February 1976) pp. 
119•12 . Also, Jahan, Bangabandhu, op. cit. 
64 Barua, op. cit.,pp. 209-210. 
65 Maniruzzaman, Bangladesh 1975, op. cit. 
66 Talukder Maniruzzaman, "Bangladesh in 1976: Struggle for Survival 
as an Independent State", Asian Survey, Vol. 17, (February, 1977) 
p. 195. 
67 Barua, op. cit., pp. 202 and 207. A systematic study on the socio-
economic background of the officers in the Bangladesh Army is still 
awaited. 
68 Ibid., p. 202. 
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substantially to policise them69 . 	They became further disenchanted 
with the Awami League Government as the latter did allegedly give only 
inadequate recognition to the contribution of the Army toward the 
Liberation70 . The officers in the Bangladesh Army, a few in number 
but trained in British-Pakistani tradition were socially a closed, 
cohesive and elite group with a sense of professional pride 71 which 
stood magnified owing to personal contributions of a number of 
officers in the Liberation War. 	In addition, for the military elite, 
a continuance of the military rule or their position of dominant 
authority meant an access to virtually unlimited upward social mobility. 
The military regime could draw its strength from the closely knit 
group of officers and above all from the possession of arms, to prolong 
and if possible, to perpetuate its hold over the State. 	In order to 
widen its popular support, the military elite "made several gestures 
to the growing Muslim sentiment" in Bangladesh 72 . 	The Constitution 
although not abrogated was amended by a Martial Law Proclamation" 
abandoning "secularism" as a fundamental principle of the State and 
inserting instead some Islamic provisions. 	Socialism in the Consti- 
tution modified by the military administration was to mean henceforth 
as "economic and social justice" together with the principles derived 
69 M. Rashiduzzaman, "Changing Political Patterns in Bangladesh: 
Internal Constraints and External Fears", Asian Survey, Vol. 17 
(September, 1977), pp. 792-808. 	Also, Jahan,'&mgabandhu, op. 
cit., Maniruzzanan, Bangladesh 1975, op. cit. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Barua, op. cit., see Chapter 13. It is not to say that there was 
no factionalism within the Bangladesh Army. Indeed there were 
successive coups and counter-coups but in their attitude toward 
supremacy of the martial law administration over the civil adminis- 
tration most of the military officers seemed to have hardly any 
difference. 
72 Rashiduzzaman, Patterns Bangladesh, op. cit. 
73 Martial Law took precedence over the constitutional law. Parliament 
was dissolved. 
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from it as set out in the Constitution. The Constitutional provisions 
regarding acquisition, nationalisation and requisition of property were 
amended to make room for compensation 74 . The military administration 
also paved the way for a future change in nationalisation policy by 
making provisions in the Constitution allowing the articles regarding 
nationalisation to be amended by a simple majority vote in the Parlia-
ment instead of the previous requirement of a two thirds majority 75  . 
Simultaneously in pursuit of political legitimacy a referendum was 
held to validate General Ziaur Rahman as the President and national 
elections were promised at the end of 1978. With the same end in 
view economic policies were being revised to attract domestic and 
foreign investments. There was no instance of further nationalisation 
after the military take over 76 . 
Planning Strategy  
As the dialectical contradition set out above continued to 
persist, the planners in Bangladesh were left in the position to plan 
without a clear political consensus 77 . The First Five Year Plan of 
Bangladesh for the period 1973-78 (FFYP) was, therefore, without any 
firm political commitment from the political leadership leaving it 
74 Constitution, op. cit., Articl 42 read with the Proclamation 
(Amendment) Order, 1977 in April, 1977. 
75 Ibid., Constitution, op. cit., Article 47 (2). 
76 M. Rashiduzzaman, "Bangladesh in 1977: Dilemmas of the Military 
Rulers", Asian Survey, Vol. 18 (1978), pp. 126-134. 
77 See, Anisur Rahman, Priorities and Methods, op. cit., p. 16. 
Rahman was a member of the Planning Commission under the Amaral 
League regime. Also see Emajuddin Ahmed, "Development Strategy 
in Bangladesh: Probable Political Consequences", Asian Survey, Vol. 18, (1978) pp. 1168-80. Rahim, Planning Strategy, op. cit. 
Inside account may be had from Islam, Development Planning, op. cit. 
specially pp. 33-39 and pp. 21-23. 
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without the necessary political support. 	The FFYP, no doubt, made 
an attempt to outline a concrete framework and strategies for achieving 
the socialistic goals. 	But in the absence of a political commitment 
the planning for socialist development of Bangladesh as embodied in 
the plan document was destined to be abortive. An examination of the 
FFYP document reveals that the authors of the Plan were not unaware of 
the unsure grounds on which they were treading. The Plan was a 
comprehensive document which attempted to give shape to the policies 
of the government and its socialist intentions as enshrined in the 
Constitution. 	But the Plan was also cautious and took note of the 
fact that 
the ideal of socialism cannot be translated into reality 
as easily or as quickly as the other three principles of 
State policy. 78 
• The Plan observed that at the time of its preparation socialism 
remained a vision and a dream. Although some steps were already 
taken in this direction much more was needed to be done if Bangladesh 
was to avoid the painful processes which countries had to go through 
in their quest for a socialist way of life 79 . 	The Plan listed the 
removal of the capitalist system of income distribution; of the private 
ownership of the means of production; and of the precapitalist mercan-
tile or feudal forms of production relations as necessary preconditions 
for socialist development. Depending upon the objective condition of 
the society this may have to be done in stages. Yet no plan for 
socialist transformation can afford to ignore the basic necessity of 
fulfilling these preconditions. 	A programme for a socialist trans- 
78 FFYP, op. cit., p. 1. 
79 Ibid. 
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formation, the Plan pointed out, would have to identify clearly the 
form and manner in which the mercantile and feudal production relations 
function and the measures to be taken to eliminate them. 	In an under- 
developed economy like Bangladesh, the Plan pointed out, the socialist 
transformation of the economy must accompany the growth of productive 
forces. Anything which hampers increase in productivity or growth of 
productive forces and dissipate the meagre resources in unproductive 
activities and unnecessary consumption is in contradition with the 
basic principles of socialism 80 . 
As the authors of the FFYP saw it, for a well formulated 
socialist plan, the basic premise had to be that the government and 
the ruling party would have the will and determination to transform a 
society where productivity, discipline and savings were the basic 
tenets of economic activity81 . The Plan therefore, called for a 
political cadre with firm roots in the people and motivated by the 
new ideology and willing to live and work among the people as one of 
them. 	Finally, the Plan realised that 
execution of policies and programmes depends entirely 
on the political will of the country and as such or the 
commitment and the effectiveness of the leadership, the 
ability of the party in power and mobilise the people 
and the dedicated functioning of the goverment machinery. 82 
To the authors of the FFYP, planning appeared, undoubtedly to 
be more a political process than merely an economic device. However, 
it seems that the planners remained uncertain about the commitment of•
the political leadership. According to a World Bank report, the 
First Plan suffered from the lack of any clear conception where the 
80 Ibid., p. 2. 
81 Ibid., p. 3. 
82 Ibid., p. 2. 
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economy was headed and did not provide firm guidance on the central 
issues facing the economy 83 . 	This only tended to bring out the 
inherent contradiction between what the planners had conceived and 
the political leadership had intended. 
The uncertainties of the planners did not subside with the 
preparation and launching of the Two Year Plan 1978-80 84 during the 
military regime. As the military administration effected profound 
changes in the national philosophy the planners were inclined to 
emphasize the transitional nature of the political economy85 . 	The 
planners noted that during the post-Awami League administration prag-
matic economic policies were being gradually introduced, new emphasis 
was being laid and new dimensions being added in priorities and 
strategies. There were new incentives provided to enable the private 
sector to play its "legitimate role" in development86 . Yet in the 
absence of political decisions on crucial issues of land reform or 
determination of relationship between public and private sector, it 
was decided to launch a short-term plan until the political consensus 
was available through promised future general elections. As reflec-
ted in the draft of the Two Year Plan (TYP) in March 1978 the plan 
authors seemed to have viewed the TYP and its policy implications as 
"short term affairs" 87 . 	The TYP was apparently construed by them as 
a launching pad for the Second Five Year Plan 1980-85. The TYP was 
formulated taking "specific cognizance" of the socio-economic objectives 
83 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Bangladesh 
Development in a Rural Economy Volume 1: The Main Report, September, 
1974, p. 24. 
84 TYP, op. cit., p. 291. 
85 Ibid., Supra., Introduction. 
86 /bid., p. 149. 
87 Ibid., p. 291. 
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of the military regime as declared in the "Nineteen Point Progranmen 88 
which envisaged "social and economic justice" in all spheres of 
national life. 
The TYP expressed "uncertainties" about the relative roles of 
the private sector and the nationalised industries. The Plan document 
noted that the government was "keen to enable the private sector to 
play its role as envisaged in the Constitution and the laws of the 
land" 89 and various steps were taken by the government to provide 
"a climate for private investment". Even then the TYP posed the 
question 
as to whether these developments in public and private 
sector would stabilize as a settled feature so as to 
depict a trend or they will pass as transient features 
in the economy. 90 
The framers of the TYP, therefore, thoughfit 
discreet to wait for certain trends and patterns to 
emerge before undertaking a long term planning. 91 
Not surprisingly, the independent observers in Bangladesh found the 
TYP suffering from confusions, vagueness and evasiveness - essentially 
"an extension of the First Five Year Plan" that failed to make a 
"breakway from a conventional plan making" 92 . Having no conception 
of the society to be developed, as admitted by the planners themselves, 
88 See Government of Bangladesh, Ministry of Information, Address to 
the Nation by the President of the People 's Republic of Bangladesh 
Major General Ziaur Rahman, Dacca: April 30, 1977, (Dacca: 
Bangladesh Government Press, 1977) pp. 6-7. The speech outlined 
the military government policies and programmes. 
89 TYP, op. cit. 
90 Ibid., p. 25. 
91 Ibid., p. 25. 
92 Report of the Panel of Economists on the Preliminary Draft of the 
TOo Year Plan (1978-80) (Dacca, March, 1978) Mimeo, p. 5. 
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the exercise was bound to suffer from aimlessness. As the planners 
were not sure whether definition of the socio-economic characteristics 
of the society had been meaningfullyidentiffixiby the Military Adminis-
tration, the various objectives set in TYP were often in conflict with 
one another. Notwithstanding the hesitance expressed in the TYP the 
development strategy adopted by the military regime was clearly designed 
to encourage private enterprise, both local and foreign 93 . 	In essence, 
this strategy was similar to what was practised during the Pakistan 
period. 	The policy was likely to result in segmented economic growth 
both in class and regional terms 94 . 	As in industry sector, strategy 
in agriculture consisted in promoting through massive subsidies to the 
farmers. 	The emphasis on technology, tended to benefit the large and 
middle farmers and enrich them substantially. All these were going 
to increase inequality in income distribution 95 . 	This was obviously 
against the avowed goal of the military regime to ensure "social and 
economic justice". 
Industrial Investment Policies  
The Industrial Investment Policy for 1972-73 was announced in 
January, 1973 in order to help clarify the position in respect of 
industrial policy in general and private sector in particular. 	It was 
the first such step taken by the government since nationalisation in 
March, 1972. 	The delay in framing and announcing an industrial policy 
93 One of the military regime's 19 point policies and programme was 
"to give necessary incentive to the private sector for the economic 
development of the country", see also Emajuddin, op. cit. 
94 /bid. 
95 Ibid. Also see Rizwanul Islam, "What Has Been Happening to Rural 
Income Distribution in Bangladesh?" Development and Change, Vol. 
10 (1979), pp. 335-401. 
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had in fact stopped any expansion in the private industrial sector. 
Lack of clarification in respect of the constitutional provisions 
created hindrances96 . 	There were also some enterprises which were 
not nationalised but were simply taken over by the government. The 
ownership of these enterprises remained with the private sector. 	In 
• the absence of an industrial policy clarifying these aspects the 
private sector was naturally unwilling to come forward for investment 97 
It was reported that the moneyed class were transferring their capital 
abroad obviously through clandestine means as foreign exchange 
regulations did not permit unlimited transfers 98 . 
The Industrial Investment Policy stated that the government had 
to assume 
the enormous responsibility of replacing the entre-
preneurs and managers for efficient and effective 
management in the public sector. 99 
96 The noted commentator and author Abul Mansur Ahmad wrote on January 
5, 1973 in the Daily Ittefaq: Because of the lack of clarifications 
regarding the constitutional provisions industrialization has not 
only been hindered but it is virtually at a stand-still. 	This 
situation can be redressed through enunciating an industrial 
policy. 	This has not been unfortunately done by the government. 
[Translated from Bengali]. 
97 Ibid. 
98 Governor, Bangladesh Bank said on October 1, 1973 that transfer of 
funds abroad was one of the causes of economic crisis. 	The Daily 
Ittefaq, 2 November 1972. Also see, A.M.A. Rahim, "An Analysis 
of Smuggling in Bangladesh" in Bangladesh Economy Problems and 
Issues, ed. A.M.A. Rahim, (Dacca: University Press Ltd., 1977) 
pp. 107-131. An official estimate of the extent of smuggling out 
of Bangladesh between January 1972 and August 1975 was U.S. $4000 
million (Taka 60,000 million), W.B. Reddaway and Md. Mizanur Rahman, 
"The Scale of Smuggling out of Bangladesh" Research Report Series 
No. 21, Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies. Government 
of Banglades, Ministry of Industries, Report of the Price Stabil-
isation Committee, (Dacca: June, 1973). 
99 Investment Policy 197'2_3, op. cit. 
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The document noted that the situation obtaining in Bangladesh just 
after the Liberation 
presented a historic opportunity to lay the foundations 
of socialism in the industrial sector of the economy .100 
The stated aim of industrial development was: 
(i) to meet the basic needs of the people; 
(ii) to reduce the dependence on imports for meeting those needs; 
(iii) proper exploitation of natural resources; 
(iv) creation of employment opportunities; 
(v) to build up a sound industrial base101 
and within a planned socialist framework. 
The industrial policy recognised that a limited private sector 
has a role to play within a planned framework. Their role was how-
ever, restricted to small and medium sized industrial units with fixed 
assets not exceeding Taka 2.5 million. 	The policy also placed 
moratorium on nationalisation of enterprise for ten years having assets 
less than Taka 2.5 million. Foreign investment was sought to be made 
attractive while retaining majority ownership and control of such 
investments directly with the State. 
In sum, the Policy for 1972-73 was to use nationalisation to 
restore the existing industries abandoned by their owners; to replace 
the entrepreneurs and managers for efficient and effective management 
in the public sector; and to lay the foundations of socialism in the 
industrial sector of the economy. 	It claimed that 
the role of the private sector has been clearly delimited 
and out commitment to a socialist economic system clearly 
proclatmed102 
100 Ibid. 
101 Ibid. 
102 Ibid. 
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Experience, however, showed that it was difficult to achieve growth 
in the private industrial sector while conforming to the guidelines 
propounded in the first industrial policy 103  . The private sector 
remained stagnant since the adoption of the policy in 1973. 	Deval- 
uation104, rising price level 105 in the local and international market, 
high cost of machinery, land and labour made it immensely difficult to 
set up new industries in the private sector within the constraints of 
investment ceiling. The restrictions imposed on foreign private 
participation in management and capital investment with local private 
investors seemed to have been great dampers. Virtual collapse of the 
106 economy 	in 1974 compelled the Awami League administration to make a 
103 Ibid. 
104 Immediately after Liberation Bangladesh Taka was devalued. However 
Taka rate of exchange rapidly became excessively overvalued. 
Currency was again devalued by 58 per cent in 1975. 
105 According to government figures the consumer's price index rose to 
430 points in December, 1974 from the base of 100 in 1969-70. The 
government appointed a Price Stabilisation Committee in January 
1973 consisting of eminent economists of the country and high 
officials in the economic ministries. 	The Committee submitted 
its report in June, 1973. See for an account of inflation in 
Bangladesh after Liberation, A.M.A. Rahim, "Some Aspects of 
Inflation in the context of Bangladesh", Bangladesh Bank Bulletin, 
Vol. 3, (September, 1973) M. Sohrab Uddin and Syeda Rabeya Begum, 
"Some Aspects of Money and Inflation in Bangladesh", The Business 
Review, Vol. 3 (1977), Government of Bangladesh, President's 
Secretariat, White Paper on Economic Situation in Bangladesh, 
(Dacca: Government Press: September, 1975) p. 5, Report of the 
Price Stabilisation Committee made a comparative study of some 
commodities of basic necessity for the consumer and the economy in 
respect of their prices between time periods and as between whole-
saler, retailer and manufacturer/ c & f landed cost and sought to 
identify the factors leading to increase in prices. 	The Committee 
study indicated the main factors for the abnormal rise in prices 
were (i) substantial decline in the supply of commodities and (ii) 
a high increase in the money supply. 
106 See Supra. fn. 60. 
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policy shift in its industrial programme 107 . The government was in 
desperate need of foreign economic aid 108 to tide over the crisis. 
The Awami League Government, therefore, announced a new investment 
policy in 1974 primarily with a view to attract much needed foreign 
, investment. The "New Investment Policy' 109  as it was called raised 
the ceiling on private investment to Taka 30 million from the previous 
Taka 2.5 million in the first policy. 	Foreign private investment and 
participation was permitted in collaboration with both government and 
private entrepreneurs. Previously foreign collaboration was limited 
only to the public sector. 	Ceiling of foreign investment was totally 
withdrawn. A moratorium on nationalisation was declared for a period 
of 15 years from the data of going into production of the enterprise 
which was previously 10 years from the date of investment. It was 
also provided that compensation would be paid on fair and equitable 
basis in the event of nationaliation of any industry after this period. 
A tax holiday was declared for seven years and other incentives for 
private investors were announced. 
The military regime, however, brought a fundamental change in 
the approach of the government towards the role of private sector in 
industrial development. The military administration took steps for 
a "drastic revision" of the investment policy immediately after its 
107 The Awami League Government announced a new investment policy on 
16 July, 1974; the ceiling of private investment was raised, a 
moratorium on nationalisation was announced and room was made for 
foreign private investment. 
108 It was estimated that Bangladesh would need aid approaching U.S. 
$1,500 million annually for decades to overcome its difficulties. 
See Faaland and Parkinson, op. cit., p. 84. 
109 Government of Bangladesh, Ministry of Industries, "New Investment 
Policy", The Bangladesh Gazette Extraordinary, 16 July 1974. 
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assumption of power 110 . 	The reasons for a "Revised Investment Policy" 
as it was called after only 18 months of the New Investment Policy were 
given) as "higher cost of investments and inadequate response of the 
private sector 'all It was stated that 
for reaching the goal of mobilisation of investment 
funds and rapid industrialisation, the private entre-
preneurs should be afforded adequate scope and facilities 
for setting up industrial enterprises.. • 1l2 
The revised policy raised the ceiling of private investment further to 
Taka 100 million although the reserved list of 18 industries were 
retained in the public sector113 . 	Both local and foreign collaborators 
were allowed to participate with the public sector in setting up of 
industries falling within the reserved list but outside jute, textiles, 
sugar, arms and ammunitions and allied defence equipment, atomic energy, 
air transport, telephones and cables, telegraph and wireless apparatus 
and generation and distribution of electricity. Although major share 
was to be retained by the public corporations, management contracts 
could be given to private investors "on considerations of economy, 
,114 technology and management' 	The moratorium clause on nationalisation 	was 
deleted. It was reiterated that any industry nationalised would be 
paid compensation on fair and equitable bases. 	Tax holiday and other 
incentives earlier introduced were re-emphasized. 	Arrangements for 
institutional financing for small industries - "particularly agro-based, 
110 Government of Bangladesh, Ministry of Industries, Revised Invest-
ment Policy, (Dacca: Government Press, 1975). 
111 Ibid. 
112 Ibid. 
113 For the items in the reserved list see, New Policy, op. cit. 
Schedule A; Number of industries reserved for the public sector was 
Latekxyduced to only 8 from 18. See, Government of Bangladesh, 
Department of Industries, Guide to Investment in Bangladesh, 
(Dacca: May 1977). 
114 Revised Policy, op. cit. 
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agro-supporting and export-oriented industries" were provided. 	The 
stock exchange was to be reactivated to mobilise private savings and 
channel them in industrial investments. Finally, the government 
decided to "disinvest" some industrial units which were declared 
abandoned and were placed under public corporations for management 115 . 
Promoting Capitalism 
Public posture of the Awami League Government was against the 
development of large scale private capitalism. However, as most of the 
enterprises were left abandoned by the non-local owners the only freedom 
of action left to the government was in respect of the large scale jute, 
cotton and sugar factories owned by the Bengalis. These enterprises 
accounted for a fairly small proportion to the industrial assets in 
Bangladesh. 	Even so, the Awami League was not committed to their 
nationalisation. 	Yet the decision to nationalise the major large 	scale 
industries was the first important action on which the claim to socialism 
by the Awami League was primarily based. The radicalism of any govern-
ment in this context needs to be tested, however, against its overall 
policies towards industry, agriculture and rural society. 
The land policy of the Awami League declared a land ceiling per 
family to about 33 acres. This reduction of ceiling, if considered alone 
was hardly of any significance. 	During the Pakistani administration too 
the ceiling of landholding was reduced to 33 acres along with the 
abolition of landlordism. 	The abolition of the Zamindari system, 
resulted merely in a transfer of the revenue surplus from the landlords 
to the State and thereby helped to establish a kind of State landlordism 116 . 
115 Ibid. 
116 Badruddin Umar, "Agrarian Economy and Nationalisation of Industries" 
The Holiday, 9 April l972. 
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The decision to return to a ceiling of landownership of 33 acres 
amounted to a rejection of any serious attempt at land reform 117 . 
The State landlordism created an elaborate machinery for revenue 
collection that ate up what was collected in the form of land revenue 118 . 
The agrarian economy was left untouched. The land policy 
contained proposals for increasing productivity of small peasants by 
introducing co-operative farming and improved methods of agriculture but 
the worst remnant of feudalism - share cropping was not affected by 
the policy measures introduced by the Awami League. The survival of 
share cropping in rural economy meant the survival of the forces which 
not only restrained economic growth but also subverted all attempts 
earlier to introduce collective farming, co-operatives etc. 119 
The Awami League tlovernment attempted to resolve the problem 
of the rural economy through its decision to abolish land revenue on 
all land holdings up to about 8 acres. This meant that over three 
quarters of all cultivated land was exempted from the tax without any 
reasonable basis l20  . In the absence of land reform and to increase 
agriculture growth the government strategy was to develop the functional 
117 Ibid. 
118 More than 47 per cent of the land revenue receipts was spent as 
collection costs before 1971. See for detailed data in 
Statistical 1973, op. cit., p. 105. 
119 In the rural and agricultural Bangladesh 8.4 million households 
were classified as landless according to the Summary Report of 
1977 Land Occupancy Survey of Rural Bangladesh. As against this 
aggregate number of households in Bangladesh was 12.6 million in 
1973. An estimated 7.8 million households made payments in share 
(kind) or in cash for the use of land taken in from others. See, 
Statistical 1978, op. cit., pp. 121, 124 & 94. See for an analysis 
of the problem, Geof Wood, "Class Formation and 'Antediluvian' 
Capital", IDS Bulletin, Vol. 9 (February, 1978), pp. 39-43. 
120 When one considers the very meagre source of governmental revenue 
in Bangladesh, the abolition of land revenue appears to be unjus-
ifiable and politically motivated. 
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co-operative based on modern inputs. Elements of subsidy in the form 
of cheap credit and under-priced inputs supplied by the public sector 
agencies tended to concentrate these benefits in the hands of the 
bigger landowners 121 . 	In view of the large proportion of landless 
labour122 in the rural economy an obvious strategy would have been to 
pursue a land policy that would increase the size of small and uneconomic 
farms and redistribute land in favour of the landless. The government's 
resort to the conventional strategy to return to the ceiling of 33 acres 
therefore, belied the Awami League claims for radicalism. 
In the nationalised sector, political patronage became the chief 
consideration in the distribution of managerial jobs and licences for 
industries. A group of new rich class was created who had access to 
political power and utilised that contact to make their fortunes by 
working as middlemen between the real business and the government 123 . 
A large surplus in private hands was generated, often at a direct cost 
to the public sector enterprises. 	A political commentator observed 
that the government of the Awami League had nationalised industries and 
trading houses in order to organise their "open and disguised plunder" 
of the existing wealth of the nation and in order to promote capitalist 
interests in a particular manner although they claimed their policy of 
nationalisation as socialist 124 . The nationalisation policy of the 
Awami League helped to promote capitalism and capitalists interests 
through three different methods of implementation: Firstly, the Awami 
121 Supra, Chapter I ; 	See also Emajuddin, op. cit., pp. 1176-79. 
122 Yearbook 1979, op. cit., p. 145, Table 4.4. 
123. Khan, Economic Policies, op. cit., pp. 17-19. 
124 Badruddin Umar, "On the Policy of Disinvestment", The Holiday, 1 February 1976. 
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League Covernment made use of its power to appoint administrators for 
the abandoned and nationalised enterprises. 	Initially 221 enterprises 
were placed under the newly created Sector Corporations to run the 
nationalised industries. 	In addition, 311 enterprises were placed 
under various management boards constituted for different regions 125 
A regional management board consisted of officials, representatives of 
labour and members of parliament. The management boards were empowered 
to appoint administrators/managers with a view to carry on the business 
of the respective enterprises. 	The administrators were mostly 
selected126 from outsiders out of personal choice of the political 
leaders without having regard to the educational or professional 
competence of the appointee. 	Appointed by political patronage, these 
administrators, by and large, proved to be greedy, unscrupulous and 
dishonest127 . 	Subsequently verified in about 10 per cent of the 
enterprises moveable assets were found to have been removed by some 
of these administrators 128 . Some of these administrators later bought 
the enterprises under their management when those were disinvested - 
as chairmen of the employees' co-operatives formed and registered over- 
. night129  . 	The extent of corruption on the part of these administrators 
can be gauged from the fact that, after the change of the government in 
1975, a considerable number of these administrators were suspended, 
removed or apprehended and taken to policy custody for corruption and 
125 Figures collected from the Department of Industries. Appendix Table 8. 
126 Interview with the officials of the Department of Industries who 
served at the time of such appointments. 
127 Ibid. 
128 Ibid. 
129 Ibid. 
130 Ibid. 
131 The President of Dacca 
this amount was looted 
the period immediately 
August, 1977. 
132 Sobhan, Nationalisation, op. cit. 
133 The Daily Itvefaq, 8 August 1972. 
134 The Daily Ittegaq, 3 December 1972. 
Chamber of CoMmerce and Industry alleged 
from different industrial enterprises during 
after Liberation. See, The Holiday, 28 
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misappropriation of the properties of the enterprises they were supposed 
to look after130 . According to some rough estimates, spare parts and 
raw materials that were missing from various industries after Liberation 
could be worth Taka 5000 million131 . 	The administrators were under the 
'influence' of4 the ruling party. 	In order to ensure their plunder they had _ 
also given extra jobs to their own chosen people who had neither any 
skill nor any willingness to organise and raise production. 	Some of 
the Bengali entrepreneurs were again allowed to administer their enter-
prises even after nationalisation, ostensibly due to managerial vacuum 
in the country after Liberation132 . 	This anomalous decision seemed 
to have given safe passage to the transfer of the resources from those 
enterprises to the private hands. 	The situation became embarrassing 
for the government and there was a proposal to constitute a high powered 
committee to inquire into the activities of the administrators and their 
political associates including allegedly members of the Constituent 
Assembly133 . The veteran Communist leader Moni Singh observing the 
situation made it publicly known that without discarding the dishonest 
and corrupt elements from amongst the Awami League it would not be 
possible to establish socialism. 	He said: 
An important segment of the ruling party is: still 
devoted to decaying feudal and capitalist system. 
Corruption and nepotism are deeply instilled in them. 134 
Secondly, distribution of the scarce entitlements in the form of permits 
and licence was a potent device. In spite of nationalisation of large 
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scale industries, banks and insurance companies, the distribution and 
marketing channel of the industrial products were left in the private 
sector. 	A systematic distribution of entitlements in a situation of 
extreme scarcity of goods and services caused by the declining produc-
tion and interrupted trade in the wake of the Liberation War, became 
the major source of a primitive form of capital accumulation. 	The 
indentors, dealers in permit and licences of various sorts and 
distributors reaped the optimum premium out of a starved market for 
industrial products. With the connivance of the ruling party the 
chosen distribution channel could exert monopoly control over the 
market. The most important of the entitlements were the import 
licences. 	The imposition of strict exchange control to support a 
highly over-valued Bangladesh currency tended to enhance the desirability 
of possessing such import licences. 	The mechanism, in fact, meant a 
heavy concealed tax on the manufacturers of export goods and a passing 
of the profits as concealed subsidies to the recipients of import 
licences. 	The beneficiaries of this policy were the recipients of 
the import licences because they could appropriate large scarcity 
premium on the imports made against the licences. 	The importer paid 
Taka equivalent of foreign currency needed to import at the officially 
fixed rate but was able to extract a much higher price from the local 
consumer. 	Even a considerable portion of imports made under the 
auspices of the State trading corporation were distributed through the 
private traders who did not hesitate to reap the scarcity premium. 
Similarly, the products of the nationalised industries were distributed 
through private traders who took the opportunity to make best use of 
the starved market. The government policy to rely on private channel 
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of marketing and distribution in a situation of severe shortage and 
excess demand amounted to a transfer of surplus to private distributors. 
Thus a mechanism of capital accumulation was set up to enrich the 
private traders largely at the expense of what could be the profits of 
the nationalised industries 135 Trade and industry was managed and 
run in such a manner through the support of the ruling group that it 
was possible to reap large additional surpluses in the form of unearned 
income by raising the scarcity premium in the private sector. A con-
servative estimate136 of the surplus generated from the sale of domes-
tically manufactured cotton textiles and yarn and cigarettes and the 
scarcity margin of consumer goods in 1972-73 alone came to about Taka 
3000 million, an amount equivalent to more than 6 per cent of the GDP 
of Bangladesh in the same year. The entire amount was appropriated 
by the private sector without rendering any contribution to the economy. 
Untaxed income worth Taka 1300 million declared by different individuals 
to the taxation authorities was obviously far short of all realistic 
assumptions regarding undeclared volume of money in private hands 137 . 
The President of the Dacca Chamber of Commerce and Industries made no 
revelation when he stated that by the end of 1977 at least an amount of 
Taka 10,000 million was concentrated in the hands of a very limited 
135 See for a 	relevant theoretical discussion 
Konopnicki, "Interference by the Private Sector 
Commercial Interest in the Performance of their 
and Ecological Functions", Annals of Public and 
Economy, Vol. 48, 1977, pp. 135-6. 
136 A.M.A. Rahim, "Some Comments on the Five Year Plan and Planning 
in Bangladesh" mimeographed. Appendix-Table H quoted in A.M.A. 
Rahim and A.H.M. Nuruddin Choudhury, "Some Fundamental Issues on 
Economic Management in the Context of Bangladesh" in Rahim, 
Bangladesh Economy, op. cit., p. 14. 
137 Hossain Khasru, "Public Sector, Black Money and Prices", The Holiday, 28 August 1977. 
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few in a country whose average GDP since Liberation has been to the 
order of Taka 55,000 million138 ' 
Thirdly, the Awami League made use of its labour front to extend 
the activities of wanton patronage and to paralyse the genuine trade 
union activities. 	The natural expectations of the workers after 
Liberation and nationalisation was exploited by the pro-Awami League 
labour leaders. 	The members of the labour front of the Awami League 
and its militant volunteer corps, in the name of maintaining industrial 
peace, took forcible possession of some of the enterprises and offices 
of the rival trade unions. During the pre-Liberation period the 
usual strategy of some of the professional labour leaders was to incite 
the industrial workers against the owners to create conditions not 
congenial to smooth production and for adding to the list of demands 
on the one hand and accept monthly allowances behind the scene from 
the capitalist owner on the other139 . 	Nationalisation deprived these 
labour leaders of these sources of augmenting their income. 	These 
labour leaders, therefore, resorted to various tactics in attempting 
to plunder the assets of the enterprises in the public sector. 	With 
a view to this they started a systematic campaign of vilification 
against the enterprise managers. Having reached some understanding 
with the local influential political personalities attempts were made 
to seduce the managers to join in the plunder. Since they had political 
patronage the labour leaders could exert all sorts of pressure on those 
who did not easily succumb to such machinations 140  . The inability of 
   
138 Atiqul Alam, "Ferreting Out the Black Money", The Holiday, 9 September 1977. 
139 Wakefhal, "Industries Operated by the Government", The Daily 
Ittefaq, 15 November 1973. 
140 Ibid. 
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the Awami League Government to declare a labour policy assisted the 
unscrupulous labour leaders. 	The lack of restrictions on the activities of 
the pro-Awami League labour leaders was facilitated by the rising author-
itarian tenets of the Awami League administration. Neither the Awami 
League '.overnment nor the military rulers enacted suitable labour 
legislations to safeguard the legitimate rights of the workers. 	The 
Awami League policy in 1972 took away freedom to belong to trade union 
and right to organise and bargain collectively including right to 
strike. 	There was practically no provision for workers' participation 
in management. 	The right to collective bargaining in public enter- 
prises was withdrawn in 1973. 	The Industrial Relations Ordinance 
took away the rights of new trade unions and put restrictions on the 
right to be a member of a trade union on certain category of workers. 
The concerted efforts to paralyse the genuine trade union activities 
created conditions that were not congenial to productivity but were 
helpful to the pursuit of self-interests of the Awami League henchmen. 
A Place for the Private Enterprise  
The private sector in Bangladesh seems to have been spoonfed 
both before and after Liberation. 	The slender growth of Bengali 
entrepreneurship was not the result of personal initiative, drive, 
inventiveness and imagination141  . 	It was rather the outcome of a 
political decision to create artifically a wealthy Bengali industrial 
class so as to form a significant bastion of support for the prevailing 
rulers. 	It was also intended to help satisfy and appease the growing 
Bengali restiveness at the concentration of wealth in the hands of a 
141 Supra. p. 76. 
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few Pakistani capitalists. After Liberation, under the protective 
wings of the Awami League rulers the chosen people of the party amassed 
a huge wealth through, as earlier mentioned, the patronage of permits, 
licences, dealership and smuggling across the borders. 	However, 
despite repeated assurances by the ruling elite and revisions in the 
industrial investment policies with increasingly more pronounced bias 
towards the private enterprise neither the new rich class nor the old 
ones came forward to invest in industrial ventures 142 . There were 
apprehensions that there might be official inquiries about the sources 
of their capital and these deterred the prospective entrepreneurs. 
The military Administration, therefore, decided to give safe passage 
and accommodate these "unutilised and idle fund" popularly known as 
"black money"143 . 	The declared intention of the government was to 
bring these funds 
into productive stream and for mobilising investment 
funds for investments or purchase of disinvested 
units. 144 
142 A representative member of the private sector stated that the 
industrial investment policy of the government failed to ensure 
law and order or industrial harmony in the country. The Daily 
Ittefaq, 30 August. 1973. 	In a post-editorial column the Daily 
Ittefaq said, "there is hardly any willingness for private 
investment in industry. Many of the moneyed class are trans-
ferring their capital abroad, keeping in foreign banks or 
investing in foreign markets.. .as if the country has reached a 
saturation point in respect of economic and industrial develop-
ment", The Daily Ittefaq, 2 November 1973. 
143 Ershad Mazumder, "Changing Time for Black Money", The Holiday, 
18 January, 1976. Mazumder informs that the political touts 
managed unearned income of Taka 8000 million during the period 
following Liberation. A large portion of these funds were spent 
on conspicuous consumption. 	In addition the holders of these 
funds engaged themselves in indenting and other high and quick 
return yielding commercial activities. 
144 The Government Press Note, 8 January 1976. 
146 
Once legitimized, the proverbially timid and nascent indigenous 
capitalist class demonstrated a strong determination to cut out a 
place of its own in the economy. 	To begin with the strategy consis- 
ted in keeping a low profile and making requests and "humble submis-
sions" for ensuring a suitable "environment" so that private sector 
could contribute to the economic growth of the country. 	Represent- 
ations were made on behalf of the private enterprise interests for 
enforcement of discipline in labour relations, simplification of 
procedures relating to establishment of new industries, ensuring 
import of necessary raw materials and spares, a realistic labour 
policy and annulment of provisions regarding nationalisation up to 
15 years and it was pointed out that the measures would be helpful 
for the growth of the private sector investment in industries i45  
The military regime continued the follow-up actions in respect 
of the Revised Investment Policy announced in December, 1975 General 
Ziaur Rahman declared that 
the government is ready to extend all possible support 
to the private sector for utilising the full potential 
of the private entrepreneurs in stepping up of the 
productive economic activities in the country. 146 
Following the policy in December 1975 to disinvest some of the abandoned 
enterprises that were earlier placed under the Sector Corporations, the 
procedure for disinvestment of individual units was prepared. 	To 
facilitate the process, a Disinvestment Board was set up. 	Decision 
to return the specialised textile units to their previous Bangladeshi 
owners was taken. 	It was also decided that jute twine mills would be 
145 The government 
of the private 
on 7 December, 
146 The Bangladesh 
as a result took cognizance of "inadequate response 
sector" in its Revised Investment Policy declared 
1975. 
Observer, 4 August_ 1976. 
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disinvested or returned to their previous owners. 	The decisions to 
return/disinvest specialised textile units and jute twine units have 
special significance because jute and textile belong to the hard core 
public sector. 	It was, however, argued that the specialised textile 
units were small units and being responsible for production of special-
ised items were operationally more suitable to small scale management 
and that the decision to return/disinvest jute twine mills was just 
an act of rationalisation as the specialised jute products were 
included in the schedule of industrial investment in the private 
sector147 . 
The decision to make payment of compensation for the national-
ised enterprises to their previous shareholders was also being vigor-
ously implemented. The payments were to be made in phases - 20 per 
cent in 1975, 30 per cent in 1976 and the rest in 1978. 	Payment was 
being made both to local and foreign shareholders of the nationalised 
enterprises. A total of 15,377 claims from former shareholders were 
received by the government until December, 1977 148 . In monetary terms 
such claims involved an amount of Taka 320 million. Of the claimants 
only 175 were foreigners and 225 claims were from financial institutions 
and the rest were 	- 149_national.) of Bangladesh 
Liberal credit facilities from the financial institutions were 
allowed for industrial financing in the private sector. 	In some cases 
like priority and export oriented industries, the government would 
underwrite almost all expenses from the commissioning to the start of 
147 Government of Bangladesh, Ministry of Industries, Department of 
Industries, Industrial Investment Schedule for Duo Years (1976-78) 
for Private Sector, (Dacca: Government Press, 1976) p. 22. 
148 The Holiday, 5 February. 1978. 
149 Ibid. 
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operations. A review of lending activities of the financial insti-
tutions shows that by 1976-77 the private sector was getting an edge 
over the public sector. 	The Bangladesh Shilpa Bank (BSB) sanctioned 
90 per cent of its loans to the private sector in 1976-77 compared to 
17 per cent in 1974-75 and 20 per cent in 1973-74 150 . Tax holidays, 
rebate on payment of customs duties for import of capital equipment 
and raw materials, freeze on the payment of interests accumulated 
over the principal borrowed, expert counsel provided by lending 
agencies, policies sheltering the domestic market against unwarranted 
competition and thus assuring profitability were some of the important 
facilities granted to the local entrepreneurs. 	There was a reduction 
of up to 75 per cent in rates of various fees charged by the financial 
institutions for the private sector investors. 	The Investment 
Corporation of Bangladesh (ICB) was set up in 1976 to provide insti-
tutional support to the stock market. 	However, the stock exchange 
could not play an effective role in developing capital market as supply 
of scripts for transaction was extremely limited. 	Therefore, a 
proposal was mooted to disinvest the shares and stocks of a number of 
profitable public companies held by the government, either as direct 
investment or as abandoned property 151 . 
The liberalisation and incentive packages of the import and 
150 Government of Bangladesh, Ministry of Finance, Resume of the 
Financial Institutions 1977-78, (Dacca: Government Press, 1978) 
pp. 71-72. 
151 The government held shares worth about Taka 43 million which was 
previously owned by the non-locals in eight foreign companies 
operating in Bangladesh. Shareholdings of the Bangladeshi owners 
were, in contrast, valued at only Taka 2 million. According to 
the proposal government held shares were to be disinvested in 
phased manner. 	It was hoped that such a measure would help to 
activise the Stock Exchange which was opened nearly five years 
after Liberation. Source: Ministry of Finance, Government of 
Bangladesh. 
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export policies increasingly favoured the private sector in terns of 
allocations as well as infrastructural facilities 152 	The Presidential 
Advisor in charge of the Ministry of Commerce publicly announced that 
the trade policies of the government were formulated with a view to 
encouraging the shy private sector to contribute adequately in the 
development of the economy. He categorically stated that the import 
policy of the government aimed at"areduction of the public sector and 
expansion of the private sector"153 The share of the public sector 
continued to decrease and private sector to increase in the overall 
total import plans. 	The private sector commanded the whole of the 
import of essential commodities under Wage Earners' Scheme 154 . Most 
of the financing for private sector was provided through cash and 
guaranteed sources of foreign exchange. 	In contrast most of the 
funds for public sector import was dependent on external assistance 
programme based aid, credit, grants or loans and hence uncertain. 
152 The Presidential Adviser in charge of the Ministry of Commerce 
described the import policy declared that it was "the most 
liberal import policy for many years - even more liberal than 
the policies of the last days of Pakistan". The import and 
export policies were formulated with a view to encouraging the 
otherwise shy private sector. 	See "Bias Towards Private Sector" 
The Holiday, 10 July 1977. 
153 Ibid. 
154 The Wage Earners' Scheme enables Bangladesh nationals to import 
specified categories of commodities out of foreign exchange 
remittance made by 1$angladesh nationals resident and working 
abroad. Over the years since Liberation remittance by Bangla-
deshis living abroad have become a major source of foreign 
exchange earning in Bangladesh. Out of the national import bill, 
of Taka 14,500 million in 1978-79 Wage Earners' Scheme was 
projected to account for Taka 1600 million. The Holiday, 9 
July, 1978. Government of Bangladesh, Ministry of Commerce,"The 
Import Policy for 1978-79", The Bangladesh Gazette Extraordinary, 30 
June, 1978, Actual import under WES in 1976-77 and 1977-78 were 
for Taka 896 million and Taka 1290 million respectively. 
Government of Bangladesh, Ministry of Finance, Economic Survey 
1978-79[1n Bengali] (Dacca: Government press, 1979), p. 146. 
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The share of financing import bills for the private sector from cash 
and guaranteed sources was increased year to year as compared to the 
public sector 155 . 	With so much government support the representatives 
of the private sector publicly declared: 
The understanding between the government and businessmen 
and industrialists is now increasing. The tendency of 
mutual distrust and blame amongst the government, 
businessmen and industrialists since Liberation is now 
a thing of the past. 156 
The declared intention of the Military Government in formulating a 
new industrial investment schedule for the private sector was to create 
a base for long term industrial development. This meant that the 
government was assigning a dominant role to the private sector in the 
task of industrialisation. 	The upward trend in the private sector 
investmentwas quite spectacular as shown below in the table: 
TABLE 3 
Private Sector Investments Since 1973 in Industries 157  
Year Number Investments Indices 
of Units Sanctioned 	Actual Sanctioned:Actual 
(*in million Taka) 
1973-74 295 87 82 100:100 
1974-75 276 150 133 172:162 
1975-76 265 702 198 802:240 
1976-77 439 810 450 927:546 
1977-78 552 2092 750 2392:910 
1827 3841 1613 
The investments in the private sector were increasingly being spread 
over in diverse fields. 	In the past, the Bangladeshi private sector 
155 "Private Sector Pampered", The Holiday , 9 July. 1978. 
156 Statement of the President of Chittagong Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry, The Daily Ittefaci, 1 January 1976. 
157 I.B.R.D. : Bangladesh Issues and Prospects For Industrial Develop-
ment. Vol. 1, Denember, 1978. pp. 10-11. Also, TYP, op. cit. pp. 170 
and see Government of Bangladesh, Planning Commission, Economic 
Review 1977-78, (Dacca: Government Press, 1979). 
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was essentially biased towards trading and commercial activities where 
the returns on invested capital were quick and the rates of profit 
high158 Indenting houses, travelling agencies, shopping concerns 
etc. were the favoured field of activities in the private sector. 
With generous incentives and liberal facilities, the Bengali private 
entrepreneurs, unlike in the past, were venturing into a variety of 
industrial fields. 	The approved investment projects included deep 
sea fishing, synthetic textiles, specialised textiles, ready-made 
garments, footwear, weaving units, canning, drugs and pharmaceuticals, 
plastic and rubber products. 	A number of infrastructural projects 
like ship-repairing, building of barges, engineering works found 
place in the investment portfolios of the private sector. 
Lobbying for Denationalisation 
The private enterprise got the preferential treatment and obtained 
a "proper climate of investment". 	Next they made moves to secure 
special concessions for "rendering their services in purchasing the 
units placed for disinvestment "159 . The government in taking over and 
158 Papanek,Development, op. cit. study shows a movement from trade and 
commerce to industry. Lewis observed " 	 a clear progres-' - 
sion over generations from agriculturalists to trader to industrial-
ist,...". See Stephen R. Lewis, Pakistan Industralisations and Trade 
Policies, (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), p. 45. 
159 In addition to disinvestment of abandoned manufacturing enterprises 
placed under the Disinvestment Board, the government also decided 
to return to the private sector by way of sale 2187 commercial and 
trading concerns whose control and management it assumed in the 
wake of the Liberation war either as "abandoned" or "vested" former 
enemy properties, The Holiday, 18 December 1977. The government 
also sold ten out of twenty nine tea gardens and processing units 
under the public sector management in 1977 at a time when tea 
industry was showing improvement and in the wake of 1976 "tea boom". 
See The Holiday, 14 August 1977 and 9 July 1978. Several public 
sector financial institutions were providing a major portion of 
investment funds to the private enterprise and institution and infra-
structural supports. 	Even then a seminar organised by the Narayang- 
anj Chamber of Commerce and Industries demanded a facility of 90:10 
loan equity ratio for private investment, The Holiday, 25 June 1978. 
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nationalising the enterprise had assumed their liabilities. 	The 
private sector, however, demanded concessions which would absolve 
them from those liabilities. 	They were attempting once again to 
transfer the burden ultimately to the people of the country as they 
did during the pre-liberation period under alien capitalism. Among 
this class were those of the Bengali entrepreneurs who craftily 
transferred resources from the enterprises as they became apprehensive 
of the impending nationalisation 160 . This was the same class who did 
not earn their position through trial and experience and some of whom 
were given safe passage for their "black money" and who responded to 
the increased facilities by asking for more. 
The next step in the strategy of the private enterprise was to 
organise a campaign to give a bad name to the nationalised sector. 
The effect of the Liberation War and the post 1972 plunder patronised 
by the Awami League left many of the enterprises in a pitiable economic 
condition161 . Many of the problems of the nationalised enterprises 
purely in terms of accounting profit and loss were, however, attribut-
able to chaotic policy formulations and management of a combine of 
corrupt, politico-techno-bureaucracy 162 . The private sector began a 
concerted campaign for disinvestment of nationalised industries on 
the ground of their having failed to earn profit. 	The acquiescence 
of the ruling elites, a strong lobby in some influential newspapers 
and a deteriorating economy that did not generate much optimism 
160 In this they emulated the Pakistani owners of the abandoned enter-
prises. Sobhan writes that while the peasants, workers and students 
fought the War of Liberation many of the Bengali mill owners kept 
their mills open, both out of profit motive and fear of the Pakistani 
occupation forces, see, Sobhan, Nationaliaation, op. cit. p. 185. 
161 Infra., Chapter V, pp. 234-8. 
162 The Holiday, July 1976. 
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emboldened the private sector protagonists to demand in April 1977, 
that 
the Bangladesh jute mills, comprising 50 per cent of 
the total loomage (of the entire jute industry of the 
country) should immediately be denationalised and 
handed back to their previous owners. 163 
The arguments put forward by the chairmen of the Bangladesh Jute Mills 
Entrepreneurs' Society were 
Nationalisation has caused enormous loss and damage 
in most spheres of our economy - whether it is jute 
mills or the cotton textile industry or any other 
sector which has to be run on a commercial basis... 164 
The former owner of the jute and textile mills, of Bengali origin 
denounced the policy of nationalisation and demanded denationalisation. 
They brought forward charges of mismanagement, inefficiency, corruption 
and operational shortfalls in the nationalised industries. 	According 
to them, nationalisation had thwarted the industrial progrss of the 
country. 	The lobby was immensely successful and nationalisation 
which to the ordinary men since Liberation had been synonymous to 
socialism, came to be regarded as almost a dirty word 165 . 	However, 
while propagating the virtues of free enterprise this Bengali lobby 
did conveniently overlook the exorbitant social costs of the rise and 
growth of the private sector and the reasons for accounting profits 
of the private sector industries during the pre-Liberation period 166 . 
163 The Holiday, I May 1977. 
164 /bid. 
165 The Holiday, 21 March 1976. 
166 Infra., Chapters V and VII . 	National- 
ised jute industry was the most maligned sector. It has been 
convincingly argued that the jute manufacturing sector under the 
free enterprise economy during Pakistan period was not profitable 
and had to be heavily subsidized through Export Bonus Scheme and 
other indirect means. 	See Quazi Kholiquzzaman Ahmad,"Was the 
Jute Manufacturing Industry Profitable in the Pre-Liberation Days?" 
(Continued over) 
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These advocates of denationalisation seemed to forget the tremendous 
social issues and economic problems that such a wholesale denational-
isation would involve 167 . Also ignored was the ethical propriety of 
returning the enterprises for which the whole society, not a few 
Bengali capitalists with their insignificant contribution to the total 
outlay, had paid the cost. 
Progress in Disinvestment  
Of the 786 industrial undertakings that the government took 
over as abandoned by their owners after Liberation, 221 enterprises 
were placed under different sector corporations set up under the 
nationalisation Act. 	Subsequently, after verification 77 units were 
deleted from the list of the abandoned enterprises, 163 units were 
released to their owners and 14 were considered being commercial 
concerns. The remaining 311 enterprises, mostly small establishments 
of different categories were placed under the management boards in 
various regions of the country. Thus, the abandoned industrial 
establishments taken over by the government were placed under, either 
166 (Continued) The Bangladesh Development Studies, Vol. 3 (July, 1977) 
pp. 362-70; M. Moinuddin Ahmed, "Public Sector or Private Sector? 
Jute/Jute Industry". A paper read at Bangladesh Economic Associa- 
tion/Bangladesh InStitute of Development Studies Seminar on the 
Two Year Plan 1978-80 on 16 June 1978 at Dacca. Jute industry 
made a profit for the first time since Liberation in 1978-79. 
See, Azizul Hague, "Bangladesh 1979: Cry for a sovereign parlia-
ment", Asian Survey, Vol. 20 (1980), pp. 217-230. 
167 Heldman, op. cit. Also see Katzarov, op. cit., pp. 239-245. 
Katzarov shows referring to British experience in denationalisation 
that "although there are no intrinsic difficulties involved...at 
least so far as legal theory is concerned, public ownership of an 
industry for even a short period will create considerable economic 
and administrative problems in the restoration of the industry to 
private ownership". 
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the sector corporations/autonomous agencies or the regional management 
boards. The units having assets over Taka 1.5 million were placed 
under the management boards. Disinvestment process in respect of 
the units placed under the management boards, which were outside the 
purview of the nationalisation law, started in May 1972 under the 
Awami League Government. By September, 1978 in all 211 units of this 
category were disinvested in favour of the successful buyers/bidders 
and workers' cooperative societies. Of the remaining ones under the 
management boards, 50 units were pending for disinvestment due to 
some legal or other complications. 	Some of the units were partly 
abandoned or had foreign investment. No decision was yet taken in 
respect of another of 31 units whether they would be at all disinvested. 168 
In addition, the military regime, in December, 1975 decided to 
disinvest some of the abandoned enterprises that were placed under the 
corporations governed by the nationalisation laws. The declared 
intention of the government, was to streamline and improve the operative 
efficiency of management of the remaining enterprises in the national-
ised sector and to reactivate and invigorate the private sector by 
providing opportunities in the industrial activities and development 
of the country169 . 	According to the criteria laid down, only those 
units were to be deemed fit for disinvestment which were comparatively 
small in size, uneconomical for the sector corporations to run, unprofit-
able and were located in remote areas 170 The Sector Corporations 
168 Department of Industries, Ministry of Industries, September, 1978. 
See Appendix Table 8. 
169 Ibid., Papers on objectives and procedures for disinvestment. 
170 Ibid. 
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prepared a list of enterprises numbering 83 which were categorised as 
eligible for disinvestment proceedings as shown below. 
TABLE 4 
Number of Units Listed as Fit for Disinvestment in the 
Nationalised Industries as in 1977-78 171  
Sector 	Number of Units 
Jute 	 6 
Textile 3 
Chemicals 38 
Sugar and Food 	 17 
Steel and Engineering 	15 
Wood Products 4 
— 
Total 	83 
Of the above, 53 enterprises were disinvested to the private sector by 
June 30, 1978. 	Another 22 units were disinvested by the end of 
December, 1978. 	Before March 31, 1979 six more units were disinvested 
and another 16 were in the process of being disinvested. 	Chronologic- 
ally, enterprises from the nationalised sector were disinvested in the 
following order. 
TABLE 5 
Time Sequence of Disinvestment of Nationalised Enterprises 
to Private Buyers Until June 30, 1 9 78 172 
Regime  
The Awami League Government 
The Military Government 
Time 	Units Disinvested 
December 16, 1971 	None 
to 
August 15, 1975 
August 15, 1975 	53 
to 
June 30, 1978 
171 Ministry of Industries, Disinvestment and Compensation Wing, 
November, 1978. 
172 Review 1978, op. cit., pp. 114-119. 
157 
The number of enterprises disinvested in favour of the private buyers 
for the respective corporations until 30 June, 1978 is shown below. 
TABLE 6 
Sector-wise Break-up of Disinvested Nationalised Enterprises 173 
Sector 	Number of Units Disinvested 
Jute 2 
Textile 7 
Sugar & Food 	 12 
Chemical 19 
Steel & Engineering 13 
Wood Products nil 
Minerals 	 nil 
Total 	53 
By the end of the year 1979-80 a total of 110 enterprises stood disin-
vested in favour of the private sector174 . 	The government exchequer 
received, until November, 1978 a sum of Taka 88 million or about 24 
per cent of the bid prices offered for the disinvested units 175 
For the hard-core jute sector there was reprivatisation of two units 
by June 30, 1978 and another 6 units during the next two years 176 . 
This means that by the end of the FFYP period more than fourteen per 
cent of the total number of enterprises in the nationalised industries 
were returned to the private sector and by the end of the TYP nearly 
173 Ibid. 	One enterprise was partially denationalised in the 
sense that the shares held by the enterprises previous shareholders 
(two multinational interests) were restored to them while the 
government retained the majority share. 
174 Figures compiled on the basis of information in Ibid. and Survey 
1980, op. cit., pp. 32-38. Four enterprises of BFIDC were 
disinvested after the FFYP period 	, 
175 Data collected from the Disinvestment Wing of the Ministry of 
Industries of the Government of Bangladesh in December, 1978. 
176 Review 1978 , op. cit. and Survey 1980, op. cit. 
thirty per cent of the nationalised industries' enterprises were 
privatised 177 . 
Summary Observation  
Undoubtedly, the Liberation movement in Bangladesh had been 
influenced by the radical thoughts both within and outside the Awami 
League. 	The appeal of socialism as a framework for future develop- 
ment was strong during and immediately after the Liberation. 	Some 
of the enthusiasm generated has been dubbed as hardly anything more 
than middle class romanticism about some vague notion of social 
justice. 	But it was quite natural for the Awami League, with its 
practical approach of things, to make use of the popular moods of 
the time. A great deal of motivation behind the act of nationalisation 
is not hard to discern. However, the radicalism of nationalisation 
programme of the Awami League is difficult to establish, particularly 
in the context of objective conditions in the industrial field in 
Bangladesh. The owners, entrepreneurs, managers and skilled workers 
had left the country, were aliens and collaborators and with a view 
to keep the economy going it was imperative that the government assumed 
responsibility. 	There was neither an indigenous entrepreneurial nor 
a managerial class readily available. In the very uncertain situation 
prevailing after the Liberation it is also doubtful whether a decision 
to hand over the management to the available private sector managerial 
and entrepreneurial class would have been a pragmatic step from political 
177 After the merger and reorganisation of the corporations in the 
nationalised industries; there were 371 enterprises in 1976. 
See Infra., Chapter IV, Table 8. 
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economic, administrative and social considerations. It is an 
established fact that in Bangladesh a self propelling industrial 
class has not been possible and that was why public sector predominated 
the industrial scene before the Liberation as well. The socio-economic 
aspirations of the people also seemed to be inclined towards a publicly 
managed and owned efforts in economic fields that crystallized and 
became strengthened in the course of the Liberation struggle over two 
and a half decades of the association with Pakistan. The predominant 
expectation prevailing in Bangladesh at the time of Liberation was 
therefore, to depend on the Awami League to institute radical social 
and economic reforms even though it was doubtful if the Liberation 
struggle alone could have successfully transformed the party into a 
radical one. 
The nature of nationalisation programme in Bangladesh remained 
therefore, ambivalent. 	Starting from the premises of building up a 
socialist base for the economy nationalisation of industries in no 
time took the shape of a device for patronising the process of capital-
istic accumulation for a privileged few. 	It is probably here one 
finds the reason why the purpose of nationalisation and the objectives 
of the nationalised industries were never made adequately clear 
including in the nationalisation law. As we have seen the Industrial 
Investment Policy 1973 merely stated that government faced the immediate 
task of restoring the existing industries most of which remained aban-
doned by the non-local industrialists after Liberation and therefore 
assumed responsibility of replacing the entrepreneurs and managers for 
efficient and effective management in the public sector. 	As stated 
the government found in this situation an opportunity to lay the 
160 
foundations of socialism in the industrial sector of the economy. 
By the very admission in the policy statement one is tempted to ask 
if such an "opportunity" was not there whether the government would 
• have taken the decision to nationalise moved purely from ideological 
considerations. 
Although the military regime under the umbrella of the Martial 
Law pursued a policy of disinvestment that went on to denude the 
nationalised sector of as many as 53 enterprises by the end of the 
First Plan period, its origin is entrenched in the policies initiated 
during the Mujib regime. The organised power of the commercial 
middle class could be established during the military regime only as 
a consequence of the direct and indirect patronage it received earlier 
during the regime of Mujib.. In essence, both the Awami League and the 
military regime have been helping to promote capitalism. 	The nation- 
alisation policy of Mujib promoted capitalist interests in a particular 
manner. 	So also the military regime worked out a policy of disinvest- 
ment to the same purpose. 	In the former case the form was somewhat 
misleading as nationalisation was heralded to pave the way for a 
socialistic pattern of economy, whereas its content, purpose and 
results have been different. 	Viewed thus, the disinvestment policy 
of the military regime is nothing but a further rationalisation of 
the capitalist development processes that was nurtured by a capitalist/ 
nationalisation inaugurated by the Awami League regime. While the Awami League 
regime invoked the name of socialism the military regime invoked the 
concepts of rationalisation and efficiency. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE ORGANISATION OF THE NATIONALISED INDUSTRIES 
Nationalisation in Bangladesh, in terms of the political 
philosophy and the goals and objective, remained ambivalent. 	Starting 
on declared socialistic premises it ended up in consequences that 
became manifestly congenial to enrichment and growth of private capital-
ism under a direct patronage from the State. 	In this chapter, an 
attempt will be made to study the organisation and management of 
industries evolved since nationalisation, through the interactions of 
an inherited framework and a lack of commitment on the part of the 
political leadership. 	A discussion of the statutory provisions 
revealed that the nationalisation law served as an inadequate guide 
for organisation, management and operation of the industries national- 
ised. 	Issues concerning the legal and administrative status of the 
various components of the nationalised industries invited controversies 
throughout the period under study. Lack of a definition on social and 
economic goals of the nationalised industries inhibited effort to devise 
and introduce rules and regulations suited to commercial operation on 
the part of the nationalised industries. The inherited administrative 
framework needed adjustments but only half-hearted attempt were made by 
the political elites. 	In the absence of a clear policy guideline from 
successive regimes, the corporation form per se, could hardly demonstrate 
if it was inherently and generally superior to the departmental form. 
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A : INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK 
The Conglomeration of Enterprises  
The manufacturing enterprises which were nationalised under 
the Bangladesh Industrial Enterprises Nationalisation Order of 1972 
covered a wide area of activities l - jute goods, cotton textiles, 
sugar, food products of various sorts, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, 
fertilisers, steel products, ship-building, engineering products, 
timber and forest products, cement, mineral products, leather goods 
etc. 	The same law had also brought under its purview those enter- 
prises which were concerned with the development, exploration, trans-
mission and distribution of gas and other minerals. Ten public 
corporations were set up under the same order of March 26, 1972. 
With addition of a new one 2 in September in the same year, the nation-
alised industries in Bangladesh came to consist of eleven "Sector 
Corporations" as they were known with an aggregate number of 352 
enterprises under their charge as shown below: 
1 Tea, a major industry was not nationalised although public sector 
activities in the field consisted in "production of tea, improve-
ment of its quality, boosting up tea export" through Bangladesh 
Tea Board, a public body established in 1951. 	Similarly, elec- 
tric power generation industry continued to remain under a 
statutory board set up before Liberation and reorganised in 1972. 
The Bangladesh Power Board was thus assigned with responsibilities 
for "among other things in providing for generation, transmission 
and distribution of power and construction, maintenance and 
operation of power houses and grids". Public sector activities 
relating to film industries, small and cottage industries and 
fisheries development were promotional in nature and were covered 
by statutes other than the industrial nationalisation order as 
above. 	Transport industries operating in public sector had their 
own seperate statutes as their cover. 
2 Bangladesh Tanneries Corporation. 
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TABLE 7 
Sector Corporations and the Nationalised Enterprises 
Placed Under Them in the Nationalised Industries of Bangladesh 
as in December, 1972 3 
Name of the Corporation 	Number of Enterprises  
Bangladesh 
Bangladesh 
Bangladesh 
Bangladesh 
Bangladesh 
Bangladesh 
Bangladesh 
Bangladesh 
Bangladesh 
Bangladesh 
Bangladesh 
Jute Industries Corporation 
Textile Industries Corporation 
Sugar Mills Corporation 
Food & Allied Products Corporation 
Fertiliser, Chemical & Pharmaceutical 
Corporation 
Paper & Board Corporation 
Tanneries Corporation 
Steel Mills Corporation 
Engineering and Shipbuilding Corporation 
Minerals, Oil & Gas Corporation 
Forest Products Corporation 
77 
72 
16 
54 
13 
9 
30 
20 
34 
7 
20 
Total .352 
   
Additional enterprises were placed under the nationalised 
sector from time to time and the nationalisation order was amended 
accordingly to accommodate such changes. In April, 1976 some of the 
sector corporations were merged on grounds of economy and rationalis-
ation4 . Accordingly in July, 1976 the Bangladesh Sugar and Food 
Industries Corporation was established to cover sugar and food indus-
tries previously organised under two separate corporations. 	Likewise 
3 Figures given in a few published sources are often at 
presumably because additional units were added to the 
sector from time to time. The figures given in this 
based on the schedules attached to the naiionalsation 
and its subsequent amendments, The Bangladesh Gazette 
18 May, 1972 and corporation offices.'' Also, Ministry 
Nationalized Industries (Dacca: AbCo Press, 1975), p. 
variance 
nationalised 
table are 
order ("P.0.27") 
Extraordinary, 
of Industries, 
6, Table 7. 
4 Although reasons of "economy and rationalisation" were articulated 
in the statute effecting the merger/it was also declared that 
the amendment became expedient "for the purpose of enabling the 
government to sell or otherwise transfer the industrial enterprises, 
shares and proprietory interests vested in the Government". See 
The Bangladesh Gazette Extraordinary, 19 April 1976. 
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Bangladesh Chemical Industries Corporation was constituted to embrace 
the activities of the three corporations dealing with the chemicals, 
fertiliser, paper and leather industries. ,Bangladesh Steel Engineer-
ing Corporation was set up to include industries in steel, shipbuilding 
and engineering sectors. 	In addition, as a part of the reorganisation 
the Bangladesh Forest Products Corporation was merged with the Bangla-
desh Forest Industries Development Corporation which had its origin in 
pre-liberation period and all assets and enterprises of the former were 
transferred to the latter 5 . 	Similarly some enterprises and their 
assets were transferred from Bangladesh Oil & Gas Corporation to the 
Bangladesh Minerals Exploration & Development Corporation set up in 
September, 1972 6 . Bangladesh Petroleum Corporation 7 was set up in 
December, 1976 with four marketing companies, two blending plants and 
a refinery. The refinery plant was transferred from Bangladesh Minerals 
Oil and Gas Corporation. As a large number of the enterprises placed or 
transferred to Bangladesh Mineral Exploration and Development Corporation, 
Bangladesh Petroleum Corporation and Bangladesh Forest Industries Develop-
ment Corporation,had been earlier nationalised under P.0.27 of 1972, these 
three corporations along with their respective enterprises have been 
considered in this study as the nationalised industries. Accordingly, 
there were 371 enterprises in the nationalised industries in Bangladesh 
at the beginning of 1977. 
5 This was effected under Ordinance 25 of 1976, The Bangladesh 
Industrial Enterprises (Nationalisation) (Second Amendment) Ordin-
ance, 1976, see The Bangladesh Gazette Extraordinary, 19 April 1976. 
6 The Bangladesh Minerals Exploration & Development Corporation was 
set up under the Presidential Order No. 120 of 1972 published in 
The Bangladesh Gazette Extraordinary, 26 September 1972. As per 
the original schedule attached to the Order, there were eight 
projects placed under this corporation. 
7 President's Order No. 98 of 1976 The Bangladesh Petroleum Corporation 
Order, 1976. 
TABLE 8 
Reconstituted Public Corporations and the Nationalised 
Industrial Enterprises Placed Under Them as in December, 1976 8 
Corporations 	Number of Enterprises  
Bangladesh Jute Industries Corporation 	78 
(hereafter BJIC/BJMC) 
Bangladesh Textile Mills Corporation 75 
(hereafter BTMC) 
Bangladesh Sugar & Food Industries Corporation 	58 
(hereafter BSFIC) 
Bangladesh Chemical Industries Corporation 65 
(hereafter BCIC) 
Bangladesh Steel Engineering Corporation 	54 
(hereafter BSEC) 
Bangladesh Oil and Gas Corporation or Petrobangla 	4 
(hereafter PB) 
Bangladesh Minerals Exploration & Development 10 Corporation (hereafter BMEDC) 
Bangladesh Petroleum Corporation 
(hereafter BPC) 	 7 
Bangladesh Forest Industries Development Corporation 	20 
(hereafter BFIDC) 
Total 	371 
With disinvestment of enterprises the size of the nationalised indus-
tries was reduced to 318 by the end of June, 1978. 
The corporations were not, however, always organised according 
to similarity of products of the respective enterprises placed under 
them. While BJIC controlled the entire jute manufactures and BTMC 
virtually ran the whole of the mechanised cotton textile industry, 
BCIC was responsible for production of nearly 78 heterogeneous products 
ranging from fertiliser, paper and newsprint to soaps and detergents. 
Manufacturing activites of BSEC encompassed steel making and steel 
products to manufacture of cooking utensils, bicycles, television, 
8 See The Bangladesh Gazette Extraordinary, 19 April, 1976 containing 
the notification envisaging the reorganisation and merger of the 
corporations. Figures compiled from the subsequent amendments of 
P.O. 27 of 1972 and Annual Reports of the Corporations and data given 
by them. Also IBRD, 	Prospects, 	op. cit. 	Vol. II pp.122 & 138. Figures given in several sources differ presumably because of 
frequent reorganisation and transfer of enterprise. 
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radio, assembling of cars and buses to industrial plants and machinery. 
BSFIC was engaged in manufacture of sugar, processing of tobacco 
products and frozen fish for export. 	BFIDC activities included 
extraction of timber and pulp wood, mechanical sawing, wood treating, 
tea chest, commercial plywood, veneer plant, fibreflex, coir products, 
processing of raw rubber and pulp and paper manufacture. BMEDC ran 
cement plants in addition to exploration and development of mineral 
resources. 	BPC was responsible for processing and marketing of 
petroleum and petroleum products. PB had no manufacturing or process-
ing plants and was responsible for exploration, transmission and dist-
ribution of oil and gas resources. 
Corporations within the nationalised industries varied in size, 
number of enterprises controlled, fixed assets, sales or employment 
opportunities provided. The table below shows: 
TABLE 9 
Variation in Size and Operation of the Corporations 
in the 
Corporation 
Nationalised Industries in 1976-77 10 
Enterprises 	Fixed Assets* 	Annual Sales* Employment 
BJMC 78 1700 2938 199600 
BTMC 75 611 1813 65500 
BSFIC 58 407 1401 31600 
BCIC 65 2017 1849 25300 
BSEC 54 .804 1424 14500 
PB 4 177 220 2800 
BPC 7 148 560 2800 
BMEDC 10 - 211 1100 
BFIDC 20 338 78 4000 
* in million Taka. 
9 See Appendices for a list of the products of Bangladesh Nationalised 
Industries. 
10 Head Offices of the respective corporations. 	Annual Reports of the 
respective corporations and IBRD, Prospects, op. cit. 
The size and structure of the enterprises within the respective 
corporations varied too. 	The largest cotton mill under BTMC had 
51720 spindles and 1364 looms employing 6200 workers and the smallest 
one had 12400 spindles and 97 looms with 1050 workers 11 . 	Adamjee 
Jute Mills, the largest in the world had 3251 looms and the smallest 
under BJMC had only 44 looms 12 . 	The largest enterprise in BCIC 
employed 3000 men while the smallest one only 23. Within a particular 
group of enterprises under one corporation the range of sales differed. 
Thus in the paper group of BCIC enterprises annual sales for one enter-
prise was Taka 184 million against another's only Taka 4 million 13 . 
Of the nationalised industries, jute was the largest and the 
most important in the economy. Exports of raw jute and jute manu-
factures accounted for 75 per cent of foreign exchange earned by the 
country through exports. 	Jute goods accounted for over 80 per cent 
of the country's aggregate manufactured exports. 	The jute industry 
employed 34 per cent of the labour force in the organised manufacturing 
sector and about 20 per cent of the country's total industrial labour 
force. 	Textile industry like jute was labour intensive and peculiarly 
suitable in the face of a vast magnitude of employed and underemployed 
in Bangladesh. 	Cotton textile industry helped to sustain the large 
handloom industry14 based in the rural areas and which supplied 67 per 
cent of cloth availability. 	The BSFIC enterprises monopolised sugar 
production, absorbed a large amount of rural agricultural production 
of sugarcane and its other varied enterprises opened up new opportunities 
11 BTMC, Annual Report 1976-77, (Mimeo) n.d. 
12 BJMC Head Office; IBRD, 	Bangladesh Survey of the Jute and 
Cotton Textile Industries, (Washington: 1975), Part I, Table 6. 
13 BCIC, Achievement in Retrospect and the Target 1977-78, (Mimeo.) 
14 Handloom industry is said to provide works for approximately 750,000 
persons. 
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of diversifying exports which was imperative  because of near dependence 
on jute alone. 	The major engineering industries revolved round the 
nationalised sector. 	Although plants in the BSEC represented less 
than 10 per cent of the total number of plants in the engineering 
industry, they dominated manufacturing activities based on iron and 
steel products. 	All the fertiliser plants, paper mills and newsprint 
factories, the petroleum refinery and cement plants belonged to the 
nationalised industries sector. 	Exploration, transmission, distri- 
bution and development for industrial use of the only mineral resources 
which is known to be available in some substantial quantity, i.e., 
natural gas,was entrusted to the nationalised sector. 
Though numerically a minor fraction of the industrial sector 
the nationalised industries dominated the scene and to use the phrase 
of Musolf - "nearly linked the economy" 15 . 	The nationalised industries 
accounted for nearly 90 per cent of the aggregate fixed assets in the 
major industrial groups 16 . Aggregate annual expenditures of the 
nationalised industries were estimated at about 64 per cent of the 
total expenditures incurred by all public sector institutions in the 
country17 and their annual average budget expenditures were equivalent 
to nearly 78 per cent of the average aggregate amount of government 
revenue and capital expenditure during the FFYP period 18 . 	They 
15 Lloyd D. Musolf, Public Ownership and Accountability, (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1959), p. 23. 
16 For fixed assets of the nationalised industries see Appendices. 
For fixed assets in major industries, see Year Book 1979, op. cit. 
pp. 260-261. 
17 Government of Bangladesh, Ministry of Finance, Financial/Budget 
Statement of Autonomous Bodies, respectively of 1975-76, 1976-77, 
1977-78 and 1978-79, (Dacca: Government Press, 1975, 1976, 1977 
and 1978). 
18 Ibid., Statistical 1978, op. cit., pp. 224-225. 
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accounted for 81 per cent of total FFYP allocations for the industrial 
sector19 . Nearly 43 per cent of financial resources provided by the 
commercial banks went to the manufacturing sector and bulk of these 
went to the nationalised industries 20  . On the other hand the nation-
alised industries contributed nearly 5 per cent of the total non-tax 
revenue receipts of the government 21 and were responsible for payment 
of about 24 per cent of the aggregate tax revenue of the government 
during the FFYP period 22  . 	Exports of the products of the nationalised 
industries fetched 59 per cent of the national foreign exchange earnings 
through exports 23 . Value of the products of the nationalised industries 
was about 62 percent of the national aggregate of gross value of the national 
industrial production24 . 	Public enterprises in general, contributed only 
8.2 per cent of the GDP and of this public sector manufacturing units 
contributed a half 25 ,nearly all of which came from the nationalised 
industries. 	The nationalised industries were responsible for employ- 
ment of about 37 per cent of the labour force engaged in manufacturing 
19 ITYP, op. cit., p. 216, Table 9-4. 
20 Compiled from Statistical 1978, op. cit., p. 232; Economic Indicators 
of Bangladesh, Vol. 5 (July, 1978), p. 12. 
21 Figures derived from Statistical 1978, op. cit., pp. 226-7, Government 
of Bangladesh, Planning Commission, Economic Review, respectively of 
1974-75, 1975-76, 1976-77 & 1977-78 (Dacca: Government Press, 1975, 
1976, 1977 & 1978), Survey 1979,   op. cit., p. 256, also IBRD, , Bangla-
desh Current Economic Trends, Vol. 1 (Washington, IBRD, 1978) p. 58. 
22 Statistical 1978, op. cit., pp. 226-7, Data collected from the corp-
oration offices and the annual reports, see Appendi&g. 
23 IBRD, Prospects, op. cit. Vol. 2, p. 205; Review 1978, op. cit. p. 205. 
24 Data derived from Year Book 1979, op. cit. pp. 262-3; Annual reports 
and offices of the corporations, Review 1978, op. cit. p. 113. IBRD, 
Prospects, op. cit., Vol. 2, see Appendix. 
25 Muzaf far Ahmed, "Public Enterprises in the National Economy", journal 
of Management, Business and Economics, Vol. 3, (July, 1977), pp. 1-58- 
works in the economy 26 . 
The Corporate Form  
Previous experience in Bangladesh with the public sector indus-
tries was confined to industries run by the PIDC during the pre-liber-
ation period. The organisational problems of EPIDC were subject to a 
number of studies all of which suggested the need to 27 
(i) break away from the overcentralised and bureaucracy dominated 
structure; 
(ii) provide professional management with clearly defined lines of 
responsibility; 
(iii) create conditions so that the enterprises could operate with 
sufficient freedom to be able to secure their own commercial 
viability. 
After nationalisation, the "conglomerate" structure of EPIDC/ 
BIDC28 was dismantled and in its place new sector corporations were 
set up. 	These corporations were defined, by and large, according to 
the technical similarity of products and processes of the enterprises 
placed under them. 	In placing most of the public manufacturing activ- 
ities under the control supervision and co-ordination 29 of public 
corporations a preference for this form of organisation was demonstrated 
to those of company form, departmental management or control board. 
Compared to neighbouring India, for example, there was hardly any intense 
discussion regarding the adoption of the public corporation form in 
26 Average annual employment figure of the nationalised industries 
during the FFYP period was 350,000 as compared to 948,000 persons 
employed in aggregate for the organised manufacturing sector as a 
whole. 	See, Year Book 1979, op. cit., pp. 83-4, 331-2, 391 & 394; 
Annual Reports of the corporations and information provided by the 
respective corporations. IBRD, ProsPects, op. cit., Review, 1978, 
op. cit. see Appendix. 
27 Sobhan, Nationalisation, op. cit. p. 190. 
28 After Liberation EPIDC was renamed as BIDC. 
29 Industrial Nationalisation Order 1972, op. cit., Preamble. 
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Bangladesh 30 . 
It has been suggested that the public corporation form is the 
product of an advanced state of industrialisation 31 . It gives freedom 
from political decision and red tape and helps to introduce the 
"business type" leaders at the top management level in response to 
the business type tasks assigned to the corporation by the government. 
The public corporation form facilitates the performance of assigned 
tasks regarding conservation and exploitation of natural and human 
resources in a country. The advantages of this form lay in the fact 
that it 
could be clothed with the powers of government but 
possessed of the flexibility and initiative of a 
private enterprise 32 
In Bangladesh, despite the obvious preference for public corpor-
ation as the predominant organisational form for the operation of the 
nationalised industries, public enterprises were also organised as 
government departmental undertakings, control boards and public 
companies33 . Generally, enterprises in the nature of public utility 
were organised as departmental undertakings. They were financed 
through appropriation from the government treasury and were subject to 
30 See for example, P.V. Pylee, "Government Enterprises in the Indian 
Economy", Asian Survey, Vol. 1 (September, 1961) pp. 16-26. Also, 
Nabagopal Das, The Public Sector in India , (London: Asia Publishing 
House, 1966), pp. 53-67 for discussions on the relative merits of 
different organisational forms viz, company, public corporation or 
departmental in the Indian context. 
31 See Robert LaPorte Jr., "An Analysis of a Development Strategy: 
Public Corporations and Resource Development in South Asia", Inter- 
national Review of Administrative Sciences, Vol. 33 (1967) pp. 319-328. 
32 The statement is attributed to the American President Franklin D. 
Roosvelt. 
33 Public manufacturing undertakings other than the nationalised indus- 
tries were also placed under the Freedom Fighters' Welfare Trusts, 
Sena Kalyan Sangstha,a welfare foundation for the soldiers and 
Telegraph and Telephone Board, an autonomous but a departmental 
undertaking. 
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the same budget, account, audit and control procedures like the govern-
ment departments 34 . Relaxations were made, from time to time, of the 
normally rigid government rules and regulations so that the commercial 
character of these public enterprises could be accommodated to a certain 
extent. 	In spite of this, the departmental undertakings remained a 
part of the government. 
Nationalisation made the government responsible in productive 
activity in contrast to the traditional regulatory and promotional 
responsibilities. Public ownership of a large scale and diverse 
industrial activities gave rise to a monopoly situation, whether formal 
or real, substituting competition. This tended to make the entire 
industry a single unit merging the problems of the firm with the 
problems of the economy. Public corporations were set up as aid to 
resolve the problems of organisation and control. They were conceived 
as the "central organisation" in the management structure of the nation-
alised industries 35 . 	They were to "control, supervise and co-ordinate" 
the operation of the nationalised enterprises placed under them. 	The 
enterprises in the nationalised insdustries, with a view to the same 
purpose, may be categorised as: 
(i) those directly run by the corporations as their subdivisions; 
(ii) those organised as limited companies under the Companies' Act 
having their own Memorandum and Articles of Association. 
The role of the public corporation is expected to be defined in 
the law under which it is created. The corporation sets the overall 
objectives and policies for its field of activity in consultation with 
the administrative ministry. It is responsible to the government for 
34 For example, the Bangladesh Railway. 
35 Qazi Kholiquzzaman Ahmad, "Aspects of the Management of Nationalised 
Industries in Bangladesh", The Bangladesh Development Studies, Vol. 2 
(July, 1974), p. 675-702. 
173 
attainment of targets and satisfactory operation of the enterprises 
placed under it and to submit periodical statements to the government 
in this respect 36 . 	The corporation is to prepare sector budgets, 
conduct internal audit, arrange procurement of bulk items, approve 
production planning and ensure a smooth marketing mechanism for the 
products of the enterprises in conformity with the government's 
distribution policy 37  . 	It formulates a manpower strategy and ensures 
recruitment of suitable personnel in the executive and other cadres 
of enterprise management38 . 
To cope with the diversity and complexity of the nationalised 
industries, the corporations were placed under the administrative 
controls of different ministries. 	No single agency or ministry 39 
was placed in overall charge of the nationalised industries as a whole. 
To begin with the Nationalised Industries Division in the Ministry of 
Industries was responsible for all the sector corporations except BJMC 
and PB. BDIC was placed under the administrative control of the 
Ministry of Jute and PB under the Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral 
Resources. After reorganisation of the sector corporations, the 
jurisdiction of the Ministry of Industries was limited to only for 
36 Industrial Nationalisation Order, op. cit., Articles 19 & 22. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid., Article 16. 
39 In India a Bureau of Public Enterprises was set up. See R.C. 
Mascarenhas, "The Bureau of Public Enterprises in India", Inter-
national Review of Administrative Sciences, Vol. 34 (1968), pp. 
246-256. The FFYP seems to have perceived the Nationalised Industries 
Committee in the Nationalised Industries Division of the Ministry 
of Industries as a form of "deliberative and not executive agency." 
See MT, op. cit., pp. 252-3. 	The Committee hardly ever functioned 
and with different ministries being responsible for different corpor- 
ations such a committee under the umbrella of one ministry could 
hardly be effective. 
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CHART 2 
THE NATIONALISED INDUSTRIES AS PART OF THE 
GOVERNMENT MACHINERY 
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BSFIC, BCIC and BSEC. A separate textile ministry was created in 
1977 and BTMC was placed under its control. BFIDC was under the 
administrative control of the Ministry of Agriculture. 	The Ministry 
of Petroleum and Mineral Resources was made responsible for PB, BMEDC 
and BPC. Although under the administrative control of different 
ministries the nationalised industries were nevertheless not insulated 
from the influences and control of other ministries such as the Ministry 
of Planning, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Law, the Ministry 
of Commerce and the central personnel agency of the government, Estab-
lishment Division. At macro level policies were generally the result 
of consultation and consensus among the ministries and thus ultimately 
the Cabinet of Ministers was involved 40 . 
The basic dilemma of co-ordination, control and accountability 
was however to reconcile the operational flexibility of the public 
corporations with the need for control, accountability and consistency 
in public policy. 	This remained, like many other countries, elusive. 
The FFYP prescribed "maximum commercial autonomy 1141 for the public 
corporations without defining its operational meaning. But the public 
corporations for the nationalised industries did not or could not enjoy 
autonomy as implied in the definition of public corporation form 42 . 
40 Infra., pp. 178-84. 
41 FFYP., op. cit. p. 252. 
42 One of the earliest writings on the public corporation form was 
of Marshall E. Dimock, "Government Corporations: A Focus of Policy 
and Administration", The American Political Science Review, Vol. 63 
(October, 1949), pp. 899-921; Also see Harold Seidman, "The Theory 
of the Autonomous Government Corporations: A Critical Appraisal", 
Public Administration Review, Vol. 12 (1952); W.G. Shepherd, "Public 
Corporation and Public Action", The Political Quarterly, Vol. 35, 
(1964); R.S. Arora, Administration of Government Industries: Three 
Essays on the Public Corporation, (New Delhi: Indian Institute of 
Public Administration, 1969); Also Edward Richard Ball, The Signif-
icance of the Government Corporation in Administrative Theory, 
Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, University of Notre Dame, 1955. 
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They were instead reduced to a position of a government department 
"with somewhat exalted position" 43 . This happened through the 
following ways: 
First, the needed rules were not framed as to introduce flexi-
bility and required operational freedom in the policy framework, pro-
cedures, decisions and action. The functional responsibility of the 
ministry remained confused due to the lack of the rules of business 
and absence of clear definition of relationship. Nationalisation 
law itself was vague 44 and an omnibus law45 could not adequately 
recognise the differences in function, goals, objectives and organis-
ational needs of all the corporations. 
Second, the inability of the government to define objectives 
of nationalisation or the nationalised industries and of the corpor-
ations led to a confused policy mix. Different ministries and 
agencies of the government pursued contradictory goals. Thus the 
Ministry of Finance pressed for returns on investment and generation 
of surplus, while the Ministry of Commerce wielded its authority to 
fix a price to give relief to the consumers. 	The physical targets 
were set by the Ministry of Industries based on capacity but it was 
not followed by the Ministry of Finance or of Commerce in respect of 
43 Muzaffer Ahmad, "Whither Public Enterprise", The Journal ofManage-
ment Business and Economics, Vol. 3, No. 1 (January, 1977) pp.130-151. 
44 A questionnaire was circulated to the chairmen and directors and 
secretaries to the corporation boards in September-November, 1978 
in connection with this study. 	Out of 9 public corporations covered 
in this study, 7 chairmen, 20 directos and 7 secretaries responded 
to the questionnaire supplied to them. 	The coverage was about 75 
per cent of the personnel manning the corporation boards in the 
nationalised industries. About 59 per cent of the respondents 
thought that the nationalisation law was vague. 
45 Infra. See the section on "Legal Framework" below. 
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foreign exchange allocations to import industrial raw materials or 
much needed machinery and spare parts. The Investment Board went 
on sanctioning new capacities in the private sector while the public 
sector was being plagued by underutilisation of capacity in the same 
sphere of activity. 
Third, if autonomy was the raison de l tre for establishing public 
corporations for operating the nationalised industries it also became 
the victim of control which was the loudest theme in the nationalisation 
order. But the authority and control of government as provided in 
P.0.27 of 1972 were at times specific and at times vague and at times 
an umbrella clause making it all encompassing46  . The locus, areas and 
instrument of control were left unspecified. 	There was thus overload- 
ing of the ministries in pricing, procurement, distribution, personnel 
management and financial administration. 
The Working Arrangements  
Human organisations of any size have a clear hierarchical structure. 
Any set of plans used to govern organisation also constitutes an exceed-
ingly elaborate hierarchical system. 	If a system is conceived of as a 
complex of interrelated activities 47  management of as large a conglomer-
ation as of the nationalised industries of Bangladesh was fundamentally 
a matter of coping with complex problems. 	It was, therefore, necessary 
to design the system - especially, the particular type of system known 
as organisation. Organisation like all systems has to have a hierarchical 
46 Muzaffer Ahmad, "Prospects and Problems of Nationalised Industries: 
A Critical Review of Views", The Journal of Management, Business 
and Economics, (Dacca: January, 1975), Vol. 1, pp. 28-53. 
47 See R.L. Ackoff, "System Organisation and Interdisciplinary Research" 
in Donald P. Eckmanjd ed., Systems Research and Design, (New York: 
John Wiley & Sons, 1961), pp. 26-42. 
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structure which results from factoring global objectives into a hier-
archy of more manageable objectives. Following Emery 48 the organis-
ation of the nationalised industries - its compartmentalisation, dele-
gation of authority and assignment of responsibility for achieving the 
assigned objectives should, therefore, represent an effort to complement 
the results of the factoring process. As organisation becomes more 
complex and large, an important variant of the functional structure is 
introduced - the federal decentralised structure. With it the problems 
of maintaining a coherent and orderly pattern of activities become a 
subject of increasing concern49 . 
The system adopted for the management of the nationalised indus-
tries in Bangladesh was stated to be a three-tier system50 . The 
hierarchical levels or the pyramids consisted of the government in the 
ministries at the top, sector corporations in the middle and the enter-
prises at the bottom. 	The interrelated activities in the system of 
the nationalised industries may be accordingly identified as follows: 
(i) Government set the overall policies and objectives for the 
industry; 
(ii) Corporations guide and assist the individual enterprises to 
achieve the overall objectives; 
(iii) Enterprises act to achieve individually their share of required 
production of the sector. 
The Nationalisation Order defined the role of the government as 
"the sole share holder" and owner of all the properties of the nationalised 
48 James C. Emery, Organisational Planning and Control Systems, Theory 
and Technology, (New York: Macmillan, 1969), p. 21. 
49 G. Mackecrie, M. Franklin & Blennerhassel, "Organisational Analysis: 
State of the Art", Administration, Vol. 23, (1973), pp. 150-155. 
50 The FFYP pointed out the "need for a clearcut demarcation of 
responsibility between the Minister as the policy maker, the sector 
corporation as regulating agencY...and the individual enterprises 
directly in charge of productive operations. FFYP, op. cit. p. 251. 
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industrial enterprises51  . The government could sell or transfer any 
of the nationalised enterprises except those in the jute, sugar and 
cotton textile sectors other than the specialised textiles. 	The 
government was also clothed with a blanket power and could 
take such measures and do such things as it deems 
necessary or expedient for the purpose of efficient 
running of such industrial enterprise. 52 
It could appoint the Chairmen and Directors of the Boards for the 
corporations for the general direction and administration of the 
affairs and business of the nationalised industries. The government 
could issue general or special instruction for the control and super-
intendence of the boards of the corporations. 	The government could 
delegate its power to the corporation, determine the manner of sub-
scription by it the authorised share capital, approve the annual budget 
statement of the corporations, give permission to the corporations to 
raise loans, appoint auditors to audit the accounts of the corporations, 
require the corporations to furnish reports and accounts and alter the 
composition by transferring in or out the enterprises from one or other 
corporation or elsewhere53 . 
In contrast to the pre-liberation practice of the government's 
role being confined to the enforcement of rules and regulations the 
Industrial Investment Policy of 1972-73 visualised the government as 
provider of constructive assistance and dynamic leadership for efficient 
and effective management in the manufacturing sector. The report of a 
management consultant appointed to advise the government on the organisation 
51 Industrial Nationalisation Order, op. cit., Article 4, later amended 
by Ordinance No. 25 of 1976. 
52 Ibid., Article 5. 
53 Ibid., Articles 18, 19, 20 and 21. 
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of the nationalised industries viewed the role of the government as 
a policy maker and not as a Manager54 . The role of the different 
tiers was identified by the consultants was as follows: 
(i) The Planning Commission will submit to the Cabinet. Plans for 
new industrial development and general economic policy; 
(ii) The Cabinet, if these plans are accepted by it, will ratify 
them and request the Minister to implement them; 
(iii) The Minister of Industries will advise the Chairmen of the 
Corporations of the Cabinet plans and policies; 
(iv) The Chairmen of the Corporations will implement the policies 
by overall supervision of the enterprises. 
(v) The Chief Executives of the enterprises will strive to achieve 
individually their share of production targets and other contri-
butions towards the sector.55 
The consultants group identified three separate roles for the 
government when it attempts to operate commercial and industrial under-
takings: 
(i) The government owns the enterprises and exercises normal rights 
and responsibilities of any owner but delegate to the executives 
the management of the business; 
(ii) The government defines and ensures the implementation of social, 
political and economic policies through the nationalised 
industries in the same way as it would through private companies; 
(iii) The government carries out normal routine administrative functions, 
for example, foreign exchange controls, fiscal policies, legis-
lation or labour. 56 
The report of the consultants group recognised that the government 
as owner would look for increased production, lower costs, maximum prices, 
more profits and commercial freedom, but it would also want to keep the 
prices low and permit wages to meet inflation with a view to achieve its 
54 Report on the Organisation Structure for the Nationalised Industries: 
The Government and the Sector Corporations, (Government of Bangladesh/ 
P.A. Management Consultants Ltd., London, 1972), p. 8. 
55 Based on ibid., and Final Report on the Bangladesh Nationalised 
Industries Management Consultancy Project, (London: P.A. Management 
Consultants, 1975). 1 
56 Ibid. 
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social and economic objectives. 
The essence of the report of the management group seems to lie 
in visualising the role of the government parallel to the public and 
private sector alike. 	As defined policies are issued to industrialists 
in the private sector and the private owners strive to attain optimum 
efficiency and prospects through exercise of their own role and respons-
ibility, so will the government as the owner of the nationalised enter- 
prises within the policy guidelines set for itself. 	However, the 
implications of a mixed economy apparently did not conform with the 
prevailing ethos of the Mujib regime. The government did not come out 
in the open with its views and seems to have let things go as they were. 
Thus except for some structural improvements the Report had no profound 
implications for the nationalised sector. 
The iovernment sought to strengthen its machinery in the ministries 
in view of a large public sector in the economy. The Administrative and 
Services Reorganisation Committee constituted in March 1972 envisaged the 
function of the Ministry of Industry to effectively coordinate and assist 
the sector corporations, without in any way impeding their operational 
autonomy57 . The Committee recommended that the ministry retained direct 
responsibility for the supervision of the 
(i) organisational set-up 
(ii) personnel management 
(iii) pricing policy 
(iv) budgetary matters and 
(v) investments of the sector corporations. 
The Committee also recommended that the government should delegate full 
57 Government of Bangladesh, Reports of the Administrative and Services 
Reorganisation Committee, (Volumes 1-6) (Dacca). The report was not 
published for general information. But the general contents were 
known. 
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responsibility for all other matters to the corporation. 	But the 
report was never made public nor its recommendations accepted or 
rejected. 
During the post-Mujib period, there was initially some efforts 
to formulate a set of prescribed rules in the affairs of the government 
and its activities in the economy. One such attempt materialised in 
the framing and adopting of the "Rules of Business". It was not that 
such "Rules of Business" were absent in the past, but after Liberation 
in view of the changed perspectives and emphasis a fresh approach was 
required in the transactions of the governmental business. 	Even though 
the Constitution clearly provided that such "Rules of Business" should 
be framed58,Mujib administration followed a policy of procrastination 
in this respect. This meant ad-hocism in government business resulting 
in a rule of one person and not a rule of law 59 . However, the Rule 
of Business 1975 made effective after Mujib's exit spelt out the role of 
the government in respect of the nationalised industries. 	Accordingly, 
the government through the respective ministries was to be responsible 
for: formulation and administration of industrial policy, preparation of 
schemes relating to the public sector industries, formulatrepolicies and 
examine problems common to nationalised industrial corporations, analysing 
the financial reports and pointing out deviations if any, determination 
of pricing policy of the products of the nationalised industries, indust-
rial research and accountability to the Cabinet for the performance of 
58 Constitution, op. cit., Article 56 (5). 
59 The Awami League partymen openly advocated for one-man rule of 
Mujib in place of the rule of law.Sheikh Moni, Mujib's nephew said 
in a leading article in the Daily BangZar Bani that what was needed 
was a rule of Mujib and not a rule of law. 
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the nationalised industries. 	The performance of the governmental 
responsibilities towards the nationalised industries implied close 
coordination, consultation and coherence in the multifacet activities 
of its various components. 	Thus for example, Establishment Division 
as the central personnel authority for the government played a vital 
role in respect of deployment of civil service officers to the nation-
alised industries specially for the corporation boards positions. 
Any move to reorganise the nationalised industries required the opinion 
of the Establishment and the Organisation and Management Division. 
The Ministry of Finance was responsible for scrutiny and approval of 
budget of the corporations on the matter of capital issue and also to 
enforcement of financial discipline and propriety through inspection 
of the accounts and activities of the corporations. The Ministry of 
Commerce had to be consulted regarding operation of the assets of the 
companies and also pricing policy and control. The Ministry of Labour and 
Social Welfare had an important role to play about matters concerning 
labour laws and welfare and labour disputes. 	The preparation of rules 
regulations, by-laws and notifications could not be complete without 
being vetted by the Ministry of Law. The Ministry of Planning was 
to be consulted on all economic questions arising out of foreign exchange, 
export programme and import policy, grant of protection to indigenous 
industries, pricing policy including grant of subsidy, determination of 
investment policy and determination of labour policy. In sum, the 
government performed its overall responsibilities through the concerted 
efforts of its various organs in the ministries 60 . 
60 As per the Rules of Business, 1975 and Allocation of the Different 
Ministries and Divisions in the Government of Bangladesh published 
after the exit of the Awami League from power. 
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In a democracy, besides the executive organ, the legislative 
branch has a cardinal role to play. 	The founders of Bangladesh 
carrying the wishes of the people as reflected in election mandates 61 
visualised a parliamentary democracy. But In line with the post-liberation 
practices of the Awami League,supremacy of the parliament was virtually 
relegated to the subordination of a popularly elected authoritarian 
leader62 . 	It was, therefore, not surprising that parliament did not 
demonstrate a meaningful interest in the affairs of the nationalised 
industries63 . Although obligatory 64 under the Nationalisation Order 
no annual report of a nationalised industrial corporation was considered 
or debated in the Parliament. There was no meaningful parliamentary 
discussion as evidenced from the records of the proceedings of the 
parliament during 1972 and 1975. Most of the questions asked appeared 
to have been addressed to the gallery, being ephemeral and topical 65 . 
The devices intended to regulate relationships between nationalised 
industries were hardly used. There was no regular full scale debate 
on the nationalised industries, supposedly a corner stone of the ruling 
elite's efforts to establish socialism. 	There was also the Controller 
and Auditor General who was supposed to examine the workings of the 
nationalised industries for the express purpose of presenting information 
61 The Awami League Manifesto 1970 envisaged that "the character of 
the Government shall be Federal and Parliamentary". 
62 Supra. , pp. 122-3. 
63 Mohiuddin Alamgir, "Nationalised Industries of Bangladesh: Problems 
and Prospects", The Bangladesh Development Studies, Vol. 2 (July 
1974, pp. 703-20. 
64 Industrial Nationalisation Order, op. cit., Articles 22 (2) and (5). 
65 Interview with Mr. Mofazzalul Haq of the University of Dacca who 
was conducting a research on the aspects of the parliamentary 
control of the public enterprises in Bangladesh. His preliminary 
findings tended to confirm the above observation. 
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to the parliament. Parliamentary control, however, remained non-
existent not only during the military regime but also during the Awami 
League regime - the protagonists for the parliamentary system of 
democracy. 
The sector corporations have been described as the central 
organisations in the management of the nationalised industries 66 . 
The main responsibility for running the nationalised industries 
devolved on the sector corporations. 	They were also the commercial 
units 67 since they, as guardians of assets of the enterprises placed 
under their respective control wereresponsible for ensuring that 
overall targets and objectives of the nationalised industries were 
achieved. 	The functions of the corporation were broadly classified 
in two categories - general and specified 68 . 	The general functions 
of the corporation were defined as: 
to operate, as national concerns, on commercial and 
economic basis and to meet the needs of the public 
in the most efficient and economic manner. 69 
The specific functions were to be indicated in respective laws and 
rules creating the corporation. 	While the Guidelines sought to 
attribute "commercial and economic basis" and a public purpose to the 
autonomous bodies and public corporations in general, the sector 
corporations, whose basic law was the Nationalisation Order did not 
seem to be under such obligations as provided in the law. 	Thus while 
the statutes constituting BFIDC, BMEDC and BPC clearly had commercial 
66 Supra. fn. 35. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Government of Bangledesh, Cabinet Division; Guidelines on the 
Relationship Between Government and Autonomous Bodies/Corporations 
and the Autonomous Bodies/Corporations and Enterprises Under Them. 
(Dacca: Government Press, May, 1976). 
69 Ibid. 
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implications and a public purpose 70 , 	P.0.27 of 1972 cannot be said 
to have incorporated any such provisions in clear terms. 	The statutory 
obligations of the sector corporations were 
to control, supervise and co-ordinate...the activities, 
business and affairs of the...industrial enterprises 
placed under it and to establish and develop new 
industrial enterprises within their respective fields. 77 
The corporations could frame regulations relating to the manner 
they control, supervise and coordinate the business and affairs of the 
industrial enterprises. 	The corporation could also exercise the power 
of the sole shareholder in the industrial enterprises and as such 
according to the companies law,appoint the directors of the Boards of 
the enterprises and the auditors, approve the audit report, the audited 
balance sheets and the dividend to be distributed among the share holders. 
The corporation could exercise these powers on behalf of the government 
if delegated to it by the government. 	The corporation was obliged to 
submit to the government for approval the annual budget statements 
showing estimated receipts, expenditure and sums which were likely to 
be required from the government during the financial year. 	The Corpor- 
ation was authorised to expend such sums of money as per the annual 
budget approved by the government. 	The corporation was under statutory 
obligation to publish the audited accounts and annual report and to lay 
the same before the parliament 72 . 
70 Article 7 (2) of the Bangladesh Mineral Exploration and Development 
Corporation Order, 1972 envisaged that the Board of BMEDC "shall 
act on commercial considerations having due regard to public 
interest generally.." Forest Industries Development Corporation 
Ordinance, 1959 and Provincial Industrial Development Corporation 
(East Pakistan) Ordinance 1962 also emphasised "commercial 
considerations". 
71 Industrial Nationalisation Order, op. cit., Article 17 (1). 
72 Ibid., Article 22. 
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The Nationalisation Order defined to some extent the internal 
structure of the corporation. The whole responsibility for management 
and results was vested in the Boards of Directors of the corporation 
reported through the Secretary of the Ministry to the government and 
the Minister. 	The internal structure of the corporations was spread 
over various levels of hierarchy. 	The first level was, of course, 
the Chairman, the chief executive of the corporation followed by members 
of the Boards of Directors. As the Boards were functional and chair-
man and directors were appointed by government not as representatives 
of any interest group but as managers, their professional expertise 
was to be the criterion for appointment. 	The Nationalisation Order 
provided for appointment of not more than six such directors. 	All 
the positions in the Boards were not always filled up. The directors 
came to be designated according to the functional area which he was 
assigned to look after. 	This was determined generally in accordance 
with his specialisation and experience but frequently while a director 
was appointed the job specification of the incumbent was indicated by 
the title. 
The Nationalisation Order did not attempt to indicate the internal 
structure of the enterprises placed under the sector corporations. 	The 
rules and regulations to be framed under article 25 and 27 of the 
Nationalisation Order were expected to cover those aspects. 	However, 
not all corporations prepared the respective rules and regulations even 
after five years of nationalisation73 . 	There was consequently a lot 
of ad-hocism in the working procedures between the corporation and the 
73 BJMC published the Bangladesh Jute Mills Corporation Rules as late 
as in April, 1977. BJMC's Enterprises Board Regulations were 
prepared in late 1977. 
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enterprises and vice versa. 	The Guidelines 74 defined the respective 
rules of the corporation and enterprises regarding the working pro-
cedures - administration, personnel, labour procurement supplies, 
sales, financial matters, legal affairs, production planning and 
implementation, investment, incurring liabilities etc. The enterprises 
were required to obtain prior approval of the corporation in most of 
these matters. Not all the corporations had framed their regulations 
under P.0.27 as late as in January, 1978. 	Like the Board of Directors 
for the corporation, the government decided to have Enterprise Boards 
for the respective enterprises. 	The Enterprise Board was the highest 
policy making body at the enterprise level with the responsibility for 
achieving objectives determined by the corporation and the power to 
delegate the authority to implement the policies to an executive team 75 . 
The Guidelines issued by the Cabinet Division in 1976 76 indicated that 
the enterprise Board might consist of the chief executive of the enter- 
prise, Corporation Appointee and Workers' Representatives 77 . 	As 
provided in the Guidelines, responsibility of an Enterprise of commercial 
nature was to 
operate on commercial consideration, having due regard 
to national interests in the most efficient and economic 
manner within the policy framework and guidelines 
prescribed in the rules and regulations. 78 
Unfortunately for the nationalised industries, for most of the period 
between 1972 and 1978 the relationship between the various components 
of the nationalised industries remained uncertain and continued to be 
74 Cabinet Division, Guidelines, op. cit. 
75 Ibid. 
76 Ibid. 
77 Ibid., p. 10. 
78 Ibid. 
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resolved as much by ad-hoc measures and expediency of the situation 
as by various rules;. regulations, procedure usages and conventions. 
B : LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
The Legal Process  
The decision to nationalise the large scale industries in March 
1972 consisted of two distinct parts. 	The first part provided a legal 
framework for the taking over and management of enterprises abandoned 
by former non-local owners. The second part provided for nationalis-
ation of three major large industries viz., jute and cotton textiles 
and manufacturing of sugar. The entire legal process of nationalisation 
of industries was completed in the following stages. 
First, the State was empowered to take over control and manage-
ment of industrial enterprises of the non-locals who had left the 
country and were not available to control and manage the enterprises. 
The government was authorised to take over management and control of 
any enterprises whose owners or directors could not be allowed to control 
and manage the same in the public interest. The government was empowered 
to take over control and mangement of any such enterprise or appoint a 
management board and administrator or could direct any public corporation, 
semi-government organisation or authority to take over its control and 
management 79 . 
Second, all industrial enterprises abandoned by non-locals were 
to vest in the Government of Bangladesh. The government was empowered 
79 Government of Bangladesh, Ministry of Law, "Acting President's Order 
No. 1 of 1972 The Bangladesh (Taking Over of Control and Management 
of Industrial and Commercial Concerns) Order, 1972", Article 2, The 
Bangladesh Gazette Extraordinary, January.1972. 
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to administer, control, manage and dispose of the enterprises by 
transfer or otherwise and to take such measures as it might consider 
necessary or expedient. 	Boards could be constituted or administrators 
appointed for management of such enterprises 80 . 
Third, Bangladesh Industrial Development Corporation was 
established for the purpose of taking over the assets of the East 
Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation. As a result the business, 
projects and industrial undertakings of EPIDC stood transferred to and 
vested in the BIDC. 	This meant that all public sector industrial 
undertakings of EPIDC were transferred to and vested in the newly 
constituted BIDC 81 . 
Fourth, government nationalised jute, cotton textiles and sugar 
industries and all the shares in each enterprise under the three 
industries stood vested in the government. 	Ten corporations were 
established having powers to exercise in respect of the following 
categories of enterprises: 
(i) all industrial enterprises in jute, cotton textile and sugar 
industries; 
(ii) abandoned industrial enterprises vested in the government; 
(iii) industrial enterprises owned and managed by a statutory corpor-
ation that the government might place under any of the corpor-
ations as constituted through the nationalisation order. 82 
80 Government of Bangladesh, Ministry of Law, "President's Order 16 of 
1972 The Bangladesh Abandoned Property (Control, Management and 
Disposal) Order of 1972", The Bangladesh Gazette Extraordinary, 
28 February 1972. 
81 Government of Bangladesh, Ministry of Law, "President's Order No. 
39 of 1972 The Bangladesh Industrial Development Corporation Order, 
1972", The Bangladesh Gazette Extraordinary, 9 May 1972. 
82 Industrial Nationalisation Order, op. cit. Articles 4 and 10. 
The Statutes  
The principal nationalisation law, known as the Bangladesh 
Industrial Enterprises (Nationalisation) order, 1972 did not mention 
any reason or purpose or objectives for nationalisation of industries. 
The law was proclaimed through a Presidential Order and simply stated 
in its preamble that it was "expedient to provide for the nationalis-
ation of certain industrial enterprises fl83 . 	However, the law relating 
to the taking over of abandoned properties were more specific and 
stated the reasons for taking over was the absence of the owners and 
managers to occupy or supervise or manage in person their industrial 
enterprises. Another reason for taking over was stated to be in 
"public interest" 84 . 	The text of the nationalisation order does not 
give an indication of any ideological motivation behing the decision 
to nationalise. 	The absence of any ideological incantation in the 
principal nationalisation laws is possibly explained from the fact 
that these laws were promulgated through Presidential Orders and not 
enacted through the Parliament. Moreover, Bangladesh did not have a 
Constitution at the time which was in the process of being framed. 
The First Five Year Plan which contains a lot of ideological cliches 
was yet to be announced. The nationalisation and taking-over orders, 
were, however, baptised by reference to the Proclamation of Independence 
of Bangladesh Order read with the Provisional Constitution of Bangladesh 
Order85 . None of these Proclamations attempt to define the ideology of 
83 Ibid., Preamble. 
84 Taking Over Order, op. cit. Abandoned Property Order, 1972, op. 
cit. 
85 For a text of the Proclamation of Independence Order, 10 April 1971 
see Bangladesh Document Vol. I. op. cit., pp.281-282. Government of 
Bangladesh, Ministry of Law, "The Provisional Constitution of Bangladesh 
Order, 1972", The Bangladesh Gazette Extraordinary, 11 January, 1972. 
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the State or its future economic or social programmes. 	Viewed in 
this context and in the absence of an expressed ideological motivation 
of the nationalisation decision as reflected in the law, some critics 
described Bangladesh socialism as socialism of abandoned property 86 . 
Whatever way nationalisation is viewed, it is necessary for a 
law that purports to establish a monopoly in favour of the State or 
State-owned corporations, to be reasonable (a) for a public purpose 
and (b) to provide for compensation 87 . When one considers the wide 
range of opinion 88  as to the need for a requirement of "a public 
purpose" or "new objectives" for a definition of nationalisation, it 
is strikingly obvious that none of the prime nationalisation laws in 
Bangladesh, the Bangladesh Industrial Enterprises (Nationalisation) 
Order, 1972, the Banks (Nationalisation) Order, 1972 or the Bangladesh 
Insurance (Nationalisation) Order, 197289 did make an attempt to spell 
out the "direction to a new objective" of nationalisation or the enter-
prises so nationalised. 	The contemporary critique 90  on the constitu- 
tional provision dealing with the right to private property and the 
power of the Parliament to make laws was confined to the observation 
that compulsory acquisition should be made for "public purposes" and on 
"payment of compensation". 	But the State should have an "absolute 
86 Abul Fazl Hach Constitution Making, op. cit., p. 64. 
87 R.S. Arora, "Rise of the Public Corporation in India: Some Consti-
tutional Aspects", Public Law, (1961), pp. 362-385. 
88 Most of the legal writings on nationalisation agree that "a public 
purpose" is an essential ingredient of the definition of national-
isation. 
89 Bangladesh Industrial Nationalisation Order, op. cit. 
Banks Nationalisation Order, op. cit. Bangladesh Insurance Nation-
alisation Order, op. cit. 
90 Report of the Constitution DraftingCommittee, pp. 5-24, cited in 
Abul Fazl Huq, op. cit., p. 61. 
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right to nationalise any property to any extent with or without 
compensation. 	Perhaps at the time of promulgating the laws of 
nationalisation and in the absence of a constitutional consensus until 
then it was found not expedient to define the reasons or the public 
purpose of nationalisation. 	Probably it was left for the Constitution, 
industrial policy and the First Five Year Plan to identify the national 
as well as corporate objectives of the nationalised industries. 	It 
may also be argued that nationalisation law was prepared in great haste 91 . 
This evasiveness on the part of the basic nationalisation law in Bangla-
desh is in contrast with such laws in many other countries. 	Thus for 
instance, in Yugoslavia, the Preamble to 1946 Act specified the motive 
of nationalisation as the desire 
to give a total impetus...to the principle of the 
collective ownership of the means of production, 
the main foundation of the state for the development 
of the national economy...(and to) the principle of 
the defence of the people against exploitation. 92 
In Indonesia, the objective of a state enterprise as stated in the 
Indonseian law Perpu No. 19/1960 was 
to participate in constructing a national economy 
in accordance with guided economy giving priority 
to the need of the people and to tranqulity as well 
as to will to work within the enterprise, aiming 
towards the establishment of a materially and 
spiritually just and prosperous society. 93 
In France nationalisation laws were preceded by the declaration of the 
National Resistance Council led by General De Gaulle that included 
nationalisation in its programme for the future organisation of France. 
91 Interview with Mr. Azimuddin Ahmed who was a Deputy Secretary in 
the Ministry of Law at the time of promulgation of the Nationalisation 
Orders. 
92 Katzarov, op: cit., p. 59. 
93 J. Panglaykim, "Some Aspects of State Enterprises in Indonesia", 
Ekonomi Dan Kevangaw Indonesia, Vol. 16, (1963) pp. 3-18. 
Nationalisation was defined as 
an economic system designed with a view to the 
development of national resources and not for 
the advantage of individual interests, in which 
the great sources of common wealth belong to the 
nation. 94 
In Britain, the Labour Party adopted its formal objective as 
to secure for the workers by hand or by brain the 
full fruits of their industry and the most equitable 
distribution there of that may be possible, upon the 
basis of the common ownership of the means of production, 
distribution and exchange, and the best obtainable 
system of popular administration and control of each 
industry and service. 95 
This objective necessarily implies the introduction of nationalisation 
as a means to achieve it96 . 	Further, the specific laws of national- 
isation mentioned the duties of the bodies so set up clearly and 
unambiguously. Thus the Coal Industry Nationalisation Act, 1946 
charged the National Coal Board with the duty of directing the whole 
industry and making supplies of coal available 
in such quantities and at such prices as may appear 
to (the Board) best calculated to further the public 
interest in all respects. 97 
The Transport Act, 1947 nationalised rail communications, the 
docks, inland waterways lighterage and London Transport and placed the 
British Transport Commission under a 
94 R. Gendarme, L'Experience francaise de la Nationalisation indust- 
rieZZe et ass Enseignements Economiques, (Paris: 1950) cited in 
Katzarov, op. cit. p. 43. 
95 The 1918 constitution of the British Labour Party, Section 3. For 
a detailed exposition, see Hugh Gaitskell, "The Economic Aims of 
the Labour Party", The Political Quarterly, Vol. 24, No. 1 (January-
March, 1953) pp. 5-18; Also Gaitskell, Socialism, op. cit. Harold 
Wilson, The Relevance of British Socialism, (London: Weidenfeld & 
Nicolson, 1964). 
96 Strachey, op. cit. 
97 Cited in Katzarov, op. cit., p. 49. 
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general duty to provide or promote the provision 
of an efficient adequate, economic and properly 
integrated system of public inland transport and 
port facilities within Great Britain for passengers 
and goods with due regard to safety of operation. 98 
The nationalisation law in Roumania was accompanied with the following 
government statement 
The nationalization of the principal enterprises 
consolidates our economic and political independence, 
fortifies the forces in their struggle against the 
attempt of interference with out internal matters 
and rape of our independence, carried on by the 
Anglo-American imperialists. 	It stresses our role 
as an active factor of the democratic and anti-
imperialist front. 99 
Similarly in Iran, the Parliament adopted the following bill which 
became the nationalisation law 
For the happiness and prosperity of the Iranian 
nation and for the purpose of securing world peace, 
it is hereby resolved that the oil industry through-
out all parts of the country, without exception, be 
nationalized; that is to say, all operations of 
exploration, extraction and exploitation shall be 
carried out by the government. 100 
Since the Second World War different States have attempted to consol-
idate nationalisation through legislative measures 101 . Article 4 of 
the Constitution of U.S.S.R. gave nationalisation a constitutional 
status. 	But even earlier,sanction for nationalisation was recorded 
in the Weimar Constitution in Germany in 1919. 	The Spanish consti- 
tution of 1931 gave sanction to nationalisation on the grounds of 
"common interest" and "where social needs so require' 102  , 	The Burmese 
constitution 1947 provided for expropriation of private property "if 
98 Ibid., p. 50. 
99 N.R. Doman, "Postwar Nationalization of Foreign Property 
Columbia Law Review, Vol.48, (1948). 
100 Alan W. Ford, The Anglo-Iranian Oil Dispute of 1951-52' 
University of California Press, 1954. 
101 Katzarov, op. cit., pp. 131-138. 
102 Ibid., p. 134. 
in Europe", 
(Berkely, 
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the public interest so requires“ 103  . 	The Constitution of the German 
Federal Republic provided for exercise of expropriation and socailis-
ation measures "for the good of the community" 104  . Many of these 
constitutions when giving sanction to nationalisation cited reasons 
such as "public utility or social interest" 105 , "public utility” 106 
or "general interest" 107 or "national welfare and defense" 108 
Compared to nationalisation provisions in many other constitutions, 
the relevant article in the Bangladesh constitution on nationalisation 
was not by itself, explicit about the motives behind national-
isation in Bangladesh. 	The Article 42 of the Constitution of Bangla- 
desh merely stated 
no property shall be compulsorily acquired, nationalised 
or requisitioned save by authority of law. 
and that 
a law...shall provide for the acquisition, national-
isation or requisition... 109 
None of the nationalisation laws in Bangladesh, such as the 
Bangladesh Industrial Enterprises (Nationalisation) Order, the Bangla-
desh Banks (Nationalisation) Order and the Bangladesh Insurance 
(Nationalisation) Order did make a reference to public purpose or 
reasons of such actions except of expediency. 
103 Ibid. 
104 Ibid., p. 135. 
105 The Constitutions of Panama and Columbia cited in Ibid., pp. 134-135. 
106 Ibid. 
107 The Constitution of Nicaragua, 1950, Article 70, Quoted in Ibid. p. 135. 
108 The Constitution of the Philippines, 1935, Ibid., p. 135. 
109 Constitution, op. cit., Article 42 (1 & 2). 
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P.0.27 provided for the establishment of certain corporations 
for the purposes of control, supervision and co-
ordination of the nationalised and some other 
enterprises and for the establishment and develop-
ment of new industrial enterprises and for matters 
connected therewith or incidental thereto ; 110 
Here again, the law demonstrates a lack of clarity in words such as 
"for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto". Nor it is 
indicated unambiguously and definitely what objectives such "control, 
supervision and co-ordination of the enterprises" were to achieve. 
Furthermore, P.0.27 is an omnibus legislation of a general nature. 
A number of industries, such as jute, textiles and sugar manufacturing 
were nationalised and ten corporations were set up under which were 
the nationalised as well as the abandoned enterprises Placed by 
the government. The enterprises placed under the corporations manu-
factured a diverse range of products and also were engaged in exploration, 
transmission and distribution of some mineral products & P.0.27 embodied 
provisions covering various aspects of these corporations such as, 
composition and powers of the boards of the directos, relationship 
with the government and the enterprises, financial and general affairs 
of business etc. 	All these provisions were, equally applicable to all 
corporations and their enterprises regardless of diversities in the 
areas of operation and nature of activities. This created an anomalous 
position for some corporations entrusted with special type of operation 
like oil and gas exploration and production which was obviously unlike 
most other corporations running industrial enterprises. 	It was diffi- 
cult to accommodate diverse characteristics of the corporations and 
their enterprises through an omnibus legislation owing to the special 
110 Industrial Nationalisation Order, Op. Cit., Preamble. 
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nature of activities and responsibilities of some of them. 	In a 
study attempting to analyse the need for a general law on the working 
of public enterprises in India it was shown that such a law would be 
impracticable as it would lead to greater rigidity by ignoring the 
individual characteristics of various enterprises. 
Management and Legislation  
According to some theorists, the State itself cannot directly 
exercise possession over the entire mass of its property. 	As the 
sole owner of its property, it can exercise possession only through 
its agencies to whom State property is turned over for operative 
control 112 . The corporation functions and operate in the name of 
the State through a special juristic form, the form of legal person-
ality. The personification of such industrial public corporation is 
thus a method of administering the function of the nationalised indus-
tries sector. 	The corporation being legal personality cannot set any 
goals for themselves, their goals are to be set for them by the State 113 . 
But the government did not, in the nationalisation order define the 
goals and objectives of the corporation nor the purpose of national-
isation. 	The mere assignment in respect of control, supervision and 
co-ordination for the affairs and business of the enterprises without 
identifying the goals, objectives or purposes of nationalisation and 
the nationalised enterprises was not adequate to evolve an appropriate 
111 R.C. Mascarenhas, "General Law for Public Enterprise in India", 
International Review of Administrative Sciences, Vol. 30 (1964), 
pp. 398-403. 
112 R.S. Arora, Administration of Government Enterprises in India, 
(New Delhi: Institute of Public Administration, 1969) , p. 86. 
113 Ibid., p. 37. 
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organisational and administrative structure for the nationalised 
industries sector. 	Moreover at the time of promulgation of the 
nationalisation order there was obviously no clear conception about 
the exact place the nationalised industries, corporations and the 
enterprises were to hold in the administrative structure of govern- 
ment. 	As the economic, financial and social obligations of the 
nationalised industries and their corporations were not spelt out it 
was not clear if the industries were to be organised as business 
concerns or in the fashion of a government departmental undertaking. 
According to the Nationalisation Order ownership of the shares, 
assets and liabilities and other proprietory interests in the enter-
prises lay vested in the government and the enterprises were to be 
controlled, supervised and co-ordinated by the corporations in respect 
of the activities, business and affairs. 	But there were some 
confusions in the interpretation of the provisions of the Nationalis-
ation Order itself and controversies beleaguered those concerned with 
the management of the nationalised industries. It was stated that 
there were certain anomalies in the management status of the enter-
prises and in the relationship amongst the government, corporation 
and the enterprises. 	Attempts made to define the status of the 	three 
components of the nationalised industries and their relationship with 
each other in 1976 seemed to create more confusion. The "Guidelines 
on the Relationship between Government and Autonomous Bodies/Corpor-
ations and the Autonomous Bodies/Corporations and Enterprises under 
them"114 issued by the government were contradictory in many respects 
114 Cabinet Division, Guidelines, op. cit. 
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to the provisions of P.0.27. 	While P.0.27 provided that all the 
shares vested in the government, the Guidelines stated that the 
shares might be held by the corporations. 	The Guidelines were not 
also in conformity with the Companies' Act. The enterprises became 
government companies in the Guidelines although no such term existed 
in the Companies' Act. The Guidelines also left out the "control" 
function of the corporations in respect of the enterprises115 
There were also debates whether the corporations might take 
the character of a holding company and the enterprises as its subsid-
iaries with authority to the corporation to hold share in the subsid-
iaries on behalf of the government and appoint the board of directors 
for the enterprises. 	It was argued that during pre-liberation time 
E.P.I.D.C. used to hold shares in its enterprises on behalf of the 
government and managed the affairs of the companies as managing agent 
through Managing Agency Agreement 116 . The controversies were not 
resolved until about the end of the First Plan period. 	Essentially, 
the points in issue were: 
(a) whether the government could authorise the corporations 
to hold the shares of individual enterprises on behalf 
of the government; 
(b) whether the corporations could form Board of Directors 
of individual enterprises though the government held 
shares of the enterprises; 
(c) whether the corporations could be authorised by the 
government to manage the affairs of the enterprises on 
behalf of the government or if it could be done through 
a management agqncy agreement between the Board of 
Directors and the Corporations, and 
115 Interview with Mr. M.A. Malik, Joint Secretary, Ministry of Finance. 
November, 1978. Mr. Malik as a senior official in theMinistry of 
Finance was associated with various committee concerned with the 
operation of the nationalised industries. 
116 interview with Mr. Rafiquddin Ahmed, Chairman, BCIC. November, 1978. 
(d) 	whether the projects placed under the corporations 
whichwerenot limited companies, could be converted 
into such companies within the framework of the 
prevailing provisions of the P.0.27 of 1972. 
The extent of uncertainty and confusion can be understood from the 
fact that the enterprises which were already incorporated as limited 
companies were not functioning as per Memorandum and Articles of 
Association of respective companies and could not fulfil the require-
ments of the Companies' Act. 	Moreover, the boards of directors for 
enterprises that were legally limited companies either did not exist 
or wherever they existed, they came in conflict with the corporations 117 
The "anomalies" said to exist really related to questions about the 
legal status and character of the companies which were placed under 
the corporations and the extent to which the Companies' Act continued 
to be applicable to such companies. The entire scheme of the 
Nationalisation Order (P.0.27) seem to have, on the one hand, retained 
the corporate status of an industrial enterprise and allowed the 
enterprises to function as companies as they were functioning before 
the promulgation of P.0.27. 	The properties owned by the enterprises 
continued to be considered as the properties of the companies and as 
such the companies continued to conduct the business and affairs relating 
to those properties. On the other hand,government was not only the 
holder of all the shares of the industrial enterprises considered as 
companies but also the owner having proprietory interest in those 
enterprises. The companies which formerly owned. the enterprises had 
no proprietory interests in the enterprises. 	However, they continued 
to exist despite their lack of ownership. 	In other words, a company 
117 Interview with Mr. Anwar Hussain, Director, BSEC, November, 1978. 
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placed under the corporation under P.0.27 of 1972 existed in name 
only though the board of such a company was being appointed by the 
government. 	The Boards of companies placed under Sector Corporations 
although constituted by the government were not the same as constituted 
under the Memorandum and Articles of Association of a Company or the 
Companies' Act. 	It was a Board completely subservient to the will 
and wisdom of the government 118 . Not only had the provisions of the 
Companies' Act relating to the mode of appointment of directors been 
superseded but also the very concept of the Board of Directors as a 
body vested under the law with power of company management was com-
pletely substituted by the wide sweep of power which was reserved for 
the government119 . 	Since the government was the owner of the enter- 
prises, they could be managed in any way it liked. If the government 
managed the enterprises through the Board of Directors it was in order. 
The corporation on the authority of the power delegated by the govern-
ment could form management board 120•  The corporations exercised 
powers of control, supervision and coordination of the enterprises and 
hence also of the management board of the enterprises. 	The 
corporations were placed in a managerial position in relation to the 
government. 	It was also considered that the affairs of the individual 
enterprises including companies could be fully and effectively managed 
by the corporation on behalf of the government without having resources 
to any managing agency agreement 121 . 	Since the affairs of a company 
could be effectively managed by the corporation on behalf of the 
118 Interviews with various officials in the corporations and enter-
prises. November, 1978. 
119 Industrial Nationalisation Order, op. cit., Article 5. 
120 Ibid. 
121 Ibid., Article 17. 
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government without having recourse to the managing agency agreement, 
there was no legal necessity for authorising corporations to hold 
shares on behalf of the government. Moreover, the management of an 
individual enterprise had nothing to do with shares of the company. 
There were also controversies whether the projects which were placed 
under corporations but not limited companies ought to be converted 
into companies. 	The government decided that majority of enterprises 
under corporations in the Ministry of Industries should be converted 
into limited companies to allow them to run on commercial considerations 
and give them a legal status122 . 	But P.0.27 of 1972 does not mention 
anything about conversion of projects into companies. 	The only 
restriction imposed by the Order seems to be in the case of scheduled 
industrial enterprises other than specialised textiles which have been 
debarred from selling or transferring their assets to anybody. 	This 
created legal difficulties for a project wishing to transfer its assets 
to the Company by vendors agreement. 	This led subsequently to an 
amendment of P.0.27 of 1972 123 . 	It was argued that a distinct legal 
entity with an established reputation and goodwill in the market would 
be an irrefutable advantage for the enterprises strictly from commercial 
point of view. A legal entity for the enterprises would also give the 
government and corporations relief from getting directly involved in 
production and commercial activities or from getting involved into a 
financial commitment or litigations commercial or otherwise on behalf 
of the enterprises. 	It would help to build up requisite capabilities 
122 This decision was taken by the government in June, 1978. 
123 First Proviso to Clause (2) of Article 4 of P.0.27 of 1972 was 
substituted as per decision of the government in June, 1978. 
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for responsible decision making at the enterprise level and attract 
potential foreign buyers who would be otherwise unwilling to deal 
with the government directly in view of a possible defence of sovereign 
immunity. 	It was also pointed out that a majority of the industrial 
enterprises in the public sector including nationalised sector were 
having separate legal entity124 . 
C : ADMINISTRATIVE FRAMEWORK 
Diffusion 
Decision making at the macro-level is a cycle consisting of 
planning, structuring, directing and controlling 125 . 	Essentially 
the character of the top-level decision making in a public or a private 
enterprise should be similar. 	But it may not be true of the locus of 
such decision making in a public enterprise. In contrast to a private 
enterprise whose top management can be located easily in its board of 
directors, there is more than one layer of potential decision makers. 
It is not always easy to discern where such decision making takes place. 
It may be the Board of the Enterprise or its Chief Executive, or it may 
be the Corporation Board or its Chairman. 	The decision may also be 
taken by the Minister, or by the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry, 
or by someone in the departmental hierarchy in the secretariat. 	The 
124 Interview with Mr. Nasimuddin Ahmed, Joint Secretary, Ministry of 
Home Affairs, November, 1978. Mr. Ahmed served as a Joint Secretary 
in the Ministry of Law and was associated with various law making 
processes regarding the natiOnalised sector. 
125 J.M. Shrinagesh, "Organization For Top Management", The Indian 
Journal of Public Administration, Vol. 10, 1964), pp. 497 -505. 
issues may also be referred to the Secretaries Committee126 or 
deliberated in the Industrial Consultative Council 127 or even they 
may be put up for the approval of the Cabinet. 
The Nationalisation Order, Guidelines issued by the Cabinet 
Division, Rules of Business and the Articles of Association, Rules 
and Regulations framed on the basis of the law and Guidelines all 
defined the decision making powers and functions of top management 
of the nationalised industries. 	These may, and in fact do, change 
at the instance of the government from time to time. Despite this 
it seems that the macro level decisions were taken in nationalised 
industries in Bangladesh in a number of placed in the organisation. 
These varied according to the nature of the activities and structure, 
to the powers granted to the corporations and enterprises by the 
Nationalisation Order, the executive directives, rules and regulations 
and to the various interpretations at different levels that was 
inevitable. 	Similar considerations apply to the performance of 
management functions. 	In practice, the point of decision was often 
settled by an interplay of interpretation of the rules by the Ministers, 
Permanent Secretaries, Chairmen and Directors of the Corporation Boards 
and the Chief Executive and his board at the enterprise level. 	Thus 
for example, in the domain of planning, the preparation of broad plans, 
the definition of objectives, the preparation of budgets, deadlines of 
126 Committee composed of Secretaries to the government in charge of 
the Ministries and Divisions were constituted to provide support 
to the Cabinet and also to co-ordinate activites between various 
ministries and aivisions. 
127 The Military Government decided to constitute some national level 
consultative councils in various fields, such as, agriculture, 
rural development, education, labour, population control and 
industries. 	Each council, consisting of the offials, represent- 
atives of different interest groups nominated by the government 
and members of the Presidential Advisory Councils was mainly deliber-
ative. 
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programmes and the settlement of methods, all required decision making 
at the higher level. 	In the case of nationalised industries macro- 
planning was undertaken by the government in the ministry concerned 
and the Planning Commission. The government formulated policies 
define the objectives, set the budget and the dateline, decide on 
pricing policies on the products of the nationalised industries and 
often settle the processes to be adopted by the nationalised industries. 
Although the government retained all pervasive powers it was in 
exercise of control functions that one finds both diffused management 
and confused procedures. The control exercised not only by the 
administrative ministry concerned about the operation but also the 
ministries of Finance, Planning, Labour and Welfare, Commerce and Law 
and the Establishment Division in their respective jurisdictions. The 
decisions and recommendations of the public bodies like the Public 
Service Commission, The Administrative and Services Reorganisation 
Committee, Pay and Services Commission, Industrial Workers' Wages 
Commission, Industrial Workers' Wages and Productivity Commission, 
and similar other continued to influence the structure, functions and 
performances of the nationalised industries in multifarious ways. 
For quite some time, there was no defined pattern according to 
which the key functions were to be apportioned to the different author-
ities who were concerned with the management of the nationalised 
industries. 	Each ministry had its own system of apportionment, each 
Minister and Secretary had his own views on the way the top management 
functions were to be divided and performed. At times, through various 
Secretaries' Committees, both standing and ad-hoc some general agree- 
ment was reached. 	Thus on various occasions a consensus on pricing 
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of the products of the nationalised industries, 	interministerial 
and inter-corporational claims and counterclaims or resolving a partic-
ular financial or organisational problem of a sector could be arrived 
at the level of the Secretaries' Committee. 	At times a ministry on 
behalf of its corporation attempted to secure the support of the 
Secretaries' committee before initiating an important policy or pro-
gramme. 
A cursory view of the top management of the nationalised indus-
tries suggested that the broader plans and the setting of goals were 
left largely to the ministry of the government. 	The internal struc- 
turing of the organisation was generally left to the initiative of 
the Board or its chief executive,although to give it effect,approval 
of the government was required. 	The direction of the enterprise was 
generally left to the Board of the corporation and a comprehensive 
information system was contemplated and partly introduced. 	But awidely 
dispersed and overextended structure and diffused apportionment led 
to friction in the top management128 and also a lack of opportunity 
for the executive development. The function of top management were 
divided among the Minister, the Secretaries and the Corporation Boards. 
Although the Directors of the Board •are appointed by the government to 
coordinate work as a team129 the line of demarcation has not been always 
clear. As a result some tension and confusions prevailed between the 
secretariat, corporation and enterprises. 	One manifestation of this 
128 Before nationalisation each enterprise had its own board of 
directors. 	One or more directors used to personally look after 
the management of the mill. See, Bangladesh Bank, A Study of Jute 
Industries in BangZdesh (Dacca: J.U. Ahmed & Co., 1973). 
129 Industrial Nationalisation Order, op. cit., Articles 11, 12, 13, 
14 and 15. 
209 
was the controversy ragarding the practicability of having a "corporate 
division". The question was whether the corporation would also be 
clothed with the power of a division in the ministry. It was argued 
that investing the corporation with the authority of the government 
would enable it to take quick and flexible "Board decisions" instead 
of "slow and rigid bureaucratic decisions" of a traditional government 
variety 130 . Moreover within the Board and with its relationship with 
the secretariat at times interdepartmental rivalries, former cadre 
affiliations and different professional backgrounds of the top manage-
ment personnel in the nationalised industries were not conducive for 
. . 131 building up team spirit 	. There have also been frequent changes in 
top management position at the different layers of the nationalised 
industries. 	The government seemed to have not given due weight to the 
fact that team spirit and continuity is as essential in the public sector 
as in any other organisation. Frequent changes in the structure of the 
corporation (mergers, additions, disinvestment, renaming, intercorpor-
ation transfer of enterprises, changes in the ministerial responsibilities 
130 Petrobangla and BJMC were given the status of ministerial divisions 
thus combining the regulatory authority of the government with 
commercial operation of the corporation in a single legal person. 
131 The chairmen and directors of the corporation boards who were members 
of the "elite" administrative cadre (former Civil Service of Pakistan) 
were, in particular, subject to virulent attack from the "professional 
group". A former chairman of Pretrobangla and sometimes secretary to 
the government for the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Resources, 
himself a technical personnel who did not belong to a civil service 
cadre, branded the "generalist" administrators as "peddlers of poison" 
and "showboys", see, The Bangladesh Times ) 4 May. 1977. The 
composition of the corporation boards was varied. The members were 
not always appointed considering if they would be able to work as a 
team. 	The decisions seemed to hinge-more on availability of suit- 
able personnel. In the first boards constituted immediately after 
nationalisation there was only one civil servant chairman. 	See 
Sobhan,NatiOnalisation , op. cit. 
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also did not help to develop top executives, inculcate integrative 
behaviour in them and foster better relationships among the various 
component of the top management. While in a private enterprise the 
top management can work together as a team as their main objective 
is the economic well-being of the financial interest in the enter-
prise,in the nationalised industries these conditions did not neces-
sarily exist. 	It was therefore, necessary for the government to 
demarcate the function of the different layers of management both 
vertically and horizontally in unambiguous terms if rivalry and antagon-
ism within the top mangement was to be avoided. 
Routinization of Procedures  
In Bangladesh, the influence of government methods of work in 
the management of the nationalised industries seemed to be pervasive. 
As their own rules and regulations were not framed soon after nation-
alisation, the corporations too often tended to operate on existing 
governmental rules, regulations and procedures. 	For instance, the 
Fundamental and Supplementary Rules, the Government Servants' Conduct 
Rules and the instructions issued by the government in its amplification, 
the governmental Pay Scales etc. were either applicable or used as a 
guide. The office procedures were often the same as in government 
offices. 	Similarly the accounting and stores, purchase procedures 
were tied down to the standard procedures in government departments. 
As the corporations were slow to frame their own work rules and pro-
cedures and evolve their own system of work suited to their own needs 
and requirements they functioned and tended to be treated as a sub-
ordinate office of a government department rather than an autonomous 
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public corporation. 	There have been only half hearted efforts to 
devise and introduce rules, regulations and procedures suited to 
commercial operation. The corporations did have the power to make 
regulations for all maters for the purpose of giving effect to the 
provision of respective act, laws and rules. 	In practice however, 
the power remains inhibited even if it was explicitly guaranteed by 
the Nationalisation Order. 	Thus, for instance, the corporations were 
given the power of appointing office consultants, advisors, auditors 
and employees necessary for its requirement. 	The corporations could 
not, on its initiative and without reference to the government, devise 
the specific administrative structure which met the needs of a partic-
ular corporation. The organogram of each corporation was to be 
approved by the administrative ministry prior to any recruitment, 
appointment, promotion etc. 	Rules and regulations were to be framed 
for the purpose that needed prior approval by the government 132 . The 
legally sanctioned administrative power could thus be hardly used to 
create new position. 	Specifics with regard to personnel policies and 
practices and contact with suppliers (procurement of materials and 
technical personnel) were not left to the discretion of the corporation 
alone. Administrative flexibility in response to specific needs in-
herent in industrial, commercial and management problems could not 
emerge due to various restrictions placed by various executive orders. 
The statute itself had put embargoes on the freedom of the corporations. 
The flexibility, as a by-product of autonomous powers to permit manage- 
ment to avoid delays was elusive. 	The corporation was guided in the 
discharge of its function, by such instructions as might be given by 
132 Cabinet Division, Guidelines, op. cit., p. 3. 
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the government. All the powers of the corporation were subject to 
any regulation that mightbe made by the government and the corporation 
exercise only such powers asmight be prescribed or delegated to them 
by the government 133 . 	Under the circumstances it was difficult to 
assert that the corporations were governed by less crippling rules 
than the governmental departments. Undoubtedly the First Five Year 
Plan noted the need for developing appropriate rules and for decentral-
isation and delegation of authority for matters such as employment 
practices, purchases and exports 134 . 	But little enthusiasm was ever 
demonstrated to give them some meaningful effect. There is not much 
evidence to suggest that the corporations in Bangladesh have encouraged thE 
assumption of initiative on the part of its officers and employees. 
In comparing sector corporation personnel practices, recruitment, in-
service training, salary and fringe benefits etc. the corporation 
practices did not reveal much innovation. 	Innovations and iniative 
were equally lacking in the area of financial administration. 	The 
concept of programme budgeting had not been introduced in the corpor-
ation. Although budget analysis, preparation and administration was 
decentralised permitting those individuals close to the situation to 
make fundamental decisions, the type of budgeting and auditing employed 
closely resembled that of other public agencies. 	Thus in the depart- 
mental tradition the sector corporations seemed to have routinized their 
procedures. 	The Boards in the corporations could not take many decisions 
without prior ministerial approval. 	Raw materials were strictly control- 
led as was foreign exchange. 	Frequent references of decisions to the 
133 Industrial Nationalisation Order, op. cit. Article No. 17. 
134 FFYP, op. cit. p. 250. 
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ministries was certainly the result of external pressure placed upon 
the corporations, but the routinization of activities, the development 
of detailed operational rules and procedure and delays in execution of 
programmes were the results of internal decisions. From the beginning, 
the sector corporations tended to behave like a typical governmental 
agency. 	In fact the overall tendency of the officials and the employ- 
ees in the nationalised sector seemed to consider themselves as state 
employees. 	From the inception the sector corporations developed or 
borrowed work procedures and regulations from the government agencies. 
As the government did not control with clear statement of economic and 
social obligations of the nationalised industries,the management of the 
nationalised sector could not, on its own volition use the drives of 
business. 	The vices of red tapism became apparent. The techniques 
of management became static and mechanical. It became: hard to 
emphasize the strategic value of "government of corporation". 	The 
objective of the avoidance of the pitfalls which affect departmental 
administration seemed hardly accomplished by the corporation form. 
The Bureaucracy  
It has been said that even under the best of circumstances 
Bangladesh would constitute a complex development problem135 . After 
Liberation the same overextended and inadequately motivated and inherited 
administration was asked to implement a development programme. The 
management vacuum resulting from the exodus of Pakistani entrepreneurs 
and nationalisation was temporarily solved by promoting Bengali managers 
to senior positions or by secondment of civil servants. 	The promotees 
135 IBRD, Rural Economy, op. cit. p. 5. 
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did not have the experience and could not immediately adapt to the 
new dynamics of the public enterprise operation. 	The civil servants 
with their "law and order orientation" and some experience in executing 
development programmes generally found industrial management challenging 
but an onerous responsibility. 	The lack of experience generally led to 
delays in the decision making process and an inability to seize economic 
opportunities. 	This was notwithstanding the fact that many of the 
officials were men of great ability (as a World Bank report recognized)P 8 
Indeed some of the most able and skilled members of the society were in 
government service 137  . 	Yet the administrative system, according to 
all observations, was ill fitted to the tasks of industrial and economic 
development in Bangladesh. 	It was alleged that the administration had 
succumbed to political pressures and suffered from widespread corruption. 
The all encompassing expansion of ,state activities and controls and 
nationalisation of all important areas of economic activity made the 
. administration more susceptible to such malaise. 
Bureaucracy has been very often considered as an impediment to 
development administration138 . Although typologies of administrative 
diseases have not yet been developed 139 the main deficiencies of the 
administrative philosophy handed down from the pre-liberation period 
relate to areas of adaption of decentralisation and modernisation of 
personnel practices, public service policies, financial administration 
and budgeting, steamlining of accounting system and improvement of 
136 Ibid., p.iy. 
137 FFYP, op. cit., p. 5. 
138 R.S. Milne, "Burearcracy and Development Administration", Public 
Administration, Vol. 51 (Winter, 1973), pp. 293-320. 
139 Third Five Year Plan, Pakistan, 	op. cit., p. 160-161. 
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systems and procedures and forms in use in government offices, codifi-
cation of rules and regulations and ensuring a continued supply of 
justified and trained personnel at all levels in the light of carefully 
assessed requirements 140 . The civil service tradition in Bangladesh 
seems to suffer from many of the pathology and dysfunctions for which 
any bureaucracy is criticised 141 It has been a frequent contention 
that Weberian bureaucracy is unsuitable for conditions in a developing 
country and that it should be deliberately rejected as a model or a guide. 
Some scholars have raised the question if such a contention should be 
left without sufficient examination142 The criticism about the 
elements of a generalist tradition and paternalistic authoritarian 
tenor of administration has been levelled against the higher civil 
servants 143 in Bangladesh. 	This is perhaps open to serious scrutiny. 
As in India144 the positive contributions of the higher civil service 
in a developing country seems often insufficiently acknowledged. 
The administrative machinery in Bangladesh was involved after 
the Liberation, in the total national efforts to provide a sound 
foundation after the traumatic experiences of the immediate past, for 
sustained economic growth, for increasing opportunities, for gainful 
employment and for improving living standards and working conditions 
140 Ibid. 
141 See for example, Christopher Hood, "Administrative Diseases: Some 
Types of Dysfunctionality in Administration", Public Administration, 
Vol. 52 (1974) pp. 439-453; R.M. Thomas, "The Rejuvenation of Public 
Administration in Developing Countries", Journal of Administration 
Overseas, No. 2 (April, 1974) pp. 367-73; S.C. Dube, "Bureaucracy 
and Economic Development", Indian Journal of Public Administration, 
Vol. 12 (1966) pp. 343-351. 
142 Milne, op. cit. 
143 Supra, fn. 131. 
144 Dube, Bureaucracy, op. cit. 
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of the people. 	The fact of few Bengalis in the higher echelons of 
the civil service posed problems that arose from the grass under-
representation of the Bengalis in the united Pakistan 145 . 	On top 
of this the new state started on its independent career without the 
services of its senior and experienced civil servants who remained 
stranded in Pakistan since the beginning of the tiberation war. 
Moreover, a sufficiently large number of the civil servants possessing 
skills and experience in various other segments of administration was 
not readily available. 	A provincial government was suddeny catapulted 
into the central government of an independent nation 146 . 	The weakness 
of the civil services increased due to the dissimilar backgrounds of 
the civil servants which resulted as a direct consequence of the 
Liberation war. 	The government in exile was manned by a hastily 
assorted group of persons united in their determination to win freedom 
but mostly young and very often lacking enough previous administrative 
experiences. The new government in Bangladesh set out to replenish 
its civil service by recruiting generally on contract basis personnel 
from professions like teaching, journalism, etc. and from the private 
sector. 	Such persons moved into government to occupy middle and 
senior positions. 	The lateral entries came under severe criticism 
on the ground that it was politically inspired and has been hardly 
distinguishable from the spoils system 147 . The bureaucracy was 
   
145 See Lambert, Bengali Regionalism, op. cit., Akanda,Regionalism , 
op. cit., pp. 103-163, Rounaq Jahan, Pakistan: Failure in National 
Integration, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972) 
146 Shiriram Maheshwari, "Problems of Public Administration in Bangla-
desh", Indian Journal of Public Administration, Vol. 36 (1975), 
pp. 385-98. 
147 A.T.R. Rahman, "Administrative Culture in Bangladesh", in J.R. 
Mclane ed., Bengal in the 19th and 20th Centuries, (Michigan State 
University, Asian Studies Center, 1975), pp. 119-152. 
217 
further weakend due to the tension among its various components - 
those who stayed behind within the country and those who joined the 
Liberation war having crossed the frontiers and those who were stranded 
in Pakistan. 	There were alos intense jealousies among the services 
according to cadre affiliations 148 . 	It was therefore not easy to 
weld the divergent groups into a harmonious and integrated team vital 
for meeting the challenge of nation building149 . 
The greatest challenge for the civil service in Bangladesh in 
the new mileu was its relationship with the political leadership. 
During the pre-liberation period administration, its values, pattern, 
leaders, is said to have dominated the political environment 150 . 	The 
bureaucracy in association with the army then played a decisive role not 
only in internal management of its systems, procedures and relation-
ships, but also in the decisions involving basic economic, political 
and social issues151 The bureaucrats came to possess power so 
important and evident that it can only be termed political 152 . 	The 
civil service was accountable only within the bureaucratic hierarchy. 
Security of the tenure was guaranteed by the constitution. 	The strength 
of the civil service was sustained through monopoly occupancy of key 
posts and by securing major involvement in the new development 
148 There were many cadres in civil services some belonging to the 
erstwhile central and some to the erstwhile provincial governments. 
149 The factionalism within the services continued throughout the period 
under study. 	Later, the Military regime seemed to have taken 
political advantage of this inter-service jealousies. 
150 A.T.R. Rahman, op. cit. 
151 Ibid. 
152 Guthrie S. Birkhead, ed. Administrative problems in Pakistan, (New 
York: Syracuse University Press, 1966), p. 211. 
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institutions like the Planning Commission and public enterprises which 
proliferated during the previous decades. Simultaneously the members 
of the bureaucracy developed necessary skills both within and outside 
the country. There was of course opposition to bureaucracy that came 
from several sources - politicians, professionals especially engineers, 
doctors and teachers. But the bureaucracy demonstrated a tenacity to 
survive during the pre-liberation period 153 . 	However, during the post- 
liberation period the strength of the civil service seems to have 
continuously eroded. 	First of all, the Awami League Government did not 
take positive steps to reestablish the civil bureaucracy after the dis- 
location of the Liberation war 154 . 	Instead persistent Awami League 
interference undermined the strength of a civil service 155 which had 
been instrumental in bringing about significant economic development 156 
Secondly, the military in its inflated ego resulting from enjoyment of 
a sustained power for nearly two decades before and after Liberation 
set the outer limit157  of the influence that bureaucrats and other 
groups could exercise in the national system. 
In the liberated Bangladesh, the weakened bureaucracy was 
expected to work in the framework of democratic control. 	The reversal 
of positions in the relationship between administration and political 
153 S.J. Burki, "Twenty Years of the Civil Service of Pakistan: A 
Re-evaluation", Asian Survey, Vol. 9 (April, 1969), pp. 239-254. 
154 Maniruzzaman writes: Thus, by the end of 1974, there was not any 
civilian institutional group in Bangladesh to implement Mujib's 
program of national reconstruction. 	See Maniruzzaman, Bangladesh 
1974 , op. cit. 
155 Oren, Bangladesh Coups, op. cit. 
156 Naniruzzaman, Economic Crisis, op. cit. 
157 A.T.R. Rahman, op. cit. 
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system became a reality. The civil servants were not immune any more 
from the popular control and pressures. 	While this may not be in a 
democracy, it presupposes neutral and autonomous socio-political insti- 
tutions. 	In spite of Mujib government's publicly stated attachment 
to the ideals of democracy, the policy pursued did not leave any room 
for a neutral bureaucracy. 	Instead the pattern that emerged in 
institution building was similar to those followed in many countries 
with totalitarian government. The growth of one monopoly political 
party, the gradual development of party affiliated organisations of 
key interest groups (e.g. students, youths, Labour etc.) and the attempt 
to replace the traditional regional administration by a directly elected 
local government contributed to inhibit the bureaucratic neutrality and 
making it completely subservient to the political party. 	The security 
of tenure of service through constitutional protection was less- 
ened in an effort designed to encourage innovation, hard work and greater 
conformity to the interests of the political party in power. 	The struc- 
turing of the services was to became less archaic and elite oriented, 
with fewer classifications and more scope for mobility within and between 
various services. Additional positions were created to provide opening 
for non-bureaucrats. 	Some of the positions previously reserved for the 
members of the higher civil services were opened up so that party sympath-
isers (and later in the military regime the 'retired' officers of the 
armed forces) could be appointed. 	The victims of the Liberation war 
were to be specially treated for the purpose of employment and a large 
number of freedom fighters were appointed in the superior services through 
special examination158 . 	Recruitment was node from the freedom fighters 
158 Selection was arbitrary and quality of the intake was generally poor. 
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for a newly constituted cadre named Industrial Management Service 159 
when all cadres were virtually abolished. The rigid seniority rule 
was discarded. 	Loyalty and closeness to the regime were among the 
criterion used for selections of appointees to higher administrative 
posts. Any civil servant could be dismissed without the right of 
appeal
160
. 
The indictment of the civil services by the political elites 
was not rationalised in the name of new and improved conceptual 
and operational framework in the form of socio-economic models, 
economic and social planning devices and programming of the total 
161 objectives to render the national development manageable and practicable. 
Of course, the Awami League manifesto of 1970 called for a radical 
restructuring of the administrative machinery "in order to serve the 
needs of a dynamic, democratic societyH162 and the existing administra-
tive machinery was proclaimed a colonial legacy. 	The steps by which 
the Awami League intended to implement its policies weretwofold. On 
163 the one hand abolitionofall central superior services and leaving 
federal services only for administering foreign affairs and defence, 
and on the other hand, creating specialised professional cadres separat-
ely for the provinces and strengthening local government institutions 
159 This cadre was abolished in 1978. 
160 This was popularly known as P.0.9. For a text, see Government of 
Bangladesh, Ministry of Law, "President's Order No. 9 of 1972, 
Government of Bangladesh (Services) Order 1972", The Bangladesh 
Gazette Extraordinary, 24 January 1972. 
161 See for a parallel in J.I. Iboko, "Developing the Administration 
in a Developing Country", International Review of Administrative 
Sciences, Vol. 38 (1972), p. 193-197. 
162 Awami League Manifesto, op. cit. 
163 Various cadre services organised to run the government affairs on 
behalf of the central government were to be abolished. 
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including geographical readjustments of the basic administrative units. 
The conflicting views of the Award League were demonstrated in 
the First Five Year Plan. The Plan did realise the role of the civil 
service in the implementation of the development policies but simul-
taneously introduced the concept of political cadres primarily to 
perform watchdog functions. The Plan identified such political cadres 
as "an essential element in the revolutionary transformation of society" 
164 	However, the concept of political cadres was not likely to be 
more than a parallel hierarchy in administration. 	In fact,all the 
contemporary evidences suggest that such a political cadre was bound 
to degenerate into corrupt bureaucracy165 . 	The extent of corruption 
and use of spoils system during the Awami League regime was too potent 
a factor to suggest an interpretation to the contrary. 
The extent of the ambivalance of the Awam.i. League was also 
demonstrated in its handling of the reports of two committees that were 
constituted by the government for administrative reforms, reorganisation 
of the services and formulation of a rational pay structure relating to 
all employees in the public secotr. 	The report of the Administrative 
Services and Reorganisation Committee was known to have emphasised the 
importance of specialisation including for the generalists in adminis- 
. tration166  . Merit was to have preponderant importance for promotion. 
The importance of ensuring the administration unfettered by political 
interference was advocated. The Committee also made recommendations 
for simplification of procedures and above alla unified civil service 
structure thus trying to eliminate the bane of "elitism". But the 
164 FFYP, op. cit., p. 7. . _ - 
165 Maheswhari 	Public Administration Bangladesh, op.cit.i 
166 Government of Bangladesh, Administrative Servicesiand Reorganisation 
Committee, Report Vol. 1 
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government did not take a decision on the report and for all practical 
purposes the report was shelved. 	The report of the National Pay 
Commission was however accepted to the extent of its recommendation 
on the pay structure. 	By the time it was being processed for 
implementation, 	the suggested pay structure became virtually out- 
dated because of the hyperinflation that was raging over Bangladesh. 
On the whole the two reports during the Mujib regime on the aspects 
of administrative reorganisation seem to have been sincere attempts by those 
who prepared the reports. 	But the obsession of the Awami League 
government with party interests precluded any possibility of a genuine 
effort for administrative reform. 
The military regime was also beseiged with the problems of re-
casting the bureaucracy and readjustments of grades and pay scales 
and other related issues. , Tangible reforms remained elusive as before. 
It is quite significant 	that the military rulers initiated 	their 
new move to "reorganise" the civil services structure and reformulate 
a pay structure in spite of the two volumunous reports mentioned above 
during the Mujib regime. The Report of the Pay and Services Commission 
prepared at the behest of the military regime seems to have helped create 
more controversies and agitations 167 . 	It was suggested that the 	military 
regim65,exercise made "no sense at all" and created "a mess" 168 It was 
argued that the exercise demonstrated an insensitivity by the authors of 
the report to the social, political and economic situation in the country 
and also their unfitness to handle delicate issues 169 . Thus the 
167 See The Holiday, 12 March 1978, wrote: "Pay report needs total 
reform". 
168 Ibid. 
169 Ibid. 
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fundamental issues regarding the role of the civil servant still 
remained undefined. 	If the bureaucracy in Bangladesh was top heavy, 
expensive and alienated from the people whom they serve, it was for 
the political leaders to take such decisions as would make it "people 
oriented". As an agent of the government the qualitative change in 
the bureaucracy can only be effected by a conscious decision of the 
ruling elite. 	The Awami League regime like the pre.-liberation ruling 
elites made an attempt to politicise bureaucracy to perpetuate their 
own ends. 	The military regime because of its own political imperatives 
apparently did not make tangible efforts like its prodecessor to clearly 
identify the role of the bureaucracy and sought to keep the civil 
services factionalised. 	Their exercise in reorganisation of services 
and reformulation of the pay structure assisted this aim. 
Hoyle170 observed that the politicians and even planners scarcely 
realise the imperative need for the creation of a strong administrative 
structure for the successful implementation of an ambitious development 
plan. The very obvious fact that the plans are not self executing is 
not often sufficiently appreciated by the politicians. 	Following 
O'Connell it may be stated that the ruling elites of the successive 
regimes in Bangladesh seem to forget that 
it was the professional administrators who maintained 
the continuity in the public services that underpinned 
the popular consent to be ruled. 171 
Under such circumstances it is not surprising that the administrative 
170 A.R. Hoyle, "The Role of the Civil Service in the Development 
Process", Journal of Administration Overseas, Vol. 11 (November, 
1972) pp. 45-52. 
171 James O'Connell, "Politicians, Administrators, and the Problems 
of Modernisation", Journal of Administration Overseas, Vol. 6 
(April, 1967) pp. 121-125. 
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efficiency deteriorated since Liberation 172  . 	Galbraith advocated 
pragmatism and adaptability for an administrator to be successful 173 
It has also been said that only the best and most dedicated adminis-
trators can keep up their morale in the context of poor political 
leadership174 . Viewed this way the civil servants in Bangladesh have 
shown adaptibility and patriotism. 	They were the only social group 
whichhad sacrificed a major portion of their earnings in the early 
months of poor financial condition of their country. They have faced 
the inflationary spiral essentially the creation of the ruling elites 
without causing disruption in the civil administration. 	However, their 
weakened role significantly affected the quality of the personnel in 
the nationalised industries and had lasting effects on the capacity 
of those industries to meet development expectations. 
Summary Observation  
The decision to nationalise certain industrial enterprises was 
taken before the Constitution of the Republic of Bangladesh was adopted 
in the legislature. 	Of course, the decision derived its force from 
the Proclamation of Independence of Bangladesh and the Provisional 
Constitution of Bangladesh Order, 1972. 	Besides nationalisation of 
certain industries mentioned in the Nationalisation Order, the industries 
left abandoned by the aliens were taken over by the State under the 
Bangladesh Abandoned Properties Control, Management and Disposal Order, 
172 See Maheshwari, op. cit., Maniruzzanan, Economic Crisis, op. cit., 
Jahan, Bangabandhu , op. cit. 
173 John K. Galbraith, "Public Administration and the Public Corporation" 
Indian Journal of Public Administration, Vol. 7 (October-December, 
1961) pp. 438-446. 
174 O'Connell, op. cit. 
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1972. 	Later, the Constitution of the People's Republic of Bangladesh 
was adopted in November, 1972 which declared that a fundamental aim of 
the State would be to realise a socialist society, free from exploit-
ation, through democratic processes. 	It was also laid down that a 
socialist economic system would be established with a view to ensuring 
the attainment of the same goal. 	It provided for a State ownership 
(besides cooperative ownership and private ownership as prescribed) by 
the State on behalf of the people through the creation of a nationalised 
public sector embracing the key sectors of the economy. 	The National- 
isation Order however, did not state a reason or purpose or objective 
of nationalisation in the statute itself. 	It did not make an effort 
to explain the nationalisation decision from any point of view - 
ideological, political, economic or otherwise and mentions only 
"expediency". While the conditioning factors leading to this absence 
of a clause on objectives in the nationalisation statute can be traced 
in the political and socio-economic conditions as obtaining in the 
country before and after the Liberation, the genesis of the management 
system, organisation and style also seems to lie herein. 
Operationally, the Nationalisation Order prescribed the corpor-
ation form of management for the nationalised industries as the insti-
tutional device. The provisions of the Order, however, appear to have 
equipped the government with preponderant dominion in respect of any 
measure or action as might be deemed necessary or expedient. 	The 
hierarchy developed was a four tier system - cabinet, ministries, 
corporations and the enterprises. 	The relations and even the legal 
status were left unresolved. Owing to the preponderance of civil 
service practices the corporations soon began to be run like government 
226 
departments. 	In the virtual absence of a professional management 
class, the civil service traditions lingered on. 	The implications 
of the envisaged socialist economy were not explained and there was 
a tendency of centralisation which went on to negate the operational 
freedom of the corporations. 	The administrative efficiency of the 
civil servants also declined after Liberation due to the loss of 
morale and continued interference and negligence by the ruling 
elites. 
The vast complex of industries compressed into a few corpor-
ations made the organisation extensive, unwieldy and overcentralised. 
The corporations attained a monolithic character, although subservient 
lo ministries for virtually everything. 
CHAPTER V 
THE OPERATION OF THE NATIONALISED INDUSTRIES 
Nationalisation in Bangladesh was launched in an environment 
where the ruling elite found it convenient to maintain an ambiguity in 
respect of the goals, objectives and purposes of their action. 	In 
the preceding chapter it has been suggested that the lack of clarity 
in goals, objectives or purposes of nationalisation had influenced the 
organisation structure and the management style of the nationalised 
industries in ways which inhibited smooth operation. In this chapter, 
some aspects of financial operation, production, marketing, distribution 
and expansion programmes will be discussed with a view to see if a policy 
vacuum existed in these areas also. 	It will be examined if the ways of 
financing, the sources of funds, channels for obtaining finance, capital 
structure and generation, disposal, accumulation and appropriation of 
surplus, spheres of activities and the extent of independence in the 
operational processes were clearly spelt out. It will be probed if the 
policy measures, institutional framework and financial flow were simul-
taneously activated to synchronise with the target set or as perceived 
and if the ground rules and policies concerning investment, pricing, 
marketing, profitability were drawn up and while doing so whether the 
policy makers took adequate cognizance of the economic and political 
implications. The professed socialist economy was never explained in 
the context of Bangladesh. The functional responsibility of the 
nationalised industries in the avowedly socialist construction of the 
Bangladesh economy was not delineated. Even where the national objec-
tives of the nationalised industries were identified and understood, 
their corporate and commercial objectives required to be explicitly 
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stated. 	It was also necessary to appreciate that these objectives 
might not be achievable without impairing the corporate autonomy. 
In quintessence, the chapter will examine if the absence of a 
clearly laid down norm or other criteria of economic efficiency had posed 
the nationalised industries to the expediency of government intervention, 
a vitiated corporate autonomy and use of political processes to influence 
investment price, cost and return and production and decisions regarding 
future expansion programme. 
A : SEARCH FOR A POLICY 
The public enterprises in many of the developing nations in South 
East Asia have demonstrated the lack of a clear provision of norms or 
criteria for their economic efficiency 1 . 	The nationalised industries 
in Bangladesh were no exceptions in this regard. The operational rules, 
regulations and procedures for them were not framed at an early date. 
Exposure of the industries to the expediency of external action, on the 
other hand, resulted in decisions regarding investment, return, profit, 
cost and price being subject to ad-hoc decisions. 	This along with 
complex social, political and economic issues made financial management 
of the nationalised industried extremely difficult. 	Apart from the 
absence of defined objectives of nationalisation in the statute as 
mentioned in the previous chapter 2 , administrative, managerial, economic 
or financial principles under which the nationalised industries were to 
operate remained ill specified. One can indeed discern elements of 
indifference on the part of the legislative or the executive authorities 
1 Basu, Enterprise Policy, op. cit., Suwanabol, op. cit. 
2 Supra., pp. 192-9. 
229 
towards formulation and implementation of such needed rules and regu-
lations. 	The social, economic and financial obligations of the 
nationalised industries were not discussed with depth and probity in 
the legislatures. Even the executive arms of the government which 
were instrumental in the creation of public corporations during the 
Pakistani administration 3 demonstrated no initiative in the absence of 
a political directive and because of the erosion in thier own morale 4 . 
The lack of concern in the policy makers in Bangladesh towards 
forumlating a guideline for the operation of the nationalised industries 
was, in many respects, in sharp contrast with the British experience in 
this regard and from which Bangladesh could possibly draw valuable 
lessons. Thus in the United Kingdom, discussions and debates surround-
ing the nationalised industries found expressions in the three major 
policy declarations 5 of the government towards their operational 
principles as under: • 
(i) In 1961 a system of financial targets for the British nationalised 
industries was set out describing the implications for pricing 
and investment policies. The objective was to find a reasonable 
3 Birkhead writes: "Judging from the sources and content of official 
reports...the creation of corporations throughout...has been the work 
of administrators and the legislative branch has seemingly played no 
role at all". Birkhead, op. cit., p. 120. Also see, Mushtaq Ahmed, 
Government and Politics in Pakistan (Karachi: Pakistan Publishing 
House, 1963), p. 101. 
4 Supra., Chapter IV, pp. 213-24. 
5 Three major policy declarations are embodied in the following: White 
Paper, The Financial and Economic Obligations of the Nationalised 
Industries (1961, London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office) Cmnd. 1337; 
White Paper, Nationalized Industries: a Review of Financial and 
Economic Objectives, (1967, London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office) 
Cmnd. 3437; White Paper, The Nationalized Industries, (1978, London: 
Her Majesty's Stationery Office) Cmnd 7131. Also see, Leonard Tivey 
ed. The Nationalized Industries Since 1960 A Book of Readings, 
(London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1973), pp. 65-85; Coombes, op. cit. 
pp. 31-74; M.R. Garner, "The White Paper on the Nationalized Indus-
tries", Public Administration, (Spring 1979), pp.7-20. 
230 
balance between the commercial and wider social obligations of 
the nationalised industries. 
(ii) Requirement of a more specific definition of efficiency and a 
minimum standard of financial performance led to the enunciation 
of a guideline in 1967 according to which the financial objectives 
were to be flexibly interpreted taking into account social obli-
gations and national policies. 	It was provided that the govern- 
ment would assume responsibility for making special payments or 
for adjusting objectives if any industry was to operate against 
its commercial interests. 
(iii) In 1978 the basic philosophy was to leave the industries free to 
make their day to day operational decisions while the government 
must lay down the broad economic and financial framework within 
which they would want the industries to operate. 	The essential 
elements in such a framework were the targets for the financial 
profits, the principles governing investment appraisal and pricing 
policy and the form of financing. 
In Bangladesh the policy makers were not seemingly concerned with 
the above issues and no clear framework was given under which the nation-
alised industries and their corporations were to operate and formulate 
policies for the industries under their charge. 	The nationalisation 
statute did not state if the nationalised industries were to operate on 
commercial or some other principles or to seek a reasonable balance 
among the various conflicting obligations 6  . 	Absence of a firm declar- 
ation about the objectives and the obligations of the nationalised 
6 In contrast, for example, public enterprises statutes in Greece, 
envisaged that the public enterprises would function in the public 
interest but according to the "rules of private economy". See Pella 
Lenoudia, "Public Enterprise in Greece", Public Finance, Vol 18 
(1963), pp. 287-306. 
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industries did not necessarily invest them with "excessive freedom". 
Instead the lack of a definite guideline resulted in the government 
eventually deciding all matters. 
In the nationalisation statute itself there were six articles 
pertaining to the financial operation of the nationalised industries 
out of the total twenty six articles governing various aspects of the 
nationalised industries and nationalisation. 	The six articles were 
related to aspects of control, submission of annual budget statements, 
annual statement of accounts and audit, etc. 	Only articles 18 and 
20 referred to operational aspects of financing. 	Article 18 provided 
for an authorised share capital of Taka 10 million for each corporation 
to be subscribed entirely by the government and an initial share capital 
of half a million Taka fully paid-up and subscribed by the government. 
Article 20 conferred powers upon the corporations to spend such sums as 
they would think fit within the limits of their annual budgets approved 
by the government. 	Other than these aspects the nationalisation 
statute did not contain specific guidelines on matters such as invest- 
ment, pricing or profits. 	Nor did it seek to define the financial, 
social and economic obligations of the nationalised industries. 
The plan documents and industrial policy statements of the govern-
ment later made some attempts to identify various objectives of the 
nationalised industries rather in oblique ways. The FFYP mentioned 
concepts such as "production targets" or "other defined objectives" 7 . 
According to Alamgir 8 while this indicated an appreciation of the need 
for a performance criterion , it still fell short of a clear thinking on 
the subject by the planners. 	The FFYP mentioned however its expectation 
7 FFYP, op. cit. p. 251. 
8 Alamgir, op. cit. p. 708. 
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that the broadened industrial base of the economy would generate 
substantial surplus and create additional employment and income 9 . 
The Annual Development Programme 1972-73 identified objectives such 
as, to reach the level of production of pre-Liberation level and to 
rehabilitate all enterprises which suffered from damages and disloc- 
ation due to the Liberation War 10 . By mid-1974 planners were sensitive 
to the need for reforms in the field of financial management of the 
nationalised industries and formulated detailed policy measures. 	The 
anomalies in the price policy in a mixed economy was noted. It was 
advocated that market conditions should determine the prices of the 
products and that any departure from the market price and price felt 
socially desirable by the government should be covered by budgetary 
subsidies. The rate of increase of surplus from the nationalised 
sector was set conservatively for the early years of the FFYP but was 
expected to accelerate as operating efficiency started yielding results. 12 
The annual budgets of the government assumed that the national-
ised industries would be able to generate a surplus. The Budget 
speeches of the Finance Ministers contained indirect references about 
the government's desire to see the industries generate surplus and 
. 	13 earn profits . 
9 FFYP, op. cit., p. 208. 
10 TYP, op. cit., p. 1 noted that a part of the Annual Plan for 1972-73 
was directed more towards economic recovery. 
11 Government of Bangladesh Planning Commission, Economic Development 
in 1972-73 and Annual Plan for 1974-75, (Dacca: Government Press, 1974) 
P• 40. 
12 PFYP, op. cit. 
13 See for example Budget Speeches of the Finance Minister for the finan-
cial years 1974-75 and 1975-76. Government of Banglades, Ministry of 
Finance, Annual Budget for 1974-75 Budget Speech of Mr. Tajuddin Ahmed 
Minister for Finance (Dacca: 19 June, 1974) p.12. The surplus from the 
(Continued over) 
The first industrial policy statement of the government 14 
indicated that the purpose of establishing the sector corporations in 
the nationalised industries was to achieve efficient and professional 
management. This implied an appreciation of the need for a commercially 
oriented philosophy. A foreign consultant was appointed to review 
existing financial procedures and suggest modern "business methods". 
The investment policies, however, appeared to be primarily concerned 
15 
With assuring the private sector of government sunc s)it' 
The government seemed to have overlooked the need for filling 
various policy vacuums arising out of several blanks in the statute. 
Contemporary policy speeches of the ruling elite failed to provide a 
clue about the thinking of the government. Likewise the parliamentary 
proceedings were singularly lacking in appreciation among the legislat- 
ors about the need for an explicit statement on the operational principles 
for the nationalised industries. 	In the absence of any clear statutory 
guideline, political directive or administrative order it seems the 
Planning Commission initially bore the responsibility for delineating 
the economic and financial objectives of the nationalised industries. 
Later the Guidelines issued by the Cabinet Division emphasised the 
"commercial considerations" for operating the enterprises and the need 
"to earn additional revenue for the government" 16 . During the later 
13 (Continued) nationalised industries was expected to be Taka 90 
million. Also, Government of Bangladesh Ministry of Finance, Annual 
Budget 1975-76 Budget Speech Dr. Azizur Rahman Mallik Finance Minister 
(Dacca: 23 June 1975)(in Bengali), p. 31. Revenue receipts from the 
nationalised sector was estimated to be Taka 213 million. 
14 Industrial Policy 1972-73 op. cit. 
15 Supra., Chapter III, pp. 134-6, 146-51. 
16 Cabinet, Guidelines, op. cit. 
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period of the FFYP the guiding principles appeared to be rationalisation 
and corporations were required to "push up sales and repay outstanding 
bank loans and operate on commercial basis" 17 . There were however, 
"uncertainties". 	The country as the planners noted was still in a 
"real transition" 18 . 	In the absence of national convictions on import- 
and issues definite guidance was not available 19 and the nationalised 
industries wavered uncertainly in a volatile political environment. 
B : FINANCIAL OPERATION 
An Inherited Liability  
A number of the nationalised enterprises inherited heavy debts 
run up by their former owners immediately prior to Liberation 20 . 
With the intensification of the Liberation War in 1971 many of the 
West Pakistani owners began to pull out of Bangladesh. 	They would 
not, of course, carry away the plant and machinery but they could 
transfer cash resources to West Pakistan to build up financial assets 
there21 . 	Inventories were depleted. 	There were very few imports 	or 
replacements during the period of the Liberation War. As a result, 
17 TIP, op. cit., p. 24. 
18 Ibid., p. 23. 
19 /bid. 
20 Sobhan, Nationalisation, op. cit., pp. 185-6. A parallel can be 
drawn with the British experience of nationalisation. The capital 
requirements for the recovery of the British coal industries, for 
modernisation of the British Railway and to overcome technical and 
economic disadvantages in the small scale and localised organisation 
of the gas industry made nationalisation in Britain almost inevitable. 
See for example G.L. Reid, Kevin Allen and D.J. Harris, The National- 
ized Fuel Industries, (London: Heinemann Educational Books, 1973), 
pp. 13 & 93; A.W.J. Thompson and L.C. Hunter, The Nationalized Trans- 
port Industries, (London: Heinemann Educational Books, 1973), pp. 
125-30. 
21 Faaland and Parkinson, op. cit., p. 33. 
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at the time of Liberation inventories of raw materials and spares were 
at an all time low. 	The West Pakistani owners also extracted over- 
drafts from their banks working in Bangladesh and transferred the 
accounts to West Pakistan. 	Outstanding loans to the commercial banks 
alone amounted to Taka 1079 million of which Taka 153 million was not 
backed by stock and stores. 22 
Industries at Liberation were faced with critical liquidity 
problems. 	The jute industries inherited huge liabilities towards 
banks and financial institutions. 	The mills were unable to meet all 
pre-Liberation liabilities. 	The liquidity gap of the jute industry 
as on June 30, 1973 was estimated at Taka 1063 million23 . 	The cumul- 
ative annual operating loss of jute industry since 1971-72 stood at 
Taka 550 million on June 30, 197324 . 	Interest on jute mills borrowings 
in the pre-Liberation years was about Taka 50 million25 . 	Similarly, 
extent of damages to buildings, machinery and transport system of the 
sugar industry was estimated at Taka 27 million at the time of Liber- 
ation26 . 	The total accumulated loss of the sugar mills as on the date 
of nationalisation was Taka 98 million 27 and the deficit in the working 
capital was to the extent of Taka 107 million 28 . 
There were debates, delays and hesitation by the new Awami 
League Government on the policy to adopt on the inherited heavy financial 
22 Plan 1974-75, op. cit., p. 106. 
23 Ibid. 
24 S.I. Khan, "Problems Relating to Finance to Jute Industry" in Problems 
of the Jute Sector, (Dacca: Bangladesh Jute Mills Corporation, 1978) 
pp. 56-62. 
25 Ibid. The amount of interest grew to Taka 310 million in 1978. 
26 Bangladesh Sugar Mills Corporation, Annual Report 1972-73, (Dacca: 
MIS Department, not dated) p. 1. 
27 Ibid., p. 2. 
28 Ibid. 
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liabilities of most of the enterprises. 	It was, however, decided 
that the nationalised sector should not carry the burden of these 
debts during the initial period of its operations. All liabilities 
on capital account were to be converted into long term debentures with 
five years' moratorium on payment of interest and capital 29 . 
No precise estimate of working capital requirement of national-
ised industries was available at the time of nationalisation. 	In 
November, 1973, the government appointed a committee for the purpose 
of examining the liquidity gap of the sector corporations. 	They 
estimated the total liquidity gap as on June 30, 1973 to be Taka 2229 
million30 . The actual gross working capital requirement on an assumed 
capacity utilisation at various levels for various different units was 
calculated at Taka 3265 millionn . The task of calculating the liquidity 
gap was made difficult initially as the total financial position, the 
profit and loss accounts and balance sheets of the nationalised enter-
prises were not available. However, in view of the urgency, the 
Planning Commission recommended a further moratorium for five years for 
capital repayment and accumulated interest. 	This referred to all 	pre- 
Liberation loans given to the enterprises by financial institutions, 
including commercial banks, for all industries other than jute. 	In 
the case of the jute industry it was decided that all outstanding loans 
taken from the various financial institutions for long term industrial 
credits as of June 30, 1973, should be converted into long term debentures 
29 Plan 1974-75, op. cit., p. 40. 
30 Ibid., pp. 106-107; the liquidity gap estimated for the nationalised 
industries other than jute sector as on 30 June, 1973 was Taka 1155 
million. 
31 Muzaffer Ahmed, "Financing of Public Sector Enterprises: Some Reflec- 
tions on its Procedures, Problems and Administration in Bangladesh", 
The Journal of Management Business and Economics, Vol.2, 1976. 
(pp.69-94). 
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Pre-Liberation liabilities of income tax, excise tax and sales tax in 
respect of taken over units were to be written off, as would be all 
subsidy claims by enterprises. 
The Nationalisation Order provided for payment of compensation 
in respect of the shares of the nationalised enterprises which subse- 
quently vested in the government. 	Initially, the Constitution provided 
that payment for compensation for the acquisition, nationalisation or 
requisition lay at the discretion of the government 32 and the amount was 
to be determined by the government and was not to exceed paid-up value 
of such shares 33 . 	Later the Constitution was amended to provide for 
payment of compensation for all compulsory acquisition, nationalisation 
or requisition 34 . The government approved guidelines in late 1975 for 
evalutat ion of compensation for nationalised industries. 	Accordingly, 
the foreign shareholders of nationalised industries were to be paid 25 
per cent of compensation in 1975-76, 30 per cent in 1976-77 and the 
remaining 50 per cent in 1977-78 35 . 	The Bengali shareholders of 
nationalised enterprises were to be paid compensation in non-negotiable 
savings certificates though provision was made for small investors to 
pay compensation in cash in one instalment36 . 	The total amount of 
compensation payable was estimated at Taka 217 million of which Taka 30 
million was payable to foreign shareholders and Taka 187 million was 
32 Constitution, op. cit., Article 42 (2). 
33 Industrial Nationalisation Order, op. cit.,Article 9. 
34 Government of Bangladesh, Ministry of Law, "The Proclamations 
Amendment Order, 1977 Proclamations Order No. 1 of 1977", The 
Bangladesh Gazette Extraordinary, 23 April, 1977, Article 7. 
35 Government of Bangladesh Press Note, 5 December, 1975. Ministry 
of Industries, Nationalised Industries Division, Compensation Wing. 
36 Ibid. 
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payable to Bengali shareholders 37 . The huge amount of compensation 
which the government was committed to pay created an additional liabil-
ity for the nationalised industries. 
Many of the crippled enterprises could not be made operative 
with the liabilities of the past 38 . 	Failure of the government to 
define its policy toward the question of inherited liability helped 
to compound the liquidity problem of the nationalised industries. 
This led to the question of liquidity gap. 	If nationalised enter- 
prises were found to be uneconomic in changed circumstances, it would 
be better to close them down and if on the other hand these enterprises 
were to run and operate this gap had to be bridged. 
Sources of Finance  
Nationalised Industries, like the private sector, were in need 
of finance for the acquisition of fixed productive assets along with 
its fixed or permanent capital. 	The industries also required working 
capital with which the expenses of current account, such as raw mater-
ials, debt and administrative expenses including wages and salaries 
of employees could be met. 	The main sources of finance included 
(i) equity share or creditor securities (ii) retained earnings or plough 
back profits in the form of depreciation reserves, development reserves, 
special resources etc. (iii) commercial banks (iv) financial institutions 
37 Ibid. By May, 1975 evaluation of net worth of 256 companies under 
various sector corporations out of 283 required to be evaluated was 
completed for the purpose of compensation. 	Companies belonging 
to jute, textile, sugar, chemicals, shipbuilding, food and allied 
products and steel sector were evaluated. 
38 Evaluation of net worth revealed that 12 enterprises in jute sector 
26 in textile and 3 in sugar had excess of liabilities over assets. 
Source: Ministry of Industries, Nationalised Industries Wing 
Compensation Branch. 
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specialising in medium and long term finance (v) investing public 
(vi) international financial institutions such as IBRD, IFC, IDA, etc. 
(vii) foreign capital (viii) insurance corporation and (ix) other 
institutional investors like the investment trust 39 . Whether or not 
the source of investment is important and whether government invest-
ments are inherently superior nor inferior to private investments or 
not, both have the same alternative sources to choose from and are 
interested in maximising the same goals40 . 	Even then, the nature of 
industries, the size of the unit, the risks involved and the cost of 
raising capital could be as important a consideration in respect of 
the nationalised sector as the private in determining the proportions 
• 
of the various sources of finance. 	In Bangladesh this was complicated 
by the fact that the government was the principal investor and source 
of funds for financing the nationalised industries. A low per capita 
income, low ratio of savings to the national income and a smaller market 
sector all combined to make the public sector's share in industrial 
productive investment overwhelmingly large. 	It is the public sector 
which has to furnish the social overhead capital in Bangladesh. 
The government was, therefore, the sole shareholder in all 
nationalised enterprises placed under the sector corporations 41 . 
39 Following B.G. Hebbalkar, "Finance for Industry", The Indian Journal 
of Public Administration, Vol. 20 (July-September, 1974) pp. 623-37; 
V.V. Ramanadham, The Finances of Public Enterprises, (Bombay: Asia 
Publishing House, 1963), pp. 107-110. 
40 Oscar T. Brookins and Gustav Schachter, "The Role of the Public 
Sector in Industrial Investment in South East Europe", International 
de Science Economische Commerciale, Vol. 17, (1970) pp. 1190-1207. 
41 Industrial Nationalisation Order, op. cit., Article 4. 
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As has been earlier noted the authorised, initial and subscribed 
capital of the sector corporations was statutorily fixed. 	The author- 
ised, initial and subscribed capital was to be provided by the govern-
ment. In addition, the capital of the sector corporations was derived 
from the following sources 42 : 
(i) Grants by the government; 
(ii) Loans obtained from the government; 
(iii) Sales proceeds of the bond issued under the authority of the 
government; 
(iv) Loan and foreign aid obtained by the corporations with the 
special and general sanction of the government; 
(v) All fees and levies, charges and rates received by the corpor-
ations; 
(vi) Sales proceeds of both raw materials, finished products and by-
products; 
(vii) Revolving funds placed at the disposal of the corporations by 
the government for survey, feasibility study etc. of the schemes; 
(viii) All other sum received by the corporations. 
The predominance of the government as the prime financier of the nation-
alised industries is no unique example for Bangladesh. 	Studies on 
financial performance of government owned corporations in less developed 
countries bear out the fact that the government provides the 
major part of their financial needs43 . 	This dominance has advantages 
too: it helps the government to exert financial regulations on capital 
expenditure programme and long term borrowings of the sector corporations. 
It also confers on the corporations the advantage of cheap capital, 
42 Shamsul Islam, Public Corporations in Bangladesh, (Dacca: Local 
Government Institute, 1975), p. 53. 
43 See Andrew H. Gant II and Giuseppe Dutto, "Financial Performance 
of Government Owned Corporations in Less Developed Countries", 
International Monetary Funds Staff Papers, Vol. 15 (1968) pp. 102- 
140. Gant and Dutto made an exhaustive study collecting data 
regarding public corporations in the following countries: Argentina, 
Bolivia, Brazil, Ceylon, Chile, Columbia, Dahomey, India, Liberia, 
Malagsy, Malaysia, Mauritius, 'Malawi, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, 
Peru, Rhodesia, Sudan, Uganda, Thialand and Zambia and also France, 
Italy and the United Kingdom. 
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government supported without having to face the test of the capital 
market44 . 
The capital structure of the nationalised industries, however, 
remained weak because of their dependence on the advances made by the 
exchequer as the main source of capital. 	All the sector corporations 
received considerable amounts of funds at the time of their establish- 
ment and in subsequent periods. 	No obligation was put upon the cor- 
porations to pay interest and amortisation to the government for capital 
granted. 	Moreover, while the sector corporations were permitted to 
borrow funds from the financial institutions 45 and capital market they 
were hardly able to realise profits that could be used in order to 
finance new investments. 	The sector corporations as a result could 
not develop autonomously and independently of the State and their 
investment programme became rigid. 
Nationalised industries had two alternatives to procure capital 
from non-governmental sources. 	The sector corporations could, with 
approval of government, borrow funds as might be required by them to 
discharge their functions. 	The corporations were empowered under 
certain conditions to raise loan capital in the open market. 	The 
loan funds were almost invariably to carry a governmental guarantee. 
The only difference from the government directly providing finance 
was that the enterprises enjoyed some flexibility. The other alter- 
native was to acquire equity capital, which the nationalised industries 
could not do in Bangladesh. 	To do so would have meant a deviation 
from the principles of State ownership where the State was the sole 
owner of the shares of the enterprises. 	Even if the device of equity 
44 Ramanadham, Finances, op. cit. pp. 107-8. 
45 Industrial Nationalisation Order, op. cit., Article 20 (2). 
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participation by private investors was provided for it could be of 
limited practical value at least during the period immediately after 
Liberation. There would have been a very limited supply of private 
capital and the initial losses of the nationalised enterprises and the 
turbulent industrial atmosphere" in general were not likely to induce 
the private investors to come forward47 . 
The Planning Commission pointed out the anomalies and problems 
in the traditional pattern of financing public sector industries and 
called for the evolution of new financial procedures 48 . 	The problems 
enumerated in respect of financing of industries were as follows: 
(i) Pattern of financing a public sector project, i.e. debt-equity 
problem; 
(ii) Mobilisation of funds by the financing institutions; 
(iii) Working capital requirements of public sector industries; 
(iv) Past debt liabilities of the abandoned enterprises; 
(v) Determination of rate of return on funds provided by the govern-
ment or the public sector projects; 
(vi) Demarcation of project financing through central plans and 
financial institutions. 
The Planning Commission suggested policy measures in this area 
the main principles underlying which were 49 : 
46 guimuddin Chowdhury, "Industrial Conflict in Bangladesh 1947-75: 
A Preliminary Analysis", The Bangladesh Development Studies, Vol. 
2 (April, 1977), pp. 211-226. 
47 A government estimate firmed up in 1975 identified shareholders as 
Bengalis and Pakistanis in jute, textile and sugar sectors as follows: 
Government in BIDC 	 Taka 104 million 
Insurance and Financial Institutions 	Taka 58 million 
Bangladeshis Taka 141 million 
Pakistanis 	 Taka 90 million 
Foreigners other than Pakistanis 	Taka 30 million 
Total 	Taka 423 million 
Government of Bangladesh, Ministry of Industries, Nationalised 
Industries Wing. 
48 Plan 1974-75, op. cit., pp. 104-105. 
49 Basedton, ibid. pp. 40-41 & 104-105; FFYP, op. cit., pp. 259-261 and 
Ministry of Industries, Nationalised Industries Wing. Corporations 
submitted proposals to the government for conversion of their loans 
into share capital and obtained the same on several occasions. 
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(i) The debt equity burden should be so distributed as to avoid 
burdening the cost structure of the enterprises; 
(ii) The debt equity structure of the enterprises should be determined 
by converting Taka component of the total investment into equity 
and foreign exchange component in debt. 	Savings should be 
promoted in foreign exchange used in the project; 
(iii) All corporations should organise units into companies; 
(iv) For existing companies existing debt equity structure was to 
continue until changed due to expansion. 	If there were existing 
companies whose debt equity structure was economically unviable 
these were to be submitted for examination; 
(v) Proprietory business with no loan liability was to have 100 per 
cent equity; 
(vi) Units not already formed into a company equity was to be equiv-
alent to local currency component and loan should be equivalent 
to the foreign currency component unless it was demonstrated 
that such a capital structure made the plant financially unviable; 
(vii) Units should operate in such a manner as to repay interest on 
loan, repay loan capital instalments and generate on average a 
minimum 71/2 per cent return on the equity in the form of dividend; 
(viii)Each corporation was to work out the capital structure of such 
enterprise under its control on the above guidelines. 
However, as late as in September, 1978 the various issues involved could 
not be resolved and the sector corporations were still busy undertaking 
exercises to define an appropriate debt-equity and capital structure 
for the enterprises administered by them50 . 
As a result of all these factors the nationalised industries were 
unable to contribute to total savings and capital formation in the 
country. They were not able to develop a more independent view of 
financing investments,whether to acquire more business like flexibility 
and initiative or to help accelerate the pace of industrial growth in 
the economy. Moreover, the government required enormous funds to 
finance the achievement of the high targets of the First Plan. While 
foreign aid provided 75 per cent of capital for the First Plan 51 in the 
50 During the field study in September-December, 1978 it was found that 
BCIC, BSFIC and BSEC had undertaken the needed exercise under the 
directive of the Ministry of Industries. 
51 Review 1978, op. cit. p. 22. 
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public sector the government could not indefinitely look upon these 
as the prime sources. _ 	It was imperative that the budgetary 
surplus particularly the revenues from the nationalised industries 
could be increasingly relied upon. 	The loanable funds were needed 
to be raised from the domestic or foreign capital markets as well. 
But unfortunately, like many other less developed countries the 
nationalised industries in Bangladesh placed a financial burden on 
the government rather than serving as a method of collecting resources 
for their own financial support 52 . 
Raising of Loans  
The government had, therefore, to reorient its approach to the 
nationalised industries in relation to the suitability of their capital 
structure. 	The initiation, operation and expansion aspects of nation- 
alised industries needed to be linked together by a self-evolving capital 
structure - a result of their savings 53 . 	In other words, it was necessary 
to strengthen the position of the sector corporations by associating 
them with suitable financial institutions capable of giving necessary 
assistance. 	Such financial institutions would encourage productive 
activities and facilitate the circulation of assets by a credit proce- 
dure in conformity with the needs of the economy. 	It would enable the 
nationalised industries to reduce their demands for government funds 
and to get used to relying on ther own independent means of acquiring 
capital. 
52 Gant and Dutto, Financial Performances, op. cit. 
53 R.K. Jain, "Capital Formation in State Enterprises in India", 
The Indian Journal of Public Administration, Vol. 7 (January - 
March, 1961), pp. 57-91. 
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The absence of an organised capital market 54 made this possi-
bility extremely unlikely. The relatively small volume of domestic 
savings equally presented serious difficulties for the floating of 
loans. However the accumulation of private savings in banks and 
other financial institutions helped the nationalised industries to 
acquire funds through issue of some loans in the domestic capital 
market. The FFYP projected an amount of Taka 1570 million 51 as 
possible borrowing from banking system to finance the public sector 
investments. 	This was exclusive of Taka 3000 million short term 
credits56 for the nationalised enterprises to finance working capital 
and similar requirements not included in First Plan outlay. 	However, 
the World Bank considered that the scope for financing public sector 
plan expenditures through borrowing from the banking system (deficit 
financing) was limited 57 . Nevertheless, the Planning Commission took 
cognizance of the problems of mobilisation of funds for financing 
industries by the financial institutions and the need for reorganisation 
of financial institutions for the purpose 58 . 	It also felt that the 
financial institutions should be given a more important role for finan-
cing the nationalised sector. There is however no reference to the 
need to activate the capital market or a stock exchange as an agency 
for mobilising savings and financial investments either in the indus-
trial investment policy of 1972-73 or in the new investment policy of 
54 A direct access to domestic capital market helps to develop more 
flexible means of acquiring long term funds for public enterprises. 
See Lenoudia, op. cit. 
55 MT, op. cit., p. 49. 
56 Ibid., p. 240. This includes nationalised banks and insurance 
companies. 
57 IBRD , 	Rural Economy, op. cit., p. 256. 
58 Plan 1974-75, op. cit., p. 104. 
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1974. It is no wonder that the stock exchange remained a very 
weak vehicle for mobilising resources at the end of the First Plan. 
The Planning Commission recommended some specific roles for 
the domestic banks in financing nationalised industries 59 . 	Policy 
measures regarding financing of nationalised industries envisaged were 
as follows: 
(i) Moratorium to capital repayment and accumulated 
interest will be granted on all pre-Liberation 
loans given to the enterprises by the financial 
institutions including commercial banks with 
certain qualifying provisos; 
(ii) Special treatment could be accorded to a sector 
corporation regarding its liquidity problem if 
they were unable to meet the liquidity gap through 
its own resources or through banking arrangements. 60 
Although the banking system as a whole failed to mobilise the savings 
of the community particularly in the early years of nationalisation 61 
the nationalised banks and specialised financial institutions remained 
the usual source of credit for the nationalised industries. 	Out of 
tot4 commercial bank advances the share of the manufacturing sector 
was 35 per cent on June 30, 1973. 	It was 33 per cent on the corres- 
ponding date in 1974, 52 per cent in 1975, 45 per cent in 1976, 43 
per cent in 1977 and 43 per cent in 1978 62 . 	The bulk of the bank 
59 Ibid., p. 40. 
60 Ibid., p. 108. 
61 Because of large scale corruption, wholesale smuggling, hoarding, 
blackmarketing, permit-mongering, extra-departmental influences and 
political manipulations a huge amount of black money generated out- 
side the banking system. 	See Government of Bangladesh, Ministry 
of Finance, Resume of the Activities of the Financial Institutions 
(Dacca: Government Press, 1976) p. 9. Lack of institutionalised 
savings coupled with above factors brought about mounting pressures 
on the price line and frustrated all efforts in restoring financial 
disciplines. 	Simultaneously the government policy regarding private 
sector industries tended to discourage private investment during the 
early period and discouraged savings through institutional channels. 
62 Ministry of Finance, Resume of the Financial Instiutions 1979-80 
(Dacca: Government Press, June 1980), pp. 20-21. 
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credit in the manufacturing activities went to the nationalised sector. 
The following table will illustrate the magnitude of the bank credit 
received by the nationalised industries as compared to other sectors 
in the national economy: 
TABLE 10 
Distribution of Bank Credit by Sectors63 
Sector 
Position 
31-12-74 
Percentage 
30-6-77 
as on: 
30-6-75 	30-6-76 
I Nationalised Industries 39.5 46.2 50.0 11.4 
II Public Sector other than 
nationalised industries 24.2 37.0 12.0 32.1 
III Private Sector 36.3 16.8 37.8 56.5 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
The above table demonstrates the resurgence of the private sector in 
the economy since mid-1975. 	Share of the bank credit to the national- 
ised industries declined to only 11.4 per cent of the total bank credit 
in 1977 from 39.5 per cent in 1974. 	On the contrary the private sector 
came to account for 56.5 per cent of the bank credit in 1977 against 
its previous 36.3 per cent in 1974. 
Development Plan Allocations  
Requirement of investment fund was direct function of investment 
plan for the nationalised industries which were largely reflected in 
the Five Year Plan and the corresponding Annual Plans. Planning activ-
ities were guided by the Five Year Plan and the Annual Plans. 	The 
Five Year Plan defined the broad objectives of development and strate-
gies; the Annual Development Programmes were drawn within the framework 
63 Figures in the table are based on Yearbook 1979, op. cit. p. 316, 
Table 7.20. 
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of the short term operational plan known as the Annual Plan. 	Thus, 
Annual Plan provided the necessary link between the Five Year Plan and 
the current economic situation obtaining in the economy. 	The funds 
allocated for the nationalised industries as in other sectors were 
released through the budgetary process of the Annual Development 
Programmes (ADP). 
Financial allocation under the FFYP for the nationalised indust-
ries was Taka 7239 million. This amount was about 96 per cent of the 
First Plan allocation for the industrial development through the public 
sector. The following table shows the FFYP allocations for industry, 
according to sectors. 
TABLE 11 
The FFYP Allocations for Industrial Development 64 
Sector Total Amount* Percentage 
Nationalised Industries 7239 81 
Public Sector other than 
nationalised 311 3 
Private Sector 1415 16 
8965 100 
* in million Taka 
Actual development expenditure in the public industrial sector during 
the period between 1973-74 and 1977-78 was Taka 5672 million. 	The 
comparative phasing of allocation and actual estimated expenditure is 
depicted below: 
64 FFYP, op. cit., p. 212. 
TABLE 12 
Annual Phasing of Allocation and Expenditure in 
Public Industrial Sector During the FFYP Period 65 
(in million Taka) 
Item 	FY74 	FY75 	FY76 	FY77 	FY78 	Total 
Allocation 790 1436 1738 1792 1794 7550 
Expenditure 525 650 1166 1430 1901 5672 
Of the amount allocated actual amount utilised was estimated to be 
Taka 3150 million. Break-up of allocation and utilisation for each 
of the corporations is given below. 
TABLE 13 
Financial Allocation and Utilisation of Development Funds 
by the Nationalised Industries During the FFYP Period 66 
(in million Taka at current prices) 
Corporation Allocation Utilisation 
BJMC 480 370 
BTMC 1090 800 
BSFIC 230 160 
BCIC 1070 340 
BSEC 3080 150 
BFIDC 110 460 
PB 815 694 
BPC 123 136 
BMEDC 250 40 
Total 7248 3150 
Compared to shortfall in total public sector development outlay estim-
ated at 50 per cent, in industry implementation was only to the order 
of 36 per cent 67 . 	For nationalised industries it came to a little 
more than 43 per cent. The total expenditure could be financed by 
65 Review 1978, op. cit., p. 20, Table 7. 
66 TYP, op. cit., p. 152 and pp. 194-5. 
67 Review 1978, op. cit., p. 21. 
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domestic resources only to the extent of 24 per cent of the fund 
requirements 68 which caused bottlenecks, uncertainties and delays. 
Apart from those problems, the nationalised industries suffered from 
cumbersome governmental procedures for release of funds on which they 
almost entirely depended. 	In the multiple scrutiny involved in 
procedures for release of development funds several ministries were 
associated. The ministry administering the corporation and the 
Planning Commission examined the physical programme of expenditure 
for the year submitted by the corporation. 	Once cleared it went to 
the External Resources Division and the Ministry of Finance for release 
of foreign exchange and Taka finance. Every agency tended to initiate 
its own scrutiny in the process which was thus often duplicated. 	In 
certain cases even after clearance from the Ministry of Finance and the 
External Resources Division the ministry concerned in charge of the 
corporation would again carry out its own examinations. 	The FFYP 
sought to streamline release procedures and recommended a modification ° . 
Essentially however for the nationalised industries, without their own 
financial base, it had to be a dependency relationship with the govern-
ment which stifled their operational flexibility. The need for gener-
ation of surplus or return on investment as a simple technique to aid 
the investment decision was therefore acute. 
Generation of Surplus  
The sharp increase in revenue expenditure of the government 
reduced the surplus for investment in development. Revenue surplus 
in national budgets projected at Taka 11,620 million during the FFYP 
68 Ibid., p. 
69 FFYP, op. cit., pp. 260-261. 
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reached the figure of only Taka 4,720 million - about 45 per cent of 
the estimated goal 70 . 	This revenue shortfall was attributed to, among 
other reasons, low level of income generated by the nationalised indus- 
tries which fell far short of expectation. 	Some of the nationalised 
enterprises instead incurred heavy losses and survived on subsidies as 
will be seen later71 . 
The aspects of return on investment, surplus or profit were 
discussed by those concerned with the nationalised industries. 	It was 
argued that these undertakings should operate on no profit no loss basis 
because they were established for the public purposes and welfare. 	On 
the other hand, it was also stated that the concept of return of invest-
ment should be as applicable in the public sector as in the private 
sector. 	It was held that the investment in the public sector was 
mostly from the government. The usefulness of such investments is 
best evaluated in terms of money. Assessment of future return and 
profitability would help justifying the current investment decisions. 
The repayment of the capital in the long run and, the reduction of the 
burden on the government would be facilitated. through the generation of _ 
surplus. The nationalised enterprises therefore, should run on a profit 
making basis not only in the sense that it should yield an economic 
price but it must also fetch resources for the community in order to 
finance a part of the investment. 
The controversy in Bangladesh was made more complex as the 
nationalisation order did not place any obligation on the corporations 
or enterprises to generate a profit or to contribute such profits to 
70 TYP, op. cit., p. 14. 
71 Infra., Table 14. 
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the government exchequer. Nor the corporations were empowered under the 
provisions of Nationalisation Order to appropriate and draw any profit 
or surplus from the enterprises, either for their own use or for the 
purpose of depositing it in the government exchequer. Early in 1973 
the Planning Commission Esuggestedi government levy on public sector 
enterprises and proposed that 
all public sector projects whether existing or new 
shall pay to Government a minimum fixed return of 71/2 
per cent on the original value of their investments. 
This surplus after deducting the minimum shall be 
distributed by a formula to be determined by the 
Government. 72 
Discussions about rate of return on investment in the Bangladesh 
nationalised industries did not however, culminate in a clear policy 
declaration by the government. This was in sharp contrast with the 
British experience where the awareness of the government about the 
need for a guideline for operation of the nationalised industries and 
its determination to resolve the problem were amply reflected in the 
publication of a succession of White Papers 3 . The government in 
72 Plan 1974-75, op. cit., p. 105. 
73 Supra., fn. 3. p.229 . 	In Britain, at the time of the creation of 
the nationalised industries it was stipulated that they should "pay 
their way". 	This was taken to mean that their revenues, on average, 
over a number of years should cover their costs. Being ill defined, 
unspecific and vague this guideline came into conflict with other 
objectives of the nationalised industries. 	This resulted in setting 
a target for an overall return to be achieved by the industries (1961 
White Paper). The 1967 White Paper viewed the rate of return largely 
as a measure of performance and to "reflect different statutory and 
social obligations, conditions of demand, domestic costs and other 
factors peculiar to the individual undertaking". (1967 White Paper 
p. 13). The 1978 White Paper viewed the financial targets set 
generally for 3-5 years in the form of percentage return as the 
central elements in the guidelines. 	Accordingly, the level of 
financial target generally to take into account the "required rate 
of return" of 5 per cent in real terms. 	This rate was set so as 
to reflect the opportunity cost of capital. 	The White Paper high- 
lighted the need for an adequate level of profits in the nationalised 
industries in their own interests and the economy as a whole. 
(Continued over) 
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Bangladesh failed to demonstrate such awareness and hesitated as if to 
assume responsibility and to discharge it afterwards by announcing its 
commitment to a particular framework of operation. 
The lack of a clear corporate and commercial objective for the 
nationalised enterprises of Bangladesh was generally in line with other 
South East Asian countries 74 like Malaysia, Thailand, Srilanka and 
Indonesia. The Planning Commission's proposal of a minimum fixed 
return of 71/2 per cent resembled the Indian pattern where public enter-
prises were expected to generate a return of about 8 per cent on the 
capital invested 75 . 	The surpluses generated by public enterprises 
are ploughed back for new investment in public sector within the plan 
framework. In Japan however public enterprises were expected to be 
self financing and self supporting 76 
The proposal of the Planning Commission suffered from certain 
ambiguity. For example, 
(i) The term "original value of investments" required a definition. 
It was not stated whether the original value of investment would 
be original cost of the scheme approved by the government and 
fund received thereof including both local and foreign currency 
or it would mean such ADP fund as would be received by an 
enterprise from government through ADP. 
(ii) Whether the payment of fixed return would be paid on such portion 
of government fund as would be converted into equity and interest 
payment at the respective rate on the balance of government loan; 
73 (Continued) The choice of 5 per cent as the required rate of return 
was based on among other things the returns achieved by private 
companies. 	Undoubtedly these guidelines did not immediately resolve 
the issues once for all. 	But they did help to improve performance 
in the British nationalised industries. 	See for example Richard 
Pryke, Public Enterprise in Practice the British Experience of 
Nationalization Over Two Decades, (London: MacGibbon & Kee, 1971). 
74 Basu, Enterprise Policy, op. cit., pp. 38-43. 
75 Ibid. 
76 Yoshiro Nishikawa, "Some Basic Problems in Accounting System for 
Public Enterprise with Special Emphasis Upon the Concept of Capital 
and Profit", Hitsobishi Journal of Commerce and Management, Vol. 6 
No. 1 (May, 1971), pp. 1-13. 
254 
(iii) Whether payment of 71/2 per cent fixed return would be treated 
as a charge and enable the corporations to debit this as 
expenditure to the revenue account for getting relief from 
income tax. 77 
The suggestions of the Planning Commission remained unimplemented. 
It was argued that the corporation should earn profit and contribute 
to the government exchequer. 	The rate of return should be decided 
every year on the basis of the volume of profit earned by the enter- 
prises, their liquidity position, provision for corporate tax, payment 
of long term loans, past losses, general and specific reserves for 
meeting future contingencies, working capital, capital expenditure for 
replacement of machinery etc. 78 The share capital and not total 
investment should be the basis for dividend because the equity of the 
investments covers both share capital as well as loan capital 79 . 	The 
loan capital carried interest but the share capital did not involve 
such charge. 	It was further argued that the rate of dividend cauld 
not be fixed and would vary with surplus of enterprises and the dividend 
should be paid after the profit (as normally defined in the Companies 
Act) was determined at the end of each financial year 80 . 
Administering a Profit Policy  
An examination of profitability in the nationalised industries 
presented several difficulties. 	Firstly, the data base was inadequate 
and weak. The figures were ploughed back amounts and current profits 
as shown in the published account were not necessarily accurate in some 
77 Based on interviews with Directors of Finance in BJMC, BCIC, BSEC, 
PB, BTMC and BFIDC during September-November, 1978. 
78 Ibid. 
79 Ibid. 
80 Ibid. 
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cases. 	The profit figures were not always net in nature. 	They were 
often not inclusive of provision for income tax. Necessary revenue 
charges were not debited in every case. 	Secondly, the corporations 
were set up at the time of nationalisation but many of the enterprises 
were established long before. 	Their capital figures represented 
historical values. The rates of return calculated in terms of such 
figures were not conceptually homogeneous with those computed on more 
recent investment. It was difficult to make out a comparative picture 
from the financial statements of various corporations. 	The figures 
cited by different agencies were not always consistent and at times 
irreconcilable. 	Thirdly, administrative facilities required to pursue 
a profit policy by the nationalised industries seemed to be lacking. 
There was no unequivocal declaration about the pursuit of a profit 
policy in the Nationalisation Order or later on by the executive agen- 
cies. 	The structure of nationalised industries was highly heterogen- 
ous, in terms of the profit motive. 	Some industries like jute or 
fertiliser were subsidised for operation, some were expected to make 
high profits and some reasonable profits. 	The nationalised industries 
were organised in an extensive manner. 	They covered industries of 
various categories - basic, secondary and teritary. They were organ-
ised for some time both as department and as autonomous institution. 
Furthermore "the full range of problems and relativities of interests 
raised by the policy of profits" in a vast nationalised industries sector 
entailed a neutralisation of decision at the level of administration 
devised for implementing the policy 81  . 	As Ramanadham aptly puts it: 
81 Following V.V. Ramanadham, The Structure of Public Enterprise in 
India, (London: Asia Publishing House, 1961), p. 114. 
The total target of resources expected... has to 
be apportioned among the different enterprises, 
interindustry potentialities of profit have to 
be adjudged, shifts of interindustry transfers 
of profits are to be assessed, the choice between 
the tax method and the profit method needs a 
thorough examination, the claims of workers for 
a share in profits warrant a judicious and courag-
eous probe, and undue regional pressures are to 
be resisted. 82 
Moreover, profit as an overall economic policy may be poorly compatible 
with administrative inflexibilities at the management level of the 
nationalised industries. 	Since some of the directors of the orpor- 
ation boards were officials seconded from the regular government 
services it became difficult to take suitable action against them if 
their personal responsibility for the poor financial performance was 
established. 	At best, a heavily criticised officer could be reverted 
to his former departmental position. 
Formulation of an aggregate picture of profits in the national-
ised industries in Bangladesh has remained difficult. In contrast to 
the financial institutions in the nationalised sector data from the 
industrial enterprises seem to be incomplete and tentative. 	The table 
below attempts to present a consolidated profit position of the nation- 
alised industries. 	In spite of losses in aggregate it depicts a 
remarkable recovery in respect of profitability of the nationalised 
industries excluding the jute sector in the terminal year of the FFYP. 
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TABLE 14 
Consolidated Profits/Losses of the Nationalised 
Industries in Bangladesh 1972-78 83 
(in million Taka) 
Financial Year .  Total Amount Total Excluding the 
losses of the BJMC 
1972-73 - 232 93 
1973-74 + 	78 400 
1974-75 - 243 - 	2 
1975-76 - 312 - 	27 
1976-77 - 309 216 
1977-78 - 123 513 
Total -1141 1193 
The above tabular presentation on the profitability of the nationalised 
industries however present a dismal picture. The following general 
conclusions can be drawn: 
(a) Nationalised industries have incurred heavy losses since their 
inception. The corporations have been a net drain on the budget in 
the sense that the cost of capital has not been covered. 	But for the 
taxes and duties collected as a result of the operation of the national-
ised industries and foreign exchange earned through exports of the 
products of the industries the net financial results could have been 
negative. 
(b) Profit performance varied considerably among the different corpor- 
ations. 	Significant fluctuation in profits of the individual corpor- 
ations is also discernible. 	Jute corporation suffered continuous losses 
since its inception and mainly contributed towards the poor performance 
of the nationalised industries in financial terms. 	If the jute sector 
is excluded the nationalised industries would show an aggregate net 
83 For sources and basis of calculation see Appendix Part B Table No. 
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profit of Taka 1193 million up to the end of the terminal year of the 
FFYP. 	If jute figures are incorporated the total loss in financial 
terms for the nationalised industries sector stands at Taka 1141 million 
during the corresponding period. 	It must, therefore, be admitted that 
not much reliance can yet be placed on nationalised industries for 
obtaining resources for investment. 
(c) Profitability performance of the nationalised industries needs 
to be qualified suitably by the quantum of indirect returns expected 
of it. 	Financial profitability is not an adequate indicator for 
measurement of the efficiency of a public enterprise. There are other 
benefits of nationalisation84 and many of the indirect returns though 
not easily quantifiable consist of a complicated series of chain effects. 85 
(d) The profit being a function of price86 with a strict political 
control on price the limit for profitability is set by the government. 
Thus financial losses by the chemical and textile sector were largely 
due to reluctance of government to grant price increases for fertilisers, 
newsprint and textile products for factors external to the operation of 
these enterprises. On the other hand steel and engineering industry 
has been able to generate a sizeable profit in spite of their low 
production efficiencies. 	This was possible due to the monopoly status 
of BSEC in respect of many of its products and also price increases 
granted by the government in 1976 and 1978. 	The jute sector sustained 
a continuous loss (besides production inefficiency) because export 
prices of jute goods had to be maintained at relatively low levels in 
84 See for a discussion of various other benefits of nationalisation, 
Awad, op. cit. 
85 Ramanadham, Finances, op. cit., pp. 40-45, p. 53. 
86 Ibid., p. 55. 
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view of stiff competition from synthetic substitutes and other jute 
goods manufacture. On the other hand cost of production remained high 
due to poor maintenance of machinery and inefficient management 87 . 
Contribution of the Nationalised Industries to Government Exchequer  
According to FFYP projections, 68 per cent of the domestic 
resources for the planned development during the Plan period was to 
be generated by the existing and new taxes. 	The nationalised indus- 
tries are the major producers of the manufactured goods and in quite 
a few cases the only producer of certain products in the country. 
Their imports and exports constitute a major segment of the foreign 
trade. Since much of the governmental revenue comes from custom duty, 
sales tax, excise duty and also from business income tax, the national-
ised industries offered a major potential contributor of tax revenues 
to the treasury. 	This in turn could help national savings and 
resource generation for further investment. 
Aggregate tax revenue for the Government of Bangladesh during 
1973-74 to 1977-78 was Taka 43,304 million of which receipt from custom 
duty, excise duty, sales tax, income tax and corporate tax was Taka 
31,664 million88 . 	Against this, the nationalised industries contri- 
buted to the government exchequer in the form of duties and taxes an 
amount to the order of Taka 87001 million during the five years of the 
FFYP. The table below gives a lireak-up of amount paid by the 
' nationalised industries over the years. 
87 Infra. pp. 282-4. 
88 Review 1978, op. cit. p. 206. The actual amount of tax revenue 
was later found to be more as the Table 15 shows. 
TABLE 15 
Contribution of the Nationalised Industries to the Government 
Exchequer (Tax and Non-Tax Revenues) During the FFYP Period 89  
(in million Taka) 
Year Total Government receipts Contribution by the Nationalised ' 	Industries 
revenue Tax revenue: Non-tax revenue Tax revenue: Non-tax 
1973-74 2959 959 1255 29 
1974-75 4836 1691 1363 99 
1975-76 7950 2238 1612 68 
1976-77 7426 2294 1894 34 
1977-78 10291 2814 2560 261 
Total 33462 9996 8684 491 
The aggregate contributions of the nationalised industries to the govern-
ment exchequer thus constituted approximately twenty one per cent of the 
total tax revenue receipts of the government during the First Plan period. 
Sales, Exports and Foreign Exchange  
Value of the aggregate sales of products of the nationalised 
industries increased by about 95 per cent during the First Plan period. 
The following table depicts the overall picture as made up by the 
activities of the nationalised industries during the FYYP period. 
89 For national aggregate of tax revenue, Government of Bangladesh, 
Ministry of Finance, The Economic Situation A Monthly Summary, 
February 1980. (Dacca: Bangladesh Government Press, 1980), p. 2; 
For aggregate non-tax revenues for the government and the national-
ised industries,Rev2ew 1978, op. cit., p. 206. 	Figures regarding 
tax revenue contribution of the nationalised industries: respective 
corporations/their annual reports. Yearly average revenue has 
been assumed for the data which could not be obtained. For details 
see Appendites. 
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TABLE 16 
Value of Sales of Products of the Nationalised 
90 Industries during the FFYP period 
(in million Taka) 
Financial Year Amount Index 
1973-74 5388 100 
1974-75 6916 128 
1975-76 9532 177 
1976-77 10494 194 
1977-78 12404 + 230 
However, the increase in sales value was mainly due to rising prices 
as production increased little91  in most corporations in comparison 
to the rise in prices. 	It was as the principal foreign exchange 
earner that the nationalised industries dominated the Bangladesh 
economy and somewhat redeemed the position of dependence for funds from 
the government. Jute industry alone contributed more than 50 per 
cent of the total exports of Bangladesh and the share of BJMC products 
was more than 86 per cent of the total exports of the nationalised 
industries. 	After jute goods, the major exports from the nationalised 
industries were paper, newsprint, tanned and semi-tanned leather, naptha, 
furnace oil, processed fish, shrimps etc. 	In addition, insignificant 
quanity of rayon, cellophane, paper board, sugar, molasses, meal powder 
90 Figures have been compiled on the basis of data available in the 
Head Offices of the respective corporations. 	Published sources 
are: Annual Reports of BJMC, BTMC, BSFIC, BFIDC and Review 1978, 
op. cit. 	IBRD , Prospects Vol. 1 & 2, op. cit. Also Ministry 
of Industries, Nationalised Industries Wing have provided some data. 
91 Infra. p.264.In case of jute goods manufactured by BJMC production 
increased from 500,000 tons in 1973-74 to only 547,000 tons in 1977- 
78 whereas the sales value increased during the corresponding period 
from Taka 1657 million to Taka 4033 million. 
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wheat bran, canned food, safety matches, electric bulbs, bicycles, 
electria fans, fluorescent tubes, galvanised steel pipes etc. were 
also exported. 	Exports of the products manufactured by the national- 
ised industries were responsible for earning more than 56 per cent of 
the country's total exports during the period between June 1973 and 
June 1978 as the table below shows: 
TABLE 17 
Share of the Nationalised Industries in the Total Country Exports 
in Bangladesh during 1972-3 and 1977-8 92 
Year 
(in million US dollars) 
Aggregate Exports Exports by the Nation- 
of Bangladesh alised Industries 
1972-73 340 193 
1973-74 361 210 
1974-75 358 243 
1975-76 373 212 
1976-77 403 225 
1977-78 468 256 
2303 1339 
The jute industry in Bangladesh was export oriented and more than 90 
per cent of the production of the BJMC mills were exported during the 
FFYP period. 	Likewise 24 per cent of the total production of paper 
and newsprint by the BCIC mills were exported. Almost the entire 
production of processed fish, shrimp etc. was exported. 	Export 
sales of the nationalised industries constituted i approximately 
32 per cent of the aggregate sales value of their products 
92 Export Promotion Bureau, Government of Bangladesh. The 
aggregate national earnings through exports during the First Plan 
was Taka 25,147 million. Against this jute products alone contri-
buted Taka 12,727 million. 	See Survey 1979, op. cit. p. 291. Also see Appendix. 
during the FFYP period93 . 
C : PRODUCTION AND ITS HINDRANCES 
One of the basic objectives of planned development progranme in 
Bangladesh was to expand the output of essential consumption items with 
a view to provide the minimum consumption requirements of the people. 
The FFYP specifically mentioned in the basic objectives such items as 
food, clothing, edible oil, kerosene and sugar. 	The Plan also sought 
to reduce dependence on foreign aid through expansion and diversification 
of exports. 	Priority was attached to the production of fertiliser, 
cement and steel. 	The nationalised industries sector was predominantly 
responsible for manufacturing and processing all these items. 	Output 
in major groups of nationalised industries showed considerable improve-
ment over the production level in 1973 and in some cases it exceeded the 
1970 level mainly due to creation of new capacity. 	But the actual 
achievement was far short of the target set in the FFYP. 
TABLE 18 
Shortfall in Achieving the FFYP Production Target 
94 For Some Major Products of Nationalised Industries 
Items Units 
Benchmark Target Production Actual Product 
Production For the Terminal at the Terminal 1969-70 Year 1977-78 Year 1977-78 
Jute Goods Tons 587,000 766,000 547,000 
Sugar Tons 106,000 148,000 175,000 Paper/Newsprint Tons 54,000 100,000 58,000 Fertilizer Tons 101,000 700,000 279,000 Steel Ingots Tons 80,000 450,000 115,000 Cement Tons 53,000 1000,000 339,000 Cotton Yarn Pounds 86 million 197 million 107 million Cloth Yards 72 million 191 million 100 million 
93 Supra. Table 16, Aggregate value of sales of the products of the 
nationalised industries is estimated at Taka 44834 million for the 
five years of the FFYP. 	Against this exports of jute goods, paper 
(Continued over) 
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Although production in 1977-78 could not attain the FFYP target level,. 
it largely recovered the pre-Liberation status and in some cases 
exceeded the previous maximum. The index of production of the major 
commodities of the nationalised industries would show95 : 
TABLE 19 
Production Indices of Commodities in Nationalised Industries 
Product 
1970-1978(1973-1974 
FY70 	FY74 
= 100) 
FY75 FY76 FY77 FY78 
Jute Goods 112 100 88 95 98 109 
Cotton Yarn 109 100 105 95 98 111 
Cloth 75 100 110 97 88 128 
Sugar 105 100 112 ' 99 158 198 
Paper 129 100 104 75 100 116 
Newsprint 138 100 111 77 54 115 
Fertilizer 35 100 34 114 118 96 Steel Ingots 72 100 102 121 138 155 
Cement 98 100 265 294 581 639 Petroeum Products 278 100 233 255 321 295 
Natural Gas 100 66 100 118 128 
In the terminal year of the First Plan-l977-78, the production of 
all commodities except fertilizer exceeded the level of the base year 
and except jute goods for all commodities vis-a-vis the level in 1970. 
The aggregate value in monetary terms of the principal commodities 
produced by the nationalised industries (excluding petroleum products 
and natural gas) was Taka 6663 million in 1977-78 against Taka 5659 
93 (Continued) newsprint and petroleum products come to Taka 13455 
million during the corresponding period besides other items of 
exports from the nationalised industries. See Survey 1980, op. cit. 
p. 284. 
94 FFYP, op. cit., pp.220-221; Review 1978, op. cit., p. 202; Survey 
1979, op. cit., pp. 252-253. 
95 Ibid., Prospects, Vol. II, op. cit., also Statistical 1978, op. cit. 
p. 198. 
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million in 1969-70 at 1973-74 constant price. 	The table below gives 
the year-wise aggregate value of the produce of the nationalised 
industries except petroleum and gas sectors: 
TABLE 20 
Value of Production of the Nationalised Industries 
at 1973-74 Constant Prices 96  
Financial Year Total Value Index 
in million Taka 
1970 5659 100 
1973 4445 78 
1974 5519 97 
1975 5463 96 
1976 5536 98 
1977 6074 107 
1978 6663 117 
The production of the nationalised industries was slow to pick up and 
it was as late as in 1977 that production value of the manufactures 
surpassed the 1970 value. 	The production of the nationalised indus- 
tries suffered immediately after Liberation. 	Reasons varied and 
differed not only across subsectors but also from plant to plant. 
Some of the problems were inherited and the rest were dislocations 
following the Liberation War. A number of common factors have been 
identified elsewhere. 	Bringing all these factors together the major 
difficulties can be summarised as: 
(a) 	Shortage of manpower owing to departure of non-local managerial, 
technical and skilled personnel could not be sufficiently bridged due 
to further depletion of the workforce who left for overseas employment 
particularly to the Middle East 97 . 
96 Review 1978, op. cit. p. 113. 
97 IBRD , 	Prospects, Vol. II, op. cit., p. 108. 
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(b) Disruption in supply of raw materials and spare parts in the 
wake of the Liberation War. 	The condition of equipment in the mills 
was poor which was partly due to neglect in maintenance during and 
prior to the Liberation War by the private sector owners. 	Some 
equipment was badly damaged during the War and rendered practically 
useless. 	In some cases equipment showed wide divergence and was 
obsolete and could not be replaced as it was no longer being manufac-
tured. 
(c) Inadequate supply and availability of indigenous raw materials 98 
such as jute, sugar cane, bamboos or oil seeds resulted in unterutil-
isation of capacity. 	Likewise potential for expansion of certain 
industries such as fruits and vegetables processing and canning plants 
was limited owing to insufficient supply of fruits and vegetables or 
marine and inland fish. 
(d) Chronic shortage of foreign currency impeded import of raw 
materials and spares for the industries. There was sharp increase in 
the cost of imported inputs. 	The industries further suffered due to 
increase in debt service liability as a result of the devaluation of 
the local currency. 	The export industries suffered initially due to 
overvalued exchange rate and later due to fall in international price 
of their products. Pre-liberation incentive in providing foreign 
exchange to the export-oriented industries in the form of the Export 
Bonus Scheme 99 was withdrawn and the facilities of foreign exchange 
98 Production of oil-seeds in 1972-73 was 207,000 tons; in 1976-77 it 
was no more than 213,000 tons. Statistical 1978, op. cit., p. 384. 
Between 1968 and 1976 total catch of fish in Bangladesh increased 
only by 17,000 tons whereas population increased by over 14 million. 
Ibid., p. 174; For jute production see BJMC, Problems of the Jute 
Sector as seen by BJMC (Dacca, BJMC Public Relations Department, 
1978) pp. 4-5. 
99 Report on Sick Jute Jills, unpublished internal document prepared 
by BJMC, 1978. 
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100 allocation through the medium of the Export Performance Licence 
were not extended to such important nationalised industries as jute, 
sugar, paper or newsprint. On the contrary the nationalised indus-
tries depending on imported raw materials suffered as they were not 
allowed to pass on the higher world market prices of the imported raw 
materials to the consumers owing to price restriction imposed by the 
government101 . 
(e) Transport system suffered serious damages during the Liberation 
War102 . 	The inadequate port facilities and blockades of the port 
during the war added to the problems and slavage operations were 
delayed. Problems due to shortage of ocean going vessel hampered 
import of raw materials and export of finished products. 
(f) There were frequent interruptions in power supply. 	Production 
loss due to power failure during 1972-73 was more than 10 per cent of 
actual in case of jute goods 103 
(g) Prevailing industri01 disharmony was not congenial to smooth 
production. There were 643,246 man-days lost during the period between 
December 1971 to December 1974104 . 	In fact, post-nationalisation 
period was stated to be characterised with a higher magnitude of indus-
trial conflict than ever before 105 . 
100 Through Export Performance Licence a registered exporter is enabled 
to additionally import certain specified items on the basis of a 
percentage determined on the value of his export. See Government 
of Bangladesh, Ministry of Commerce, "The Import Policy (January-
June, 1978) Order", The Bangladesh Gazette Extraordinary, December 
31, 1977). 
101 Salahuddin Ahmed, Chairman BJMC, Interview, September, 1978. 
102 BSFIC, Report 1972-3, op. cit. 
103 BJMC, Chairman's Report For 1973-74 (Internal document). 
104 Government of Bangladesh, Directorate of Labour, Bangladesh Labour 
Journal, Vol. 2, 1974, p. 51. 
105 Nuimuddin, Industrial Conflict, op. cit. 
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(h) 	Critical liquidity gap remained unbridged. 	In addition to 
the inherited factors, poor liquidity was due to unsold stocks, poor 
realisation of accounts receivable and inadequate contribution of 
working capital or introduction of fresh equity. 	Governmental control 
on price and distribution for certain products aggravated the liquidity 
position further. 
D : COMMERCIAL AND MARKETING OPERATION 
The commercial and marketing functions of the nationalised 
industries broadly comprised of the following: 
- procurement of inputs; 
- fixing the prices of the products; 
- marketing the finished goods. 
Procurement  
The nationalised enterprises in course of their normal manufac-
turing operation had to procure plant, machinery, spare parts, indust-
rial raw materials, stores and equipment. 	The procurement system was 
criticised on the grounds of it being not competitive and economical. 
It was much too centralised and caused inordinate delays. 	In the 
beginning the Department of Supply and Inspection of the government 
acted as the central purchasing organisation on behalf of several 
public sector organisations. 	Later, most of the sector corporations 
were autnorised to make direct purchases. 	Financing of procurement 
through diverse sources, such as local currency, cash foreign exchange, 
tied or untied foreign loans or credits and barter created complications. 
The Cabinet Guidelines provided that all procurements and supplies were 
to be made in accordance with the purchase manuals and "normal commercial 
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practices". The government determined the procurement price of raw 
materials like jute or any other commodity needed in particular by the 
export oriented industries and made forecast on the demand. 	The 
internal procurement of indigenous raw materials like jute and sugar-
cane was subject to influences of national policies on agriculture, 
food, jute or sugar. 	As about 62 per cent of the cost of production 
originated from raw materials for industrial production the effect of 
these macro-level decisions on the procurement prices was pivotal 106 
For procurement from overseas, foreign exchange both in cash 
and under aid, loan, credit or barter was made available by the govern-
ment annually as well as on six-monthly basis. Normally for imports which 
were financed by the Import Policy,foreign exchange allocations were 
made on bi-annual bases to correspond with the period covered by the 
Import Policy. This system of implementing the import programme was 
conceived as an important instrument of industrial development and the 
import policies were geared to that end. 	The import policies were, 
therefore, formulated after much deliberation and inter-ministerial 
consultation. 	In their bias towards industrial sector the import 
policies were categorised as "production oriented". 	The import poli- 
cies contained special provisions for meeting the requirements of 
industrial raw materials, chemicals, machinery and spare parts for 
the nationalised industries giving them priority over import of consumer 
goods. 	In addition, to encourage export oriented industries extra 
licences were issued to export industries over their normal share for 
import of their production requirement on the basis of their export 
performance. 	Thus,according to original estimate in the FFYP the 
106 Head Offices of the Corporations and also Review 1978, op. cit. 
p. 199. 
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share of the public sector accounted for more than 85 per cent of the 
aggregate import liability for current inputs 107 . Cotton textiles, 
chemicals and petro-chemicals together accounted for about 50 per cent 
of the total public sector import liability. 
The manouverability to influence cost of materials, men and 
finances on the part of the nationalised industries was limited to 
some rationalisation in procurement procedures,prevention of wastage 
of materials and better financial portfolio distribution. 	The table 
below gives the composite picture of the cost of sales of the products 
of the enterprises run by BJMC, BTMC and BSFIC. 
TABLE 21 
Composition of Cost of Sales of the Products of the 
Enterprises Under BJMC, BTMC and BSFIC During the FFYP 108  
(in percentage) 
Item FY74 FY75 FY76 FY77 FY78 Total 
Materials 56 58 60 62 65 61 
Wages and Salaries 22 21 18 17 16 18 
Administrative and 
Selling Overheads 17 17 18 18 15 17 
Financial Charges 
and Depreciation 5 4 4 3 4 4 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Material inputs components accounted for, on average, 61 per cent of 
the total cost. 	Inclusion of figures relating to other corporations 
indicated virtually the same result suggesting 	the 'preponderance of 
the material component in the cost structure of the products of the 
nationalised industries. 
107 FFYP, op. cit., p. 227. 
108 Figures based on data collected from the respective corporations. 
See Appendices Part II, Table 17. 
Price Fixation and its Implementation  
The nationalised industries operated in various market situations. 
Some of the enterprises were operating under monopoly conditions. The 
nationalised sector had the status of single producer in cases such as 
fertiliser, sugar, jute goods, paper, newsprint, cement. 	In certain 
cases the nationalised enterprises had to compete with private sector 
producers as well as the imported products. Where needed, the govern-
ment sought to control imports and prices to secure the monopoly posi-
tion for the nationalised producers. Nationalised enterprises produced 
a variety of products - some were produced from local raw materials but 
mostly exported, some were manufactured from imported materials but con-
sumed domestically and some were produced from local materials and were 
consumed locally. 
Like many developing nations, no overall policy guideline on 
pricing in nationalised industries in Bangladesh seemed available109  . 
A pricing policy seems to have multiple objectives. In the ultimate 
analysis the issue of pricing policy involves some sort of 
value judgements about the objectives which the nationalised industries 
were expected to achieve in the economy. The Nationalisation Order 
did not give any guidance either to the objectives or on pricing of the 
products. As noted earlier110 the planning document made SOME refer- 
ence regarding the quantum of profits to be aimed at by the nationalised 
industries. 	It proposed that the corporations would be free to fix 
their prices up to a limit of 10 per cent over their cost of production. 
109 Basu, Enterprise Policy, op. cit. See the country papers on Sri 
Lanka, Thailand, Iran, Indonesia and India. 
110 Supra., p. 231. 
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From a logical point of view it meant that: (i) the enterprises should 
not run into losses; (ii) the enterprises should try to maximise their 
productive activity; and (iii) the enterprises should maximise their 
surpluses. 
A considerable degree of diffusion existed in respect of respon-
sibility for the pricing policy among the government, corporations and 
enterprises. 	This presented practical complications. 	In the private 
sector,on the other hand, the managers might decide on pricing subject 
to the broad policies laid down by the shareholders and any government 
control. 	The Planning Commission itself regarded price policy as a 
misnomer. 	There was, it stated, no rationale behind the pricing of 
industrial products in nationalised industries 111 In certain cases, 
the Cabinet fixed prices e.g. fertiliser, newsprint, sugar. 	In some 
cases, the Ministry of Commerce regulated the prices of some specified 
commodities under the Essential Commodities Prices and Distirbution 
Order, 1970. 	But the criteria for defining essential items appeared 
to be somewhat misleading, since the prices of items like motor cycles, 
fans, television sets came under the purview of this Order. 	Initially 
during the pre-Liberation period this Ordinance was designed to regulate 
market prices to check profiteering in the private sector. 	After 
Liberation, it was applied to manufacturers in the public sector as 
well. 	This resulted in fixing prices at the producers' level but due 
to lack of control over the distribution system the set market prices 
were never properly controlled. 	This resulted in dealers, permit 
holders and the middlemen in the chain making windfall profits while 
corporations and enterprises were compelled to operate at regulated 
111 Plan 1974-75, op. cit. p. 109. 
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factory prices and face liquidity crises and losses. Extreme short-
ages of consumer items 112 facilitated middlemen reaping the scarcity 
premium to the full. The government's attempts to introduce adminis-
tered prices have had similar results. 	In the absence of a suitable 
distribution system, administered prices could not benefit those who 
were intended to be beneficiaries. 	In an inflationary and scarcity 
situation price control which fixed prices at below the market price 
was ineffective. The consumer remained the victim of hie' prices and 
the benefits accrued to the distributors and dealers. There were 
further anomalies as a result of the co-existence of public and private 
manufactures in the same sector and imports and domestic production of 
the same product. 	Some of the "essential" items were not subject to 
price and distribution control when imported under the Wage Earners' 
Scheme. 	Regulation of prices only in public sector products was not 
only discriminatory but also meaningless if the private sector had a 
free hand in pricing and distribution. 	Some public sector units had 
to make their pricing in such a way as to be able to pay one bonus a 
year when a private sector unit paid three bonuses a year by raising 
their prices more than proportionately 113 . 
The nationalised industries were severely restricted in their 
ability to fix the prices of their own products. 	The major constraints 
112 The Price Stabilisation Committee found that the decline in the 
total output of the country was a principal factor behind the rise 
in prices. Extent of decline in production in 1972 over 1969-70 
was: cotton }raft' 40 per cent, cloth 38 per cent, sugar 74 per cent, 
cement 58 per cent, paper and newsprint 53 per cent, jute goods 29 
per cent, fertilisers 15 per cent, rice 18 per cent, edible oil-
seeds 23 per cent, tea 22 per cent and petroeum products 15 per 
cent. Table 3.1 Price Stabilisation, op. cit. p. 34. 
113 Muzaffer Ahmed, "Prospects and Problems of Nationalised Industries: 
A Critical Review of Views", The Journal of Management, Business 
and Economics, Vol. 1 (January, 1975), pp. 28-53. 
were: 
(i) In many cases the input prices were predetermined as a part 
of the general policy of the government. Thus Annual Jute 
Policy determined the minimum price of raw jute, Sugar Policy 
that of sugarcane, Energy Policy that of petroleum and oil and 
electric power. In addition, international prices prevailed 
for imported items. 
(ii) Salary and wages bills were largely determined by the labour 
and wages policies of the government and the salary structure 
given by the government. 
(iii) Duties and taxes, depreciation and interest were also predeter-
mined. 
(iv) A fixed charge of 71/2 per cent on fixed investment was to be 
levied. 114 
Apart from these constraints, the government, in fact, exercised other 
significant explicit and implicit control over the pricing policies of 
the nationalised industries. 	For a large number of products of the 
nationalised industries pricing was •done either explicitly by the 
government or in consultation with the government. As a matter of 
fact, there was not much difference between fixation of prices by the 
government and that in consultation with the government. 	The respon- 
sibility on matters of price policy was apportioned among different 
ministries. 	The Ministry of Commerce had the responsibility on matters 
relating to "Price Control", the Ministry of Industries for "pricing 
policy of the products of nationalised industries" and the Ministry of 
Jute for "fixation and control of price of jute goods". 	In practice 
interministerial consultations were held before a firm decision on 
pricing of products of , basic importance was taken. 	Thus prices on 
textile goods, sugar, cement, paper, newsprint and fertiliser were 
decided at the cabinet level. A Price Advisory Board 115 was constituted 
114 Interview with the officials of the Sector Corporations. 
115 Prices and Tariff Commission was not, however, set up. 	Instead, 
the existing Tariff Commission continued to function. A separate 
Prices Advisory Board consisting of officials only, was set up in 
June, 1975. See The Bangladesh Gazette Extraordinary, 12 June 1975. 
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in the Ministry of Commerce in 1975 to fix the prices of essential 
commodities on national basis and to coordinate the prices of commod-
ities locally produced and those imported. 	It was the responsibility 
of the Board to examine on a regular basis the cost of production and 
price of the manufactures of the nationalised industries and also to 
recommend the price of the commodities produced by nationalised monopoly 
or private sector industries. 
There was much discussion at different levels in the government 
and at different times since Liberation on the various issues involved 
in price fixation and its enforcement, a mechanism for fixation of 
prices of the products of nationalised industries, and desirability of 
fixing "national" prices for as many commodities as possible and if 
possible evolving a "national price policy" for Bangladesh. 	But as 
has been observed, the use of pricing as a policy arm of the govern-
ment presupposes centralised planning with a centralised planning 
authority as the arbiter on price variables116 Bangladesh was not 
obviously a centrally planned economy. 	The prices of all inputs and 
outputs were not administered and controlled by the State at all stages. 
Production and distribution were not all subject to State planning. 
The economy was far from being insulated from the international market 
forces. 	The FFYP did not envisage the Bangladesh economy as a centrally 
planned one. In fact the government's basic approach seemed to be to 
gradually move the economy towards market mechanism and to act both at 
macro and micro levels for price stabilization 117 . According to this 
approach the government was to interfere in a limited way and observe 
116 Muzaffer Ahmed, Problems, op. cit. 
117 As noted in Price Stabilisation, op. cit. Chapter IV and V. 
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the price trends of some essential commodities and take appropriate 
fiscal and monetary measures when the prices behaved irrationally. 
The government, therefore, interfered to protect the interests of 
certain economic groups or to attain greater economic development in 
a desired direction. One example is the jute industries which were 
sustained through government subsidy despite an average annual loss of 
Taka 390 million since hationalisationin . 	The gap between cost of 
production and export price could not be bridged through higher external 
value even though stiff rise in the cost of raw jute was primarily 
responsible for higher cost of production. 	In contrast textile indus- 
try suffered financially mainly due to nonadjustment of selling price 
to increased cost of production which had gone up as a result of sharp 
increase in the price of raw cotton in international market. 	The 
government would not, however, allow raising the export price of jute 
goods and domestic price for textile goods. 	In general, many of the 
issues concerning pricing of the products of the nationalised industries 
could not be satisfactorily resolved at the end of 1978. 
Distribution and Marketing  
The market in Bangladesh consisted of goods produced by the 
nationalised industries, goods produced by the private sector and commod- 
ities imported by commercial importers and public sector trading corpor- 
ation. 	The Ministry of Commerce was responsible for price and distri- 
bution control of the commodities declared as "essential". 	Such goods 
as C.I. Sheet, cement, mechanically propelled vehicles, bicycles, tyres 
and tubes, mild food for infants, dry cell betteries, cocoanut oil, 
118 Supra., Table XIV. 
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electric fans and spices were declared essential for this purpose. 
Iron and steel items were included in the "essential" list. There 
was price control at different times in respect of C.I. sheet, tin 
plate, G.I. wire, G.I. pipes, radio, television, cigarettes, washing 
soap, coaltar, electric lamps and asbestos sheet. Many of these 
items were produced in the nationalised sector. 	But when some of 
these "essential"items were imported under the Wage Earners Scheme, 
price and distribution control did not apply. On the other hand 
control was exercised over the same goods when imported by the Trading 
Corporation of Bangladesh (TCB). 	The Ministry of Food was 
responsible for price control and distribution of rationed food items 
like sugar and also kerosene oil. 	The Ministry of Health was respon- 
sible for price and distribution control of drugs and medicines. 	The 
Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Resources was to control price and 
distribution of petroleum products. 
' The pattern of distribution of consumer goods was as follows: 
(i) State Trading: Rationing system was administered by the Ministry 
of Food and Consumers Supplies Corporation (hereafter CSC) 
distributed imported and local produced cloth and a number of 
other consumer items imported by TCB. 
(ii) Co-operative Societies: responsible for distribution of yarn 
cloth and consumer goods. 
(iii) Distributors/dealers appointed or approved by government for 
imported goods some of which were sold against permits. 
(iv) Sector Corporations: appointed distributors/dealers for their 
products. 
(v) Private traders for items imported by commercial importers and 
products of industrial units in the private sector. 
The system outlined above was both complex and unsatisfactory. 	The 
limitation of the rationing system was that it could cover only a minor 
section of the market. Of the products of the nationalised industries 
sugar, edible oil and kerosene oil was distributed by this system to a 
278 
limited extent. Kerosene was distributed partly by the dealers of 
the BPC enterprises and partly through rationing system. 
The goods imported by the public sector (TCB) were initially 
distributed mainly through the Consumer Supplies Corporation (CSC), 
the co-operative marketing society and dealers appointed in the various 
regional areas. 	The CSC until it was virtually dismantled because of 
allegations of corruption and malpractices used to sell the goods 
through its various fair price shops spread throughout the country. 
In the case of dealers,distribution was generally made against permits 
issued by the regional offices and there were also committees headed 
by local members of the Parliament to supervise the distribution during 
the Awami League regime. 
The large chain of fair price shops of CSC in the rural levels 
were closed down because of unsatisfactory performance and later the 
activities of the CSC itself had to be extensively curtailed. 	The 
system of distribution through appointed dealers was also not free 
from abuse. 	The commodities were distributed throughout the Country 
on an agreed principle of regional allocation. 	But often the 
appointment of dealers was made out of political consideration and in 
many cases genuine businessmen were not inducted. 	To patronise a 
large number of party men it was necessary to appoint dealers in numbers 
that were far from economical in size and of a reasonable margin. 	This 
gave incentive to malpractices. 	The original intention that CSC would 
perform as a price moderator and important channel of distribution for 
commodities of consumer interest which were manufactured in the national-
ised sector was belied. 	The government policy limited responsibility 
of the nationalised industries to the aspects of production. 	The 
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responsibility for distribution and marketing of the products of the 
nationalised enterprises however varied from corporation to corporation. 
Thus owing to the relatively small size of the domestic market, public 
sector activities in jute products was mainly confined to exports. 
Initially only BJMC had the monopoly to export jute products and only 
it could enter into export contracts for jute products. 	The export 
trade of jute products was opened up for the private sector during the 
later part of the FFYP, the end of 1978. 	Export activities were thus 
confined mainly to the public sector. 	On the other hand, the sales 	of 
BTMC products were limited to the domestic market and BTMC unlike BJMC 
had no responsibility for the distribution of its products. 	The 
distribution of yarn and cloth was undertaken by other public sector 
agencies under strictly controlled allocation system. The marketing 
directorate of BTMC had concentrated only on purchase of raw materials. 
In the case of sugar, the government framed policies regarding sales, 
price and distribution for the nationalised enterprises. 	The BSFIC 
followed the marketing policy announced in the government's annual 
sugar policy which made allocations to the Food Ministry for selling 
through ration system, to the farmers of sugarcane, for exports and 
lastly a minor proportion for sale in the open market. 	Similarly BCIC 
had no hand in marketing, sales and distribution of its major product — 
fertilizer. 	The entire production of fertilizer was distributed by 
Bangladesh Agricultural Development Corporation at a price decided by 
the government. 	The government decided the national price of cement 
which was backed by full distribution control. This national price 
was, however, later withdrawn and the dealers were given freedom in 
respect of distribution and fixation of retail selling price once the 
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government fixed the ex-factory/ex-godown price of imported and locally 
produced cement. 	BPC controlled the sale and distribution of petroleum 
, products through its subsidiary marketing companies and dealers appointed 
by them. 	In many cases again enterprises themselves had been distri- 
buting their products themselves and partly through distributors. 	The 
lack of uniformity in the system led towards studies which suggested 
that the marketing function of the nationalised industries should be 
centralised within the marketing directorate of the respective corpor- 
ations and strengthened. 	Accordingly the marketing directorate of 
each corporation was organised as a national pool of the product of 
the various enterprises under it and allocated the same according to 
regional demand. It also earmarked the products for the purpose of 
exports where possible. 
Problems Relating to Domestic Sales and Distribution of Yarn  
The problem of domestic sales and distribution of the products 
of the nationalised industries was perhaps best exemplified in the 
yarn industry. 	The textile industry was totally oriented towards 
meeting the internal demand but was almost completely dependent of 
imports of raw cotton and yarn. 	The bulk of the nationalised textile 
industry was devoted to spinning of the yarn. 	The handloom weavers 
were the major consumers of this yarn who provided some 70 per cent of 
the cloth consumed in the country. 	Until 1975, the sale of yarn and 
cloth produced by the nationalised mills was fully controlled by the 
government. While the responsibility of BTMC was limited to the 
aspects of production, distribution of yarn and cloth was the respon-
sibility of other public sector agencies including the organisation of 
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cooperative societies in which many small handloom weavers were 
members. This system was designed to replace the pre-Liberation 
private yarn traders. 	This pattern seemed to have been devised out 
of the conviction that private middle men were obtaining very high 
profits in channeling first the yarn to the small and poorly organised 
handloom weavers and then the cloth from the weavers to the ultimate 
consumers. However, the important economic functions performed by 
the middlemen were overlooked and the replacement devised was unequal 
to the task. 	The public sector agencies failed to lift their full 
supplies of stock resulting in building up of a huge inventory and at 
the same time an artificial scarcity of yarn and cloth was created 
which shot up prices. 	There was control on selling prices charged by 
the mills but not on the prices charged in the open market. 	The 
unlifted stock caused liquidity problems for the mills. 	In the fact 
of the difficulties encountered, the sales and distribution system 
was decentralised in the later part of 1975. 	The enterprises were 
authorised to sell yarn and cloth to the dealers appointed by the 
Ministry of Commerce and local authorities under broad guidelines given 
by the corporation. 	The enterprises were permitted to sell directly 
to handloom weavers as well as to the public sector agencies servicing 
the latter. As a result, accumulation of stock declined. 	Even then 
there were too many licence holders and genuine business men were not 
allegedly getting supply of yarn according to the needs. 	On the other 
hand, the fake businessmen reaped the scarcity premium and sold their 
supply of yarn to genuine yarn dealers. An official committee there-
fore recommended for reintroduction, with some modifications, of the 
pre-Liberation distribution system to eliminate fake businessmen and 
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to ensure supply of yarn at reasonable prices to handloom weavers. 
Constraints in Marketing Abroad and Exports  
The bulk of the financial deterioration of the jute industries 
the prime foreign exchange earner for Bangladesh could be attributed 
to the fact that its export prices were obtained internationally at 
below cost of production. 	Historically, maximising the export of 
jute manufacture was pursued as a strategy aimed at enhancing the 
foreign exchange base. 	The measures introduced to stimulate develop- 
ment included a range of credit, tax and licencing policies which 
provided guidance, financial support and protection to jute mills. 
Most important was the Export Bonus Scheme which in effect heavily 
subsidised the jute industry through augmenting domestic currency 
received from exports of jute goods. 	The competitive position of jute 
products was seriously threatened in recent decades due to the inroads 
of synthetic substitutes. 	The position further deteriorated due to 
the conditions prevailing in the economy from 1970 to 1972. 	The buyers 
were uncertain of the supply and had, therefore, developed substitutes 
during the interim. 
After Liberation, the Bangladesh jute industry experienced loss 
of protection with the withdrawal of the Export Bonus Scheme. There 
were sharp increases in the cost of inputs, at rates surpassing increase 
in export prices of jute goods. 	On the other hand, there was excess 
capacity and lower labour productivity. 	The cost of production kept 
. 	120 on rising steadily 	and the overall efficiency declined 	. 	The 
119 Taka cost of production of jute manufacturing increased sharply 
after Liberation. 	The table below illustrates: 
(Continued over) 
, 
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extent of financial losses widened further as the industry 
was not covering its costs even before depreciation and interest. 
If the industry was to cover its production costs at current export 
prices excluding subsidy and to generate profit to put aside for 
replacing machinery and equipment, reductions in operating costs were 
required. 	As the raw jute constituted about 60 per cent of the total 
cost of jute goods the competitiveness largely depended on the low 
production cost of jute fibre in the absence of an expanding market 
and recovery of market from the synthetic products. But reduction 
in the price of raw jute was dependent on variables on which the 
industry had scant control. 	Be-cause of food -shortage and high 
prices of rice,Bangladesh was faced with a dilemma of how to revive, 
maintain and increase jute production. There has been no breakthrough 
in jute research during the past sixty years on the yield -per acre. ' 
Moreover, there were different agencies responsible for processing 
improved variety of jute seeds, utilisation and related extension 
services and the responsibility to manufacture jute goods without having 
a control over the instability in the prices of raw jute. 	The BJMC was 
hardly ever in a position to economise in its purchase of raw jute which 
alone at a time required financial resources to the order of Taka 1600 
to Taka 1800 million121 . No banking system in Bangladesh would be able 
	
119 (Cont.) 	Index of Taka Cost of Production 
of Jute Manufacturing in Bangladesh 
Item 1969-70 	1973-74 	1975-76 
Hessian 	100 220 305 
Sacking 100 	226 	288 
Carpet backing 	100 223 306 
BJMC, Report on The Five Sick Jute Mills, op. cit. 
120 IBRD, 	Bangladesh Survey of the Jute and Cotton Textile 
Industries (Washington, 1975). 
121 Interview with Mr. Salahuddin Ahmed, Chairman, BJMC, September, 1978. 
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to release such huge funds at a time without unleashing an inflationary 
pressure in its wake. 
In addition, foreign credits were not forthcoming as the credit-
ors became apprehensive of the market shrinkage against the inroads of 
substitutes. 	There were ianomalies in the government policy in respect 
of allocation of foreign exchange. 	The facilities of allocating foreign 
exchange for the import requirement of export industries in the form of 
Export Performance Licences was not extended to jute industry. 	As a 
result there was delay in allocation and release of foreign exchange 
which disrupted operation and dislocations in meeting the export schedule. 
Along with the withdrawal of Export Bonus Scheme new taxes were imposed 
on the jute indusry. 	It was difficult to defend this new tax burden on 
an industry which was being subsidized by the government to help it 
going 122. Moreover such facilities as payment of cash subsidy or rebate 
of custom duty and import licence and tax paid on imported raw materials 
used for export goods were not made available to jute industry. 123 
For the paper and newsprint industries, the loss of West Pakistan 
market posed a serious blow after Liberation. 	Domestic consumption was 
less than 50 per cent of the installed capacity of papers and less than 
25 per cent of newsprint production. 	The main problem facing the 
export of paper and newsprint however was the discrepancy between the 
domestic cost of production and the international price level. 	Even 
average domestic sales prices was less than the variable production 
cost in all the mills. 	It was only with increased capacity utilisation, 
reduction of cost, improvement in quality of the products and enhanced 
122 Ibid. 
123 Interview with Mr. M.A. Syed, Director Marketing, BJMC, November, 
1978. 
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external sales that the situation could be salvaged. But the increase 
in cost of production remained the major hindrance. The cost of 
production of newsprint per ton increased by 268 per cent and paper 
by 195 per cent since Liberation124 . 	The main elements for such 
abnormal increases were the steep rise in the prices of furnace oil 
and imported chemical pulp which accounted for 31 per cent and 26 per 
cent of total cost in 1975-76 125 . 	The newprint mill did not receive 
any compensation for the losses sustained by it owing to the price 
control imposed by the government. 	As an export oriented industry, 
the mills did not receive a rebate of excise duty on furnace oil or a 
moratorium on payment of outstanding loans of the banks or similar 
other facilities. 	The mills did not receive any benefit in the export 
market from the 1975 devaluation for the cost push originating from 
devaluation. 	Instead government had withdrawn the cash subsidy granted 
before devaluation. No attempt was made by the government to impose 
a ban on the import of certain quality papers which could have helped 
the industry. 	The paper industries did not receive any export rebate 
on excise duty on furnace oil similar to rebate allowed for duties paid 
on other imported raw materials. 	The paper units were not allowed to 
draw power from the national grid which would have been comparatively 
cheaper to use. 	The higher cost of production due to devaluation and 
the world wide recession stunted the possibility of an extension in the 
export market of the Bangladesh paper products and crippled the industries. 
The extreme dependence of the jute goods indicated an unhealthy 
structure of the export sector in Bangladesh. With disinvestment of 
124 Ministry of Finance, Report of the Inspection Team of the Inspection 
Division, Ministry of Finance into the Affairs of Bangladesh Chemical 
Industries Corporation (Dacca July 1977) unpublished internal document. 
125 Ibid. 
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tanneries, export of leather no longer remained within the ambit of 
the nationalised industries at the end of the FFYP period. 	The most 
important manufacture for export purposes after jute, paper and news- 
print was processed and frozen fish shrimps etc.,which during the last 
two years of the First Plan came to constitute a little more than 7 
per cent of the export of jute goods. 	But the plants of the national- 
ised industries were already operating close to capacity and scope for 
expansion of export was limited due to depleting local source of raw 
materials and stiff foreign competition. 	The desire of the government 
to diversify the export base received an expression in an attempt to 
export sugar in 1978 which caused a loss of Taka 65 million for the 
nationalised industries for having to sell at a price which was only 
41 per cent of the domestic open market price. There were some minor 
exports in various other commodities produced in the nationalised 
industries. 	But in general the export potentialities of the divergent 
products remained greatly unexplored. With quality control, market 
research and some dynamism in salesmanship the process of diversifi- 
cation could become a possibility. 	But the marketing services of the 
corporations needed to be strengthened. 	There was a need for collec- 
tion of marketing information and overseas promotion. Detailed studies 
were necessary of the current and short term as well as long term world 
market for the major products like jute, paper, newsprint and sugar. 
There was also a need for quality control and qualitative improvement 
of many of the products of the nationalised industries to make them 
more eligible for the export markets. 
E : DEVELOPMENT AND EXPANSION 
The FFYP was formulated on a weak base and optimistic assumptions. 
The state of the economy was poor and shaken in the manufacturing sector 
and industrial output in the base year of the Plan was 23 per cent below 
the normal output of the pre-liberation period. The damages and dislo-
cations suffered during the Liberation War took a longer time to repair 
and recoup than anticipated. 	The world wide inflation and oil crisis 
and recession shattered the assumptions of the plan. The corporations 
controlling the various nationalised industries, nevertheless submitted 
as part of the national plan, proposals for balancing, modernisation and 
rehabilitation and also expansion of the various enterprises placed under 
them. There were proposals for completion of projects which were under-
way, either for expansion of existing capacity or establishment of new 
facilities. 	In some cases projects had been started prior to the 
Liberation War and even much of the imported equipment had actually 
arrived. 	To replace the damaged and lost equipment additional funds 
were required. 	Funds were received from the government under the 
various Annual Development Programmes but non-availability of foreign 
exchange remained a major bottleneck. 
The long term prospects of the nationalised industries depended 
on the capability to achieve significant improvement through development 
of new uses and new market. 	With the existing poverty and resource 
constraints of Bangladesh there appeared to be scant immediate possi-
bility of substantial stimulation in the effective domestic demand 
despite the lack of evidence of a tangible deceleration in population 
growth. 	It has been said that the development strategy in the poor 
countries has both short run and long run aspects. 	In the short run 
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the strategy must be aimed at reducing the shortages of the critical 
items and inputs, curb inflation and enhance foreign exchange earning 
potential. 	In the next stage, taking cognizance of the lessons of 
experience in the short run a long term perspective needs to be conceived 
with the development strategy oriented towards "specific goals and 
actions" for attack on mass poverty and unemployment 126 . 	This would 
necessitate a "reordering of investment programme and the sectoral 
allocation of resources". 	The planners in Bangladesh seemed to have 
adopted this "consistent framework" and proceed on the assumption of 
an attainable minimum basket of consumption and fixed the production 
targets accordingly. 	But the aspects of demand and income tended to 
frustrate the strategy. 	It was found difficult to create new produc- 
tive capacity in the jute and paper industries although they used 
indigenous raw materials. Any projected extension was constrained by 
international market forces as well as restricted availability of 
domestic supply of the raw materials. 	On the other hand, despite 
subminimum consumption of cloth per capita, the scope for 
extension of capacity inthe textile industry was severely limited not 
only because of foreign exchange constraints to import raw cotton but 
also a lack of potential increase in the domestic demand due to poor 
purchasing power. More or less the similar conditions would apply 
in all other subsectors. 	This emphasized the important role 
of research and development in fostering industrial development. 
Although research and development can be regarded as an "input in the 
aggregate national production function inadequate attention was given 
126 Nurul Islam, "Development Strategy in the Poor Countries", The 
Bangladesh Development Studies, Vol. 3 No. 3 (July 1975), pp. 367-77. 
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to it in the planned development programme in Bangladesh. 	Only two 
per cent of the public industrial outlay of the FYYP was allocated to 
research and study 127 
A cursory glance at some of the specific industries and their 
problems would bring out the fact that role of the research and develop-
ment function was not adequately appreciated. To take the textile 
industry in Bangladesh, there has always been a need to review its 
development strategy. 	Given nearly full dependence of the industry 
on imported raw cotton and textile machinery an evaluation of the 
alternatives of expanding yarn capacity to achieve self sufficiency as 
compared to import of additional amount of yarn could be warranted. 
Within the textile industries, spinning is the most capital intensive 
and the net foreign exchange savings after allowing foreign exchange 
costs of both the raw materials and equipment might well be marginal. 
The net foreign exchange savings could indeed be negative as compared 
to imports of yarn unless a high level of productivity was achieved 128 . 
There was also the need to assess the potential of the handloom industry 129 
as compared to the larger integrated textile mills in the nationalised 
sector specially in respect of potential dislocation of a more than 750,000 
weavers in the handloom sector. 	The overall balance of payments positions 
also called for careful consideration of consumption and hence expansion 
programme. 	To achieve 9 yards of cloth per capita consumption by 1980 
would necessitate an increase in the import requirement of raw materials 
and additional machinery. The raw materials alone would double the present 
level of annual import bill of raw cotton and yarn. 	This leads to the 
127 FFYP, op. cit. p. 214, Table 9-3. 
128 World Bank, Jute and Cotton Textiles, op. cit. Part II, p. 18. 
129 See, Year Book 1979, op. cit. p. 248 for summary results of hand-
loom industries. 
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need of search for alternative raw materials particularly the man 
made fibres from local resources of which a small supply of nylon and 
rayon filaments was already available. A comprehensive study may be 
undertaken of the possibility of using man made fibres which would 
include consideration in the first stage, of importing fibres for 
blending with cotton and in subsequent stages, of domestically producing 
the basic raw materials from natural gas and refinery wastes. 	Such a 
development strategy of the cotton textile industry should try to 
maximise the potential of the labour surplus economy through manufactur-
ing fabrics with blends of cotton and man made fibres. 
The loss of market share by jute products to synthetic has forced 
the jute producing countries to reduce the price of their products 
substantially. 	In Bangladesh, this has meant exporting at a price 
that had been less than the cost of production. 	The raising of overall 
industrial productivity efficiency and reduction of domestic cost can 
retrieve the position to a certain extent. 	But a firm solution need 
to be sought in a breakthrough in jute research first through arresting 
the decline in yield per acre and then attaining an agricultural produc-
tivity in jute that would make it substantially competitive to rival 
agricultural crops and to manufactured synthetics. This might enable 
the jute industries to be free from its dependence on subsidies and 
eliminate the need for such make-shift arrangements as Export Bonus 
Scheme. 	But until this does materialise, concerted efforts are needed 
for market promotion and research. 	Simultaneously multipronged drive 
needed to be mounted for agricultural research on jute, improvement in 
quality of jute products and also diversification of jute products 
finding newer uses of jute. The future development programme of jute 
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industries needed to be oriented towards the above goals along with 
the measures for modernisation, balancing and replacement of existing 
machinery and taking curative measures to check the declining efficiency 
which has been vexing the industries since 1960's. For this joint 
collaboration with foreign agencies can also be envisaged in the fields 
like manufacture of jute carpets 130 
Likewise research and development efforts to enhance the produc-
tivity of all indigenous raw materials like sugar cane, fruits and vege-
tables, tobacco, fish, livestock and forest products like bamboo should 
have priority in future expansion programmes. Exploration, development 
and fruitful utilisation of mineral resources to industrial manufacturing 
should also be an important part of the program. 	But additional efforts 
will be needed to implement such projects as manufacture of urea, fibres 
and P.V.C. based on the only mineral resources of significance that 
Bangladesh possess. Demand projections for the internal market indicate 
a substantial growth in urea requirement over the next two decades. 
Urea requirements would increase by more than 5 times by 1995. To 
satisfy this demand several large urea plants would have to be built 
over the next ten to fifteen years. 	Gas consumption of such plants, 
according to the known reserves could be quite feasible. 	On the other 
hand methanol could be developed as a gas based industry in Bangladesh. 
Besides being a substitute fuel for fuel oil, gasoline and diesel oil, 
in the context of Bangladesh it could be replacement for kerosene in 
household applications such as cooking and lighting. 
Finally, in the context of predominantly agricultural character-
istics of Bangladesh economy, extension and development of nationalised 
130 A well established jute carpet industry already existed in Yugo-
slavia, for example. The new carpet units with Iraqi assistance 
were being established. BJMC, Problems, op. cit. p. 82. 
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industries, . have great relevance. to modernisation of 
agriculture. The nationalised industries provide necessary support 
to agriculture through manufacture of fertilizer, pesticide, agricul-
tural equipment, pumps etc. and also through extending facilities for 
storage, preservation and processing of agricultural products. 	More- 
over, in selecting development products, like most developing countries 
labour intensity in manufacturing activities is not only feasible but 
also immensely desirable. 	Future expansion programme of nationalised 
industries cannot be oblivious of this imperative need. 
Summary Observation  
Government intervention in investment, capital structure and 
financing was inescapable. The sources of investment funds for the 
nationalised industries emanated from the government. 	Investment in 
the nationalised industries had to fit in with national economic planning 
and maintain a link between the corporate goals and the national goals 
of development. The extent of financing programme other than the 
governmental sources especially borrowing through the markets by issue 
of stocks and otherwise reserve creation as in private enterprise firms 
was limited. Modern investment appraisal techniques were applied 
perfunctorily, if at all. 	There was no clear guideline as to who 
could take non-economic considerations into account while deciding 
policy - executive government or legislature and with the executive 
government, ministry or corporation. 	The nationalised industries 
could hardly make any amount of capital available for investment. 
The plea that economic calculus alone should not dominate the decision 
process was frequently taken as a refuge. 
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The policies, practices and machinery of price fixation, marketing 
and distribution and production did not evolve on the basis of a clearly 
defined national objective or objectives to be achieved. 	In an 
imperfect market situation as in Bangladesh,where output has been a 
function of physical availability of inputs, limited demand and manag-
erial ability rather than of monopolistic manipulation, the extent to 
which a price policy could be applied.for determination of output was 
limited. The nationalised industries could hardly exploit their 
statutory monopoly to meet every increase of costs with a rise in price 
and rely on the monopoly to yield necessary increase in revenue. 	The 
economy of Bangladesh was far from being a centrally planned one as 
professed during the Awami League regime and as such a centrally fixed 
price could hardly be relevant. Moreover, the degree of freedom in 
fixing prices itself was limited. 	In the absence of a suitable distri- 
bution system,regulated prices could not be implemented for the benefit 
of the consumers. This was a situation when some privileged groups in 
the private sector could fleece the consumers, make huge profits and 
evade payment of taxes while the public sector was not allowed to mop 
up the scarcity rent in inefficient supply conditions. 
The question of disposal of profits along with capital structure 
and pricing is important in investment planning for the national economy 
for redistributing incomes and accumulating savings for reinvestment 
through the medium of profits of the nationalised industries. 	However, 
there was no explicit policy guideline in this respect for the national-
ised industries to generate a "return" on the capital employed although 
the social cost benefit function of the public enterprises has been 
indicated in the FFYP. 
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In sum, there has been inadequate attempt at identification 
of commercial and economic objectives on the one hand and the social 
and political objectives on the other; while non-commercial objectives 
have often been emphasized quantification of the cost of these non-
commercial objectives in the targets assigned were yet to be attempted. 
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CHAPTER VI 
THE HUMAN RELATIONS IN THE NATIONALISED INDUSTRIES 
Nationalisation was expected, among other things, to fill up the 
entrepreneurial and other personnel vacuums which resulted in the wake 
of the Liberation War owing to the exodus of non-local owners, entre-
preneurs, managerial and various other technical personnel. Assumption 
of ownership of the industries by the State foreshadowed its role as a 
model employer. 	Predilection with socialist ideology indicated the 
need for ownership of the means of production in the interests of the 
society as a whole and effective democratic participation by production 
and other workers in the management of the means of production 1  . 	In 
this chapter, an attempt will be made to appraise the personnel policies, 
strategies and practices as evolved in the nationalised industries of 
Bangladesh and to examine if a durable, sound and well-integrated system 
of personnel practices and of industrial relations could be established. 
The question is how far the ruling elites in Bangladesh were concerned 
to develop a productive and efficient work force. Did the government 
make a concerted move to recruit, deploy, utilise and develop the human 
potentialities for the purpose of operating the nationalised industries 
in most efficient manner possible? It will be examined if nationalis-
ation succeeded in providing a sound entrepreneurial base for the indus-
tries in Bangladesh and if nationalisation helped in achieving industrial 
democracy. 
1 Constitution, op. cit. Article 13 calls for people's ownership and 
control of the instruments and means of production and distribution. 
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A Personnel Strategy  
A personnel strategy for the nationalised industries in Bangladesh 
could not overlook the need to promote a creative synthesis 2 between two 
apparently contradictory imperatives towards (i) more efficient produc-
tion of quality goods and services and (ii) a higher quality of life in 
the organisation. 	The obligations of the personnel policy in the 
nationalised industries was, therefore, not limited to provide the enter- 
prises with a competent work force. 	It was expected that the national- 
ised industries would display socially responsible behaviour regarding 
the quality of life for the work force. A personnel strategy for the 
nationalised industries could not become a private world but must develop 
in tune with the national values, ethos and the milieu3 . 	The increasing 
complexity of economic, political, social and cultural environment along 
with the newer organisational problems of governmental units, labour 
unions and related social organisations created a growing atmosphere of 
imperson4lity. 
The policy planners in Bangladesh faced the task of evolving a 
personnel strategy within the framework of the national ideology as 
expressed in the Constitution and physical targets as stated in the 
FFYP. A fundamental responsibility of the State was to achieve a 
steady improvement in the material and cultural standard of living of 
the people. 	It was the accepted duty of the State to provide for the 
basic necessities of life including food, clothing, shelter, education 
and medical care. 	The citizens had the right to work, the right to 
guaranteed employment at a reasonable wage having regard to the quantity 
2 Wendell French, 
AdMinistration, 
3 Supra., Chapter 
The Personnel Management Process, Human Resources 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1974), P.T2I, 
297 
and quality of work, the right to reasonable rest, recreation and 
leisure and to social security4 . 	The State had an obligation to make 
endeavours to create conditions in which human labour in every form - 
intellectual or physical should become a fuller expression of creative 
effort and other human personality 5 . 
The foremost objective of the FFYP was to reduce proverty 6 . 
The Plan recognised that it required an expansion of employment oppor-
tunities 7 and that fulfilment of the national goals could not be attained 
through total reliance upon routine direction and control of employee-
activities. 	The personnel strategy needed to be predicated upon a 
living philosophy which would provide the top management and management 
at the successive layers with their basic assumptions and values. 	The 
management at various tiers should orient itself within the environment 
in order to identify itself with and help achieve the programme and 
objectives of the nationalised industries. The desire and ability to 
undertake management responsibilities by the personnel who occupy the 
positions in the organisation structure is of fundamental importance 8 . 
Thus the top management needed to demonstrate willingness to undertake 
personnel responsibilities as a part of their total responsibilities. 
Awareness of this responsibility was reflected early almost with nation-
alisation. A British management consultancy firm was associated with 
the government's efforts in devising an organisational structure for 
4 Constitution, op. cit., Article 15. 
5 Ibid., Article 20 (2). 
6 FFYP, op. cit. p. 9. 
7 Ibid. 
8 H.D. Koontz and Cyril J.O. Donnell, Principles of Management, (New 
York: McGraw Hill, 1964) 3rd ed. p. 468. 
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the nationalised industries. 	The reports 9 of the firm contained 
recommendations on the organisational structure and introduction of 
modern methods of personnel management. The major personnel problems 
and needs were identified as under: 
(i) Undefined responsibility and overloading at the top management 
level of the corporation; 
(ii) Inadequate attention to forward planning and personnel policies 
and procedures; 
(iii) Lack of necessary skills, knowledge, experience and expertise 
on the part of the newly promoted managers and supervisors and 
dearth of experience personnel; 
(iv) Lack of personnel policies and procedures and those that existed 
tended to be elaborate and cumbresome. 
(v) Absence of a comprehensive government policy on labour matters 
resulting in ad-hocism, confusion and delays. 10 
A personnel strategy would necessitate the development of a strategic 
long term plan for personnel philosophy and practice,man power resources, 
recruitment and training, employment conditions, compensation, incentives, 
welfare and management of manpower. 	It was from such a plan that fuller 
participation in the strategic planning of the nationalised industries 
and development of short range tactical plans for attaining short targets 
without jeopardising longer term interests would be possible. A central 
direction in personnel policies was an obvious need for the nationalised 
industries. 
Essentially there were very great human and personnel problems 
in the nationalised industries. The problems required urgent solution 
without which efficient performance, higher productivity and generation 
of surplus were not feasible. The government demonstrated a broad 
awareness of the human problems in the Constitution and in the documents 
9 Various reports prepared by P.A. Management Consultants Ltd., London 
on behalf of the Government of Bangladesh. See Bibliography. 
10 Consultants, Final Report, op. cit., p. 113. 
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like the FFYP and the Industrial Investment Policy 1972-73. 	But in 
coming to deal with the specific issues in the nationalised industries 
the government apparently could not grasp the complexity of the problems. 
It took a long time, for example to appreciate the fact that there was 
a need for specialised handling of the personnel problems in the nation- 
11 alised industries. 	The sheer dimension of work involved in the 
management of the work force, huge number of multifarious categories of 
the employees involved called for a judicious man-management and job 
allocations for a harmonious industrial relations and optimum utilisation 
of manpower. Arrangements on "fire-fighting" basis seemed only to have 
facilitated political interferences in the nationalised industries. 	The 
problems were compounded because of bitter factionalism and rivalries as 
already mentioned within and among the various components of the vast 
work force in the nationalised industries. 	The size of the work forces 
in the nationalised industries fluctuated around a number of 350,000 
during the FFYP period. The estimated manpower position in the nation-
alised industries is given below: 
TABLE 22 
Estimated Manpower Position in the Nationalised Industries 1973-1978 12 
Year 	Estimated number of 
manpower employed 
	
1973-74 353,600 
1974-75 	 335,700 
1975-76 339,900 
1976-77 347,200 
1977-78 355,500 
11 P.A. Management Consultants in their report on the Adamjee Jute Mills, 
the largest jute mill in the world employing nearly 23,000 persons, 
noted that no special function existed within Adamjees to handle the 
personnel problems. 	Government of Bangladesh, P.A. Management 
Consultants, Report on the Adarniee Jute Mills, (London: 1975), Ch. 6, 
p. 73. 
12 For sources,basis of estimate and break-u see Appendices. 
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The government grappled with the problems through setting up several 
committees and commissions to examine the personnel system in the 
government including the nationalised sector. Besides the Administra-
tive and Services Reorganisation Committee (hereafter ASRC), the 
National Pay Commission (hereafter NPC), the Industrial Workers' Wages 
Commission (hereafter IWWC) and the Industrial Workers' Wages and 
Productivity Commission (hereafter IWWPC) were set up to make suitable 
recommendations for the wage structure of industries in the public 
sector compatible with the recommendations of the other commissions. 
However, prevailing confusions, uncertainties and controversies could 
not be resolved. 	Instead the suggested pay structure had given fillip 
to corruption and brain drain in a situation of acute shortage of 
managerial and technical talents 13 . 	Interservices and group rivalries 
within the personnel systems intensified 14 . 	The IWWC envisaged that 
its recommendations were to remain broadly valid for the FFYP period 
and the NPC based its recommendations hoping almost naively that the 
price level would remain relatively stable. 	The recommendations of 
the IWWPC on the other hand could hardly keep pace with the unpreceden-
ted rise in prices and intense agitations and industrial unrest in the 
sector corporations prevailed in late 1978 15 . 
Constant fiddling with the public administration system by the 
successive governments did not help to build a sound edifice of personnel 
13 Maheshwari, op. cit. 
14 The services were divided on the basis of those who left Bangladesh 
territory to join the government in exile, those who stayed within 
Bangladesh territory during the Liberation War and those who had to 
be repatriated from Pakistan or fled from Pakistan. See Jahan, 
Bangabandhu, 	op. cit. In addition, the services were factionalised 
on the basis of earlier belonging to provincial government or central 
government; among generalists, professionalists, and technical 
personnel. 
15 See The New Nation, 30 July and 3 September 1978. 
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management in the nationalised industries. The recommendations of 
the FFYP about raising and training of political cadres created uncer- 
tainty in the first instance. Although the FFYP recognised 16 the role 
of the civil servants in carrying out the development programme it 
characterised a government functionary as a skilled worker a few among 
whom could be motivated. The political cadres were envisaged as 
catalytic agents and as watch dogs for misappropriation of public money 
and materials17 . Raising a parallel hierarchy was however, unlikely 
to ensure improvement in administration 18 . 	The abortive attempt to 
introduce a new and untried concept in administration seemed to have 
eroded the morale of the personnel traditionally in government adminis- 
tration. 	Induction of army personnel in the nationalised industries 
further reduced the career opportunities of the personnel usually 
associated with the management of the nationalised industries. 
Managerial Personnel  
The nationalised industries in Bangladesh had to draw on its 
available managerial ability from divergent sources 19 . These persons, 
16 FFYP, op. cit. pp. 4-5. 
17 Ibid., pp. 7-8. 
18 Maheshwari, op. cit. 
19 The first 11 Chairmen of the Sector Corporations brought the following 
experiences to their jobs: 
Executive in private sector 	3 
Executive in public sector 3 
Both public and private 	2 
Civil Service background 3 
In contrast, in September, 1978 all of nine incumbent chairmen of 
the corporations in the nationalised industries had public service 
background. 
Civil Service background 	4 
Service in government technical 
department 3 
Public Corporations 	2 
(Continued over) 
302 
technical or non-technical as they came from both public and private 
sector had brought different kinds of experiences. The positions 
left vacant by the non-local managerial and technical personnel had to 
be filled up by comparatively less qualified and less experienced 
people from the lower level. Persons having civil or military service 
background were inducted into the nationalised sector. As the public 
enterprises formed part of the government system and of the civil 
service structure this did not seem incongruous. 	Some of the Bengali 
owners of the nationalised jute and cotton mills were also called upon 
to provide managerial services to nationalised enterprises 20 . This 
diversity of experience brought together in a quick regrouping section 
did not result in integrating them into a new and dynamic management 
tradition. The "promotees" caused inconsistent decisions and improper 
handling of the situations. The civil servants although coming from 
the same government system did not have uniform approach to the problems 
of management. Nor they were afforded adequate opportunity to develop 
a common outlook of expertise through a long enought tenure in the 
nationalised industries. 	Retention of the former owners in managerial 
19 (Continued) Information on 27 servicing Chairmen and Directors of 
the boards of corporations in nationalised industries revealed the 
following on the sources of their recruitment: 
Government Departments 10 
Public Corporations 6 
Defence Services 1 
Contract Services (Private) 9 
Academician 1 
20 In asking the previous owners of the nationalised enterprises to 
discharge managerial responsibility as before, Bangladesh followed 
the pattern set earlier in some East European countries. 	In Bangla- 
desh, under the Nationalisation Order, Boards of Directors of the 
Bengali owned units were asked, to begin with, to continue discharging 
their managerial functions. The original intention was to dissolve 
these boards immediately on nationalisation and only to ask the Chief 
Executive of the enterprises to stay on with the job. A sudden 
vacuum could have very adverse effects on production. See Sobhany 
Nationalisation, op. cit., p. 193. 
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positions even though only for a short period of time helped some of 
them to siphon off resources. This also raised doubts about the 
socialistic intentions of the government in the mind of the workers. 
Being a large and complex organisation, it was necessary for 
the nationalised industries to dovetail the personnel policies with 
the plans for expansion so that mobility could be achieved from the 
older to the newer plants without impairing the performance of the 
former. This would entail provision of training to acquire skills 
and scope for upward mobility to deserving talent. The successive 
governments, however, did not take a well-conceived action to build 
up a management framework. The government seemed apathetic to the 
concept of a service based on real organisational needs 21 . 	Various 
committees and commissions apparently worked under an illusion of a 
unified service structure which ultimately amounted to a disintegration 
of an(stablished government service structure without replacing the 
same by a viable alternative. The nationalised industries in partic-
ular, went almost without attention in the dispensations about the 
services structures in the reports of the committees and the commissions. 
The government seemed little aware of the advantages of an organised 
system for managing top positions in the nationalised industries in an 
economy which had charted a planned course of development for itself 
and of the numerous pulls and pressures particular to each individual 
nationalised industry. The government failed to devise a delivery 
system staffed with adequate reservoir of entrepreneurial or managerial 
resources of the right kind for the nationalised industries as for the 
government itself. 
21 As Chandy Found in the Indian context. See K.T. Chandy, Managerial 
Personnel for Public Enterprises", The Indian Journal of Public 
Administration, Vol. 10 (4) (October-December, 1964) pp. 601-7. 
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In recent times there is a growing realisation in some of the 
public enterprise system in the developing countries about the advant-
ages of constituting a generalist managerial service on national basis 22 . 
It is argued that such a national service for the public enterprise 
system would bring in prestige to the jobs in public enterprises, 
introduce competitive richness in the managerial content and make a 
diversity of experience available to the enterprises. However, no 
attempt was made in Bangladesh to constitute a well structured entre-
preneurial-cum-managerial cadre either within the ambit of the national 
civil services or exclusively for the nationalised industries. On 
the contrary, the Industrial Management Services (hereafter IMS) consti-
tuted in 1973 was abolished in 1978. The INS was created to provide 
an uninterrupted flow of managerial personnel trained in socialist 
economic management and with this end in view the first batch of two 
hundred officers were recruited through the Bangladesh Public Service 
Commissions and later trained in some East European countries. The 
arguments for abolition of the IMS cadre within five years of its 
inception were held as follows: 
(i) The IMS cadre did not prove workable; 
(ii) A centrally constituted cadre like INS was conceptually incompat-
ible with the government policy of autonomy and decentralisation 
for the corporations and disinvestment of many of the nationalised 
industrial enterprises; 
(iii) Appointment of personnel other than the Chairmen and the Directors 
of the Corporation Boards were not envisaged in the Industrial 
Nationalisation Order. 
The faults and failures of the Industrial Management Pool 23 in 
22 See for example, P.K. Basu, Managerial Civil Service in Asia, (Kuala 
Lumpur: Asian Centre for Development Administration, 1976). 
23 See H.K. Paranjape, The Industrial Management Pool: An Administrative 
Experiment, (New Delhi: The Indian Institute of Public Administration, 
1976). Also see Government of India, Administrative Reforms Commis- 
sion, Report of the Study Team on Personnel Administration, (New 
Delhi: Manager Government of India Press, 1967), pp. 201-6. 
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India and the criticism levelled against the Economic Pool 24 in Pakistan 
were used to destroy the nascent IMS cadre in Bangladesh which was 
orphaned almost from the very beginning of its birth. Like the Indus-
trial Management Pool in India which had to tread its way in an environ-
ment lacking a seriousness on the part of the government to operate 25 
the INS faced hostile reception from the beginning. The facade of its 
encadrement was out of tune with the prevailing attitude toward all 
cadre affiliations 26 of government services. 	It was alleged, not 
without foundation, that there was no real attempt to recruit quality 
personnel for the IMS cadre and that it was amanoeuvre to win over a 
large section of the freedom fighters. Lack of definite service con-
ditions, allegedly questionable method of their selection and attitude 
of other employees in the public corporations towards the IMS recruits 
helped to create an unfavourable image of them. 
The arguments levelled against the INS cadre and the principles 
underlying them need a scrutiny. It may be as well argued that if the 
INS was found to be not workable it was more because of the unwillingness 
on the part of the ruling elite to make them operate successfully. The 
survival of a nationally constituted career service would add to the 
problems of implementation of the disinvestment policy of the military 
regime because of the need to find for such officers some suitable 
alternative employment. According to the terms of disinvestment the 
buyers of the enterprises disinvested were not bound to accept the 
24 The "Economic Pool" as a new service was constituted by the Pakistani 
administration in order to meet the specialised needs of economic 
ministries - finance, commerce and industries. 
25 Ajit M. Bannerjee, "Managerial Personnel for Public Enterprise", 
The Indian Journal of Public Administration, Vol. 10 (1964), pp. 513-25. 
26 Awami League Manifesto in 1970 advocated abolition of the cadres in 
the civil services. 
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previous employees. Furthermore, in the context of an acute shortage 
in managerial talents, the absence of a national pool of managerial 
resources gave way to spoils system. 	It also requires to be weighed 
if individual corporations would be able to attract quality personnel 
as against regularly constituted government services which in the 
developing countries like Bangladesh offer better prospects in terms 
of prestige and security of tenure. The qualified technical personnel 
already in the nationalised industries could be absorbed in such a 
central pool which would raise their morale and motivation. 	In 
addition, industrial nationalisation order was not something sacrosanct 
which could not be amended to accommodate the changed needs and the 
continuance of a national managerial service would not necessarily 
comprise the avowed decentralisation policy. Under the above circum-
stances, abolition of the INS cadre may be interpreted as an ancillary 
step to implement the disinvestment programme of the government. This 
is reinforced from the fact that by the end of the FFYP the nationalised 
industries contained a substantial number of technically qualified 
personnel. One can discern several factors responsible for this 
phenomenon. Firstly, the Sector Corporations inherited a large number 
of technical-managerial personnel from the PIDC. Secondly, in the 
wake of Liberation and the socialistic predilections of the Awami 
League Government employment opportunities provided by the private 
sector was severely limited and public sector became virtually the only 
employer for the technically qualified persons. 	Thirdly, delay in 
formulating a national personnel policy by the government and absence 
of recruitment in the line of the recruitment made by Pakistani adminis-
tration before Liberation made the nationalised industries the main 
employment provider for such persons. Investigations conducted in 
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some corporations regarding the qualifications and training of technical 
and managerial personnel clearly indicated the possibility of developing 
a national reservoir of such talents 27 . 	Instead reticence of the 
successive governments about a firm personnel policy for the nationalised 
industries, poor pay and benefits, constant criticism against the nation-
alised industries and above all government's unwillingness to dispel 
doubts about the continued existence of the nationalised industries 
through defining firmly the operational limits of both the public and 
private sectors eroded the morale of the managerial and technical 
personnel in the nationalised industries. As a result the nationalised 
industries became a training ground of managerial and technical execu-
tives for the expanding private sector within the country after the fall 
of the Awami League Government and for the Middle East employment markets 
outside. 
27 Examination of the bio-data of 388 executives in BJMC, BSFIC, BCIC 
and BSFIC (officers with ranks of enterprise managers and above 
including divisional heads in the corporation head offices) indicated 
the following qualification contents: 
Ph.D. 	 9 
Master's degree including A.C.A. & Ll.B. 	104 
Bachelor degrees 	 135 
Degree in Engineering 62 
Undergraduate (pre-university level) 	44 
Secondary School Certificate 	28 
Unspecified 	 6 
Total 	388 
Nearly 50 per cent of the BJMC executives had foreign diploma or 
training in jute technology mostly in U.K. In BCIC 113 of 190 
executives whose qualifications were collected had foreign training 
of one sort or other. In BSFIC 13 out of 52 executives surveyed 
did have some parts of their traning in a Western country. Nearly 
all the executives have had exposure to management development 
courses in the national training institutes like the Management 
Development Centre, National Institute of Public Administration 
or the Institute of Business Administration. 
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Non-managerial Personnel  
A large number of non-managerial and technical positions became 
vacant after Liberation. Nationalisation brought in its train funda-
mental changes in the recruitment and selection processes. During 
private management the top positions in the policy and decision making 
process were held by the owners themselves'. The general manager of 
the enterprises was the trusted person of the owners with wide range 
of powers and authority for recruitment and selection of employees. 
This 'method of recruitment was discarded after nationalisation. 	But 
initially all the posts were filled up by promotions largely of persons 
without basic adademic or technical qualifications even though there 
were plenty of technical diploma holders or science graduates outside 
the industries. Later it became difficult to screen out the unqualif-
ied persons and to make arrangement for training for those surviving 
the screening. 
Recruitment and selection processes in the nationalised indus-
tries however became subject to inordinate delays. The nationalisation 
statute and the incorporating statutes providing authority to the 
corporations for recruitment, promotion, deputation, dismissal etc., of 
their employees. The corporations were authorised to make regulations 
regarding the terms and conditions of the services of their employees 
subject to approval of the government. The recruitment of the officers 
and staff of the corporations were also brought within the purview of 
the Public Service Commissions 28 on the same basis as the government 
28 Bangladesh Public Service Commissions were established according to 
the constitutional provisions as envisaged in Articles 137, 138, 139 
140 and 141. The functions of a Public Service Commission were, 
among other things, "to conduct tests and examinations for the 
selection of suitable persons for appointment to the service of the 
Republic" of Bangladesh. Constitutions, op. cit. Articles 137-141 pp. 56-8. 
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employees. 	The statutory intentions seemed to have been to confer 
full powers in respect of personnel management in the nationalised 
industries. Except the Chairmen and Directors of the Boards who were 
appointed by the government on terms and conditions determined by it 29 
a corporation could appoint such officers, consultants, advisors, 
auditors and employees as it might consider necessary. 	In practice, 
the powers of the corporations were severely constrained. 	One of 
the factors responsible for such limitations was the built-in obsession 
within the government apparatus which relied excessively on procedures 
of cross-references 30 . 
Induction of civil servants into the nationalised industries 
became an involved process as a result of the above system of cross-
references. Acute shortage of personnel in different layers in the 
nationalised industries necessitated a practice of secondment of civil 
service personnel to the nationalised industries. 	The corporation 
unable to find the required personnel would notify the administrative 
ministry which in turn would approach the Establishment Division - 
the central personnel agency of the government. Filling the vacancy 
of a hitherto non-existent post-technical or non-technical would release 
a stream of actions - multiple cross-referencesora number of interminis-
terial consultations at the appropriate levels. The job sought to be 
created must be legitimized, and given a place in the organisation 
structure. Needed additional financial commitment would have to be 
authenticated by the Ministry of Finance. The services and recruitment 
29 Industrial Nationalisation Order, op.cit., Article 12 (2). 
30 While examining India's administrative system Appleby noted that it 
was "a system whereby everybody is responsible for everything before 
anything is done". See "Digest of Reports", The Indian journal of 
Public Administration, Vol. 2 (1956), pp. 276-85. 
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rule would need vetting from the Ministry of Law. On issues having 
relevance to labour situation the Ministry of Labour might have to be 
consulted. When civil servants were appointed on secondment they 
retained their civil service privileges although serving in the corpor-
ations. The corporations could not alter the terms and conditions of 
service of those seconded. Nor could they take extreme disciplinary 
action against them. The government retained the power to regulate 
the personnel administration of the corporation employees as well as 
the government employees seconded to the corporations 31 . 
The Cabinet Division Guidelines made an attempt to give effect 
to the provisions that existed in the statutes but which needed to be 
re-emphasized. Thus the Guidelines stressed the fact that while the 
government would continue to make appointment of Chairmen and Directors 
the corporation would have the authority to recruit, appoint and promote 
other officials and employees. 	In this, the corporations were to be 
governed by the rules and regulations framed by the corporations and 
approved by the government. 
Development of Skills  
An efficient work force calls for a comprehensive training and 
development programme for both managerial and technical personnel. 
The FFYP pointed out the need for an intensive management development 
programme specially designed for the nationalised sector 32 . 	In the 
context of the desired socialist transformation in the early phase of 
nationalisation it seems that a motivational approach was more appropriate. 
31 Amendment of Article 6 (2) of "The Bangladesh Industrial Enterprises 
(Nationalisation) Order, 1972", see The Bangladesh Gazette Extra-
ordinary, 27 November 1972. 
32 FFYP, op. cit., pp. 254-5. 
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Such an approach holds that the basic assumption of training is the 
creation of a change in the individual - a change in the direction 
which is in the best interests of the organisation. A programme of 
management development in the.. nationalised industries would there-
fore, need to impart both management skill as well as socialist values 
to the new recruits and the managers inherited from the pre-nationalis-
ation set-up. The FFYP suggested a programme of management develop-
ment both within the corporation and in specialised training institu-
tions like the Management Development Centre, the Industrial Relations 
Institute, Institute of Business Administration and the National Insi- 
tute of Public Administration. 	Facilities provided in these instutions 
were limited as the facilities for management training in Bangladesh as 
a whole were modest. 
The FFYP did not, however, suggest a comprehensive programme to 
develop management skills as it was being examined by the government 
separately. As an interim measure the Plan sought to recommend the 
creation of management cadres in all corporations and arrangements for 
on-the-job and in-service management training within the corporations. 
Special emphasis was to be given to socialist management. Trainers, 
trainees and corporation executives were to be sent to the socialist 
countries to study the socialist management systems 33 . But there 
never existed adequate training facilities within the corporations 34 . 
It was noted that the personnel shortage and the gap in efficiency could 
have been reduced with a planned and integrated training scheme 35 . 
33 Ibid. 
34 See for example, Report on BJIC, op. cit., Industries, Textile 
Enquiry, op. cit. and Prime Minister's Secretariat, Report of the 
Prime Minister's Special Enquiry Team on Adamjee Jute Mills, (Dacca, 
1974) Unpublished p. 12. 
35 Ibid. 
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Ironically however the INS cadre was abolished by the Military regime 
in spite of the training imparted to the IMS officers in the socialist 
countries during the Awami League administration. 
The ASRC36 emphasized in its turn the need for training of the 
functionaries of the government and the nationalised industries. 	It 
called for an orientation programme for the senior civil servants in 
democratic values and methods and in socialism. 	It suggested for 
adequate institutional arrangements for training at different levels. 
A national level training academy was proposed. The corporations and 
enterprises were to assume responsibility for training of all others 
below the level of last direct entry as officers. The ASRC also 
recommended for setting up of a National Enterprises Training Council 
to design the entire training programme for entrants at the managerial 
level positions in the nationalised sector. 	In contrast, the PSC 37 
seemed to have not emphasized the role of training as much as the ASRC. 
The PSC ruled out the suggestion for constituting career services in 
the public corporations. 	Instead it advocated a career development 
36 The Administrative and Services Reorganisation Committee was appointed 
by the government in March, 1972. The tasks of the Committee were to 
consider the existing structure of various services, and amalgamation 
of all the civil pervices and also to determine the principles of 
integration of the personnel of the various services and the future 
recruitment policy and formulation of a comprehensive scheme for 
administrative organisation. All the six parts of the report were 
submitted by May,1975. 
37 The Pay and Services Commission was appointed in February, 1976 and 
was to recommend, "having regard to the fundamental objective of 
state policy for the establishment of a socialist system" a suitable 
service structure for the civil services and pay structure for the 
civil services, the employees of the autonomous and semi-autonomous 
bodies, statutory corporations, the Universities and nationaised 
enterprises among other things. The Commission submitted its full 
report in 1978 but a new national pay scale with 21 grades for all 
employees was earlier announced in July, 1977. 
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scheme for the managerial cadres in the public sector. Each public 
sector undertaking was to be encouraged to formulate and implement 
suitable carrer development schemes in which a phased programme of 
training at different levels was linked to a different ladders of 
promotion. The PSC did not elaborate how the fresh managerial 
entrants were to be trained. Earlier the recommendations of ASRC 
were never made public nor its recommendations on the aspects of 
training were implemented. The PSC did not make any concrete recom-
mendations on a long term training policy. It had apparently not 
envisaged any long term managerial succession plan in the nationalised 
sector. The half-hearted recommendations of the reports of the ASRC 
and the PSC and lukewarm approach of the successive governments towards 
them did not help to clear the confusion prevailing around the personnel 
system in the nationalised industries without a firmly delineated career 
development programme. Building up of an inventory and reserve of 
managerial talents under such circumstances was bound to be frustrated. 
As with the managerial personnel a tremendous training effort 
was needed for all other categories of personnel. 	The professional 
advisors 38 considered it essential in the crisis following large scale 
exodus of non-local skilled workers to concentrate on training minimum 
essential skills and knowledge to enable each worker to do his job 
efficiently. 	The standard of supervisors in the mills fell far short 
of requirements as most of them possessed little technical knowledge 
or supervisory skills. As with the operative a crash course was 
necessary for the supevisors to teach them basic technical essentials 
of the jobs which they supervised. The FFYP laid emphasis on develop-
ment of skills through training, labour welfare, management development, 
38 Consultants, Report Adamjee Jute, op. cit. p. 81. 
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labour management relationship, employment promotion and research in 
the fields of manpower and labour. Important programme included 
establishment and expansion of the technical training centres. But 
essentially labour and training according to the admission of the 
Planning Commission itself was accorded a low priority 39  . 	There 
was little facility for training of the work force either within the 
enterprises or in a centrally based training centre for each corpor-
ation nor there was a separate training intstitute for the mmrkers 40 . 
Most of the workers learnt the trade just being on the job. There 
was no organised training system for the workers 41 . In the absence 
of an apprenticeship scheme in the enterprises the normal annual turn- 
over of labour was met by the recruitment of inexperienced and untrained 
persons. 
From the available evidence it is hard to suggest that there was 
an adequate appreciation in the government about the role of the skilled 
workers as vital inputs for industrial progress. On the other hand in 
the wake of Liberation unskilled labour assumed jobs of skilled workers 
and even clerical personnel were made technical supervisor and sent for 
training abroad 42 while qualified candidates from the available technical 
institutes were not given fair opportunity. The planners realised that 
development of skills of labour force was important but the programme 
lacked a multisectoral perspective. Achievement in skill development 
39 About lack of training facilities all reports agreed. See Bangla-
desh Bank, Jute Industrie4,op. cit., p. 17; Prime Minister's Team 
Enquiry Adamjee Jute, op. cit.; Finance, Report BJMC, op. cit.; 
Industries, Report Textile Enquiry, op. cit.; Consultants, Final 
Report, op. cit. 	Consultants, Report Adamjee, op. cit. p. 
40 MP, op. cit. p. 9. 
41 Industries, Textile Enquiry, op. cit. p. 23. 
42 Ibid. 
fell far short of requirements and expectations. 
National Wages Policy  
A systematic and acceptable structure of incentives for both 
workers and other employees was of paramount importance to the govern-
ment in power since it faced the task of formulating a pay and wage 
structure 
having regard to the fundamental objective of the 
state policy for the establishment of a socialist 
system43 . 
Determination of compensation for the employees before pre-Liberation 
days was essentially an administrative process. 	The various pay 
plans44 before the Liberation were somewhat rudimentary and colonial 
in origin. 	Separate pay policies, pay structure and pay administration 
existed for different categories of employees. Wide proliferation and 
overlapping were flagrant 45 . 	Several problems were, however, associa- 
ted with determining a suitable incentive structure in terms of monetary 
and material benefits in the nationalised industries. The problems 
were: 
43 See The Bangladesh Gazette Extraordinary, 21 July 1972 and 20 
February. 1976 containing government Resolutions appointing 
respectively the National Pay Commission and the National Pay and 
Services Commission. 
44 Some of the Commissions engaged in formulation of pay plans before 
1971 were: 
(i) Islington Commission (Royal Commission on the Public Service 
in India, 1917); 
(ii) Lee Commission on the Superior Civil Service in India; 
(iii) Varadachariar Commission, 1946-47; 
(iv) Das Commission; 
(v) Muneer Pay Commission, 1948; 
(vi) Pay and Services Commission, 1959; 
(vii) Mumtaz Hassan Commission, 1970. 
45 Government of Bangladesh, National Pay Commission, Report Vol. I, 
(Dacca: Government Press, 1973), pp. 14-5. 
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(i) Formulation of an overall compensation policy; 
(ii) Determination of a basic remuneration rate for the nationalised 
industries as a whole; 
(iii) Determination of the specific remuneration rates or its range 
for each job according to job classification; 
(iv) Prevailing rates in the private sector and the provision of 
the Minimum Wages Act; 
(v) Standard of living and cost thereof; 
(vi) Ability of the nationalised industries to pay thewage/salary/ 
remuneration bills. 
The NPC set up in 1972 was asked to recommend a national pay 
structure embracing the entire public sector employees other than 
industrial workers keeping in view the cost of living, resources of 
the government, disparity between incomes, requirement of efficiency, 
equity and incentives etc. 46 . 	Its recommendations on the ten national 
grades and scales were, however, partially implemented in view of 
changes in objective conditions and difficulties arising out of reducing 
a large number of pay scales in a few national scales 47 . 	Implementa- 
tion of the recommendations of the NPC in respect of the remaining 
grades was discontinued since February, 1976 and the new PSC was 
constituted. As recommended by the PSC twenty New National Pay Scales 
were announced which became effective from July, 1977 for the employees 
of the nationalised enterprises excluding the industrial workers. 
The lowest pay was Taka 225 per month and the highest was Taka 
against Taka 2000 fixed earlier according to the recommendations of 
the NPC. There were other benefits such as medical and housing 
facilities. 
The IWWC submitted its report on wage structure of the indus-
trial workers in September, 1973 with recommendations for 33 wage scales 
46 Resolution National Pay Commission, op. cit. 
47 Resolution Pay and Services Commission, op. cit. 
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for the workers in the nationalised sector. The Commission felt 
that an industrial worker should receive compensation at about 10 per 
cent more than a public office employee of the lowest grade recommended 
by the ASRC. 	The IWWPC was constituted in April, 1976 to review the 
wage structure in the "context of the present cost of living and the 
productivity of the industrial enterprise" and to recommend incentive 
measures to enhance labour productivity. 	The report of the IWWPC 
submitted to the government in July, 1978 contained recommendations, 
broadly related to two aspects: (i) wage structure including fringe 
benefits and of relating wages to productivity and (ii) major problems 
affecting industrial productivity and industrial viability such as 
jute and cotton policies, project planning and implementation and 
industrial model and technology. The IWWPC recommended the minimum 
basic wage of Taka 270 with total remuneration of Taka 404 per month 
for workers in the industrial areas and Taka 381 for workers in the 
non-industrial areas. The minimum basic wage recommended by the IWWC earlier 
was Taka 215 per month with additional amounts as fringe benefits like 
house rent, conveyance and medical allowances. 	Festival bonus equiv- 
alent to one month's basic wage was allowed by both the commissions. 
The principles emphasized in the terms of references of the 
various commissions took note of the various social, economic and 
psychological factors. As a virtual monopoly employer in the modern 
industries sector, the pay and wages policy of the government had 
crucial implications for employment and income distribution in the 
economy48 . 	The social compulsions for constituting the respective 
commissions were (i) the need to reduce disparity between the highest 
48 Recommendations of the IWWC directly affected 400,000 industrial 
workers in the public sector,NPC was responsible for determining 
salary and benefits of more than 650,600 employees in 1973. 
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and the lowest incomes in the society and (ii) the supply and demand 
in respect of different professions and occupations. The commissions 
had to be conscious of the need to attract and retain the talented and 
trained, professionally and technically qualified persons in the public 
sector and to provide for necessary incentives. The government on 
the other hand needed huge resources for reconstruction and rehabili-
tation of the economy and to take up future and current expansion 
programmes. In devising a national pay and wages policy the government 
had to take cognizance of the need for generation of surplus in every 
productive organisation for reinvestment. This was compelling since 
the usual resource base for the government was inelastic. 
The NPC perceived the priorities under the circumstances as to 
provide a "living wage" for the lowest paid employees with minimum 
differentials in remuneration in various packages, to cushion the 
employees from acute inflation through providing essential commodities 
at a fair price, to give assistance in the form of environmental support 
like housing, health, conveyance and education and to share the hard-
ship by those who could afford to do so. The pay plan of NPC was, 
therefore, formulated on the basis of a "livable rate of wage", social 
acceptability, standardisation of different tiers of administration 
into a minimum number of levels which would be functionally distinguish-
able, time scale, etc. 	It was assumed that patriotic consideration 
would motivate the highly competent people for whom the public sector 
might not be able to give full monetary compensation at international 
rates. 	The PSC took note of the facts that resource constraints 
severely limited the ability to raise pay and wages in step with the 
decline in the real income, that the employees were indeed receiving 
a subsistence level emoluments and that a living wage must be paid. 
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While taking note of the need to link up pay/wages with price l index-
ation of wages was not suggested. However a cost of living allowances 
at an unspecified rate when inflation exceeded 15 per cent were 
recommended. The IWWC like NPC based its recommendations on the 
wages structure on the assumption that this would remain valid only 
until June, 1978. 	The wage packets consisted of three elements, 
namely, (i) an assured supply of essential commodities at fair prices, 
(ii) cash wage and (iii) environmental supports in the form of housing, 
medical and transport facilities. After the minimum wage scale for 
an unskilled worker was fixed for various grades, wage differentials 
were also built up for each industry having regard for the nature of 
skill on a very broad basis such as, the qualification at entry points, 
the time taken for promotion and the rate of wage obtaining in the 
industry. 
The objective situations prevailing in Bangladesh would suggest 
that the majority of the employees and workers in the nationalised 
industries as in all other public sector employement did not receive 
remuneration enough to give them a subsistence living. Resources 
available at the disposal of the government or within the capability 
of the nationalised industries to generate in the near future would 
continue to remain inadequate to sustain a meaningfully living package 
of remuneration. But pay and wage structure in the public sector could 
not afford to remain insulated from the same in the private sector and 
compatibility must be maintained especially at the professional and 
technical levels. 
Incentives and Productivity  
Both the wages commissions were asked to examine the use of 
financial incentives as stimulants to productivity and to recommend 
suitable incentives to increase productivity. 	In Bangladesh, an 
historically developed inconsistency was the payment of bonus to 
individual workers irrespective of productivity on the occasion of 
a religious festival. 	The commissions decided to state this ex- 
gratia payment as "festive bonus" which became, in fact, a part of 
the pay packages of the industrial workers. As the pre-determined 
bonus was regarded as part of the wages, the payment of festival bonus 
could not serve as incentive. Both the wages commissions, as a 
result, recommended various types of bonus such as basic wage and 
festival bonus, shift bonus and night shift allowance. The IWWPC 
introduced accelerated incentive wage system in its efforts to relate 
wages to productivity. Besides material incentives,other forms of 
incentives were also introduced. These were rewards, medals, publicity 
and other forms of good performance recognition at the level of corpor-
ation, enterprise, unit or even group. 	It was hoped that a feeling of 
participation would create a heightened impulse in everyone connected 
with the nationalised industries. 
Various reports indicated that the incentive systems needed 
improvement. The Inquiry Committee on the Textile Industry found in 
December, 1976 that the prevailing incentive systems did not take 
individual merits of workers in actual production and performance into 
consideration49 . As a consequence it failed as a motivating factor. 
49 Industries, Textile Enquiry, op. cit. 
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The festival bonus was fixed but the production incentive bonus must 
vary with production. All workers of the enterprises were entitled 
to both the bonuses in proportion to their pay. Production bonus was 
subject to achievement of production at a certain level and beyond. 
In this system an individual worker had little incentive to motivate 
him or boost up his morale. Prevailing system of bonus seemed to 
benefit the supervisory staff more than production workers. Percentage 
of bonus on total emoluments for non-production workers increased at a 
higher rate than production workers after nationalisation. The data 
below shows50 : 
Percentage of Bonus on Total Emoluments 
Workforce 	Pre-nationalisation : Post-nationalisation 
Officers 5.50 	11.48 
Staff 7.50 12.79 
Workers 8.86 14.97 
It must be said, however, that the IWWC- andIWWPC like the NPC and PSC 
, helped to introduce ammrationalisation in the pay and wage structure 
Of the nationalised industries. Uniformity was brought into unwieldy 
range of wage packets under the previousmanagement in the private 
sector. Dissimilarities in emoluments and fringe benefits could not 
altogether be abolished until the reports of the commissions were 
implemented in respect of wage and pay structures. Thus for example, 
the petroleum refinery had been paying compensations to workers which 
were far more generous in comparison to other enterprises requiring 
similar skills and efficiency51 . By seeking to remove the inconsistencies 
50 Ibid., pp. 2475 and p. 44. 
51 Personal visit to Eastern RefineryTimited, an enterprise with BPC 
and interview with the. personnel officers of various corporations. 
The reports of IWWC noted the disparity in compensation and fringe 
benefits for the employees in different industries in 1973. . 
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and inequities in pay structures the commissions reduced the possi-
bility of discontent. 	In the end, however, the recommendations of 
the commissions failed to generate sufficient incentives in an environ-
ment of galloping inflation. Financial incentives failed to motivate 
the workforce to enhance productivity or inculcate a socialist conscios-
ness in them. 
Labour Welfare  
The report of the IWWC pointed out that one way of improving 
motivation of the workforce would be an effective programme to improve 
its living and working conditions 52 . At the time of nationalisation 
there was no law providing for housing to industrial workers. Even 
where some enterprises provided accommodation to a minority of the 
workers the quality of accommodation was mostly unsatisfactory. There 
was no comprehensive social security legislation 53 and medical attention 
and maternity benefits were restricted barely to the limit prescribed 
in the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, the Maternity Benefit Act, 1939 
and the Factory's Act 1965. Some employers provided medical treatment 
by way of setting up of dispensaries. 	In some cases, medical expenses 
were reimbursed to the workers. No satisfactory arrangement existed 
to supply foodstuffs and other daily necessities at reasonable prices. 
There was a statutory provision for canteens in the Factory's Act, 1965 
52 Papers read at the National Seminar On Making Work More Human held 
at Dacca in December, 1976 provide excellent information on the 
situation obtaining in Bangladesh. See International Labour Office, 
Bangladesh, Report National Seminar On Making Work More Human, Dacca: 
December 13-15 1976. (Dacca, 1977). 
53 On social security legislations for workers in Bangladesh see seminar 
papers read at the Seminar on Social Security and National Development, 
December 20-22 1976 Dacca. International Labour Office, Bangladesh, 
Report Seminar on Social Security and National Development, Dacca 1978). 
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but most of the canteens existed in name only. 	In certain cases a 
nominal allowance for transports was provided. Wage system followed 
in the public sector units presented a better picture but in private 
enterprises no definite system existed. 
Reports of the two wages commissions contained recommendations 
for standardisation of fringe benefits and environmental supports like 
housing, medical treatment and transportation. The IWWC also recom-
mended educational facilities, recreational arrangements, subsidised 
meals etc. Institutional arrangements on the line of the health 
insurance schemes were being contemplated pending free medical coverage 
to all people. The commissions mentioned the provisions for contribu-
tory provident funds, group insurance scheme, gratuity and pension 
scheme for the industrial workers. 	In practice inadequate attention 
was given to the welfare of the workers. The major constraint was 
the financial position of the nationalised industries. While housing 
problem for the workers and employees remained acute, some corporations 
were planning to construct multi-storied office buildings by imposing 
levies on the enterprises. On the other hand l even in the largest 
mills general physical condition and working environment or safety 
provisions were far below the desired level. It was difficult under 
such circumstances to keep up the morale of the workers and infuse in 
them a sense of pride in their work and in the enterprise. 
The FFYP perceived labour welfare as a form of social investment 
with high returns in terns of social and economic benefits. 	It 
allocated a sum of Taka 277 million for labour welfare and training 
against a total investment of Taka 60 million during 25 years preceding 
the Liberation54 . The Plan emphasized the need for housing, sanitation 
54 FFYP, op. cit. pp. 493 and 495. 
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and health care for the workers most of whom had come from the rural 
area. 	The Plan also envisaged facilities of recreation, education 
and skill development. Achievement was far short of target. This 
was, according to the Planning Commission's own admission,due to 
inadequate policy orientation, weak organisational set up, lack of 
initiative and drive on the part of the executing agencies and inade-
quate financial support55 . 
Managerial Emoluments and Motivation 
With nationalisation, management of the nationalised industries 
passed into the hands of the professional managers who were full time 
executives. The capitalist entrepreneur class was nearly eliminated 
from the large scale industrial sector. This was not unique. Even 
in a free enterprise society,divorce between ownership and management, 
participation of the industrial investors and financial institutions in 
providing increased input of capital and in adoption of improved tech-
nology combined to cause considerable displacement of the capitalist 
entrepreneurial class. However, in a Western capitalist society these 
executives receive high remunerations and generous facilities because 
of their expertise and experience and because they have no compensating 
gains similar to the owners. 	In the private sector,remuneration of 
the top executives is usually governed by the provisions of the Companies' 
Act. The approval of the government is required for remuneration pay-
able to the chief executive who is usually called the managing director 
or whole time director. 	Such remuneration is also subject to certain 
ceiling (normally in percentage of net profits) specified in the 
Companies' Act. In India,public sector undertakings have been generally 
55 TIP, op. cit., p. 34. 
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set up as joint stock companies. Provisions regarding managerial 
remuneration are equally applicable to them. But the terms of appoint-
ment of Chief Executive of these public sector undertakings are deter-
mined by the government separately as also for other senior officials 
whose emoluments exceed certain limits 56 . The persons for the govern-
ment services in secondment to public sector undertakings usually draw 
their emoluments according to their own scale of pay in the government 
service. However, they are usually entitled to an additional deputation 
pay. 
In Bangladesh, the highest monthly salary was fixed at Taka 2000 
and no one under public employment, be it in the government departments 
or in the public sector enterprises, autonomous or semi-autonomous 
bodies was to receive an emolument more than this. It meant no .pay 
differential for a civil servant if he is in secondment to a corporation 
in the nationalised sector. 	If he reached the highest ceiling the 
same pay would be drawn by him. If the incumbent had not reached the 
highest ceiling his salary would just be the same. Prior to formu-
lation of the National Pay Scale the government employees on deputation 
to the public sector or autonomous organisations used to draw their pay 
according to their respective scales of pay and not according to the 
scales of pay of the organisation to which they were deputed. In many 
cases, resulting from this a civil service employee was drawing less 
than the pay entitlement of the post as per the organisation's own 
scales of pay. Generally, the pay scales in public enterprises and 
autonomous organisations have been better than the regular government 
56 See Mohd Afzal and Raj K. Nigam, "Management Remuneration and 
Incentives in Public Sector Undertakings" in Raj K. Nigam ed. . 
Management of Public Sector in India, (Bombay: Vora & Company 1971) 
p.53. 
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services. The deputation allowance to which a government employee 
was previously entitled on secondment to other organisations was also 
discontinued. 	There were certain fringe benefits in the form of 
transport and housing facilities; but for a senior civil service personnel, 
these could hardly be any additional incentive. On the other side of 
the coint it was alleged that implementation of the National Pay Scales 
had resulted in downgrading of almost all officers (and staff) who were 
direct employees of the enterprises and not on secondment from the govern-
ment departments - in respect of their existing rank and status. 	This 
created a "simmering discontent" among the employees and lowered their 
efficiency and morale57 . The new pay scales devised by the PSC in 1977 
were substantial improvement in absolute terms from those of the NPC in 
1973 because of a continuous erosion in the real value of money since Liber-
ation. 	But in the context of the initial low base of Taka 2000,this 
award could hardly be considered as sufficient material incentive for 
the highest professional competence in the country. 
In Bangladesh I there were not many large scale industries in the 
private sector after Liberation. There was also no meaningful differ-
ential in the remuneration ranges of top executives in the public sector 
and government departments. Only comparison that might be realistic 
was inrespect ofthe large private sector in trade, commercial and con-
struction sector as they existed. The average initial pay of manage-
ment staff in the private sector industries in Bangladesh was found to 
be Taka 1,451 per month 58 . As against this tthe NPC had recommended 
the starting pay of a fresh entrant for management level officers of 
Taka 475 per month with fringe benefit of Taka 145 per month at 1971-72 
57 BSFIC, Report 74-75, op. cit. p. 31. 
58 Government of Bangladesh, Cabinet Division, Report of the Pay and 
Services Commission, Bangladesh 1977, Vol I Part II (Dacca: Govern-
ment Press, 1978), p. 57. 
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price level. The starting salary of the management level officers 
was Taka 450 and Take 500 per month as early in 1965. If the remuner-
ation was to have relevance to the cost of living index the initial 
remuneration of a fresh entrant needed to be fixed at Taka 2604 per 
month in 1978 and Take 2907 in 1975. The initial pay of a fresh 
entrant was fixed at Taka 750 per month plus House Rent Allowance 
between 25-34 per cent of pay according to the location of posting, 
effective from July 1977. At the higher levels, the disparity in 
emoluments was far greater between the public and private sector and 
also between the pre-Liberation andpost-Liberation level. The top most 
government executives drew generally a monthly salary of Take 4000 before 
Liberation. After Liberationpit was fixed at Taka 2000 in 1973 and 
Taka 3000 in 1977. The cost of living index was 407 in 1975, 382 in 
1977 and 441 in 1978 against the level of 100 in 1970 59 . 
Apart from the low salary which acted as a damper,proper incen-
tives also seemed to be lacking. Ordinarily incentive for managerial 
personnel is provided by such main factors as his own stake in the 
destiny of the enterprise, in respect of a stable career in the under-
taking, a feeling of accomplishment, recognition for good work etc. 
A study60 in India which has nearly similar societal values as Bangla-
desh, showed that the managers regarded the "Feeling worthwhile accom-
plishment" as the most important to them. While the priority rating 
of different incentives depend on the personality Of and the appraisal 
of values by the individual,managerial personnel,the validity of incen-
tives would seem to be indisputable. The requirement of material 
59 See Survey 1980, op. cit. p. 270. 
60 See Laxmi Narayan, Managerial Compensation and Motivation in Public 
Enterprises (New Delhi, Oxford & IBH Publishing Company, 1973). 
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incentives could have been relegated to a secondary importance by the 
top executives if the need for recognition or accomplishment could be 
otherwise fulfilled. Instead,rigid compartmentalisation in the 
nationalised sector severly restricted the promotion vistas for able 
managers and technicians. 	In addition, the post-liberation promotions 
were mostly made as a matter of course without evaluation 61  . This 
resulted in wide spread discontent among the management personnel. 
The incentive of a stable career was also disappearing specially during 
the Mujib regime. Although the Constitution provided that no person 
holding any civil post could be dismissed or removed or reduced in 
rank without a reasonable opportunity of being heard 62 the Government 
of Bangladesh (Services) Order, 1972 widely known as the Presidential 
Order No. 9 of 1972 or simply as "P.0.9" empowered the government to 
remove any person from service without assigning any reason. There 
was also no scope of judicial redress for such action 63 . 	Ostensibly 
promulgated out of national interest and 
to reorganize the entire system of administration and 
to establish an administrative machinery which can 
effectively meet the urgent task of national recon-
struction64 
the law was indiscriminately used by the Mujib Government to intimidate 
and coerce all employees in the government and public sector, autonomous 
and semi-autonomous organisations to subserve the ruling political elite. 
Immediately after Liberation,the industries were in the doldrums owing 
to dislocations caused during the war and it was quite possible to 
charge many of the managerial personnel with alleged corruption, 
61 Finance, Report BJMC, op. cit. 
62 Constitution, op. cit.', Article 135 (2). 
63 P.0.9 of 1972, op. cit, 
64 Ibid. 
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inefficiency or collaboration with the occupation forces. 	Coupled 
with the poor material incentives, insecurity, lack of recognition, 
absence of fulfilment in a sense of accomplishment, the prestige of 
the public services declined sharply after Liberation 65 . 	The prevail- 
ing environment was hardly congenial to the growth of a dynamic entre-
preneurial class in the nationalised industries. 
The Credibility Gap  
In the past 2 the goal of the trade union movement in Bangladesh 
seemed to be meaningful and comprehensive. 	In this it was not differ- 
ent from the rest of the Indian sub-continent. One section of the 
labour movement tended to be radical 66  in nature and intended to trans-
form itself into a revolutionary movement. The other group continued 
to strive for development through constitutional means for the protection 
and advancement of the economic interest of the workers67 . The trade 
unions also took part with other segments of the society in the various 
movements against the discriminatory actions of the employers and the 
ruling regimes - against the British colonialism before 1947 and the 
neo-colonial dominance of the Pakistani capitalism after 1947. Thus 
the labour forces played significant role in the Liberation struggle. 
65 See Syed Giasuddin Ahmed, The Image of Public Service in Bangladesh 
A Survey of Attitudes Towards Public Service and Public Employees in 
Bangladesh (Dacca: Centre for Administrative Studies, University of 
Dacca, 1975). 
66 See for an analysis of the labour movement in Bangladesh in the light 
. of Marxist ideas in Badruddin Umar and Shahriar Kabir, Bangladeshe 
Marsbad 0 Shramik Andoloner Samasya [in Bengali] (Dacca: Juba 
Prakashonee, 1978). Also see Kamruddin Ahmed, Labour Movement in 
East Pakistan, (Dacca: Progoti Publishers, 1967). 
67 Shah Abdul Halim, Trade Unions and Law in Bangladesh, Unpublished 
paper (Dacca: 1978) Mr. Halim is a prominent labour leader in Bangla-
desh. 
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They spearheaded the resistance against Pakistani oppression, militarism 
and exploitation. 	Most of the workers, therefore, tended to think 
that nationalisation in the wake of liberation would end their previous 
sufferings and would usher in an era of plenty for them. But the 
production of the nationalised industries could not be reactivated to 
the pre-nationalisation level due to the dislocations caused during the 
Liberation War. The authoritarian attitude of management in the indus-
tries did not undergo a metamorphosis overnight into a more democratic 
outlook. Rather the undue favour and privileges to some, divide and 
rule strategy, exclusion of workers from decision making, the rule of 
convenience and anarchic condition prevailing in the various facets of 
management caused disappointment in the workers 68 . 	The first and 
foremost requirement to establish rapport between labour and management 
in the nationalised industrial activities and to induce the workers to 
increase productivity was missing. 
On the side of the labour force, no new orientation seemed to 
have taken place as the changed context called for. There was a need 
for responsible trade union. However, union alignments were based on 
regional considerations and political affiliations. Any group of 
workers of a factory, plant or industry or office could form a trade 
union. Registration of unions were also not obligatory. 	Trade 
unions formed at the level of an enterprise were not necessarily organ- 
ised vertically on the basis of industries at the national level. 	The 
existing national federation unions of labour did not represent all 
units within an industry. A great deal of infighting and inter-union 
68 Durgadas Bhattacharya, "Management of Nationalised Industries in 
Bangladesh", The Business Review, Vol. 1, (Dacca: December, 1972) 
PP. 89-97. 
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quarrels obtained. The existence of a number of trade unions affil-
iated directly or indirectly to the major political parties presented 
complexities. The trade union organisations which were associated 
withdeparties in opposition to the ruling party or not belonging to 
the government party wished to obtain control of the workers' organis-
ations in the nationalised enterprises with a view to exert political 
influence not only in industrial and economic matters but also on the 
general political affairs of the country. At the same time f the unions 
with affiliation with the ruling party tried to establish and exert 
influence in the undertaking where they had a good following and simul-
taneously wished to extend their influence where they did not have a 
majority following. They also brought political pressures on the 
management of the enterprise if need be. These currents and cross-
currents in the various nationalised industries caused a great deal of 
disharmony amongst the general body of workers. 	In the absence of a 
formal channel of negotiating disputes and discussing problems concerning 
the industry as a whole, union leaders tended to use unofficial channels 
exploiting their personal contact with high political figures. 	In 
responding to the requests of the union leaders the political leaders 
appeared to have undermined the authority of management of industrial 
enterprises and management of the nationalised enterprises could not 
steer clear of political manoeuvring of the unions. Under such circum-
stances it was difficult for a constructively motivated union leadership 
to mobilise all workers to productive efforts. 	Instead the labour 
problem became a major problem in the wake of Liberation69 . Expecta-
tions rose very high without appreciating the economic realities of a 
69 Finance, Report BJMC, op. cit. p. 31. 
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war devastated economy with very scant resources. 	Everyday at least 
one or two incidents of labour trouble would appear in the newspapers 
• in 1972 70 . 	There was a lack of discipline among the workers in 
general. There was a tendency to abstain from work on the slightest 
excuse. Labourers demonstrated negligence and did not even take 
appropriate care in handling machinery when they were irritated 71 . 
The workers showed indiscipline in all respects - timekeeping, concen-
tration in work, general behaviour and respect for instructions from 
the supervisors72 . The workers demanded wages that were simply beyond 
the capacity of the industries at the time. 	Delay in acceptance of 
demand often resulted in violence. Many unfounded claims of the years 
as far back as 1965 had to be reimbursed by the management under duress. 
In some cases, the management personnel became helpless and then tools 
in the hands of the labour 73 . 	Simultaneously, the labour leaders 
extorted undue facilities for themselves from the mill managements. 
Houses, cars, telephones and other facilities were too liberally used 
by the labour leaders. They got paid without work and even without 
work attendance. A certain labour leader took possession of a wheat 
crushing mill. There were 23 ration shops in the name of various 
labour leaders within the Adamjee Jute Mill premises alone 74 . The 
labour leaders occupied 412 out of 462 quarters in a government owned 
residential colony by use of sheer threats and intimidation. 	The 
70 Shahid Uddin Ahmed, "A Critique of Industrial Management in Bangla-
desh", The Business Review, Vol. I (January-April, 1973), p. 69-91. 
71 Enquiry Adamjee Jute, op. cit. 
72 Ibid. 
73 Finance, Report BJMC, op. cit. 
74 Enquiry Adardee Jute, op. cit. 
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supporters of labour leaders owned shops that were illegally constructed 
and which were to be later demolished. The dismissed workers on dif-
ferent charges had also to be reinstated under pressure from the labour 
leaders 75 . There have been many instances when statutory requirements 
were thrown overboard by workers to get their demands accepted by 
management76 . 	The nationalised enterprises had to absorb a host of 
redundant labour. Exmployment of labour much in excess of requirement 
added a new dimension to the prevalent lawless atmosphere after 
Liberation. The surplus labour 77 without any work and under the 
leadership of irresponsible labour leaders indulged in political 
activities and agitations. They kept the atmosphere charged with 
tension and would not allow the management to get down to work and give 
attention to production and connected issues. In addition to the drain 
on resources for the redundant employments the expenditure also increased 
in the form of ad-hoc reliefs and payment of bonuses when most of the 
industries were incurring heavy losses. Workers were paid one month's 
wage ex-gratia soon after Liberation. Over and above the workers who 
had participated in the Liberation War or who had abstained from working 
in the mills during the military occupation were paid 9 monthe wages. 
75 Ibid. 
76 Bangladesh Bank, Study Jute, op. cit. 
77 Compared to 1969-70, the jute industry had approximately 20,500 
surplus labour in 1973 involving an additional expenditure of Taka 
65 million per annum at the existing rate of wage. The average 
number of workers per operating loom increased to 8.07 in September, 
1973 from 6.60 in 1969-70. 	The number of excess workers in Septem- 
ber, 1973 on this basis was worked out to be 29,600 and resulting 
annual payment on account of them was Taka 92.5 million. See. 
Bangladesh Bank, Study Jute, op. cit., p. 56; The Textile Inquiry 
Committee found 5959 number of labour in excess to requirement in 
the textile mills with additional cost of Taka 14.3 million in 
1976. 
334 
Payment of advances on some pretext or other and extortion of money 
under coercion amounted to huge sums which had to be ultimately written 
off. While there was excess labour, some mills still had to pay 
overtime to the workers. There was apprehension of wide malpractices 
in this respect also and the management of the enterprises, the corpor-
ations or even the government could not make any firm move to gradually 
reduce the excess labour. Workers were dissatisfied with the new 
schedule of wages introduced in 1973. Price inflation further eroded 
the effect of real value of increase in money wages. Absence of a 
system of appropriate incentive payment and welfare measures, delay in 
implementing the proclaimed policy on workers' participation in manage- 
ment and lack of integrity and competence of some administrators combined 
to create a credibility gap in the mind of the worker. Some workers 
were also apprehensive about the concept of workers' participation in 
management which they deemed to be a surrender of the fundamental right 
of collective bargaining 78 . 
Despite the fact that rights of the industrial workers were duly 
provided in the Constitution and they were assured of a share of owner-
ship and management, industrial disputes led to frequent closures of 
the mills. A recent study 79 has shown that although Bangladesh has 
been experiencing a deteriorating industrial disharmony since 1947, the 
post-nationalisation period has been characterised with relative higher 
magnitude of industrial conflict than any other period before Liberation. 
The protection of wages has been the single most dominant cause of 
industrial dispute since Liberation and close correspondence between 
the movement of real wages and extent of industrial conflict showed no 
78 Interview with Shah Abdul Halim, Labour Leader, November, 1978. 
79 Nuimuddin, Industrial Conflict, op. cit. 
335 
sign of weakening80  . While in the face of a very drastic fall in 
real wages the industrial disputes came to occur as a perfectly normal 
response by the workerspthe old distrust of the management seemed to 
have persisted. The relationship between the enterprise management 
and the workers had to be maintained through invoking the use of State 
force. There was also a tendency of invoking the use of arms of law 
by the management against the labourers at every provocation 81  . This 
did not help to dissipate the mutual distrust, suspicion, doubt, fear 
and lack of understanding between the management and labour in the 
nationalised industries. The overall labour situation considerably 
improved by the end of 1975. The imposition of the Martial Law and 
the subsequent promulgation of the Industrial Relations Regulation 
Ordinance 1975 82 made significant differences to the nature of the 
organisation in the large scale industries. 	The trade unions starved 
of leadership with the embargo on the non-workers from being members 
of the trade unions 83 . 	Besides this, the important factor contributing 
to the relatively less industrial disharmony was the comparative price 
stability during 1975 and 1977. With price level rising in 1978 there 
were increasingly more signs of industrial unrest. 
The traditional antagonism between labour and management could 
not be done away with as was envisaged by the policy planners in Bangladesh. 
80 Ibid. 
81 Enquiry Adamjee Jute, op. cit. 
82 The Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1975 put several legal limitations. 
No new trade union could be registered, both in public and private 
sectors nor an election for determination of collective bargaining 
agent could be held, both in public and private sectors. 
83 Interview with Shah Abdul Halim, Labour Leader. As per section 6 of 
the Industrial Relations (Regulation) Ordinance, 1975 the non-workers 
were debarred from becoming members or office-bearers of any trade 
union unless it was a federation of trade unions, both in public and 
private sectors. 
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The government being the owner of the nationalised industries was 
indeed the employer of the industrial workers. In the event of a 
dispute or clash of interests it can no longer hold the ring, it is 
in the ring as one of the contestants 84 . The government admitted 
that the success of the industrial enterprises in the achievement of 
the national objectives depended to a large extent on the responses 
of the workers. It was also not unaware that a motivated labour 
force committed to raising productivity and sharing in the fruits of 
its efforts was an essential premise for nationalisation 85 . 	The FFYP 
maintained that to realise this the contradictions between labour and 
capital needed to be eliminated by associating the workers in the 
management of their enterprises. But according to the admission of 
the Planning Commission itself this assumption was not fully realised 86 . 
But more importantly, the government seemed to have been unable to 
recognize the psychological situation in which an average worker would 
view his employer "a remote incomprehensible abstraction" with the 
same indifference whether the ultimate authority rested with a capital-
ist owner or a state corporation 87 . Thus to an individual worker no 
visible change had taken place in the aspects of his welfare as a result 
of nationalisation rather the situation deteriorated immediately after 
Liberation88 . High expectations by the workers in the wake of nation-
alisation and the absence of an immediate redress of their sufferings 
contributed a sense of apathy and disenchantment in the labour force. 
84 J.A. Richardson, An Introduction of Study of Industrial Relations 
(London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1965), p. 380. 
85 FFYP, op. cit. p. 254. 
86 Ibid. 
87 Consultants, Adamjee Jute Mills, op. cit. 
88 Enquiry Adamjee Jute Mills, op. cit. 
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The inherited distrust of management could not be allayed and the 
management of the nationalised industries was unable to bridge the 
gap of credibility by inspiring the patriotic impulses of the workers 
which had earlier motivated them to participate in the Liberation War. 
Public Policy and Institutional Framework 
Formulation of a national labour policy defining the relation-
ship, mutual rights, obligations and responsibility of the workers and 
management would have helped bridge the gap. But this did not happen 
and a firm national policy on labour remained elusive through out the 
FFYP period. 	The existing policy and practices of organisations of 
workers into unions and of labour management relations were not 
conducive to the establishment of a sustained industrial harmony or 
to reach the avowed goal of socialism during the Mujib regime. 
The difficulties in bridging the gap between labour and manage-
ment instead became accentuated as there was a multiplicity of competing 
trade unions. The institutional and procedural framework for labour 
management relation in nationalised industries emanated from the right 
to work as guaranteed in the Constitution89 . The Constitution also 
provided for the right of every citizen to form associations or unions, 
subject to any reasonable restrictions imposed by law in the interests 
of morality or public order 90 . 	The provisions of various laws regu- 
lating industrial relations have been made applicable to the employees 
in the nationalised industries as in the private sector. 	Thus for 
example, The Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 did confer on both 
the workers and the employers the right to establish their respective 
89 Constitution, op. cit. Article 20. 
90 Ibid., Article 38. 
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trade unions and federations. In the case of multiple trade unions 
of workers in the same enterprise or industry the ordinance provided 
for determination of the Collective Bargaining Agent. For conciliation 
of labour disputes, government conciliation machinery existed under 
provisions of this Law. There were a number of labour courts to 
resolve labour disputes throtigh award and decisions under provisions 
of this law and also a Labour Appelate Tribunal. 	In cases 
where no Collective Bargaining Agent existed or unable to function y the 
Industrial Relations (Regulation) Ordinance, 1975 conferred the authority 
to constitute Consultative Committees with equal representatives of the 
workers and the employees. Apart from the statutory arrangements, some 
voluntary instruments like the Code of Discipline and Industrial Trade 
Resolution applied to the industries and regulated employer-employee 
relationship. However genuine grievances of the workers went unattended 
in the absence of a forum of discussion between the workers and the 
management because in practice a firm direction of policy in the govern-
ment was lacking. The government had prohibited strikes and lock-outs 
IA all enterprises since 1975 under the Emergence Power Rules, 1975. 
At the same time, fresh election to determine the Collective Bargaining 
Agent could not be held as meeting in the open public places were 
restricted since August 1975. No new trade union could be registered 
without prior direction of the government. The government had also 
taken away the rights of certain categories of the employees in public 
sector enterprises under the Emergency Powers Rules, 1975. The 
employees of the public sector employees who could perform trade union 
activities were however debarred from collective bargaining in respect 
of wage, bonus, leave, medical allowance, house rent allowance and 
conveyance allowance. The scope of collective bargaining was also 
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limited due largely to fixation of wages and allowances of the indus-
trial workers by the government on the basis of the recommendations 
of the various commissions and the promulgation of the State-owned 
manufacturing industrial workers (Terms and Conditions of Service) 
Act, 1974 and the Emergency Power Rules. 	It has been said that 
the trade union organisations become strong in large industries with 
larger capital investments and having important role with the economic 
91 life of the country. The scope of trade unionism and collective 
bargaining in Bangladesh nationalised industries however tended to be 
narrowed down despite the fact that the number of public sector enter-
prises increased. The large nationalised industries in Bangladesh 
could not become a good ground of trade unionism. 
Workers' Participation in Management  
In line with the official stand of the Awami League ruling elite 
on socialism, the Prime Minister declared on February 9, 1972 that 
measures of nationalisation would be combined with 
new arrangements to ensure workers' participation 
in the management of industrie8.92 
The Planning Commission initially set up a committee to formulate a 
policy for workers' participation in management. 	The Cabined decided 
in principle in June, 1972 that the workers would be allowed to partici-
pate in decision making process through their elected representatives. 
The role played by industrial labour class in the Liberation War and 
the subsequent radicalism and militancy which permeated the labour 
forces in Bangladesh made it imperative that measures were taken to 
91 Modh Afzal, "Public Enterprises and Trade Unions" in Nigam, op. cit. p. 204. 
92 Quoted in Rehman Sobhan and Muzaf far Ahmed, Public Enterprise in an 
Intermediate Regime, (Dacca: Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies) forthcoming. 
establish industrial democracy. 
The committee appointed by the Planning Commission recommended 
management Boards comprised of government and workers' representatives 93 . 
Accordingly, two elected representatives of the workers were to sit on 
the five member management Boards of all enterprises. It was envisaged 
that the workers would be given a share in the profits. 	The Labour 
Minister declared: 
*here will be no conflict of interests among the workers 
and the owners. The Management Boards will resolve all 
related matters of efficient management of industries 
except those of wage structure and financial benefits 
which the government will directly control in accordance 
with the recommendations of the national wages board. 94 
The policy remained, however, unimplemented. 	The Workers' partici- 
pation in management did not materialise because the issues as to whether 
the trade union elected as bargaining agent should nominate the repres-
entatives of workers or whether they should be separately elected 
remained unresolved. Moreover, professional managers in the national-
ised sector were yet far from being motivated or experienced. The 
workers themselves lacked a clear perception of their role in the 
changed context which was aggravated owing to their low level of educ-
ation or experience. 
In December, 1975 according to a modification in policy a consul-
tative committee was provided in each enterprise with equal represent-
ation from workers and employers to examine workers' grievances and 
suggest remedial measures. Essentially these steps fell far short of 
introducing a workers' participation and in 1976 the Cabinet Division 
93 Ibid. 
94 Shrama Neeti Gonoprojatantree Bangladesh Sarkar [in Bengali] (Labour 
Policy of the Government of Bangladesh) As per statement of Mr. Zahur 
Ahmed Choudhury, Minister for Labour and Social Welfare on 27.9.72. 
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Guidelines provided for Management/Enterprise Board as the "highest 
policy making body" at the enterprise level With representatives from 
the workers in the board 95 . The Management/Enterprise Board was to 
"have complete control over the...persammel functions except those of 
top mill managers which were held by corporations". 96 
The government's failure to declare a firm national labour 
policy during the First Plan period contributed towards making workers' 
participation in management of the natimalimi industries elusive. 
The ad-hoc labour policies announced from time to time were branded 
as "retrogressive" and "anti-labour" 97 . 	The absence of the right of 
the workers for collective bargaining and strike during both the Awami 
League and the military regime could not make workers' participation a 
practical instrument. As a result even as late as in October 1978 
the exercise to forumlate a national labour policy on the basis of 
tripartite consultations among the government, management and workers 
seemed pedantic. The tripartitie consultative committee was still 
beseized with the problems of identifying the extent and scope of 
workers participation in management at plant level, industries level, 
corporation level, national level, policy planning level etc. 98 This 
policy of procrastination only heightened the ambivalence of the govern-
ment on the objective of achieving an industrial democracy. The 
regulation formulated in 1978 constituting the Enterprise Boards for 
the nationalised mills did not contain a scope to have workers' 
95 Cabinet Division, Guidelines, op. cit., p. 10. 
96 Ibid. 
97 The Holiday, 15 October 1972; 7 December 1975 
98 Interview with Mr. S.A. Ashraf, Labour Advisor, 
and Social Welfare, Government of Bangladeshi in 
Also official papers in the ministry. 
and 9 March 1980. 
Ministry of Labour 
November, 1978. 
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representatives in such boards99 . Greaves pointed out that 
the concept of self-government in relation to 
nationalised industry does not connote absolute, 
arbitrary and exclusive authority to a junta of 
workers to impose their will by force. 100 
However, the Bangladesh experience demonstrated that the ruling 
elites both belonging to the Awami League and the Military Administra-
tion were fearful of the workforce and resultantly reluctant to intro-
duce democratic participation in industrial management. The Awami 
League followed a dubious policy so that smaller abandoned enterprises 
which were left outside the purview of nationalisation could be disposed 
of in favour of certain workers' co-operatives without ascertaining 
initial attempts to create a sense of community ownership. 	Similarly 
the Military Government while pursuing a vigorous policy of disinvest-
ment of some of the nationalised enterprises did not sell a single 
enterprise to any workers' co-operative. It was alleged 101 that while 
disinvesting some of the profitable enterprises to private entrepreneurs 
adequate attention was not paid to assess the value of assets and prop-
erties of such enterprises instead very liberal facilities in the 
form of part payment in nominal amount were provided to the private 
buyers. The government did not contemplate such transfers in favour 
of community ownership of workers as in Yugoslavia or China. But even 
the concept of democratic participation of workers in management was 
still far from implemented in practice. In not announcing a firm 
national labour policy both the governments demonstrated their reticence 
on the issues facing the nationalised industries. 	The hesitant steps 
99 The BJMC Enterprise Boards Regulations, prepared in January 1978 
was silent on the matter of workers' representatives in the Enter-
prise Boards to be constituted. 
100 H.R.G. Greaves, Democratic Participation and Public Enterprise 
(London: The Athlone Press, 1964), p. 26. 
101 See The Holiday, 13 July, 1980. 
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could only end up in results that were not to make the workers to be 
a purposeful, contributing and responsible force in increasing produc-
tivity and efficiency of the nationalised industries 102 . 
Summary Observation 
The nationalised industries had to face the dilemma to reconcile 
the demand of the rather ambivalent role as a model employer with the 
requirement of effective performance. 	In the absence of clarity in 
the objectives set by the government at the political level the policy 
planners could not be sure of the performance implications of the 
personnel practices. 	The existing system of recruitment, selection, 
appointment, promotion, education, training and career planning could 
not be moulded to the needs of the nationalised industries with a view 
to help coherent and smooth development for efficiency and productivity. 
The ability of the government simulatneously to remain a model employer 
and obtain some returns from its investment became tenuous. 
It seems that different or at least some additional criteria 
were required to bear upon the problems of personnel management if 
some social perspectives different from the private sector with its 
emphasis on commercial motives are assumed involving the objective of 
nationalisation. The existing civil service was not adequate to meet 
the personal needs in the long run. The transplantation of civil 
service values and attitudes and rigidities and thwarting of autonomy 
102 The "Labour Policy" - l' as announced by the Minister of Labour and 
Industrial Welfare of the first elected government in Bangladesh 
after the military coup of August 1975 merely contained intentions 
for creating a "greater sense of responsiblity among the workers" 
and of encouraging the "effective participation" in certain 
specified activities. 	See Government of Bangladesh, Labour 
Policy, (Dacca: Government Press, March, 1980), p. 4. 
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and initiative by government control created an atmosphere that resulted 
in a negation of pride and importance in the work despite it was in the 
public sector. 
A basic malaise of the nationalised industries as in the govern-
mental bureaucracy emanated from the absence of an appropriate reward 
system and the practice of inadequate penalty for bad work. There 
was not sufficient realisation about the need for fixing responsibility 
for results and also appraising results by objective criteria. 	The 
enterprise management had in practice scant authority allowing for 
flexibility in recruitment, appointment, promotion and disciplinary 
procedures. 	The enterprise management was uncertain if their action 
even if bonafide for betterment of the enterprise would be owned by 
the higher echelon. 
Nationalisation was expected to bring about a transformation in 
the attitudes of the workers and the employees. It was hoped that 
public ownership would inculcate puclic service and team spirit and 
also "integrate and personify the entire authority" of such public 
ownership at the lower level of management. The aspirations to 
permeate in the lower ranks of the industry a radical change in out-
look could not become a reality. 	It could hardly be said that nation- 
alisation created a new professional spirit among the administrators 
and imbued them with the idea of public service - combining high 
responsibility demanded of the civil servants with the drive and 
initiative of businessmen. 	The attempt to build up administrative 
and political cadres committed to the avowed socialism and familiar 
with its philosophy, principles and methods proved abortive with the 
fall of the Awami League regime. The various issues in respect of 
motivation of the enterprise management so that they exercise initiative 
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and enterprise when maximisation of private or personal profit was not 
the cardinal consideration remained unresolved. An appropriate system 
of incentives that affect the managerial personnel and the operators 
at all levels could not be developed. 
The government could neither view its role in industrial 
relations in terms of benevolent neutrality or non-intervention. 	The 
old values of industrial peace and economic freedom could not be 
supplanted by those of industrial efficiency and economic responsibility. 
These values were not sufficiently reflected in the efforts jointly 
made by the management of the nationalised industries and the indus-
trial workers. If transformation of labour relations was one of the 
main objectives, nationalisation was hardly able to provide a way of 
solution to industrial conflicts. 	The government's avowed intention 
to institute patterns of workers' participation in management was also 
constrained by several forces. 	The process of industrialisation 
itself was conditioned by the kind of the development route, the 
characteristics of the ruling elite, the conflicts of culture the nature 
of economic constraints, the historical timing and the way the labour 
force itself was developed. 
The declared intention of the Awami League Qovernment to intro-
duce the political cadres in the management of the nationalised indus-
tries was not congenial to development of a professional entrepreneurial-
managerial class as a career service. Preoccupation of the military 
regime with disinvestment of the nationalised enterprises resulted in 
an indifference towards evolving a long term personnel policy in the 
industries. Aspects of long term career planning for the budding 
public sector managerial class was thus ignored. Along with this, 
the government remained reticent as before on the question of a 
national labour policy or industrial democracy in the form of workers' 
participation in management. The government's stance of ad—hocism 
helpful though for gradual dismantling of the nationalised industries 
was a serious obstacle to evolving of an enduring manpower policy in 
the nationalied industries or for the public sector as a whole. 
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CHAPTER VII 
ASSESSMENT AND CONCLUSIONS 
Nationalisation and the nationalised industries in Bangladesh 
were influenced through the interactions of heterogenous elements. 
The complexity of social factors resulted in ambivalence in the ruling 
elites, absence of clarity in objectives and criteria of performance 
for the nationalised industries and a lack of commitment on the part 
of the ruling elites for the success of nationalisation. 	This final 
chapter is an attempt to recapitulate the basic scenario of nationalis-
ation of industries in Bangladesh through an analysis of some of the 
key problems and issues confronting the nationalised industries and an 
assessment of the nature and role of nationalisation in Bangladesh. 
A : SOME PROBLEMS AND ISSUES 
Uncertain Objectives  
The dimension of the activities of the State and their perspec-
tives have to be wider than those of the individuals as they concern 
national interests. 	The State policies as embodied in the Constitution, 
short and long run development plans and various economic policies bear 
the imprint of a multiplicity of objectives and attempt to resolve the 
conflicts of interest in the best possible manner. 	The nationalised 
industries as organs of the State are charged with a multiplicity of 
objectives - some of which may not be compatible with each other. A 
variety of purposes and nature of activities call for such diversity. 
In a situation when the objectives overlap or are mixed up between 
different types of activities criteria for operation and evaluation 
tend to become confused. 	Thus public utilities cannot be expected to 
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bear the same objectives of an import-substitution enterprise or of a 
plant belonging to basic industries group. Each industry can have 
its own objectives within the global area of the nationalised sector. 
Objectives of nationalisation and the nationalised industries are 
multidimensional. 	These have to be perceived as the concrete expres- 
sions of the needs of the society, who have direct or indirect interests 
in the growth and welfare of the nationalised industries. 	Indeed, the 
first step for an organisation is to lay down the objectives which 
provide direction, a framework and guidelines for performance of its 
functions and discharging its obligations. Objectives stated in clear 
terms facilitate the process of co-ordination and delegation and help 
evaluation. However, the aims and purposes of nationalisation 
are not always firmly delineated nor are the objectives of the nation-
alised industries clearly stated. Moreover, as Robson I pointed out, 
intended objectives at the time of nationalisation may change over a 
period of time. Even when public purpose is firmly established for 
a nationalisation progranne the question as to who determines the 
objectives or sub-objectives remain to be answered. Thus in Britain 
the management of the nationalised industries were relieved of the 
responsibility for wider policy considerations as contained in the 
government's following declaration: 
The government's objective is to secure the maximum 
social return on the capital invested while the 
industry's concern is properly with the financial 
return2 . 
1 W.A. Robson, "The Control of Nationalized Industries", National 
Westminster Bank Quarterly Review,(govember;1977), PP-646. 
2 U.K. White Paper: Nationalized Industries: A Review of Economic 
and Financial Objectives, Cmnd 3437, H.M.S.O. 1967, Paragraph 14. 
349 
However, as Garner 3 points out such a clear distinction between commer-
cial objectives and social objectives seems too simplistic. 	Thus in 
Britain it was suggested that 
nationalised industries should generally be expected 
to pursue a blend of social service, efficiency and 
financial objectives - objectives which can only be 
established satisfactorily through an in-depth dialogue 
between an individual nationalised industry and the 
government 
Setting of objectives for nationalised industries have, in addition, 
institutional consequences 5 such as equipping the government machinery 
or reoganising the nationalised enterprises and finally the question 
of political choice to be resolved by the Parliament if it exists or 
by the governing military elite. There are also technical problems 
involved in the establishment of objectives such as assumptions related 
to the objectives must be identified and so also the need for quanitfi-
cation of all objectives. These technical problemshave to be resolved 
if worthwhile objectives are to be established. 
Identification of objectives also becomes difficult since one 
must appreciate separately the broad national purposes of nationalis-
ation and the short and long run objectives of the nationalised indus-
tries as a whole as well as in terms of individual enterprises. 
Beacham stated that the nationalisation policies are 
in fact compounded of an odd mixture of socialist theory, 
liberal expediency and political empiricism 6 . 
3 Maurice R. Garner, "Role and Objectives of Public Enterprises"ip 
Performance Evaluation of Public Enterprises Report of a Seminar 
Organised by the Commonwealth Secretariat and the Institute of 
Development Management - Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, 3-7 April, 
1978 (London: Commonwealth Secretariat), p. 44. 
4 U.K. A Study of U.K. Nationalized Industries, (London: National 
Economic Development Office, Published by H.M.S.0.) 1976, p. 114. 
5 Garner, Public Enterprises, op. cit. p. 46. 
6 Beacham, op. cit. 
350 
The nationalised industries are expected to pursue socialist 
objectives and to run in the public interest on the one hand and to 
be efficient, cost conscious, profitable and flexible as private 
enterprise, on the other. The reconciliation of objectives presents 
formidable problems. 	In Bangladesh the broad national purpose of 
nationalisation was not stated in the nationalisation law. 	It simply 
mentioned in the preamble that it was "expedient" to nationalise. 
True, the Awami League ruling elite declared that the purpose of 
nationalisation was "to achieve the goals of socialism" and the 
"establishment of complete socialism" and to "bring revolutionary 
change in the industrial field". But ambiguity in the nationalisation 
law iteself as to the objective of nationalisation led to consequences 
which were adverse in their effects on the organisation, management and 
operation of the nationalised industries. 	Once nationalisation 
was effected its declared socialist premises were gradually forgotten, 
first with the aberrations of socialism and finally, the unambiguous 
policy of the military regime to expand the private sector with gradual 
replacement of the public sector. 	In the quagmire of all the policy 
reversals it was difficult to perceive what the objectives of national-
isation really were. 
Wu7 has suggested that like the broad national purpose, it is 
necessary to specify the objectives of the individual enterprises. 	In 
countries pursuing a development path in a planned framework the central 
planning machinery sets the objectives in the form of directives. 	The 
FFYP took note of declared socialist premises of nationalisation. 	The 
basic national objectives given in the FFYP was to reduce poverty. 
7 Chi-Yuen Wu, "Public Enterprises as an Instrument of Development", 
Journal of Administration Overseas, Vol. 6 (1967), pp. 149-58. 
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This objective could be attained through increase in output and income, 
more equitable distribution of income and a high rate of savings and 
accumulation. Accordingly, the FFYP pointed out that 
Clearly defined objectives must be set for each 
sector. 	Production targets, efficiency levels, 
cash surplus generation and other defined objectives 
should be spelt out for the corporations and by the 
corporations for the enterprises. 8 
In other words, the objectives set for the individual units were sought 
to be linked with first, the objectives for the nationalised industries 
and finally, with the national objectives and targets at the macro 
level. 	A host of factors were responsible for nationalisation. 	It 
was difficult to single out any particular determinant of nationalis-
ation - whether ideological or otherwise. It was a result of complex 
interactions. 	This made it difficult to pinpoint the objectives of 
nationalisation and inhibited the decision on the priority in the range 
of objectives which in turn led to inflated targets resulting in non-
fulfilment. But furthermore, performance could not be evaluated in 
the absence of clearly known objectives and their priorities. 
Reticence About Criteria of Performance  
The objectives themselves usually provide the criteria of perform-
ance and appraisal. But as suggested above the objectives have been 
inconclusively analysed and identified. Apart from ideology, the 
objectives seemed to shift in emphasis from social considerations at 
one end to commercial considerations at the other. 
Idang9 has observed that it would be inappropriate to insist 
8 FFYP, op. cit. p. 251. 
9 G.I. Idang, "The Nigerian Public Enterprises as Instruments of Socio-
economic policies: A Case Study of a Government Trading Company in 
the Cross River States of Nigeria" Indian Journal of Public Adminis-
tration, Vol. 24 (October-December, 1978), pp. 999-1015. 
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that the nationalised industries should only seek profit or that only 
economic criteria should apply. On the other hand "social criteria" 
alone cannot be made the sole foundation of policies. The most 
relevant question, as Idang puts it, is 
how far economic rationality can be introduced into 
the operations of the public enterprises without 10 impairing the capacity to provide social services . 
Implicit in the above suggestion is certain incompatibility between 
social and commercial considerations for the operation of the national-
ised industries. 	Indeed, Nove11 has stated strongly that commercial 
operation of nationalised industries raises a host of problems which are 
swept under the carpet or ignored. Maniatis 12 on the other hand 
thinks that social considerations present no serious problem and in no 
way impede the application of commercial standards. In Britain in 
the absence of a clear guidance in the statutes governing the national-
ised industries various Select Committees of the Parliament 13 sought 
to identify the social, economic and financial obligations of the 
nationalised industries. 	It was opined that the nationalised indus- 
tries should adhere to ubusiness principles "and should not take account 
of the "public interest". A distinction was made between "commercial 
10 Ibid. 
11 Alec Nove, Efficiency Criteria for Nationalized Industries, (London: 
George Allen & Unwin, 1973) p. 132. 
12 George C. Maniatis, "Social Calculus, Profitability and the Conduct 
of Public Corporations", American Journal of Economics and Sociology, 
Vol. 29, July, 1970, pp. 225-39. 
13 See C.D. Foster, Politics, Finance and the Role of Economics, An 
Essay on the Control of Public Enterprises, (London: George Allen & 
Unwin, 1971) especially pp. 12-19; A.H. Hanson, Parliament and Public 
Ownership, London: Hansard Society, 1961, pp. 125-174; M.R. Garner, 
"The White Paper on the Nationalised Industries", Public Administra-
tion, Vol. 57 (1979), pp. 7-20. 
353 
interest" and the "national interest" of the government. 	Even if the 
public corporations operating the nationalised industries were themselves 
to take the "public interest" into account, a definition of the 
term "public interest" is elusive and it is difficult to apply as a 
consistent standard 14 . 	In practice a variety of obligations are 
still placed on the nationalised industries in the name of the "public 
interest". 	The social and economic obligations of the nationalised 
industries invariably have link with and are in response to the national 
objectives for industry as a whole. 	It seems, however, the general 
objectives of nationalisation and the nationalised industries are not 
adequate to develop a criteria for measuring the performance of the 
nationalised industries. 	In these circumstances it becomes necessary 
to ensure that narrower standards of performance are attained and the 
enterprises achieve a certain level of performance in their commercial 
operations, a level measured by financial results or by general standards 
of management and services. 
However this kind of appraisal of performance is a complex and 
interrelated process. As Maniatis has observed, there is no unanimity 
regarding the meaning of the efficiency standard for the public enter-
prises15 . 	Sidney Webb 16 had recommended three methods to measure the 
efficiency of public enterprises namely, accurate measurement, complete 
publicity and continuous comparison. But the catalogue of difficulties 
17 for implementing these methods is formidable. Of various criteria 
   
14 Parmanand Prasad, "Efficiency and its Evaluation in Public Enterprises" 
Indian Journal of Public Administration, Vol. 7 (1961) pp. 39 -56. 
15 George C. Maniatis, "Evaluation of Operative Efficiency in Italian 
Public Undertakings", EConomica Interrazionale, Vol. 20 (1967) pp. 
111-119. 
16 Sidney Webb, quoted in A.H. Hanson, "Report on the Reports - The 
Nationalized Industries 1950-51", Public Administration, Vol. 30 
(1952), pp. 11-f-30. 
17 Prasad, op. cit. 
advocated "the most easily and obviously applied" according to 
Paranjape18 , is the profitability of the enterprise. In addition, 
the rate of return on investment, surplus in public enterprise, minim-
isation of costs, achievement of production targets, supply of foreign 
exchange especially for the developing countries have been suggested. 
If there is conflict between the different criteria it can be resolved 
through clearly laying down the priority between different objectives. 
Similarly, a large number of norms and standards might be provided for 
the purpose of evaluating efficiency within the various layers of the 
enterprises. In Bangladesh, no clear guideline was available on the 
criteria for performance evaluation of the nationalised industries. 
Awareness of the need for efficiency in the nationalised industries 
and evaluation of performance was discernible in the following state-
ment in the FFYP: 
...the efficiency of the Public Sector is critical 
for the success of the industrial sector programme19 . 
and 
Absence of precise targets makes it difficult to 
evaluate performance, motivate workers and correct 
lapses" 20 . 
But beyond the above the FFYP did not identify any criterion for perform-
ance and evaluation in respect of the nationalised industries. Accord-
ing to Ahmad, capacity utilisation was used as the measure of efficiency 
for the nationalised industries in the FFYP 21 . The need to increase 
productive efficiency was emphasized in the wake of dislocations in 
18 H.K. Paranjape, "Measurement of Management in the Public Sector" 
Indian Journal of Public Administration, Vol. VI, 1960, pp. 159-175. 
19 FRIT, op. cit., p. 250. 
20 Ibid., p. 251. 
21 Q.K. Ahmad, Nationalised Industries, op. cit. 
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productive machinery caused during the Liberation War. But as Alamgir 
rightly observed, this could not remain as the only criterion over the 
long run22 . While the Nationalisation Order remained silent on the 
matter, the Cabinet Division Guideline laid down that a public corpor-
ation vested with nationalised industries was 
to operate on commercial consideraion, having due 
regard to national interests, in the most efficient 
and economic manner; within the policy framework 
and guidance given by the Government. 23 
and that 
Commercial potentials and economic viability shall 
be the primary considerations in deciding the 
operational policy. 24 
The prescription laid down in the Cabinet Division Guideline was 
actually an exercise in semantics. 	One tended to get lost in the 
cobweb of such terms as "commercial consideration", "national interest" 
"most efficient manner" and "the policy framework and guidance given 
by the Government". Each of these phrases needed explanation and if 
possible quantification to arrive at a meaningful conclusion in perform-
ance evaluation. The Cabinet Guidelines did not provide a clue and 
one is confounded more with contraventions than adherence to the 
Guidelines. 
The FFYP set a target for nationalised industries to generate 
a surplus but this was as a means of augmenting the domestic resources 
for the Plan. 	It was not a consciously set performance criterion. 
Although the FFYP envisaged that "all existing projects in the public . 
sector" would have to "guarantee" a fixed return of 7.5 per cent of 
the original investment, it failed to provide a conceptual framework 
22 Q.K. Ahmad, Nationalised Industries, op. cit. 
23 Alamgir, Nationalised Industries, op. cit. 
24 Cabinet, Guidelines, op. cit. 
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of performance criteria in the nationalised industries. 	In the 
absence of a legislative process for most of the period under study 
the parliamentary committees which could have otherwise indicated the 
criteria, did not materialise. Even if the parliamentary proceedings 
were not suspended it is doubtful if the parliamentarians would have 
taken as much pains. 	The records of parliamentary discussions in 
Bangladesh do not indicate a keenness on the part of the legislators 
to probe the problems of the nationalised industries in depth. 
The Bangladesh nationalised industries nevertheless have been 
subject to sharp criticism for their performance. 	The argument 
against the nationalised industries derived its strength largely from 
their failure to earn profits. 	But the objectives of public and 
private enterprises are different both in degree and in character. 
For a private enterprise, at least from the viewpoint of shareholders, 
profitability is a conclusive measure of performance. Public enter-
prises do, however, have to face the dilemma of commercial profitabil- 
ity and national profitability. 	They are bound by a host of objec- 
tives which are not necessarily their own as enterprises. 	Moreover, 
if profitability was to be a measure of performance, profitability and 
inefficiency are not always mutually exclusive. Efficiency is also 
needed to be judged by other criteria such as labour productivity, 
cost reduction, machine efficiency, realisation of production targets 
or reduction of wastages. A comparable analysis of public and private 
enterprises which was often sought would have been liable to be 
prejudiced by the fact that private sector was also nurtured by the 
government and various public sector institutions and the private 
sector received hidden subsidies in the name of promotion. On the 
other handoublic sector had to live with elements of avoidable costs, 
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tied aid and imposed consultancy. 	In addition f private sector was 
not subject to the same degree of government control and supervision. 
It was also doubtful if criterion of profit alone was meaningful in 
a scarcity market of the sort that Bangladesh was after the Liberation 
and when an enterprise abiding by government regulations earned less 
while the other enterprises could reap the scarcity premium through 
finding ways of subverting those regulations. 
Clearly, in evaluating performance of the nationalised enter-
prises in a mixed economy 25 , there is a need to be aware of the multiple 
objectives. A distinction has to be made between the private profits 
of the enterprise concerned and the social profits. 	It would be 
advisable to be aware of the social milieu, the economic constraints, 
the political environment, the administrative traditions and practices 
surrounding the operation of the nationalised industries. 	It has 
been said elsewhere that many public enterprises 
generate a lot of external economies, the positive 
results of which are not reflected in their balance 
sheets but show up rather in the strengthened oper-
ational accounts of the private enterprises. 26 
It was not, under the circumstances of Bangladesh nationalised industries, 
to be different. Hanson pointed out that to improve the overall per-
formance of public enterprises, they should be 
adequately financed, provided with experienced and 
qualified personnel, given a suitable organisational 
structure, ensured that they attain the maximum 
possible efficiency and effectiveness, and subjected 
to adequate (but not excessive) controls. 27 
25 See for example, Pryke, Public Enterprise, op. cit.; also Hughes, 
Mixed Economy, op. cit.; Shanks, Public Enterprise, op. cit.; 
Jenkins, Power; Boyson, Nationalisation, op. cit. 
26 Abotayde, quoted in Idang, Nigerian Public Enterprise, op. cit. p.1015. 
27 A.H. Hanson, Public Enterprise and Economic Development, (London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1965), p. 204. 
An objective assessment of the Bangladesh experience in 
nationalisation would, therefore, require probity and pragmatism 
and not just ideological predispositions or mere expediency. 	The 
economy of Bangladesh was in a critical stage of transition in which 
several issues and problems had to be faced and resolved. A unique 
combination of political, economic and social circumstances came to , 
constitute a formidable challenge in a highly complex and difficult 
situation. A clear vision of the future society for Bangladesh 
remained elusive. 	The plan strategies became uncertain. Low per 
capita income inhibited expansion of domestic market despite an 
explosive rate of population growth. 	Simultaneously, poor natural 
resource endowments constrained enlarged production programme for the 
industries. Lack of firm decisions regarding the relative status of 
the public and private sectors in the economy helped to demoralise the 
managerial classes. Any attempt to evaluate rigourously the operation 
of the nationalised industries cannot ignore these factors. 
The Maze of Economic Policies  
The economy of Bangladesh remained virtually stagnant for various 
decades. 	It was frequently said that Bangladesh was not a viable 
economic unit. The economy was crippled and the economic situation 
was worse 'than at any time in the past at the time of Liberation. 
Economic activity declined and development was in fact, "reversed". 
The investment efforts during the two decades of planned development 
before Liberation proved to be inadequate to provide solution to the 
general or specific problems of the economy. 	In the lop-sided growth, 
28 Report on the "Mission of High-Level United Nations' Consultants 
to Bangladesh", March-April, 1972 p. 4, quoted in IBRD, Rural Economy, 
op. cit. p. 17. 
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contribution of the agriculture sector towards GDP declined whereas 
industry regarded as the catalyst for accelerating economic growth 
remained nearly static 29 . 	In agriculture, little progress was made 
towards adoption of modern technology and production remained at the 
mercy of nature. Public investment in irrigation and supply of 
inputs had been limited compared to the size of the problem. Private 
investment in agriculture was also meagre. The prevailing land tenure 
system, with a high degree of land concentration in non-cultivating 
strata of rural population, decremental trend in the average size of 
farm holdings which was already uneconomic and an increasing number 
of landless population, was a major obstacle to overcome. 	The succes- 
sive governments shyed away from undertaking a meaningful land reform. 
Shortfall in agricultural production resulted in a need to import food-
grains costing as much as 26 per cent of the import bills 30 . Payments 
for national imports, on the other hand, exceeded nearly three times 
the amount earned through exports 31 . Balance of Payments position 
remained precarious. The situation was desperate in early 1972 when 
as a new born state Bangladesh found itself without any international 
reserve at all32 . Public savings during the entire FFYP period had 
been actually negative 33 . The level of subsidy in the economy was 
staggering. An obvious implication of negative public savings was 
29 Year Book 1979, op. cit., p. 237 Table 5.1. 
30 Review 1978, op. cit. pp. 204-5, See Appendices. 
31 /bid. 
32 Year Book 1979, op. cit. p. 317, Table 7.22. 
33 According to a World Bank estimate the extent of negative public 
savings in Bangladesh was Take 1115 million on average every year 
during 1973-77 period. 	The level of actual subsidy to the economy, 
according to the same estimate was Take 15180 million during 1973- 
78 period. See The Holiday, 2 July, 1978. 
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that foreign aid not only financed the development budget but also met 
a good deal of current expenditures of the government. The government's 
difficulty in even meeting the financial obligations was apparent as 
only 24 per cent of public expenditures could be financed through 
mobilisation of domestic resources 34 . 
While agriculture sector failed to provide the base for capital 
accumulation, industrial development programme tended to become chron-
ically dependent on foreign assistance. The large scale and modern 
industrial sector was essentially developed through tied-aid financing 
and State sponsored private capitalism during the pre-Liberation period. 
These industries were characterised by factor proportions that were not 
in tune with factor endowments, inappropriate technology, and under-
utilised capacity. Much of this legacy was to be borne by the nation-
alised industries later. 	In all possible ways, a major proportion of 
foreign aid was utilised for sustaining the rather superficial indus-
trial set-up which grew over the years. Machinery and accessories 
were procured through foreign aid from the same countries as such 
assistance might have originated from and thus aid given as loan was 
rerouted to the donor country 35 . 	The fact that Bangladesh industries 
were not self-sustaining added to the dependence on a life line of 
imports. Almost every industry required spare parts and components 
which were to be imported. Furthermore, industry was not geared to 
the needs of agriculture or development in rural areas which could have 
opened up avenues of employment of the vast number of surplus labour in 
the rural areas and introduced modern technology. 	On the other hand, 
the cottage and small scale industries which constituted important 
34 Review 1978, op. cit., p. 21-2. 
35 The New Nation, 21 January, 1979. 
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adjuncts to the industrial structure and provided an alternative source 
of earnings and livelihood for a large number of rural population, 
continued to be obsessed with simple production technique and devoid 
of innovation, vigour and dynamism. 
Dependency relationship with foreign donor countries was a root 
cause of economic stagnation. 	The chronic deficit in the balance of 
trade was met by large volume of foreign aid, grants and loans. 	The 
gap gradually widened because, among other things, the rate of increase 
of the prices of export commodities could not keep pace with the rise 
in import prices. An essential prescription of the donor agencies 
was the retention of a traditional agriculture and a limited growth 
of manufacturing sector oriented towards the needs of the urban consumers 
and dependent on capital-intensive borrowed technology. 	In addition, 
an estimated 16 per cent of foreign aid was repatriated to the donor 
countries as various consultancy fees and services rendered 36 . 	The 
total debt service liability of Bangladesh went on increasing rapidly 
and constituted 10 per cent of total foreign exchange earnings in 1976-77 
and 15.3 per cent the year next 37 . 	Imports of regular industrial raw 
materials caused another drain of scarce resources. Usually the loans 
were tied requiring that the same be spent exclusively in the country 
or countries mentioned under the terms of agreement. The debt-servicing 
repayment of the principal as well as the interests was made from the 
slender hard currency earned from exports of primary and semi-manufac-
tured products. The pattern of aid absorption in the form of food and 
36 The Holiday, 26 November 1978; Estimate made by the Project Imple-
mentation Bureau of the Ministry of Planning. 
37 Year-wise debt service liability of Bangladesh increased from U.S. 
$17.50 million in 1973-74 to $65 million in 1977-78 and $81 million 
in 1978-79, Seven Years of External Assistance to Bangladesh, 
Government of Bangladesh, Ministry of Planning, (June 1978) pp. 37-8; 
The New Nation, 14 May, 1978. 
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commodity assistance accentuated the debt burden and failed to create 
necessary productive capacity for servicing debts and a viable base 
for self-sustaining economic growth. Steps taken to mobilise resour-
ces for debt servicing and reducing trade imbalances suffered from 
contradictions. 	In view of the shortage of essential commodities in 
the domestic market it was questionable as to what extent export of 
marginally surplus commodities could be advocated. 	Not much progress 
was made in respect of import-substitution industries either. Low 
level of industrialisation, under-utilisation of capacity and near 
stagnation in the other sectors of the economy left no option but to 
import certain essential commodities in the face of a huge trade gap. 
; Simultaneously, dependence on foreign aid could not hold much 
hope for the transition, transformation and development of the economy. 
The promises of self sufficiency under such a framework remained a 
delusion during the entire course of "planned development". 
The problem of inflation haunted the economy and was perhaps 
the single most important crisis in post-1971 Bangladesh 38 . 	Rise in 
prices were due among other things, to the influence of higher costs 
of imported commodities, increased flow of funds for development activ-
ities, high government expenditure, poorly regulated exports of some 
commodities resulting in scarcity in domestic markets, operation of 
the Wage Earners' Scheme, selling of import permits, import of non-
productive consumer-oriented goods, liberal bank credits and higher 
internal procurement price of paddy. But most important causes were 
the increase in money supply as the government resorted to deficit 
financing, and decline in production, smuggling and exports of marginally 
38 For Consumer Price Index 1970-1980 see Appendices , Table I based 
on Survey 1980, op. cit., p. 270 & 273. 
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surplus commodities 39 aggravated the situation. There was no effective 
organisational arrangement for containing the price situation and ensuring 
the supply of essential commodities. Nor did the government have a 
definite price policy. High rates of unemployment and under-employment 
and abysmally low per capita income further deteriorated the below subsis-
tence level of living conditions in a galloping inflationary situation. 
In the absence of mineral resources or such other raw materials which 
could possibly be exploited for economic and industrial development Bangla-
desh faced a gigantic task in nation building in the 1970's. 
The operation and performance of the nationalised industries in 
Bangladesh were inevitably constrained by the various facets of the 
economic policies pursued and several hindrances to development imposed 
by the lack of natural endowments. 	Thus poverty in general and the 
lack of purchasing power stunted effective demand which not only 
inhibited an expansion of productive capacity but also led to under- 
utilisation of existing capacity in the nationalsed industries. 	The 
avowed intention of reducing unemployment/underemployment could scarcely 
materialise. Need to give relief to consumers meant government imposed 
price control at the expense of the economics of production. Production 
activity was further hampered due to shortage of industrial raw materials, 
spare parts, machinery and chemicals as huge deficits in the balance 
of payments made foreign exchange extremely scarce. 	Inadequate inter- 
national demand for the major items of exports - particularly jute 
goods, due to competition from synthetics and poor market 
promotion tended to force the nationalised industries to sell at 
depressed prices. 	In desperation to meet its balance of payments 
39 Price Stabilisation, op. cit. TYP, op. cit., p. 66; White Paper on 
Economic Situation of Bangladesh, Government of Bangladesh: Presi-
dent's Secretariat, September, 1975, 1975, p. 5. 
364 
obligations the government had to subsidize heavily the jute indus-
tries. The need for augmenting the international reserve position 
further forced the government to encourage directly or indirectly, a 
brain drain in the form of exports of skilled manpower resulting in a 
loss of efficiency in the industries in a situation when efficiency 
standard maintained was already low. Dependence on foreign aid 
resulted in imposed consultancy and imports from predetermined sources 
caused cost escalation. 	It also caused other bottlenecks such as the 
incompatibility of the imported spare parts and machinery. The 
exports and import policies, the fiscal policies and the industrial 
policies themselves as pursued by the government often proved inimical 
to the interests of the nationalised industries. 
Lack of Clear Development Strategies  
With political sovereignty the people hoped to transform their 
political, economic and social institutions in order to improve the 
material and cultural standard and to maximise the growth rate of the 
economy. 	In this, like any other people,the people of Bangladesh had 
had their preferences in certain values and ideologies. 	Undoubtedly, 
the modern phase of development in Bangladesh began with its association 
with the Western capitalist culture. 	But the exposure of Bangladesh 
to capitalism had, due to historical reasons taken place against a backdrop 
of political subjections and economic exploitation during both British 
and Pakistani periods. As an inevitable reaction, socialistic ideas 
and values germinated and the appeal of socialistic model of development 
was enhanced. The capitalist path of development became a suspect in 
popular mind. 	The conceptual framework of socialism to be practised 
in Bangladesh however remained hazy. Planning and development strategy 
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and economic policies were interpreted in terms of socialism even though 
there were pragmatic factors which could explain perhaps as much. 
The declaration of socialism as one of the four pillars of the 
State by the Awami League, a party basically with capitalist orientation 
was itself ironical. Earlier during the pre-Liberation period its Six 
Point Formula was seen, notwithstanding the political implications, as 
a "magna carta" for the future industrial tycoons of Bangladesh ° . 
The party leaders' conception of socialism had no relation with the 
fundamental issues concerning the ownership of the means of production. 
Neither could the party live up to its promise of nationalisation of 
jute trade when saddled with power earlier during Pakistan period 41 . 
After Liberation nationalisation was asserted as steps towards socialist 
transformation. 	Because of its character and composition the Awami 
League from the very beginning was not equipped to implement 
a socialisation programme. There was no total mobilisation of resources 
nor were property relations abolished or drastically altered. 	The 
Constitution merely categorised three types of property in broadest 
terms. The political leadership continued to remain with the Awami League 
which had abiding interests in rentier property, commercial capitalism 
and other financially rewarding private pursuits. The management of 
the state undertakings continued to remain with professional managers, 
technocrats and bureaucrats, and workers' participation in manage-
ment was absent. A lack of emphasis on agriculture could easily be 
discerned in the policies of the Awami League. In an economy where 
agriculture constituted the major part, mobilisation of resources could 
not be complete without taking meaningful efforts in agriculture. 	But 
40 The Holiday, 3 April 1966. 
41 The Awami League—United Front Party had promised nationalisation of 
jute trade in 1954.- Supra., Introduction. 
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the policies of the Awami League tended to retain the traditional struc-
ture in agriculture and shyed away from introducing collectivisation 
and co-operatives in the field. 	Inadequate mobilisation of resources 
resulted in unhealthy dependence on foreign aid, thus frustrating the 
socialistic premises of the government. 	The proprietorship of the 
means of production is a criterion that provides unequivocally the 
possibility to differentiate the various socio-economic system42 . 
Csikos-Nagy made an estimate on the distribution of capital on a world 
scale between state, co-operative and private ownership. 	The order 
of magnitude established was: 
TABLE 23 
The Sectoral System of the World Economy 43 
Sector 	Capitalist World Socialist World Developing Countries 
State Ownership 15 60 10 
Co-operative Ownership 10 30 5 
Private Ownership 75 10 85 
Total 100 100 100 
Based on sectoral composition of GDP the corresponding ratio in Bangladesh 
was estimated approximately at 18 for public ownership and 82 per cent 
for private ownership 44 . Thus in terms of physical composition alone, 
the economy of Bangladesh was more capitalistic than socialistic. 
Wilczynski45 pointed out the characteristics of the socialist economic 
system as distinct from the capitalist system. Concentration of power 
in the working class, social ownership of the means of production includ-
ing land, manufacturing industries, natural resources,banking,finance, 
42 Bela Scikos-Nagy, Socialist Economic Policy, (London: Longman, 1973) 
P. 67. 
43 Ibid., p. 67. 
44 Muzaf far, Public Enterprise, op.cit. 
45 J. Wilczynski, The Economics of Socialism, (London: George Allen & 
Unwin, 1977, pp. 22-23. 
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and domestic and foreign trade; central economic planning with the 
market mechanism largely replaced by or at least supplemented with 
economic planning and finally, socially equitable distribution of 
national income with property/rentier incomes virtually abolished. 
The economic system prevalent in Bangladesh could not fully fit in 
with this model. 
The constitutional goal of achieving socialism through parlia-
mentary democracy was contradictory in many respects. Authority of 
the parliament itself was curbed due to the existence of a constitutional 
provision empowering the President to enact laws. Absolute majority 
in the parliament of one party and the undisputed charisma and authority 
of the Prime Minister Mujibur Rahman turned the parliament into a house 
of the mutes46 . 	The fundamental rights guaranteed in the constitution 
were restricted by condition that virtually negated the existence of 
such rights. 	The framers of the Constitution sought to emulate the 
Indian and British variety of democratic socialism. 	Because of the 
inner contradictions of the party in power this turned out to be 
deceptive. British socialism had its roots in distinctively British 
ideas and British institutions and was evolutionary 47 . Socialism as 
embodied in the Indian constitution had behind it a long tradition of 
political process 48 . Bangladesh had no such enduring tradition in 
46 The Holiday, 13 October 1972. 
47 Harold Wilson, The Relevance of British Socialism, (London: Weiden-
feld & Nicolson, 1964). 
48 Shallkar Ghose, Socialism and Communism in India, (Bombay: Allied 
Publishers, 1971). 
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respect of socialist ideas49 . Even after the Liberation there were 
onlya few academic and political discussions in Bangladesh on the 
implications of socialism or nationalisation 50 . The Planning Commis-
sion sought to formulate the tasks in socialist reconstruction but 
essentially the planners had to work in an environment lacking "polit-
ical consensus" and "without a firm political commitment". Under such 
circumstances in Bangladesh it was not possible to experience socialism, 
to use the words of Corrigan, 
as a more collective, more egalitarian, more 
conscious transformation of circumstances and 
people. 51 
Planning and Nationalisation 
Planning is organically linked with nationalisation. 	The 
emphasis placed by the government on planning and development becomes 
a ground for nationalisation. In an economy subjected to a compre-
hensive master plan, a large public sector and a good number of public 
enterprises are useful agents for attaining the plan objectives. As 
Katzarov52 pointed out, the most important factor in the national plan 
49 See Franda, Regional Politics, op. cit.; Maniruzzaman, Radical 
Politics, op. cit.; Badruddin Umar, Bangladeshe Communist 
Andoloner Shamahsya [in Bengali] (Dacca: Mowla Brothers, 
1976. 
50 Academic discussion on socialism and nationalisation seems rare in 
Bangladesh. On socialism see Franda, op. cit., Maniruzzaman, Radical 
op.cit.,Anisur Rahman, Socialist Development, op. cit., On national-
isation Sobhan and Ahmad, Public Enterprise, op. cit. 
51 P. Corrigan, "Review Article on Socialist Construction" Journal 
of Contemporary Asia, Vol. 6, 1977, pp. 477-487. 
52 Katzarov, op. cit. p. 249. 
369 
for any nationalised economy is its extent; the plan influences the 
public sector and state agencies, whole of administration, state 
projects and undertakings as well as for individuals and corporations. 
Nationalisation thus provides "an excellent opportunity" for the 
formulation of a comprehensive industrial development plan in Bangla-
desh53 . 
A definitive evaluation on the relationship of nationalisation 
and planning in Bangladesh at this point in time may, however, be 
precocious. The ideological foundation of a national plan has not 
been resolved nor can the Bangladesh economy be branded as "planned" 
in terms of socialist semantics. 	This, despite the fact that Bangla- 
desh had a FFYP, a commitment to pursue its development goals in the 
framework of a twenty-year perspective plan and more than a decade of 
planning experience before. The FFYP failed to outline a precise 
purpose in planning by way of suggesting direct measures. 	The plan 
proposals did not emanate from any deeply held ideological convictions. 
As has been shown the plan proposals were heterogeneous, contradictory 
and far from perceptive of the objective situation54 . As Lewis 
mentioned about British planning: it was not coolly calculated, finely 
drawn socialist blueprint - it was plain democratic muddling 55 . 
Nationalisation on a very extended front of large and various 
sizes of industries added the problem of economic responsibility to 
the responsibility of the political state. Under nationalisation the 
entire industry becomes a single unit merging the problems of the firm 
53 Alamgir, Nationalised Industries, op. cit. 
54 Panel on TYP, op. cit. 
55 B.V. Lewis, British Planning and Nationalization, (New York: The 
• Twentieth Century Fund, 1952) 
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with the problems of the economy. 	The economic responsibility of the 
State tends to be more easily identified in nationalisation. 	National- 
isation becomes a more confident and direct display of precise purpose 
of planning. 
Musolf sought to examine the importance of national planning as 
a criterion for relating public ownership to national development 56 . 
Ehlrich attempted an evaluation of the relationship between planning 
and nationalisation57 . The answers to be sought were: 
(a) how closely the plans were pursued for nationalisation? 
(b) how successful were the public corporations in realizing their 
yearly plans and overall objectives? 
(c) how helpful was the control over nationalised industries in 
achieving plans? 
Performance of the nationalised industries could be quantified 
and assessed in terms of the FFYP targets. 	But the political issues 
involved in economic planning remained unresolved even after two 
major long term planning exercises in the form of the FFYP and the TYP 
were undertaken by the end of 1978. Resulting ambiguity was not 
congenial to the plans for implementation of nationalisation programme. 
The FFYP suffered from inner contradictions and the position taken by 
the planners were often anomalous. While the FFYP talked about 
socialism t its heavy reliance on external aid belied two of the essen-
tial tenets of socialism - self-reliance and mobilisation of domestic 
resources. The plan programmes and policies in agricultural and 
industrial sectors echoed in many respects the earlier capitalism-
oriented Pakistan period plans. Nor the military regime could resolve 
56 L.D. Musolf, "Public Enterprise and Economic Planning", George 
Washington Law Review, Vol. 35 (1966), pp. 362-77. 
57 H.B. Ehlrich, Planning Under Nationalization: British Theory Plan 
and Practice, Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Rutgers University, 1956. 
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the fundamental issues of long term economic planning. It sought to 
confront the economic issues with mere ad-hoc policies. 	The set of 
measures that was initiated by the military rulers could not have 
hoped to change the status quo. 	In the absence of a political process 
no national conviction on important issues emerged or could be discerned. 
The framers of the TYP urged for political decision for long term plan-
ning - the Second Five Year Plan (SFYP) and the 20-year Perspective 
Plan. However, if the FFYP was a soliloquy on the possibility of a 
democratic transition to socialism in Bangladesh, the TYP was an 
expression of utter bewilderment as the military rulers on their part 
remained silent on major economic issues. Rationale for framing and 
launching a two year plan was stated as to make room for a breathing 
space for clear thinking to enable a transition to a long term pers-
pective plan from 1980 onwards. 	Instead of clearing the vision the 
TYP remained virtually an extension of the FFYP in so far as the 
objectives and priorities or strategies were concerned 58 . 	It followed 
the same conventional and bureaucratic and technocratic planning59 . 
There were, as before, strong elements of contingencies and the same 
heavy dependence on foreign aid despite the oft-repeated desire and 
declarations of self-reliance. 	The TYP could not, in the absence of 
specific political guidelines, firmly or even at least vaguely deliberate 
on issues such as the public versus private sector, controversies about 
nationalisation, denationalisation and disinvestment, foreign aid, land 
reforms, modernisation and transformation of the agriculture sector. 
Instead, the TYP added to the already existing confusions by virtue of 
its vague stance on the public sector and the hesitant support extended 
58 Panel on TYP, op. cit. 
59 Ibid. 
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towards it. Dependent on foreign assistance the TYP had to succumb 
to the free enterprise lobby both national and international. 	It 
was ironical that the TYP envisaged a development programme which 
contained a public sector component of 84 per cent in the industrial 
field despite its lack of faith in public ownership. 
Public and Private Sectors  
The debate over the role of the private sector versus the public 
sector agitated the scene throughout the First Plan period. 	As a 
result of nationalisation, the share of the private sector in the 
industrial economy in terms of ownership of fixed assets in the modern 
industrial sector dwindled to 12.1 per cent from 58.2 per cent in 1969- 
7060 . 	In spite of a sizeable public sector in transport, finance 	and 
foreign trade, private ownership was predominant in agriculture sector 
accounting for 60 per cent of value added; transport and construction, 
domestic trade in raw jute; wholesale and retail trade; indenting business, 
imports, tea industry which included considerable British interests and 
in small and cottage industries. The upper strata of the urban middle 
classes suffered due to nationalisation but the surplus farmers and 
the commercial traders discovered that they could still congeal their 
position and make capitalistic advances. 	These were the elements 
which sought to keep the debate on the public versus private sector 
open from the very beginning of nationalisation in Bangladesh when 
the issue seemed resolved once for all. 
The arguments against a dominance of the private sector in 
industry stemmed from the fact that the meagre Bengali "big" 
60 Sobhan and Ahmad, Public Enterprise, op. cit. 
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entrepreneurship was the result of a "neo-colonial policy" during the 
Pakistani administration. The government functioned as a "wet nurse" 
and the private sector had to be nurtured into good health on tonics 
prepared by the Ministry of Industries. Mackey examined the thesis 
that private investment was the key to economic well being and concluded 
that due to organised pressures from big business the government 
succumbed in resorting to the policy of stimulating private investment 61 . 
This policy of stimulating private investment by the government under 
pressure increased the monopoly power of large corporations, weakened 
the relative position of small business, and led to a misallocation of 
resources in the economy. The industrial process in Bangladesh seems 
to be a literal exposition of this thesis. 	In the context of agricul- 
tural character and surplus population in the economy such government 
stimulations to private sector would have been meaningful if directed 
to small and cottage industries. However as Ditullio has shown the 
government during Pakistan period did not regard small industries as 
an important vehicle to further economic growth and development in 
spite of the fact that small manufacturing units tend to employ labour 
intensive technologies 62 . 
Having been already deprived of their ownership of industrial assets, 
to which they had made scant contribution whether in terms of invest-
ment or entrepreneurial acumen,a section of the Bengali middle class 
mounted a concerted campaign so that pre-Liberation policy of growth 
by inducement and stimulation to the private sector was restored. 
61 M.C. Mackey, Jr., Stimulation of Private Investment by Government, 
Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, University of Illinois, 1955. 
62 Kathleen Ann Dittullio, The Role of Small Industries in the Political 
Economy of Pakistan, Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Syracuse University, 
1972. 
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During the Awami League regime when the public posture of the govern-
ment on socialism and nationalisation had not eroded and popular senti-
ments still ran high on socialism and nationalisation the free enter-
prise lobby kept a low profile and proceeded discreetly through the 
modus operandi of petitions for more incentives to facilitate private 
investment. The military regime was receptive to the private sector 
lobby and advocated "flourishing of the sector" 63 . 	Attuned to careful 
nurturing by the government the Bengali entrepreneurs did not develop 
into an efficient and driving class and were unwilling to set up new 
enterprises for which there was ample scope outside the reserved list 
for the public sector. In addition to the abandoned units which were 
intended to be disinvested almost from the time of their take-over by 
the Awami League Government, advocates of the private sector were openly 
demanding "disinvestment" of the enterprises placed under the national-
ised sector. Afterwards, denationalisation was explicitly demanded 
in respect of jute and cotton textile units previously owned by the 
Bengali owners. 
Bangladesh had in its economy elements of both private and public 
sectors. 	In the process of developing and diversifying the economy, 
it might be necessary to seek a balanced proportion of the two 
sectors. 	But neither the amalgam of socialist principles nor of mixed 
economy was allowed to coagulate. 	Their elements kept on changing. 
According to the public posture of the Awami League Government it was 
both a policy postulate and policy instrument to make the public sector 
dominant in the economy. But it also sought to combine the virtues of 
63 The Bangladesh Times, 31 August 1979 Speech of Industries Minister 
Mr. Jamaluddin Ahmed before a meeting of businessmen organised by 
the Federation of Bangladesh Chamber of Commerce & Industry. 
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both socialist and free enterprise economy. 	The nationalisation 
programme demonstrated this paradox. 	In certain sectors private 
enterprises were excluded but in others they could coexist with the 
public enterprise. The private sector had thus a wide area open to 
it to invest in and demonstrate its enterprise. Opportunities were 
provided in the form of disinvestment of absentee/abandoned enter-
prises which were not nationalised. 	Finances were available at the 
first instance from compensation money and lending and equity support 
and even the basis of deferred payment. 	The ideological assumptions 
of nationalisation, on the other hand, were to allow private sector to 
function only during the transition period towards socialism when public 
sector would be expanded and socialist cadres with political commitment 
and managerial skills developed. The contradictions in nationalisation 
policy inhibited declaration of an industrial policy in an atmosphere of 
fast accumulation of private wealth. As a result hardly any investment 
took place in industry in private sector during the Awami League adminis-
tration. 	The goal of socialism within the framework of a partial 
nationalisation and in the absence of an industrial policy defining the 
role of the public and the private sectors created a stalemate in 
industrial investment. Private enterprise was moribund in the 
industrial sector. 
The military regime attempted to revive the private sector. 
The government declared its intention of pursuing its policy of mixed 
economy while retaining the nationalisation policy with emphasis of 
development of the public sector side by side with providing policy 
and institutional supports to the private sector. 	However, the large 
scale disinvestment of enterprises from the nationalised sector virtually 
meant that the government was aiming at "reduction of the public sector 
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and expansion of the private sector" 64 . 	Thus the attitude of the 
military regime has been double-faced. While it accepted the respon-
sibility of the nationalised industries, it pursued a disinvestment 
policy to undo it in the name of creating proper environment for the 
private sector when there was no dearth of scope in industrial expan-
sion outside the reserve sector. 	This tended only to strengthen the 
argument of the supporters of the public sector that the Bengali 
private enterprise was yet to acquire maturity. They were unwilling 
to explore new fields and their entrepreneurial agility was limited 
to operating a running and profitable unit handed over to them 
by the government with ancillary facilities and incentives provided. 
It was, therefore, argued that the Bengali private sector could not be 
relied upon as the main vehicle, to carry the burden of industrial 
development. 	The attitude of the private entrepreneurs was evident 
from the fact that the main threads of their arguments consisted in 
giving the nationalised industries a bad name and offering the good 
tidings that the transfer of the nationalised enterprises to the private 
sector would bring forth. 	Their thrust was negative since their 
interest lay solely in reprivatisation so that they would not have to 
take the hard course. According to the advocates of the private 
sector all pioneering activities were to be undertaken by the govern-
ment and after the project attained viability ought to be transferred 
to the private sector. Meanwhile the private sector would run the 
enterprises reprivatised from the public sector. Obviously, disinvest-
ment and private sector were made synonymous and the difference between 
the concepts of denationalisation and disinvestment was conveniently 
64 The Holiday, 10 July 1977 Speech of Presidential Advisor for the 
Ministry of Commerce. 
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ignored both by the private sector and also by a susceptible military 
government. 
The military regime failed like the Awami League before it to 
work out any coherent policy to determine the role and function of the 
public and the private sector in the economy of social justice as 
envisaged by them. By the end of the FFYP period private sector 
lobby became insistent in their demand to limit the scope of the public 
sector although the vast field of small and medium industries and rural 
industrialisation programme were in moribund condition due to the lack 
of attention of potential entrepreneurs. 	Instead the private sector 
lobby called upon the government "to have fresh look at the relative 
roles of public and private sectors". It was argued that the social, 
political and religious feelings of the people did overwhelmingly 
support the free enterprise65 . The military regime maintained their 
indecisive stance on the issues. 	General Ziaur Rhaman declared that 
the Second Five Year Plan which was in the process of preparation would 
define the role of the two sectors with the objective of coordinated 
growth of public and private sectors 66 . Meanwhile continuance of 
disinvestment of nationalised enterprises eroded the morale of the 
public sector management and contributed towards the loss of vitality 
and efficiency in the nationalised sector. 
65 The Bangladesh Times, 31 August 1979. 
66 Ibid. 
B : SOME CONCLUSIONS 
The Nature of Nationalisation of Industries in Bangladesh  
Nationalisation of industries in Bangladesh has come to consist 
of the following distinctive steps: 
(i) Expropriation by the State of private property; 
(ii) Take over by the State of enterprises abandoned by the aliens 
or the enemy; 
(iii) Transfer of existing enterprises in public sector to the State 
as the sole owner; 
(iv) Placing all the above categories of enterprises under public 
ownership vesting all proprietorship in the State; 
(v) Establishment of public corporations to run the nationalised 
enterprises; 
(vi) Pursuing a legal process for the purpose of giving effect to 
nationalisation. 
The connotation of the term nationalisation did not differ in Bangladesh 
from most other countries - capitalist or socialist, Western or Eastern 
and developed or developing. Nationalisation in Bangladesh enabled 
expropriation and taking over of private properties as elsewhere. 
However, by providing for compulsory transfer of State sponsored public 
enterprises to the public corporations set up under nationalisation 
law rather than operating them under previous arrangements, an explicit 
recognition was given to the distinction between nationalised enter-
prises and other public enterprises. 	Nationalisation as a concept 
is often distorted by confusing the differences between government 
enterprises and nationalised ventures. 	In Bangladesh l one result of 
such incongruence was to consider disinvestment as synonymous with 
denationalisation. 	In India, for example, the usual practice is to 
brand all public enterprises as nationalised industries. 	This does 
not help to distinguish between the generic origins of public enter-
prises and thereby tend to ignore the implications of nationalisation 
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in expropriating private property as different from simply setting up 
a new public enterprise. Mixed enterprises jointly owned by the State 
and private sector with majority share-holdings belonging to the State 
are termed elsewhere like in Italy, India, Zambia and a host of other 
countries, as nationalised ventures. 	In Bangladesh with a single 
exception° shares and assets of all the nationalised enterprises vest 
in the State and there was no instance of a mixed enterprise in the 
nationalised industries although there was no bar to set up such types 
of enterprises in public sector. 
Nationalisation in Bangladesh closely resembled Britain in 
matters of expropriation of private enterprises and their placement 
under public corporations to be managed by the latter. In Britain 
there was no omnibus nationalisation law for industries as in Bangladesh. 
Nationalisation laws were enacted from time to time to bring different 
industries under the ambit of the nationalised sector in Britain. 	But 
•in Bangladesh nationalisation of industries was effected immediately upon 
the promulgation of the nationalisation law. 	Thus in Bangladesh 
nationalisation of industries was implemented in a single stroke where 
as in countries like Italy nationalisation took place gradually over 
a period of years through purchase of stocks of private enterprises 
by the State which eventually became the majority shareholder of such 
enterprises. 	In such cases it may be difficult to discern a conscious 
drive towards nationalisation as manifest in the nationalisation law 
in Bangladesh. 	In fact in terming such instances of buying up the 
67 The shares of Burmah Oil Company held in Eastern Refinery Ltd. 
under Bangladesh Petroleum Corporation were returned in May 1977. 
See Eastern Refinery Ltd., Annual Report 1977 (Chittagong: September, 
1977). 
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stock of private companies as paranationalisation, Sadzikowski has 
effectively distinguished them as a class apart from nationalisation. 
Nationalisation in Bangladesh was complete for some industries, 
partial for others and selective as a whole. 	Nationalisation of jute, 
cotton textile and sugar manufactureing enterprises was complete. There 
was no private enterprise in these industries. On the other hand 
there were several enterprises taken over from the abandoned category 
in particular which competed with the private sector enterprises. 
Certain industries under the reserved list for the public sector had 
enterprises only under the nationalised industries. 	These cases must 
be deemed as instances of complete nationalisation as no private enter- 
prise existed in these industries e.g. fertiliser and cement. 	In 
cases such as safety matches, various chemicals and pharmaceuticals, 
food products nationalisation was partial since private enterprises 
existed or there was no bar for them to exist. Nationalisation was 
also selective in the sense that abandoned enterprises with assets 
more than Taka 2.5 million were only nationalised; the rest were earmarked 
for disinvestment to the private sector. Nationalisation of industries 
in Bangladesh mainly consisted of manufacturing enterprises with excep-
tion of gas, mineral exploration and development, and petroleum 
processing. Public utilities such as electricity and power, transport 
or water supply were fully or partially in the public sector but they 
were covered by separate laws and most of the enterprises were directly 
sponsored by the State except those taken over as abandoned enterprises 
from the private sector. 
Nationalisation in Bangladesh seems to have been characterised, 
like many other developing countries, by the co-existence of several 
socio-economic formations and overlapping tendencies within its 
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development process. During the years of bitterness with Pakistan 
and the War of Liberation, ideological issues were subordinated to 
nationalist themes, the vision of society to the immediate aim of 
liberating the country from the unhappy association with Pakistan. 
During the euphoria of the Liberation struggle people were more likely 
to be moved by a sense of economic nationalism. 	It may, therefore, 
be asked if nationalisation was in response to this sense of economic 
nationalism. The fact that a large number of abandoned enterprises 
owned by nonlocals were taken over and nationalised raise the question 
if a desire for indigenisation of jobs and localisation of capital was 
equally observable along with the assertion of economic independence 
in the events preceding and following nationalisation in Bangladesh. 
In other words, was it a case of, what Johnson called a "nationalistic 
nationalisation"? 68 Nationalisation is a most effective strategy if 
economic nationalism is perceived in terms of national ownership of 
assets and control over economic activities. Nationalisation of key 
sectors means immediate national ownership and control of the "commanding 
heights" of the economy reducing the dependence on foreign countries for 
various strategic variables and thus forestalling a resurgent economic 
imperialism. However, it has often been asserted that far from being 
an anti-imperialist weapon nationalisation has tended to become a policy 
of support in the developing countries as in the developed countries. 
In Bangladesh not only was compensation paid to foreign shareholders 
of the nationalised enterprises but also British private investments 
in a major sector namely, the tea industry, were left outside the ambit 
68 Johnson, Economic Nationalism, op. cit. 
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of nationalisation69  . 	In addition to favoured treatment meted out to 
British capitalism, compensation to foreign (but non-Pakistani) share-
holders and even restoration of shares to a multinational corporation, 
there was utter dependence on foreign economic aid for development 
financing. These practices were in sharp contrast to professed goals 
of self-reliance and socialism in Bangladesh. 	As in the period of the 
pro-capitalistic Pakistan administration, so in independent Bangladesh, 
foreign-aid induced industrialisation led to introduction of policies 
that patronised private sector frequently at the cost of public sector 
in spite of the facade of some degree of planning and nationalisation. 
It appears that in Bangladesh economic nationalism was interpreted in 
terms of localisation of capitalism by supplanting foreign capital and 
control with that of the national middle class instead of a truly 
national ownership. 
Nationalisation was ostensibly perceived by the Awami League 
regime as a step towards socialist economic transformation. 	In other 
words, the Awami League was attempting to follow a model of socialist 
industrialisation. Gregory has outlined such a model as a form of 
rapid and forced industrialisation that is directed by a central plan; 
characterised by the rapid decline of non-socialist sectors in the 
economy, high rates of capital accumulation and the marked predominance 
of the produced goods sector over the consumer goods sector 70. A 
• 69 Tea industry in Bangladesh comprised approximately 1 per cent of 
manufacturing value-added and generated 4 per cent of the country's 
export earnings. British interests in tea industry produced 56 per 
cent of best Bangladesh teas on 47 per cent of its tea area in 1970. 
See Nuimuddin Choudhury, "A Social Cost Benefit Analysis of Tea 
Industry in Bangladesh", Bangladesh Development Studies, Vol. 3 
1976, pp. 379-401. 
70 Gregory, Industrialization, op. cit. pp. xix-xx. 
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socialist nationalisation would mean socialisation of all the basic 
needs of production which become the property of the entire people. 
The absence of private ownership of the means of production becomes 
the central feature of the society. Nationalisation of the modern 
sector of the economy and collectivisation of agriculture become 
inevitable71 . 
Public ownership of the means of production form the basis of 
the development of socialist relations of production, which are expres-
sed in a new attitude to the means of production, in conscious labour 
discipline, cooperation in work, stimulation of the people's construc-
tive activity and socialist emulation. The economic laws of capital-
ism would cease to oeprate. All the means of production, distribution 
and exchange become a component and integrated part of the single national 
economy on the basis of a single national plan and common aims. 
The objective situation in Bangladesh during the period covered 
in this study would hardly reflect the conditions stated above. On 
the contrary the genesis and implementation of the nationalisation 
policy in Bangladesh manifestly indicate capitalistic traits even 
though in some ways it resembled a socialist programme. Essentially 
the middle class character of the political party launching the programme, 
lack of leadership and cadres suitable for the building up of the avowed 
socialism,a tendency to ignore the practical difficulties in implement-
ation, failure to provide institutional supports,distorted priorities, 
absence of a strong and motivated working class party, retention of the 
property foundations of social relations in all spheres, piecemeal 
planning and nationalisation, and indifferent efforts to 
71 In China for example, private land ownership in rural areas was 
eliminated within a few years of communist revolution. See Breth, 
China, op. cit. pp. 20-3. 
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mobilise domestic savings and inculcate self-reliance,and an excessive 
dependence on foreign aid all combined to prepare a seed bed which 
could not possibly germinate the Bangladesh industrial nationalisation 
programme into a socialist nationalisation. While nationalisation 
programme of the Awami League resulted in a virtual ban on private 
industrial investment, the economic policies and political expediency 
helped to accumulate vast private fortunes through various means some of 
which were dubious. The industrial policies of the Military Govern-
ment reflected the increasing influence of the newly emerged and resus-
citated industrial and commercial capitalist groups through the patronage 
of the Awami League. The military regime's strategy of providing 
generous incentive packages to private sector and infusion of private 
foreign capital by making relaxation of controls was rationalised in 
the name of efficiency 72 , productivity and self-reliance 73 . 	By expand- 
ing the ideological framework broadly enough to accommodate its policies 
to the recommendations of the World Bank and the wishes of the donor 
countries the military regime's policy marked a shift to the right. 
This amounted to a reversal of the official Awami League strategy. 
But the policy of the military regime in promoting private sector 
through disinvestment and partial denationalisation seems to be more like 
a continuation of the nationalisation policy of the Awami League. The 
real objective of this nationalisation appears to be a localisation of 
capital in the hands of the Bengali middle classes and not the abolition 
or restriction of private capital in general. 	The Awami League policies 
72 In the words of the TYP: "emphasis has been given on better capacity 
utilisation and higher operational efficiency", TYP, op. cit. p. 30. 
73 TYP declared: "...spirit of self-reliance will be vigorously pursued" 
/bid. p. 34. 
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created the opportunities for the accumulation of private capital and 
the military regime attempted to consolidate and expand the base of 
the private capital. 	Both regimes pursued their policies within 
the ambit of nationalisation. Disinvestment policy of the military 
regime may, therefore, be construed as an inevitable follow-up of 
the capitalist nationalisation policy of the Awami League. As Sadzi-
kowski has stated nationalisation is often carried out in order to 
improve the existing socio-economic systems in the capitalist countries 74  . 
In Bangladesh too, in spite of all rhetoric on socialism, nationalisation 
turned out to be a needed boost to the ailing private sector, first taking 
certain enterprises under public care followed by treatment, nursing and 
then rehabilitation and finally according them freedom. 
Bangladesh was in a situation when its economy was mainly capital-
istic with certain sectors of its economy nationalised and operated 
directly by the State. Both private sector and State owned and control-
led sectors co-existed. 	In a country where socialist revolution occurs 
and consolidates itself under the leadership of a working class party 
as in China, certain areas of the economy are undoubtedly left in private 
hands at the initial stage 75 . The case of Bangladesh is different in 
this that in a socialist country the working class in alliance with the 
peasantry controls the State and in a capitalist country the State is 
controlled by those who own, control and manage the means of production 
and dictate the entire system of the economy. The working class had 
no grip over the State machinery. 	This gives rise to a situation where 
political bosses, bureaucrats and technocrats dominate in the affairs of 
74 Sattzikowski, Public Sector, op. cit. 
75 A gradual process of nationalisation was to be brought about through 
three stages of utilisation, restriction and transformation. Breth, 
China, op. cit. pp. 25-9. 
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the economy. 	It seems that the only thing which could be equated with 
socialism was nationalisation of certain economic activities, without 
a clear perception of the responsibilities that 	entailed and the 
institutional and policy supports it required. 	Instead of democrat- 
isation both economic and political power seemed to concentrate in the 
hands of a few politicians or the military rulers, civil bureaucracy, 
technocracy or professional management. 	In Bangladesh, nationalisation 
seemed to have turned into State Capitalism which drifted to both parli-
amentary and military dictatorship. The government as the owner and 
operator of the public sector industries was acting almost like a 
capitalist in whom all the authority of ownership and management was 
vested. Nationalisation, working within a market economy 76 could not 
eliminate the inherent flaws of capitalism nor could it ensure removal 
of inequalities. A democraticideal of nationalisation could check 
the lop sided development and concentration of wealth. Instead the 
Bangladesh variety of nationalisation depended on foreign induced 
industrial expansion resulting in heightened social inequalities and 
development on distorted priorities, long term decapitalisation of 
the economy and failure to absorb the vast multitude of unemployed and 
underemployed. External debts and influences of the donor agencies and 
donor countries even tended to encroach upon the sovereignty of the State. 
76 See Pasquale Saraceno "Public Enterprise in the Market Economy" in 
Albert Winsemuis & John A. Panous, ed. Methods of Industrial Develop-
ment, (Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation & Development, 
1962) pp. 237-249; also Maurice Konopnicki, "Public Enterprises in 
a Market Economy", Annals of Public & Co-operative Economy, Vol. 48. 
(1977), pp.137-8 ; Maurice Konopnicki, "Interference by the Private 
Sector in Enterprises of Communal Interest in the Performance of 
their Economic, Social and Ecological Functions", Annals of Public 
& Co-operative Economy, Vol. 48 (1977), pp. 135-6. 
Perception, Stance and Reality  
In choosing a model of industrialisation, developing nations 
like Bangladesh are faced with a choice amongst 
(i) a reliance on private enterprise with minimum State intervention, 
planning by inducement rather than by command, private agricul-
tural production and market economy; 
(ii) a reliance on publicly owned enterprises with command planning, 
public ownership of the means of production and foreign trade 
monopoly; 
(iii) a combination of the features of both the models. 77 
Criticism of capitalist industrialisation consisted in the arguments 
that it would give rise to concentration of economic power in a few 
private hands and that the interests of the consumers and workers 
would be sacrificed. 	Capitalism also reflected, it was pointed out, 
an irresponsibility of the people who controlled the decision making 
power by virtue of their economic power. The lack of responsibility 
became manifest in that the holders of power remained inadequately 
accountable to the community. 	Economic activities at their 
behest led to waste, insecurity, inefficiency and injustices and were 
harmful to the community. 	It was argued that a substantial public 
intervention, control and ownership was required to remove the major 
evils of capitalism and to ensure full employment, high productivity 
and social justice. 	Nationalisation, therefore, sought to draw 
justification in terms of avoiding such concentration of economic 
power in private hands and ensuring that people - the consumers and 
workers -.became the main beneficiary of the nationalised activity. 
Nationalisation was perceived as a necessary means to aid socialist 
industrialisation process. 	The goals of such an industrialisation 
77 Gregory, Industrialization, op. cit., pp. 157-8. 
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pattern should be 
(i) rapid growth of the total product and increase the 
standard of living; 
(ii) independence from capitalist markets; 
(iii) providing a sufficient base to support the industrialisation 
efforts 78 
It was stated that socialist pattern might commend itself if per capita 
income was low, population large, dependence on foreign aid excessive 
and sources of earning foreign exchange through exports limited 79 . 
Successful implementation of socialist industrial pattern would depend 
on fulfilment of scale requirements, central planning and collectivis-
ation of agriculture, adequate natural endowments and political 
stability. 	Nationalisation as an instrument of socialist industrial- 
isation process poses a challenge to capitalist industry. 	It seeks 
to democratise internal operation and external accountability of the 
nationalised industries. 	Nationalisation is expected to assist advance 
to greater equality, contribute to full employment and impart a greater 
sense of national responsibility to economic management, facilitate 
the development of industrial democracy and introduce a spirit of co-
operation replacing hostility, greed, rivalry, friction and competition 80 . 
It is hoped that nationalisation would achieve higher production greater 
efficiency and provide a shield against the monopoly power of capitalism. 
The raison d'etre of nationalisation is partly in a deliberate 
act of legislation and administrative measures based on certain political 
and legal theory and partly in the empirical reasons related to specific needs. 
The political, economic, industrial, administrative and technological 
elements are decisive factors but it is difficult to find a doctrinaire 
78 Ibid., p. 143. 
79 Ibid. 
80 Gaitskell, Nationalisation, op. cit., p. 7. 
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approach. It is hard to draw an analogy in the conception of Bangladesh 
nationalisation either with the Soviet process or the West European coun-
tries as well as Indian nationalisation. In Bangladesh nationalised 
sector was an important part of the economic body but not the body itself 
as in the Soviet systems. Nor is it easy to say that in Bangladesh 
nationalised sector resulted only from the political ideology of the 
party. The problems of operating the nationalised industries, however, 
involve decisions of many dimensions and they could not be run as partisan 
ventures but in the interests of the nation as a whole. Nevertheless, 
increasingly the nationalised industries were expected to behave like a 
commercial concern. But in an economy predominantly capitalistic, where 
the main consumer of the products of the nationalised industries were 
private enterprises in commerce and industry a disproportionate pressure 
was exerted on the nationalised industries in order to keep the price 
level stable. As a result, sustained State interventions were made to 
hold down the prices even where this led to operational deficits for 
the nationalised industries. 	Compensation payment for nationalisation 
of enterprises, system of selling prices, distribution mechanism and 
capitalist profit making made transfer of resources from the nationalist 
industries to private sector possible. While the nationalised indus-
tries were criticised for having failed to generate a revenue and to 
contribute towards net national capital formation, their accounting 
losses contained subsidy to foreign importers in the form of deflated 
international price with a view to help earn foreign exchange for 
the country. 	The deficits also represented debt liabilities in- 
herited by the nationalised enterprises from the pre-nationalisation 
era. Pricing mechanisms imposed on the nationalised industries 
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did not help reduce the distributive inequality in the community and 
instead contributed to push up the price level. At the same time 
government used the nationalised industries as instruments of wage 
restraints. Subordination of the nationalised industries in invest-
ment, price, profits, wages and so on was pervasive. Unearned income 
continued unabated, unemployment was hardly mitigated; co-operation did 
not take the place of competition, industrial democracy did not mater-
ialise. Displacement of some owners of certain enterprises by them-
selves did not alter the balance of social forces. The old class 
relationship remained unaffected as in the private enterprise firms. 
The public corporations could be manipulated so as to strengthen the 
middle class element in the society in its efforts to maintain and 
consolidate positions of power and privilege. The country did not 
make a move towards democratic socialism instead a managerial society 
emerged 	under the lever of nationalisation. 	Attitudes of the 
erstwhile property owning groups and their social attitudes were 
resurfacing among the new managerial class of the nationalised indus-
tries. The boards of membership running public corporations could 
hardly be distinguished from their counterparts during private enter- 
prise days. There was a gradual transformation of the original concep-
tion of nationalisation which went almost unnoticed. 	Simultaneously 
the government failed to carry out structural reforms in the national 
planning mechanism. All these acted as reinforcements to the denation-
alisation campaign of the free enterprise lobby. 
The unfavourable image of the nationalised industries was based 
on their allegedly poor performance. 	The major cause of 
disenchantment with nationalisation lay in the illusion - the myth 
that existed. Many expected that nationalisation would automatically 
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mean an improvement in the economy - standard of living and lower 
prices and abundance of goods. But circumstances both internal and 
external to the nationalised industries inhibited smooth operation 
and successful performance. The workers were made to believe that 
the industries on nationalisation belonged to them but were later 
disappointed to see that their conditions remained as before. 	The 
nationalised industries found it hard to meet at once their obligations 
to arrange for payment of fixed interest on the government capital, 
to provide expenditure for_ better living and working conditions 
for the workers and to supply goods to the consumers at cheapter prices 
The workers and consumers alike felt that it was their right to expect 
these things which could not be claimed from private enterprise. 
Nor did the attitudes of the workers alter in respect of the 
nationalised industries after the change over to public ownership. 
Instead they continued to view the corporation as a sort of new boss. 
The allegedly unsatisfactory performance of the nationalised 
industries resulted from factors, both man made and circumstantial. 
Tobegin with nationalisation was launched without an apparent long 
term strategy or well conceived plan. Ad-hoc measures were taken for 
controlling the operation of the enterprises. 	Technical issues invol- 
ving determination of performance criteria, fixation of prices for the 
products of the enterprises, formulation of policies relating to 
accumulation of funds, understanding of the implications of national-
isation for economic planning and even the relative role of the nation- 
alised, public and private sector could not be resolved. 	The key 
ideological issues concerning the role of incentives and method of 
developing social agents of production were not settled. A proper 
and satisfactory organisational framework for the management could not 
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be evolved. The relationship between labour and management outlining 
the code of conduct for them separately was not defined. 	The absence 
of proper autonomy at the layers of the nationalised industries and 
diffusion in the decision making process limited the operational 
efficiency. A critical shortage of managerial personnel, engineers, 
accountants, economic analysts,marketing specialists and skilled 
workers was compounded through induction of unqualified and inexperienced 
personnel through the influence of political elites. On the other hand, 
large scale destruction of the transportation system, smuggling, increas-
ing layoffs and gradual loss of foreign markets added to the long list 
of problems. General economic management and inflation along with 
malpractices in the distribution system made things difficult. 	The 
sustained campaign against nationalised industries by the free enter-
prise lobby and even politicians sapped the morale and initiative of 
the management of the nationalised industries. Devoid of political 
support and subject to political interference and adverse publicity 
without the opportunity to put up arguments in defence caused immense 
harm. Inability of the government to firmly demarcate the boundaries 
of public and private sector introduced an element of transition which 
inhibited steps from being taken to improve the performance in the long 
run. While criticism about mismanagement, corruption, inefficiency 
and economic lapses were true the circumstances as above indicated 
that much of it was irrelevant in the context. It could not be said 
that nationalisation per se was wrong or a failure. The criticism 
only reflected that the governments failed to ensure efficient perform-
ance of the nationalised industries. 	Nationalisation after all, was 
a means and not an end in itself. Indeed ideological considerations 
do not appear as of primary importance in leading to nationalisation in 
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Bangladesh. The successive regimes found it expedient to remain 
vague and ambivalent regarding their ideological orientations. 	The 
quick shifts of policy emphases influenced the structure, management 
and performance of the nationalised industries. Moreover, social, 
economic and political conditions preceding and following Liberation 
had overwhelming effects on the nationalised industries which seemed 
to be really beyond their management. 	The lack of natural resources, 
limited market, international competition, inflation and moribund 
national economy would go much in explaining the state of the national-
ised industries in Bangladesh rather than putting the blame on the 
management or on the adoption of nationalisation as an instrument of 
policy for industrial development. 
Role of Nationalisation in Bangladesh  
The need for a public sector is more pronounced in a subsistence 
economy. Various studies have brought out the existence of a positive 
relationship between backwardness of an economy and the pressure on its 
public sector81 . 	In a polity having a history of colonial domination 
which had to remain content playing the second fiddle and as a hinter-
land to an imperialist country with the economy captive, economic inde-
pendence becomes as much strategic as of political independence 82 . 
Dismantling of the colonial systems facilitated changes at accelerated 
rate. An increasing number of developing countries take the road, more 
81 Brookins and Schachter, for example concluded that there was a direct 
relationship between poverty and pressure on the public sector in a 
country. 	See Oscar T. Brookins & Gustav Schachter, "The Role of 
the Public Sector in Industrial Investment of Developing Areas in 
Southern Europe", Rivista Internazionale de Scienze Economische 
Commerciale, Vol. 19, 1970, pp. 1190-1207. 
82 Dharam P. Ghai, "Concepts and Strategies of Economic Independence", 
The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 11, 1973, pp. 21-42. 
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or less consistently to socio-economic transformation. 	Initially 
nationalisation of alien interests detrimental to the sovereignty and 
of strategic importance to the economy becomes a major instrument for 
creating and expanding the public sector. The public enterprises 
thus established have survived and multiplied even though there is a 
general apathy towards government being in business 83 . The role of 
public enterprises would vary reflecting the political and socio-
economic conditions that prevail 84 . The political elites in power 
tend to extend its control to all levels of government and to all 
sectors of the economy in their efforts to consolidate their authority. 
Alien entrepreneurs, managers and technical personnel are replaced by 
local elements. Certain interest groups receive costly benefits 
ignoring the limitations of the public enterprises. Management of 
the public enterprises become highly politicised substantially contri-
buting towards poor performance of the nationalised industries. 
Subsequently the same or a new group of political elites in order to 
preserve and strengthen its position, would attempt to reverse the 
degeneration of the national economy as a part of the general strategy. 
For this group policy decision to consolidate political strength and 
emphasis on immediate economic growth converge. The Awami League, 
thus sought to politicise nationalisation to serve its own narrow 
group interests and the military regime sought to broaden its popular 
base and tended to pursue a policy that gave more premium to the primacy 
83 See for an example Leonor M. Magtolis, "Public Enterprise in the 
Philippines: Structure and Problems", Philippines Journal of Public 
Administration, Vol. 13, 4 October, 1969, pp. 416-23. 
84 King, Ideas and Institutions, op.cit. 
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of economics. However, the general pattern of change in the inter-
action between politics and records of the nationalised enterprises 
indicate the existence of overlapping between political and economic 
strands. 	During the period preceding Liberation o elites with established 
commercial interests controlled the industries and ensured records of 
high profits. 	In the post-Liberation years the political elites jock- 
eyed to consolidate their power base and employed the resources of the 
nationalised enterprises towards that end. Commercial performance was 
thus adversely affected. Undoubtedly, nationalisation offered ample 
opportunity to develop production and accumulate the national product 
but these opportunities could not materialise by themselves. 	It was 
vital to manage the public sector efficiently. But the efficiency 
depended on what group interests the government represented. 85 
An essential precondition of efficient performance of the 
nationalised enterprises is the commitment of the ruling elites to the 
success of nationalisation. 	For this identification of objectives 
and criteria for performance must be clearly delineated by the ruling 
elites. Where nationalisation is conceived as a most crucial step 
towards changing the entire socio-economic system the ruling elites 
must take appropriate steps including central planning and simultaneous 
reforms in all modes of production, distribution and exchange. Where 
nationalisation is viewed as a policy instrument irrespective of ideol-
ogical predilections the ruling elites must demonstrate their keenness 
to ensure efficiency and attainment of objectives with needed policy 
and infrastructural supports. 	It is the efficient and objective 
management technique rather than presence or absence of certain ideology 
85 Rehman Sobhan, "Public Enterprises and the Nature of the State", 
Development and Change, Vol. 10, (1979), pp. 23-29. 
396 
that would in the long run affect the operation of an enterprise. 
An ojective perception of the role of nationalisation would be facili-
tated if a comparative perspective is kept in mind. The various 
countries practicing nationalisation may be broadly divided in the 
following groups: 
(i) where public and private sector function together; 
(ii) where private sector dominates and public enterprise in an 
exception; 
(iii) where State assumes ownership and power to operate the entire 
economy; 
(iv) where management of the means of production is effected through 
democratic participation of the workers themselves instead of 
a State bureaucracy. 
In the capitalist economies nationalisation was not aimed at restric-
ting the operation of the private sector in spite of the slogans to 
the contrary. The aim was to strengthen the capitalist system and 
remove the bottlenecks of operation in the capitalistic economy. 
This means that all that was disadvantageous to private enterprise 
was turned into an overall burden on the society 86 . In a socialist 
economy nationalisation is adopted as a political philosophy instead 
of as expediency. The mainsprings of the economic activity of the 
nationalised enterprises is determined basically by the central plan 
as an expression of the society as a whole. The goal is to maintain 
full employment continuously, provide for a sustained rapid growth, 
uphold the dignity of labour and ensure equitable distribution of 
income. In a mixed economy however like the capitalistic economy the 
connections between nationalised sector and the private sector together 
pressurize the government to strengthen and stabilise a capitalistic 
economy. 	In a mixed economy, the crux of nationalisation seems to lie 
86 Carey-Jones et al, Public Enterprise, op. cit., p. 22, Shanks, 
Public Enterprise, op. cit., p. 21; Jenkins, Power, op. cit., Chapter 4. 
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in demarcating the operational areas for the public and private sectors 
87 . 	If there is no doctrinaire predilections the growth of public 
enterprise can be a matter of necessity and there can be an integration 
of public and private economy. However, the political climate is a 
decisive factor about the relative place of the public and private 
sector in the economy. 
The present role of nationalisation in the Third World countries 
like Bangladesh consistsin the intervention of the public authorities 
in various key sectors of the economy in response to reactions against 
abuses of capitalist dominations which were detrimental to the interest 
of the national community. Nationalisation became a principal policy 
instrument for economic and social development. Nationalisation by 
helping to expand the public sector helps develop the infrastructure 
and the key and strategic sectors of the economy. 	Nationalisation 
facilitates the public sector assuming the commanding heights in the 
economy. The expanded public sector inclusive of the nationalised 
sector becomes the largest supplier of goods and services in the country. 
Nationalisation makes the entrepreneurial role of the government a stark 
reality. 	The nationalised sector renders direct financial assistance, 
technical know-how and research facilities. 	It acts as a catalyst and 
promotes the economy even as a large buyer of goods and services from 
both private and public sector. 	Nationalisation acts as an instrument 
of major provider of revenues for the economy and also a major earner 
of foreign exchange. Nationalisation is an instrument of management 
of the nation's resources. 	Nationalisation is responsible for a large 
public sector being a major source of employment. Nationalisation 
88 Arthur Salter, "The Crux of Nationalisation", The Political Quarterly, 
Vol. 21 (2), 1950 pp. 209-17. 
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helps diversifying the economic structure and results in a more balanced 
structure in industry through a wide range of activities such as petro-
chemicals, fertiliser, heavy machinery and so on. Ancillary private 
enterprises develops owing to the products made available in the nation-
alised industries. Nationalised sector does have a salutary effect on 
the private enterprise in providing better working conditions to workers. 
It builds up procution capacity, technological know how, a cadre of 
scientists, engineers, chemists and professional managers. 	On the 
other hand some major deficiencies in the role of nationalisation 
industries are underutilisation of capacities, overstaffing, high costs 
lack of cost consciousness and somewhat inelastic:cost structure. 
Industrial culture can not develop and civil service ethod thrives 
resulting in less motivated managers at various levels. 
A new possibility of wider application of nationalisation has 
emerged from the world wide activities of the multi-national corpor-
ations88 . Restriction of capitalism within the national boundaries 
has resulted in the recourse to this system of "permissive international-
isation". Modern technological and scientific developments, new 
diversion of labour, and complex international system of trade, finance 
and exchange has made all nations virtually interdependent. Capitalist 
system for its survival from the onslaugths of nationalisation and 
stringent control of the nation states has tended to take refuge in 
multinational corporations. Public enterprises developed in a purely 
national context cannot possibly deal with such international capitalist 
88 See Andre Heurtebise, "The Place of Public Enterprises in the Economy" 
Annals of Public & Co -operative Economy, Vol. 49, (1978), pp. 3257327. 
Also see Katzarov, op. cit., pp. 369-373. Katzarov mentions the 
efforts in the midst of the. Second World War of "internationalis-
ation". The broad aims favoured the "socialisation" on an inter-
national basis of the world's inheritance of raw materials. 
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institutions. 	In the context of new internationalisation of trade, 
finance and exchange it might be necessary to have a fresh perception 
of nationalisation. The scope and aims of the nationalised enterprises 
may have to be extended and redefined vesting them with needed 
authority. 	It is argued that if capitalism could demonstrate to 
survive and expand through multinational ventures it should be possible 
for the nationalised industries to transcend the national frontiers 
when economics of their activities so demand and if political will is 
available89 . 	In the face of stiff competition from synthetic products 
and multinational enterprises espousing them it seems necessary to take 
a positive view about the jute sector in terms of technological innova-
tions,diversification of products and international collaboration among 
the jute producing countries. While for survival of Bangaldesh jute, 
whether in the public or private sector, such multinational cooperation" 
seems essential clearly this is beyond the capacity of the present day 
private sector in Bangladesh. 
Finally, issue is not whether the nationalised sector would 
continue to exist or not in the developing circumstances of the resource 
starved and subsistence level existence of Bangladesh but how far it 
would play a more effective role in the economy which embraces the private 
sector as well. 	The public sector and within it the nationalised seg- 
ment and also the private sector are all important component parts of 
the economy. The need is to appreciate the role of each of them and 
89 Heurtebise, op. cit. 
90 A proposal to set up an organisation of jute exporting countries to 
protect the interest of the jute growing nations was mooted in early 
1974. Accordingly a Jute International under the auspices of the 
United Development Programme was to be formed on the lines of the 
Organisation of Petroleum Exporting countries. See The Statesman 
Weekly, 7 June 1980. 
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help them to supplement each other and flourish each other to the 
common benefit of all. 
Postscript  
Representative governmental institutions were restored and 
national elections in Bangladesh were held in February, 1979 - first 
time after having been under the military rule since August, 1975. 
A new political party named the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (hereafter 
BNP) led by General Ziaur Rahman, soldier-turned-politicain formed the 
government. The question now arises: what is the future of the nation-
alisation programme and of the nationalised industries in Bangladesh 
under the new dispensation? Disinvestment programme of the military 
regime has already reduced the size of the nationalised industries and 
virtually nothing but the hard core nationalised enterprises i.e., the 
enterprises previously owned by the Bengalis, the enterprises in the 
jute and textile sectors which were left abandoned by the non-local 
owners and the enterprises set up in the public sector during the pre-
nationalisation period, remained for further depletion of the national-
ised industries. Would the government undertake such a complete 
reversal of the nationalisation policy of the Awami League? Or would 
the government attempt a further reduction of the nationalised industries 
through reprivatisation of the jute and textile units? 
The military regime under the leadership of General Ziaur Rahman 
initiated the disinvestment programme of a number of the nationalised 
enterprises. The implementation of the programme was not kept in abey-
ance although the economic planners formulating the TYP under the 
authority of the military rulers noted that certain major issues needed 
to be resolved before undertaking some far reaching policy measures. 
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It was pointed out that national consensus on major issues could . 
emanate only from a political process and one such issue was the 
resolution of the "operational jurisdictions" of public, nationalised 
and private sector. It was hoped that the Second Five Year Plan of 
Bangladesh (SFYP) which was to be launched under the umbrella of a 
representative government on the basis of national elections would 
help to decide the issues. However, the military regime in the mean-
time completed the first phase of dismantling of the nationalised 
industries through disinvestment of mainly the abandoned units which 
were taken over in the nationalised sector. It seems that the un- 
resolved issues relating to public and private sector in the perception 
of the military rulers was whether the hard core of the nationalised 
industries were to be denationalised or not. 
In order to seek an answer to the question posed above, one 
needs to reflect upon the character of the BNP and its party leaders. 
The BNP was hastily established mainly with a view to provide General 
Ziaur Rahman with a political platform. It was a medley of assorted 
politicians from different existing parties who became disgruntled with 
their erstwhile comrades for one reason or other or those who had to 
redeem themselves from some previous stigma attached to them during 
the Liberation War and some military professional and bureaucrat 
aspirants for political foothold. The BNP was essentially dependent 
upon the personality of General Rahman just like the Awaml League in 
its post-Liberation days depended on the charisma of Mujibur Rahman. 
Once installed into power criticism related to the subordination of 
the elected elements in the government to the President91 . It was 
91 Rashed Khan Menon, an opposition leader alleged: This Parliament is 
not sovereign". DattatRay in Calcutta Statesman wrote: The atmosphere 
(in the Parliament) is that of :a school debating society with an 
(Continued over) 
402 
held that the administration was carried out like an operational plan 
at General Headquarters of the Army 92 . Furthermore, the qualitative 
content of the legislators and personalities in various political 
parties went through a significant change in the process, emphasizing 
the continued and unabated presence of the military in politics and 
administration in Bangladesh even under an elected government. The 
dominance of the Army in Bangladesh politics on terms similar to those 
in Pakistan, Indonesia or Tanzania seems to be assured for quite some 
time93 . 	In spite of massive popular support 94 behind him General 
Ziaur Rahman himself was constantly under pressure from his army 
colleagues95 which left no doubt where the locus of power and authority 
remained in spite of all the facades of democracy. 
Under those constraints it was politically expedient for the 
BNP leadership, like the previous military rulers, to further its 
group interests through various means of patronage and judicious use 
of the spoils system. 	Further decimation of the nationalised indus- 
tries would be a convenient means, like distribution of diplomatic 
91 (Continued) indulgent President sometimes languidly watching from 
the gallery", Bangladesh Identity, Datta-Ray, op. cit. Professor 
Abu Mahmood of the University of Dacca, in an interview with the 
correspondent of a Dacca weekly branded the new parliament as a 
convenient instrument for "legitimisation of perpetual martial 
law". See The New Nation, 15 April 1979. Mr. Ataur Rahman Khan, 
a former chief minister and opposition leader in the parliament 
and author of a few books on Bangladesh politics told the New 
Nation correspondent that "the parliament is not effective, simply 
because it can not be so, under the present dispensation". See 
The New Nation, 29 July 1979. 
92 Datta-Ray, op. cit. 
93 Hague, Bangladesh 1979, op. cit. 
94 General Ziaur Rahman secured 98.88% confidence vote in April 1977 
referendum and 76.3% of the votes in the June 1978 presidential 
election. 
95 Rashiduzzaman, Bangladesh 1977, op. cit. p. 131. The cabinet in 
post-election 1979 contained six retired army officers. There were 
reports of indiscipline in the Army and an abortive coup in April 
1976, September 1977, October 1977 and October 1979 which indicated 
its politicisation, dissatisfaction and restive ambitions. 
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assignments, secondment of army personnel to civilian posts, re-
employment of retired army personnel to civilian jobs or fostering 
business enterprises operated by some ex-defence personnel. 	It was, 
therefore, not in the group interests of the BNP elite that the public 
sector in general and the nationalised industries in particular should 
expand or at least continue to exist in the present form. 	The 
manifesto of the BNP did not contain a specific commitment towards 
nationalisation or the continued sustenance of the nationalised indus-
tries or an assertion of its important role in the economy although 
instances were not lacking for a categorical commitment towards 
nationalisation and the nationalised industries by some of the con-
tending political parties in the 1979 elections 96 . 
However, in line with the manifesto and the group character 
of the BNP, the SR? announced in May 1980 and launched in July same 
year failed to demarcate the operational areas of the public, national-
ised and private sectors as before and instead remained enigmatic and 
reticent on the issues involved. The SFYP while maintaining that 
public sector has come to play a dominant role in the 
economy of Bangladesh whose scope has been widened by 
nationalisation97 
also pointed out that 
private sector has been historically dependent on 
support of the public sector 88 . 
96 The election manifesto of the United Peoples' Party, for example 
stated: 
In the industrial field the nationalised industries shall 
be the principal sector and it shall play the dominant 
and regulatory role [translated from Bengali]. 
See United Peoples' Party, Khashrha Ghoshanapatra 0 Karmasuchee 
[in Bengali] (Draft Declarations and Manifesto) (Dacca: Madhumati 
Mudranalaya, n.d.). 
97 SFYP., op. cit., Chapter 1, p. 18. 
98 Ibid. 
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Beyond this the SFYP did not make an effort to indicate detailed 
strategies for the nationalised industries during the course of the 
next five years as was done earlier in the FFYP. 	There were specu- 
lations in the national press that government might introduce a 
denationalisation bill 99 in the parliament which did not elicit any 
official response 100  . Apparently the government further succumbed 
to international capital notably the World Bank and the Aid-Consortium 
for Bangladesh in favour of private investment particularly in the 
face of its heavy dependence on foreign aid and investment-. The post-
1978 experience with nationalisation in Bangladesh also thus tends to 
support the evidence that lack of political commitment created an 
ambivalence in the ruling elite in Bangladesh which in turn affected 
the administration and performance of the nationalised industries 
even though objective conditions seemed suited to pursuance of such 
a nationalisation programme. 
99 The Holiday, 3 June. 1979. 
IDO The New Nation, 17 August 1980. The Finance Minister "categori-
cally" stated at the post budget press conference that whether 
government would go for denationalisation depended on the public 
opinion, the parliamentary leaders and the "responsible media". 
101 A World Bank report recommended that public enterprise making 
continual losses should be sold off. 
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APPENDIX - PART I (GENERAL) 
LIST OF AUTONOMOUS BODIES IN BANGLADESH 
(POST-LIBERATION) 
Si. No. 	Name of the Orgaanisation 
A. Productive Sector: 
	
1 	Bangladesh Jute Mills Corporation 
2 	Bangladesh Textile Mills Corporation 
3 	Bangladesh Sugar and Food Industries Corporation 
4 	Bangladesh Chemical Industries Corporation 
5 	Bangladesh Steel and Engineering Corporation 
6 	Petrobangla 
7 	Bangladesh Petroleum Corporation 
8 	Bangladesh Mineral Exploration and Development Corporation 
9 	Bangladesh Forest Industries Development Corporation 
10 	Bangladesh Freedom Fighters Welfare Trust 
11 	Bangladesh Small and Cottage Industries Corporation 
B. Commercial and Trading Sector: 
12 	Bangladesh Jute Trading Corporation 
13 	Bangladesh Jute Marketing Corporation 
14 	Bangladesh Jute Export Corporation 
15 	Bangladesh Consumers Supplies Corporation 
16 	Bangladesh Trading Corporation 
17 	Bangladesh Fisheries Development Corporation 
18 	Bangladesh Parjaton Corporation 
C. Transportation Sector: 
19 	Bangladesh Shipping Corporation 
20 	Bangladesh Inland Water Transport Corporation 
21 	Bangladesh Biman 
22 	Bangladesh Road Transport Corporation (Bus) 
23 	Bangladesh Road Transport Corporation (Truck) 
D. Banking and Financial Institutions: 
24 	Bangladesh Bank 
25 	Sonali Bank 
26 	Pubali Bank 	 (Continued over) 
D. Banking and Financial Institutions (Continued) 
	
27 	Rupali Bank 
28 	Uttara Bank 
29 	Agrani Bank 
30 	Janata Bank 
31 	Bangladesh Krishi Bank 
32 	Bangladesh Shilpa Bank 
33 	Bangladesh Shilpa Rin Sangstha 
34 	Bangladesh House Building Finance Corporation 
35 	Investment Corporation of Bangladesh 
E. Insurance Corporation: 
36 	Jiban Bima Corporation 
37 	Shadharan Bima Corporation 
F. Developmental Organisation: 
38 	Bangladesh Agriculture Development Corporation 
39 	Bangladesh Ware Housing Corporation 
40 	Bangladesh Film Development Corporation 
41 	Bangladesh Inland Water Transport Authority 
42 	Chittagong Port Trust 
43 	Chittagong WASA 
44 	Chittagong Development Authority 
45 	Bangladesh Water Development Board 
46 	Bangladesh Power Development Board 
47 	Dacca WASA 
48 	Dacca Improvement Trust 
49 	Khulna Development Authority 
50 	Bangladesh Tea Board 
G. Autonomous Bodies Dependent on Government Grants: 
1 	Atomic Energy Commission 
2 	Bangladesh Industrial and Scientific Research Council 
3 	Shilpa Kala Academy 
4 	Bangla Academy 
5 	Bangladesh Asiatic Society 
6 	National Book Centre 
7 	Islamic Foundation 
8 	Hemeopathic Medical Board 
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G. Autonomous Bodies Dependent on Government Grants (Continued) 
9 	Unani and Ayurvedic Medical Board 
10 	Bangladesh Medical Research Council 
11 	Bangladesh Pharmacy Council 
12 	College of Physican and Surgeons 
13 	Diabetic Association 
14 	Bangladesh Medical Council 
15 	BITAC, Dacca 
16 	Wakf Administration 
17 	Institute of Chartered Accountants 
18 	Rural Development Academy, Comilla 
19 	Bangladesh Jute Research Institute 
20 	BITAC, Chittagong 
21 	Bangladesh Standard Institution 
22 	Dacca Museum 
23 	(a) Dacca University 
(b) Rajshahi University 
(c) Mymensingh University 
(d) Engineering University 
(e) Chittagong University 
Jahangir Nagar University 
24 	Inter University Board 
25 	Cadet Colleges 
26 	Girl's Guide Association 
27 	Boy Scout Association 
28 	Promotion of Fine Arts and Theatre 
29 	Women Association 
30 	Cadet Corps 
31 	National Sports Coaching 
32 	Sports Council 
33 	Residential Model School 
34 	Economic Association 
35 	Philosophical Congress 
36 	Work Camps Association 
37 	Folk Arts and Crafts Foundation 
38 	Sea Scout 
39 	Cultural Heritage Fund 
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G. Autonomous Bodies Dependent on Government Grants (Continued) 
40 	Science and Technology Museum 
41 	National Women Association 
42 	Red Cross Society 
43 	Public Orphanage 
44 	Management Development Centre 
45 	Women Rehabilitation and Development Foundation 
46 	Export Market Development Fund 
47 	University Grants Commission 
48 	Institute of Development Studies 
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Source: Ministry Of Finance, Budget Statements of Autonomous Bodies 
1977-78, (Dacca: Bangladesh Government Press, 1977), pp. 7-10. 
INDUSTRIES RESERVED FOR THE PUBLIC SECTOR 
1974 
	
1 	Arms and Ammunition and allied defence equipment 
2 	Atomic Energy 
3 	Jute industry (sacking, hessian and carpet backing) 
4 	Textiles (excluding handloons and specialised textiles) 
5 	Sugar 
6 	Paper and Newsprint 
7 	Iron and Steel (excluding re-rolling mills) 
8 	Ship-building and Heavy engineering (including Machine Tools 
and assembly/manufacture of cars, buses, trucks, tractors and 
power tillers) 
9 	Heavy Electrical Industry 
10 	Minerals, Oil and Gas 
11 	Cement 
12 	Petro-chemicals (Fertilizers, PVC, Ethylene and Synthetic fibre) 
13 	Heavy and basic chemicals and basic pharmaceuticals 
14 	Air transport 
15 	Shipping (including coastal ships and tankers.. above 1000 DWT) 
16. 	Telephone, telephone cables, telegraph and wireless apparatus 
(excluding radio receiving sets) 
17 	Generation and distribution of electricity 
18 	Forest extraction (mechanised) 
1977 
1 	Arms and ammunition and allied defence equipment 
2 	Atomic energy 
3 	Jute industry (sacking, hessian and carpet backing) 
4 	Textiles (excluding handlooms and specialised textiles) 
5 	Sugar 
6 	Air transport 
7 	Telephone, telephone cables, telegraph and wireless apparatus 
(excluding radio receiving sets) 
Generation and distribution of electricity 
Source: Revised Investment Policy, op. cit.,p. 7, Department of Indus-
tries: Guide to Investment in Bangladesh, (Dacca: May, 1977) 
p. 21. 
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LIST OF SECTORS WHERE PRIVATE INVESTORS CAN SET UP 
INDUSTRIES IN COLLABORATION WITH PUBLIC SECTOR 
1 	Paper and Newsprint 
2 	Iron and Steel (excluding re-rolling mills and Mini Billet 
Mills) 
3 	Ship building and Heavy engineering (including Machine Tools 
and assembly/manufacture of cars, buses, trucks, tractors and 
power tillers) 
4 	Heavy Electrical Industry 
5 	Minerals, Oil and Gas 
6 	Cement 
7 	Petro-chemicals (Fertilizers, PVC, Ethylene and Synthetic Fibre) 
8 	Heavy and basic chemicals and basic pharmaceuticals 
9 	Shipping (including coastal ships and tankers above 5000 DWT) 
10 	Forest extraction (mechanised) 
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Source: Industries, Guide, p. 40. 
APPENDIX - PART II (STATISTICAL) 	TABLE I 
SOME INDICATORS OF THE BANGLADESH ECONOMY 1970-1980 
1969-70 1972-73 1973-74 1974-75 1975-76 1976-77 1977-78 	1979-80 
	
67.3 	74.0 	77.0 	78.2 	- 	82.8 	85.4 	90.3 
51830 	45300 	49606 	50598 	55503 	56438 	60890 	67200 
770 	612 	644 	647 	- 	682 	712 	745 
N.A. 	100 	114 	106 	118 	113 	125 
108 100 	- 	90 	86 	87 	97 	106 	(1978-79) 
1670 	- 	2983 	3135 	5551 	6670 	7406 	12162 
1813 	- 	8320 	10842 	14703 	13992 	18216 	39600 
Nil 
in Dec. 1971 	1253 	912 	3508 	4318 	4833 	4048 
243 
(1971-72) 	558 	480 	919 	813 	502 	796 
2235 	3939 	6837 	10284 	9795 	12974 	18120 
Population (Million) 
Gross Domestic Product 
(inMillionTaka) 
3 Per Capita GDP (in Taka) 
4 Index of Agricultural 
Production (1972-73=100) 
5 Index of Industrial 
Production (1969-70=100) 
6 National Exports (in 
Million Taka) 
7 National Imports (in 
Million Taka) 
8 International Reserves 
(in Million Taka) 
9 Foreign Aid disbursed 
(in Million US dollars) 
10 Revenue Receipts of the 
Government of Bangladesh 
(in Million Taka) 
Table I (Continued) 	1969-70 1972-73 1973-74 1974-75 1975-76 1976-77 1977-78 	1979-80 
11 Revenue Expenditures of 
the Government of Bangla- 	2131 	3462 	5655 	6360 	7673 	9406 	11939 
desh (in Million Taka) 
12 Development Expenditure 
• in Public Sector (in 	4626 	4638 	5250 	9650 	10057 	12029 	23299 
Million Taka) 
13 Public Sector Expenditure 
in industries (in 	- 	342 	525 	650 	1116 	1430 	1901 	3627 
Million Taka) 
	
3875 17003 14 Money Supply (in Million Taka) 	6960 	8168 	8145 	9011 	10307 	12567 1Dec.1970) (March 1980) 
15 Consumer Price Index 100 	181 	251 	407 	380 	382 	441 	557 Urban Middle Classes 
16 Consumer Price Index 100 	205 	286 	419 	380 	366 	431 	525 Industrial Workers 
17 Bank Advance (in Million 	 1846 615 	788 	938 1490 Taka) 	 (in 1979) 
18 Index of industrial Value- 100 	81 	95 	86 	94 	100 	- Added 
19 Share of industrial sector 8.2 	7.3 	7.6 	7.4 	7.6 	8.2 	8.4 	8.7 toward GDP (in percentage) 
20 Share of agricultural sector 62.4 	60.1 	61.1 	58.9 	58.8 	56.9 	56.7 	54.5 toward GDP (in percentage) 
Sources: Review, 1978; Survey, 1980; Year Book, 1979; Statistical, 1973, Statistical, 1978; IBRD, Current Trends; 
. IBBD, Rural Economy; IBRD, Prospects. 
TABLE 2 
SECTORAL CONTRIBUTIONS TOWARDS GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCTS 
(in per cent) 
1969-70 	1972-73 1974-75 1976-77 1977-78 1978-79 1979-80 
1 Agriculture 62.42 60.08 58.98 56.98 56.77 55.57 54.58 
2 Industry 8.25 7.28 7.38 8.23 8.43 8.86 8.71 
3 Construction 4.58 3.18 3.47 4.08 4.37 4.97 5.53 
4 Power and Gas 0.24 0.40 0.52 0.69 0.67 0.75 0.85 
5 Transport 4.63 5.29 5.16 5.35 5.31 5.37 4.38 
6 Trade 7.45 7.75 7.75 7.44 7.39 7.47 7.48 
7 Housing 4.42 5.20 4.92 4.78 4.61 4.61 4.52 
8 Public Administration 2.44 2.91 4.86 5.37 5.47 5.78 5.94 
9 Banking and Insurance 0.50 0.72 0.68 0.76 0.77 0.80 0.82 
10 Professional and other services 6.05 7.3 6.51 6.33 6.16 6.22 6.19 
11 Gross Domestic Product 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
'Source: Survey, 1980, op. cit., p. 241,Planning Commission. 
TABLE 3 
PRODUCTION OF MAJOR INDUSTRIAL ITEMS IN BANGLADESH 
Items Unit 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 
-80 
Jute Goods 
Cotton Cloth 
Yarn 
Sugar 
Paper 
Newsprint 
Fertilizer 
Cement 
Petroleum 
Products 
Matches 
Cigarettes 
Steel Ingot 
Tea 
Natural Gas 
Exploration 
000 tons 
million yards 
millions pounds 
000 tons 
000 tons 
000 tons 
000 tons 
000 tons 
000 tons 
million gross 
boxes 
billion sticks 
000 tons 
million tons 
million CPT 
-70 -71 -72 -73 -74 -75 -76 -77 -78 -79 
501 
88.4 
110.6 
131 
32 
37 
362 
320 
N.A. 
6.1 
N.A. 
122 
- 
561 
59.9 
105.7 
93 
31 
36 
107 
53 
916 
12.96 
17.8 
54 
70 
440 
52.7 
81.7 
99 
32 
30 
57 
66 
10.28 
15.0 
- 
59 
315 
23.4 
45.6 
19 
20 
16 
47 
23 
63.3 
5.2 
- 
29 
17729 
446 
58.4 
80.9 
19 
23 
27 
217 
32 
788 
5.9 
10.8 
- 
56 
24503 
500 
78.7 
96.0 
88 
24 
26 
289 
54 
329 
6.2 
11.9 
73 
- 
27124 
444 
86.0 
101.0 
99 
25 
29 
100 
143 
768 
6.2 
10.4 
76 
70.9 
17976 
478 
76.0 
91.0 
87 
18 
20 
329 
159 
841 
6.8 
12.0 
90 
64.7 
27357 
490 
69.0 
94.0 
139 
24.2 
14.6 
343 
308 
1059 
7.5 
11.6 
103 
73.9 
32360 
546 
100.0 
107.0 
175 
28.7 
30.0 
279 
339 
970 
8.0 
12.7 
111 
- 
34294 
532 
96.9 
113.5 
93 
30 
40 
430 
339 
N.A. 
6.6 
N.A. 
145 
- 
Source: Review 1978, p. 202; Survey 19804 p. 251; Statistical 1973, pp. 72-3 ; Statistical 1978, pp. 186-7; Year Book 
1979, p. 242, Ministry, Nationalszed Industries, p. 36. 
TABLE 4 
VOLUME OF PRINCIPAL COMMODITIES EXPORTED FROM BANGLADESH 
Commodities Units 1973-74 1974-75 1975-76 1976-77 1977-78 1978-79 1979-80 Estimate 
1 Jute Manufactures Thousand Ton 438 379 439 454 522 458 453 
2 Raw Jute and Mesta Million Bales 266 154 234 227 166 196 199 
3 Tea Million Pounds 47 52 49 64 63 60 55 
4 Leather Ton 1503 - 12722 4432 7816 27715 7000 
5 Hides and skins Ton - 359 - 10734 4797 138 150 
6 Fish Ton 650 3200 3750 3500 3600 5805 7500 
7 Newsprint Ton 10587 8446 5010 7192, 22165 20486 21000 
8 Paper Ton 1009 295 533 2276 3304 2167 5100 
9 Hardboard Ton 159 440 140 1577 854 1572 75 
10 Spices Ton 623 243 3349 2662 1307 1372 750 
11 Bone Ton 1621 1232 1691 1935 1868 910 2000 
12 Raw Cotton Ton 360 4214 1586 435 685 554 900 
13 Rayon Thousand Pounds 1359 175 568 ' 1757 835 322 800 
14 Naptha and Furance Oil Thousand Ton - - - - 56 399 
Source: Survey 1980, op. cit., p. 288. 
TABLE 5 
PRINCIPAL COMMODITIES EXPORTED FROM BANGLADESH 
(In Million Taka) 
Leather, Fish and Naptha Paper  Period 	Jute 	Raw Jute 	Tea Handi- 	Spices 	Other 	Total hides & Fish Prep- & 	A Goods and Mesta crafts  skins 	arations Furnace News 
Oil print 
1973-74 1586 	943 	108 	176 	82 	- 29 0.90 2.5 52 2983 
1974-75 1858 	758 	162 	190 	59 	35 29 4.00 0.9 36 3135 
1975-76 2773 	1634 	238 	504 	176 	58 23 9.6 30.0 113 5551 
1976-77 2775 	1840 	494 	862 	278 	222 32 14 20 130 6670 
1977-78 3715 	1454 	679 	680 	291 	175 120 26 23 223 7406 
1978-79 4250 	2179 	621 	1147 	522 	142 108 38 21 251 9282 
1979-80 6029 	2167 	545 	1220 	730 	1000 160 46 20 243 12162 
Source: 	(1) Planning Commission (1979-80 provisional estimate) 
(2) Bangladesh Bureau'of Statistics 
(3) Ministry and Corporation concerned 
Survey 1980, op. cit., p. 284. 
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TABLE 6 
NUMBER OF REGISTERED FACTORIES IN BANGLADESH 
1969-70 to 1976-77 
Year 	 Number 
	
1969-70 3121 
1970-71 3741 
1971-72 	 3196 
1972-73 3810 
1973-74 3190 
1974-75 	 2819 
1975-76 2845 
1976-77 2976 
Source: Yearbook 1979, op. cit., p. 251. 
The figures for the handloom factory are not included in 1973-74 and 
onwards. 
TABLE 7 
OWNERSHIP OF MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES IMMEDIATELY 
BEFORE AND AFTER NATIONALISATION 1972 
A : Before nationalisation: 
Total number of enterprises in 1969-70 : 3121 
(i) Owned by EPIDC 	 53 
(ii) Owned by non-Bengalis 	786 
(iii) Owned by private foreigners 	9 
(iv) Owned by private Bengalis •2273 
B : On nationaliaation: 
(i) Units nationalised : 
(a) EPIDC units 	 53 
(b) Units abandoned by non-locals 	221 
(c) Units owned by the Bengalis 75 
(ii) Units under Bengali private ownership 2198 
(iii) Units under foreign participation 	9 
(iv) Units taken over as abandoned units for 565 disposal by sale or disinvestment 
Source: Sobhan, Nationalisation, op. cit. Department of Industries, 
Government of Bangladesh. 
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TABLE 8 
PROGRESS IN DISPOSAL OF ABANDONED AND TAKEN OVER INDUSTRIAL 
UNITS BY THE GOVERNMENT AS UP TO SEPTEMBER, 1978 
Number of units taken over by the government 
after Liberation 	 786 	786 
 
II Number of units deleted from the list of the 
abandoned units: 
(a) Transferred to sector corporations 	221 
(b) Transferred to the Ministry of Commerce 
as being trading units 	 14 
(c) Returned to actual owners on submission 
and scrutiny 	 163 
(d) Various reasons 77 	475 
III Number of units that came within the purview of 
disinvestment by the Ministry of Industries/Department 
of Industries - units that were not placed in the 
nationalised sector: 
(a) Units sold 	 211 
(b) Sale pending due to litigation of prayer 	50 
(c) Units partly abandoned 	 9 
(d) Units with foreign investment 3 
(e) Units under process of disinvestment/allotment 	7 
(f) Units yet to be disinvested 31 	311 
Source: Department of Industries. 
TABLE 9 
DISINVESTMENT OF THE ENTERPRISES UNDER THE NATIONALISED 
INDUSTRIES UNTIL MARCH, 1980 
Total number. of units in the nationalised industries as in July 1976: 371 
Corporation Number of enterprises disinvested as on 
June 30, 1976 June 30, 1978 June 30, 1980 
BJMC nil 2 8 
BTMC nil 7 10 
BSFIC nil 12 41 
BCIC nil 19 30 
BSEC nil 13 17 
BFIDC nil nil 4 
Total nil 53 110 
Source: Review 1978, op. cit., Survey 1980, op. cit., IBRD, 
Prospects, op. cit., BJMC, Reports, 1977 and 1978, Corporations. 
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TABLE 10 
CURRENT ASSETS OF THE NATIONALISED INDUSTRIES 
Corporation 1973-74 1974-75 1975-76 1976-77 1977-78 
BJMC 1705 2370 2423 2526 3263 
BTMC 979 1463 1539 1499 2124 
BSFIC 572 890 968 1213 1196 
BCIC 700 1300 1800 2300 2800 
BSEC 700 1300 1900 1700 1400 
PB 100 160 250 250 380 
BPC 969 1589 1629 1541 1432 
BFIDC 153 180 218 235 337 
Total 5878 9252 10727 11264 12932 
.. 
TABLE 11 
CURRENT LIABILITIES OF THE NATIONALISED INDUSTRIES 
(in Million Taka) 
Corporation 1973-74 1974-75 1975-76 1976-77 1977-78 
BJMC 1604 2048 1872 2799 3095 
BTMC 825 1335 1531 1626 2326 
BSFIC 381 632 751 1005 948 
. BCIC 700 1600 2000 2100 2400 
BSEC 500 1000 1400 1500 1100 
PB 40 80 - . 110 - 160 220 
BPC 924 1646 1666 1503 1435 
BFIDC 30 80 134 203 217 
Total 5004 8421 9464 10896 11741 
Sources for Tables 10 and 11: Head office of the respective corporations 
BMEDC data not included. Figures underlined indicate they are 
assumed on the basis of average of the corresponding data 
available. 
TABLE 12 - 
FIXED ASSETS OF THE NATIONALISED ENTERPRISES IN THE 
INDUSTRIAL SECTOR OF BANGLADESH, 1973-78 
(in Million Taka, written down value) 
Corporation 1972-73 1973-74 1974-75 1975-76 1976-77 1977-78 
BJMC 1624 1659 1965 1952 1700 1726 
BTMC 428 428 456 606 611 682 
BSFIC 278 272 384 403 407 417 
BCIC 900 945 1715 1817 2017 1931 
BSEC 805 816 829 835 804 971 
PB 130 125 150 172 177 294 
BPC 168+ 173 241 191 148 150 
BFIDC - 61 87 183 338 672 
Total 4333 4479 5827 6159 6202 6843 
TABLE 13 
EQUITY CAPITAL IN THE NATIONALISED INDUSTRIES 
(in Million Taka) 
Corporation 1973-74 1974-75 1975-76 1976-77 1977-78 
BJMC 159 (211) (388) (1051) (1144) 
BTMC 226 229 226 210 108 
BSFIC 118 139 196 215 221 
BCIC 429 123 (487) 21 847 
BSEC 33 36 41 44 39 
PB 370 370 370 370 370 
BPC 137 84 104 171 127 
BFIDC 14 4 10 10 30 
Total 1486 774 472 (10) 598 
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Sources for Tables 12 and 13: Respective Corporations. 
TABLE 14 
LONG TERN LOANS OF THE NATIONALISED INDUSTRIES 
(in Million Taka) 
Corporation 1973-74 1974-75 1975-76 1976-77 1977-78 
BJMC 1‘762 2659 2984 2570 3158 
BTMC 188 233 352 505 431 
BSFIC 362 520 444 473 494 
BCIC 940 1600 2300 2400 1600 
BSEC 1100 1400 1700 1600 1450 
PB 92 100 190 240 320 
BPC 81 99 50 15 61 
BFIDC 266 320 284 798 1013 
Total 4791 6931 8304 8601 8527 
Source: Head Offices of the respective corporations, Excluding BMEDC. 
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TABLE 15 
PRODUCTION OF SOME COMMODITIES OF THE NATIONALISED INDUSTRIES 
(In volume) 
Product Unit FY70 FY73 FY74 FY75 FY76 FY77 FY78 
BJMC 
Jute Goods 000, tons 561 446 500 444 478 490 547 
BTMC 
Yarn Million Lbs. 105 81 91 100 91 82 107 
Cloth Million Yds. 59 58 79 86 76 68 84 
BSFIC 
Sugar 000, tons 89 19 89 98 87 139 175 
Edible Oil 000, tons 16 19 25 26 
Molasses 000, tons 53 39 58 82 
Flour etc. 000, tons 29 31 27 28 
Biscuits & 
Bread 000, tons 4 4 4 5 
Ice Cream & 000, litres Fruit Juices 151 129 150 188 
Cigarettes Million St. 1709 2023 1009 730* 
Shrimps & 
Froglegs Million Lbs. 37 30 28 50 73 63 
BCIC 
Urea 000, tons 97 210 275 69 282 286 212 
L.S.P. 000, tons 32 40 48 38 
A.S. 000, tons 6 10 5 6 9 10 
Paper 000, tons 44 22 24 25 20 26 30 
Newsprint 000, tons 36 27 27 29 20 17 32 
Rayon 00, tons 19 21 16 11 14 13 
Particle 
Board 00, tons 15 20 21 15 20 30 
Caustic Soda 00, tons 33 8 38 14 19 21 26 
Glass Sheet 000, 	sft. 725 587 574 559 581 755 
D.D.T. Tons 305 294 255 142 386 437* 
P.V.C. Pipe Tons 168 95 23 128 93 
Soap 000, tons 8 8 9 6 5 8 11* 
(Continued over) 
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Table 15 (Continued) 
Product Unit FY70 FY73 FY74 FY75 FY76 FY77 FY78 
BCIC (Continued) 
000, dozen 	- 
Gross 	- 
000, pieces 	- 
00, tons 	- 
000, tons 	54 
000, tons 	50 
000, tons 	24 
100, tons 	13 
100, tons 	- 
Number 	1284 
Number 	455 
Thousand 	6 
Thousand 
000, cft 	172 
Thousand 	- 
Thousand sft. - 
000, cft. 	- 
000, sft. 	- 
000, units 	- 
000, dft. 	- 
000, tons 	64 
22 
81 
1513 
- 
68 
48 
27 
14 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
19 
95 
972 
- 
74 
46 
31 
17 
- 
2253 
1295 
12 
8 
- 
- 
- 
- 
53 
21 
50 
1138 
- 
76 
57 
39 
51 
26 
940 
617 
9 
17 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
143 
32 
88 
339 
26 
90 
71 
45 
48 
47 
5173 
1015 
4 
17 
359 
 122 
178 
- 
- 
- 
159 
26 
117 
617 
35 
102 
71 
57 
41 
37 
1118 
1376 
4 
18 
344 
156 
494 
41 
24 
37 
1260 
308 
22* 
175* 
- 
95 
115 
- 
- 
- 
57 
24 
1500 
10 
21 
617 
250 
254 
28 
44 
960 
1485 
339 
Cycle tyres 
& tubes 
Batteries 
Leather 
Pulp 
BSEC 
Steel Ingots 
Billets 
Bars and 
Billets 
RerolIed 
Steel 
G.I. Pipes 
Diesel 
Engines 
Tr 
Radio 
Bicycle 
BFIDC 
Rawing & 
Manufacture 
of furniture 
1 Tea chest 
Plywood 
Febriflex 
Dormat A 
Coir 
Bobbin 
Veneer 
BMDC 
Cement 
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Table 15 (Continued) 
Product  Unit 	FY70 FY73 FY74 FY75 FY76 FY77 FY78 
BPC 
  
Petroleum 
Products 000, tons 	916 	341 	329 	768 	841 	1059 	970 
Petrobangla  
Natural Gas Billncft. 	27 	27 	18 	27 	32 	34 
Source: Survey 1979, op. cit; Review 1978, op. cit.; IBRD, Prospects 
Vol. II, op. cit.; Statistical 1978, op. cit. 
* Estimated Production 
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TABLE 16 
VALUE OF SALES OF THE PRODUCTS OF THE NATIONALISED INDUSTRIES 
DURING 1973-74 TO 1977-78 
(in Million Taka at current prices) 
Corporation 1973-74 1974-75 1975-76 1976-77 1977-78 Annual 2ED:Allt 
BJMC 1657 2055 2937 2938 4033 2724 
BTMC 1294 1515 1820 1813 2000 1688 
BSFIC 587 972 1324 1401 1793 1215 
BCIC 761 879 1360 1849 1928 1355 
BSEC 589 915 1216 1424 1581 1145 
PB 60 80 180 220 200 148 
BPC 360 350 510 560 535 463 
BMEDC 36 98 109 211 232 137 
BFIDC 43 52 76 78 77 63 
Total 5387 6916 9532 10494 12379 8938 
Source: Annual and Management Information System reports of different 
corporations and their other internal papers. Also internal 
papers with the Nationalised Industries Wing of the Ministry 
of Industries. Published sources include, Review 1978, Survey 
1979, IBRD, Prospects, Vol. II, Data on BMEDC based on the 
value of production of cement given in Review 1978, p. 113, 
regarding PB, BPC and BFIDC are assumed (only for 1978 on the 
basis of the average figure of the preceding two years of the 
respective corporations. 
TABLE 17 
COMPOSITION OF THE COST OF SALES OF PRODUCTS OF THE NATIONALISED 
INDUSTRIES (ONLY BJMC, BTMC AND BSFIC PRODUCT INCLUDED) 
(in Million Taka correct to the nearest 100 million) 
Item 1973-74 1974-75 1975-76 1976-77 1977-78 Average 
Materials 
Wages and 
Salaries 
Administrative/ 
Sales overhead 
Financial 
Charges 
Total 
2000 
800 
600 
200 
3600 
2800 
1000 
800 
200 
4800 
3300 
1000 
1000 
200 
5500 
4000 
1100 
1100 
200 
6400 
5200 
1300 
1200 
300 
8000 
3460 
1040 
940 
220 
5660 
Source: Financial Directorate of the respective corporations (December, 
1978). 
TABLE 18 
VALUE IN U. S. DOLLARS OF THE EXPORTS OF THE MAJOR PRODUCTS 
OF THE NATIONALISED INDUSTRIES 1973-78 
(in Million U.S. Dollars) 
Products 1973-74 1974-75 1975-76 1976-77 1977-78 Average 
Jute Goods 
Leather 
Paper newsprint 
Petroleum 
products 
Total 
192 
15 
3 
- 
210 
213 
25 
5 
- 
243 
177 
30 
1 
4 
212 
172 
33 
. 
 1 
.14 
225 
200 
35 
10 
11 
256 
191 
29 
4 
6 
230 
Source: Export Promotion Bureau of the Government of Bangladesh, 
Quoted in IBRD, Prospects, Vol. II, p. 205. 
TABLE 19 
CONTRIBUTION OF THE DIFFERENT CORPORATIONS IN THE NATIONALISED 
INDUSTRIES TO THE GOVERNMENT EXCHEQUER IN THE FORM OF TAXES AND 
.DUTIES 1973-74 TO 1977-78 
(in Million Taka) 
Corporation 1973-74 1974-75 1975-76 1976-77 1977-78 Total 
BJMC 62 77 98 80 109 426 
BTMC 242 401 392 323 490 1848 
BSFIC 221 187 242 213 427 1290 
BSEC 70 120 130 220 410 950 
BCIC 180 179 235 404 531 1529 
PB 17 18 68 89 105 297 
BPC 360 277 286 461 371 1755 
BMEDC 100 100 100 100 103 503 
BFIDC 3 4 61 4 14 86 
Total 1255 1363 1612 1894 2560 8684 
Sources: Internal papers in the corporations, Review 1978, op. cit., 
Annual Reports of the corporations. 
Figures underlined are assumed on the basis of the annual average of the corresponding item. 
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TABLE 20 
PROFITS/LOSSES OF THE NATIONALISED INDUSTRIES 
Corporatioq 	1972-73 
SINCE INCEPTION AND UNTIL JUNE 30, 1978 
(in Million Taka) 
1973-74 	1974-75 	1975-76 1976-77 1977-78 Total -.............. 
- BJMC -325, -332 -239 -285 -525 -636 -2342 
- . BTMC 100 163 123 27 -132 120 401 
BSFIC -6 105 93 7 51 81 331 
.BCIC -42 3 -327 -233 149 116 -334 
. 	BSEC -19 48 121 118 76 119 463 
PB 2 10 6 7 8 22 55 
BPC 14 55 -40 59 50 17+ 155 
BMEDC - - - 0.3- 18 30 48 
BFIDC 44 26 20 -12 -4 8 82 
Grand Total -232 78 -243 -312 -309 -123 -1141 
Total excluding BJMC 93 400 -2 -27 216 513 1193 
Source: IBRD , 	Prospects, Vol. I, op. cit., p. 34; Review 1978, op. cit. Head offices of PB, BPC and BJMC. 
Figures relating BMEDC for 1972-73 though 1974-75 could not be obtained up to December 1977. 
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TABLE 21 
MANPOWER IN DIFFERENT CORPORATIONS AND ENTERPRISES 
IN THE NATIONALISED INDUSTRIES 
Corporation 1973-74 1974-75 1975-76 1976-77 1977-78 
BJMC 213700 191100 197500 199600 206700 
BTMC 68800 70600 68200 65500 65000 
BSFIC 25700 23200 23500 . 31600 31300 
BCIC 28600 28300 28300 25300 27100 
BSEC 9700 12900 12900 14500 14400 
PB 2800 2800 2800 2800 2800 
BPC 2500 2700 2600 2800 2700 
BMEDC 700 1100 1100 1100 1500 
BFIDC 1100 3000 3000 4000 4000 
Grand Total 353600 335700 339900 347200 355500 
Sources: Annual Reports of BJMC 1975-76 through 1977-78; Annual Reports 
of BTMC 1973-74 through 1977-78, Review 1978, pp. 115, 119, 
117 and 120. IBRD, Prospects, Vol. II, pp. 120 and 136; Muzaf far 
Ahmad, Public Enterprise, p. 43 and Head Offices of the 
corporations. 
N.B. (a) Figures underlined in the table indicates assumed figures on 
the basis of annual average employment of the corresponding 
corporation and that the actula figures could not be had or 
compiled on the basis of the available information. 
(b) BJMC data also include temporary/alternative labourers in the 
jute mills. Number of permanent workers and employees were 
however as under 
Year 	Number 	Year 	Number 
.1973-74 166800 1976-77 155500 
1974-75 149300 1977-78 158000 
• 1975-76 1522200 
TABLE 22 
WAGES AND SALARIES PAID TO THE EMPLOYEES BY THE CORPORATIONS 
AND THEIR ENTERPRISES IN THE NATIONALISED INDUSTRIES 
(1973-74 through 1978-79 in million Taka) 
Corporation 1973-74 1974-75 1975-76 1976-77 1977-78 1978-79 B 
BJMC • 654 623 650 687 929 1082 
BTMC 221 271 264 298 316 454 
BSFIC 52 70 68 85 95 97 
BCIC 113 128 139 153 195 209 
BSEC 57 50 63 75 116R 121 
PB 5 6 12 15 17 •N.A. 
BPC N.A. N.A. N.A. 32 35 37 
BMEDC N.A. N.A. 8 8 11 13 
BFIDC N.A. N.A. 12 15 13R 18 
Grand Total 1102 1148 1216 1368 1727 2031 
Sources: Respective corporations and Finance, Autonomous Bodies, op. 
cit. (respectively of 1975-76, 1976-77, 1977-78 and 1978-79). 
R = Revised Budget 
B = Budget Estimates 
Aggregates are exclusive of figures not available with the author 
of this study. 
TABLE 23 
EMPLOYMENT AND AGGREGATE EMOLUMENTS IN THE DIFFERENT 
SEGMENTS OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR IN BANGLADESH 
Sub-sector Employment Aggregate Emoluments 
Government 
Nationalised Industries 
Nationalised Banks 
Nationalised Insurance 
Specialised Financial Institutions 
Bangladesh Railway 
Post Offices 
Telegraph and Telephone 
Source: Year Book 1979, op. cit., pp. 
in 1977-78 
3924 
	
1727 	- 
433 
52 
60 
102 
75 
73 
394. 	Finance, 
470540 
355500 
) ) 	19700. 
3400 
59345 
25900 
15656 
331-3, 391, 
Autonomous Bodies, op. cit. Corporation Offices. 
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TABLE 24 
AGGREGATE OF EXPENDITURES (REVENUE AND DEVELOPMENT) OF THE 
GOVERNMENT OF BANGLADESH AND THE CONSOLIDATED EXPENDITURES 
OF THE NATIONALISED INDUSTRIES 
Year 	 Government 	Nationalised 
Industries 
	
1975-76 16010 10745 
1976-77 	17750 	 13050 
1977-78 21435 18681 
1978-79 27316R 19959 
Yearly Average 	20627 	 15609 
Sources: Finance, Autonomous Bodies (1975 through 1979), op. cit. 
TABLE 25 
ADVANCED BY THE BANKING SYSTEM TO THE NATIONALISED INDUSTRIES 
(SECTOR CORPORATIONS) AS COMPARED TO THE OTHER 
SEGMENTS OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR 
Sub-sectors 1974 1975 1976 
Government 938 380 398 
Autonomous Bodies 153 - 	186 154 
Sector Corporations 3376 4758 	• 5007 
Others . 992 707 848 
Aggregate 5459 6031 6407 
Source: Statistical 1978, op. cit., p. 232. 
TABLE 26 
SUMMARY PROFILE OF THE NATIONALISED INDUSTRIES 
(in Million Taka unless otherwise stated) 
Items 1973-74 1974-75 1975-76 1976-77 1977-78 
Current Assets 5878 9252 10727 11264 12932 
Current Liabilities 5004 8421 9464 10896 11741 
Equity Capital 1486 774 472 (10) 598 
Fixed Assets 4479 5827 6159 6202 6843 
Long Term Loans 4791 6931 8304 8601 8527 
Value of Sales 5387 6916 9532 10494 12379 
Exports value (in 
million US dollars) 210 243 212 225 256 
Contribution to govern-
ment exchequer (Taxes 
and non-Tax Revenues) 
1284 1462 1680 1928 2621 
Profit/Losses 78 -243 -312 -309 -123 
Wages/Salaries paid to 
the employees 1102 1148 1216 1368 1727 
Employment in numbers 353600 335700 339900 347200 355500 
Capital intensity (in 
Fixed Asset terms in 
Taka per man year 
employed) 
12600 11400 18200 17800 19800 
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